EGMONT IN THE PRESS - Source : European Geostrategy blog
http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu/2010/10/04/the-strategic-effect-of-european-union-operations/
4 Oct. 2010
21:39, 4 October 2010
By Sven Biscop
The European Union is certainly active through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP): witness the large number of past and present military and civilian operations, across the globe. But have these operations generated strategic effect? Have they contributed to achieving long-term European policy objectives?
The European Union does not have a specific CSDP strategy, outlining the priority regions and issues, in function of its vital interests and foreign policy priorities. That has concrete implications for decision-making. If priorities are not clear beforehand, the choice where to intervene and where not to (which the limits on capabilities necessitate) becomes difficult to make. While all CSDP operations as such have certainly been useful, were they always the most useful and timely? If strategic objectives are left undefined, it further becomes difficult to judge the success of a mission. An operation can be successful at the tactical/operational level, without achieving the desired strategic effect.
A CSDP strategy would be a tool for decision-making, aiding the High Representative and the Member States to prioritise one mission over another, serving as a basis for a much more proactive use of CSDP, and explaining to the public why the European Union undertakes the missions that it does. Such a strategy would comprise of three parts: the priority regions and issues; the types of operations undertaken to pursue those; and the scale of the capabilities required for that purpose.
The priorities can be deducted from the vital interests which European foreign policy, of which CSDP is an instrument, has to preserve: defence against any military threat to the territory of the Union; open lines of communication and trade; a secure supply of energy and other vital natural resources; a sustainable environment; manageable migration flows; the maintenance of international law and universally agreed rights; and preserving the autonomy of the decision-making of the European Union and its Member States.
A number of regions then come clearly to the foreground. In the European Union’s immediate neighbourhood, to the east and in the Mediterranean, vital interests are obviously at stake. The same holds true for the security complex comprising the Gulf and Central Asia, including Pakistan and Afghanistan. In Sub-Sahara Africa, historical responsibility and essential interests demand continued engagement. Maritime security and protection of sea lanes is becoming increasingly important. Finally, the collective security system of the United Nations demands a contribution from the European Union.
In many of these regions, the European Union is already very active, but not always in a very strategic fashion. Often only an end-date and perhaps a military end-state are defined – but not the desired political end-state – not the strategic objective. The lesson learned is that if it is insufficiently linked to foreign policy priorities, and employed in an insufficiently holistic manner in coordination with the European Union’s other instruments, CSDP cannot be but a blunt and reactive tool.
The types of operations that the European Union can undertake, in order to safeguard its priorities, are defined in the Treaty: the so-called Petersberg Tasks. Legally, these include all operations, including combat missions, except for territorial defence. Politically however, a number of Member States still reject the use of force under a European flag. That attitude makes sense neither politically nor militarily, for it renders the European Union dependent on other actors, notably the United States, whenever its interests require forceful intervention or whenever any European force gets into trouble. The starting point of a CSDP strategy must be the unambiguous recognition that the European Union must be able to undertake combat operations when necessary.
The scale of the effort to be devoted to these priorities was defined back in 1999: the Helsinki Headline Goal. The ambition is to be able to deploy up to an army corps (50,000 to 60,000 troops), together with air and maritime forces, plus the required command and control systems, strategic transport and other support services, within sixty days, and to sustain that effort for at least one year. While the European Union’s Member States have had even more troops deployed on CSDP, Atlantic Alliance and United Nations and other operations in recent years, they could not deploy significant additional troops, except by improvising (as in case of an emergency threat to vital interests they would, accepting the increased risks for the forces deployed which this would entail) or by withdrawing forces from ongoing operations, in the event of a crisis. Therefore, the Headline Goal should be understood as a deployment where the European Union’s Member States should be able to undertake at any one time over and above ongoing operations. Then the European Union would be able to deal with every eventuality.
Most of the building-blocks of an effective CSDP strategy already exist. It remains for the Member States to construct the edifice.
• This article summarises the main points of Egmont Paper No. 37, by Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont called: ‘A Strategy for CSDP – Europe’s Ambitions as a Global Security Provider.’ The paper can be found here.