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**Core Group, Directoire, Enhanced Cooperation?
Finding the Key to an Effective Foreign and Defence Policy for Europe**

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It is an honour to be here with the Royal Institute for International relations and the Clingendael Institute. It is gratifying, as someone who has been involved with the Western Alliance for a while, to hear Europeans talking about serious issues of defence. The fact that you are taking them seriously is probably as important as the particular content.

I am also delighted to see that we are talking about ‘April 29’, which most people in America haven’t noticed.

I am the sole American speaker today. I might even wonder why I am here. After all, what you do with the European Security and Defence Policy and the CFSP is not really our business in the United States. It is something for you to build and make work for Europe. Nevertheless I will, reluctantly, express a view or two.

First, I am delighted to be in this room on an equal footing with people from the European Union. When I was at NATO as Ambassador, I also dealt with the WEU. We had occasional joint NATO-WEU meetings at WEU’s headquarters. Everybody had a plastic sign. There were Members, Associate Members, Observers, Associate Partners – what have you – but there was nothing to characterize Americans and Canadians. We thus had no plastic sign; we only had a piece of cardboard on which somebody with a pencil had written down who we were. I came up with a new category: ‘Friends of WEU’. My greatest accomplishment after four and a half years visiting WEU was that I finally got a plastic sign with ‘United States’ on it.

I had the honour to negotiate on behalf of my government the Berlin Accords of 1996. I played a role in helping to transform the policy of my government toward what is now called ESDP and also to negotiate with my French colleague the almost-return of France to Allied Command Europe, because we had indeed fulfilled the requirements for NATO’s reform that had been set by President De Gaulle in March 1966.

During the Cold War, the US was in favour of a strong European pillar of NATO – provided, however, that it did not compete or interfere with US (and Western) strategy. Why? Because of the need for central management of the strategic nuclear relationship with the Soviet Union. So, we may have seemed to some observers in Europe to be hypocritical about wanting a ‘strong European pillar’, but it was to a good purpose. Then the Cold War came to an end, and there was no further reason to have any ambivalence about a strong European pillar of NATO, even one with a ‘mind of its own’. In the Clinton administration, we therefore reversed American policy and began providing wholehearted support for the ESDP.

More generally, the US, as much as any European country, favours a strong EU, 'les Etats Unis d'Europe'. With you, however, we recognize that the last act of integration in pooling sovereignty relates to decisions about young men and women being set off to battle.

We favour this strong European post-Cold War pillar of the Alliance because, if it carries on EU construction and leads people over here to take defence more seriously and spend more money, that is surely a good thing. In addition, this new creation could very well take on tasks outside of Europe that NATO, meaning the US in this case, would not want to take on. Morocco was mentioned today as an example, in case there were need for some external engagement there. The US has no intention of taking NATO to Morocco. If there is a European capacity for doing that without NATO – assuming that anything needed to be done, of course – that would be a good thing from the American point of view.

Also, during the Clinton administration, it became important to us to start breaking down the barriers between the wonderful US-led institution called NATO and that other wonderful institution to which we do not even belong, the EU. I remember an occasion when I was ambassador to NATO and my colleague from Germany, Baron Hermann von Rihthofen, and I thought it would be a good idea to bridge the differences. My colleague, the Dutch ambassador, Bert Veenendaal, had an informal meeting of the North Atlantic Council, over lunch, at his home with Hans van den Broek, who was then 'Mr. European Foreign Policy'. Our British and French colleagues didn't want to hold another such meeting: the British did not want WEU to become important, and the French did not want Americans messing around with it!

Then we in the United States had another concern, post-Saint-Malo, the Anglo-French summit in December 1998 that opened a new phase of ESDP: what became known as the '3 D's'. These were 'duplication, discrimination, decoupling'. All these US concerns, and more, were resolved to mutual satisfaction. Even the issue over the word 'autonomy', regarding possible ESDP action, was to a great extent resolved to American satisfaction. Further concerns were: first, not to have this new body compete with NATO for business. The principle we used, though it was never formally adopted, is 'NATO first'. And second, not to have a separate ESDP planning mechanism that could lead people in the two institutions perhaps to march off in different directions and, in particular, could complicate the problem of the European military's perhaps having to 'hand off' to NATO or even go to an article-5 situation, but only then starting to do the necessary joint planning, like the British and French did after the battle of Mons in 1914. It is a little late.

There was also a US concern that has been raised here, today, and that still exists: the idea of creating a European caucus in NATO. This could be unfortunate for the Alliance. If all the European Union members of NATO would come to the North Atlantic Council with a single, fixed position that is unalterable, and if they had to run back town here and have lengthy meetings before being able to change a semi-colon – that is an exaggeration, but only just – then NATO might come to an end. NATO works because 19 members sit around the table and work out matters in common, and then each ambassador undertakes to sell the provisionally-agreed outcome at home. Many were the times I would cable back to Washington and say: 'Yes, everybody else was against us, thus we should change our position'. And as likely as not, we would do so.

By the EU Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1998, however, which saw the decision to create the Rapid Reaction Force ('Headline Goal Task Force'), and now also in the

agreement called 'Berlin Plus', all of these problems were dealt with. There was a simple phrase adopted by the EU in Helsinki: the rapid reaction force will become involved only 'where NATO as a whole is not engaged'. That means the (NATO) right of first refusal. Here is your central principle. Planning was to be done together and to be transparent. At the same time, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) will be presumed to command the rapid reaction force, which makes common sense – and that person is not an American.

Regarding 'April 29', which again almost nobody in America as yet understands, the real question to be posed is: is it consistent with Helsinki? Even the word 'autonomy' is not critical, provided that the phrase 'where NATO as whole is not engaged' is honoured. If there is a consolidation of headquarters from three national HQ (British, French, and German) into one in Tervuren, which is on a multinational basis, who could be against that, provided it is transparent, open, works with NATO, is non-competitive, and could undertake a hand-off from ESDP action to NATO action in a smooth way – even if there is some 'duplication'? Is the Tervuren headquarters just a waste of money? I used to argue that, if the Europeans were 'wasting' some money on something in defence, maybe that was necessary, because maybe otherwise they wouldn't spend money on defence at all.

The real problems with 'April 29' were the following. First, the timing was poor. It came in the middle of some other business going on in transatlantic relations! At that point, if the French had offered to give us another 100 Statues of Liberty, we would have sent them all home.

Other issues are important. We have an agenda in the Western Alliance that deals with the problems of the 20th and 21st centuries. What is needed to fulfil the agenda for the 20th century – finally to bring that most tragic century in European history to a close – is all agreed by all the Allies. This includes:

- To keep the US here as a European power;
- To preserve the best of the past, including Allied Command Europe;
- To continue to ensure a 'home' for Germany, so that no one can have any doubts that that 'problem' has been solved;
- To preserve and build upon what I call the European Civil Space— the fact that the nations of the EU have abolished war as an instrument of their relations with one another;
- To integrate the Central Europeans in the West, so they will no longer be objects of power politics, but rather masters of their own destiny;
- To engage the Russians, drawing them out of their self-opposed isolation – and only the United States can do that effectively;
- To stop war in the Balkans; and
- To create new NATO commands and strategy and a workable relationship with the European Security and Defence Policy.

This is all on track. The 21st century began with both NATO and the EU moving to the Balkans, which until then was considered to be 'out of area'. First Bosnia, then Kosovo. Now we have gone to the point that, in August, NATO takes over command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan; and that NATO, two days ago, decided that there would be major NATO action to support Poland in Iraq. These are very important matters.

What happened to my country on 11 September 2001 was of signal moment in American history. Alastair Buchan once wrote that there were two dates in American history more important than any other: We have now added a third: '9/11'. Weapons of Mass Destruction, terrorism, etc. are the preoccupation of the US nowadays.

We have now come to a particular point in Iraq. The old system in the Middle East has been shattered. The US now dominates the Middle East, along with the Allies, in the sense of being responsible for its future for the next generation. In reality, my country has no choice but to work with the EU on the future of Iraq and the future of the Middle East. Of course, we have had fantastic support from the Europeans in the global war on terrorism. We could hardly take a single step without them. It is mostly a non-military set of tasks. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld has called it the largest coalition in history, including more than 90 countries.

There is also a US concern about whether the Europeans will join in power projection, not just in the Balkans, but beyond. To a significant degree, judgements are made in the United States about the capacity for exercising military power, as we decide which countries are important to us in terms of security. But we tend to discount what you do, in Central Europe, Russia, the Middle East and elsewhere, in non-military terms. You need to do a much better job of publicizing in Washington all that you do for our common security. At the same time, however, if you want to be taken seriously in Washington at the present moment, then you have to have more military clout than now.

Let me make some recommendations. The most important thing we have to do now, even before we consider the future of ESDP and its relationship to NATO, is to organize post-war transatlantic cooperation on Iraq. We have to get the crisis in our relations behind us, the disagreements and a lot of mutual childishness. In the United States Congress we have come to talking about Freedom Fries. (Our French friends point out that 'French fries' are actually Belgian!). This is ludicrous; just like mutual name calling on both sides of the Atlantic.

We have to recognize, first, what has already been done, as I mentioned, with French and German and Belgian cooperation, with others, in the Balkans; with Germany and the Netherlands and soon NATO in Afghanistan; NATO with the Poles in Iraq; the US-proposed Security Council resolution on Iraq which passed yesterday; the role of the EU in Macedonia and in Bosnia etc.

We have to understand, second, that we have a reality of mutual needs. If we had a zero-based Alliance plan, if we started today with no Alliance, to paraphrase Voltaire on God, 'If NATO did not exist it would be necessary to invent it'. The US for some time now has been pursuing a wide range of unilateral policies. Those must come to an end, not out of philosophy, but out of the facts. We already know we cannot do the war on terrorism alone, we are learning that we will not be able to do Iraq or the Middle East alone. We will not be able to shape the kind of world in which we want to live alone. It is going to be happening on the ground.

At the same time, the Europeans need us Americans, not just here in Europe, say, in regard to the future of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, but also to continue American leadership with regard to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and a lot of other things. We still do not have a replacement for American leadership which is effective, though I for one hope we will have more European leadership to achieve common purposes in the future.

Third, the US needs to start recognizing the things that you Europeans actually do that support our common interests, including non-military things. That is in part your fault! The message about the massive amount of money you put into Central Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and elsewhere never reaches the US because you are too modest. Your public relations are inadequate. Nobody knows about what you are doing.

Fourth we have to sort out this '29 April' business, get it behind us. Let the European Convention sort it out and get the language right so it is not offensive. One of the problems in Europe over the whole ESDP business is the language. More is talked about what is going to be done and more seems threatening to the US view of how things should be organized than what it is actually being done, which is in fact *not* competitive with NATO. The 'big lifting' everybody understands: if there is a major military problem, that means NATO will take responsibility. Everybody agrees on that, beginning with the French, who would be horrified if the US went home. We will not do so.

Fifth, collectively we also need the British to get involved in the '29 April' business.

Sixth, we need to have it explained in Washington, at least to be transparent. Two points are uppermost: let us get the military the planning right, and let us recognize 'NATO first'.

Seventh, military capabilities matter. Not the 'three D's', but Lord Robertson's 'three C's': capabilities, capabilities, capabilities. I would say the 'four E's': effective, efficient, energy and effort. That doesn't necessarily mean a lot more money. It means buying the right things and doing the right things, especially in areas like command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance – together called C4ISR.

Eighth: most of you in Europe cannot close the gap with US military technology. We are now spending 45% of all the money spent in the world on defence. We are spending two and a half times as much as every country represented in this room on defence. But there are some high technology areas in which you can be interoperable with us. And the militaries of some allied some countries are. A senior member of the French military has said: 'Let me get C4ISR right, and I can move the world and be with the US every day of the week'. That means high technology transfers from the US to Europe, and you protecting that technology from diversion to third parties. It means transatlantic defence industrial cooperation and avoiding a Fortress America and a Fortress Europe. It means adoption of a defence trade code of conduct. It also means the creation of a United States-European Union strategic partnership as the next great leap in what we began in 1946-47, then carried on by John F. Kennedy and others at critical moments of history. I don't mean a US-EU *military* partnership, I mean in every area that matters in terms of the great repository of capabilities shared by the US and the EU nations. The US and the EU are able to act beyond our two great areas, whether it is health or education, development, economics, or promoting democracy and human rights.

This cooperation is critical for us in the United States to be able meet our single most important strategic requirement, today and tomorrow, which is to take the insipient power of the US and turn it into lasting influence. We can only do that by helping to create or sustain institutions, attitudes, processes, and practices that work for us in America – because they also work for you here and for others elsewhere.. That is the lesson of the last 50 years which, if we are collectively smart on the two sides of the Atlantic, we will project forward for the next 50 years. Within that context, I say 'Full speed ahead with ESDP'. That has to be all positive if we do it right, if you do it right!