

C. HEUSGEN



- 1973-1977 University studies (Economics) at St. Gall (Switzerland) and Georgia Southern College (USA).
- 1977 Graduation, University St. Gall.
- 1977-1980 Post graduate studies in St. Gall and Paris (Sorbonne).
- 1980 PhD (Economics) University of St. Gall.
- 1980 Entry into German Foreign Service.
- 1980-1982 Training in the Foreign Office, Bonn.
- 1983-1986 Consulate General in Chicago (Press and Economic Affairs).
- 1986-1988 Embassy in Paris (Deputy Head of delegation to COCOM).
- 1988-1999 Foreign Office, Bonn.

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- 1988-1990 Private Secretary to the Coordinator for German-French Relations.
- 1990-1992 Deputy Head of special section in charge of negotiations of the Treaty of Maastricht.
- 1993-1997 Private Office of Foreign Minister Kinkel (since 1994 : Deputy Head) in charge of European Affairs.
- 1997-1999 Deputy Director for European Affairs.

Since October 1999 Director of Policy Unit (PPEWU) of the High Representative Javier Solana in the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Brussels.

Deciding factors for successful operations

The five factors in this respect are very much in parallel, but some aspects are perhaps complementary :

1. Public support.
2. Institutional preparedness.
3. Political willingness.
4. Military willingness (without taking capabilities into account).
5. The media.

1. Public support

Regularly, the Euro barometer conducts a poll asking the population of member States: “In which areas are you in favour of closer co-operation and integration?” These areas cover the whole range from agriculture, internal market, monetary union and foreign and security policy.

The results show that, constantly and in all member states, foreign and security policy is listed as the no. 1 priority item. So, public support is there and surprisingly also, when you differentiate between foreign policy, on the one hand, and security and defence, on the other, you always find that security and defence even come out on top of foreign policy. Thus, there is a strong wish among the population for the European Union to get more engaged and integrated in the area of foreign and security policy.

Consequently, we are facing a situation where the population is very much in favour, but we also have to convince the political establishment. There, of course, we are working in an area that is at the heart of national sovereignty, but the readiness to pass competences to the European Union is very limited: i.e. in foreign policy, you discuss the issues of integration with foreign ministers and it is actually very difficult to ask foreign ministries to give up their competences. Here I use the comparison: “If you want to dry out a swamp, don’t ask the frogs.

2. Institutional preparedness

The European Union, during the nineties, when it was faced with a crisis in the Balkans, was not able to cope with these problems other than in political terms and the European forces failed terribly to solve this problem on their own continent. The last part of this crisis that we lived through was, of course, in 1999, because of a war where again Europe was clearly not able to solve the problem on its own doorstep.

After the Kosovo war in the second half of 1999, we had the Treaty of Amsterdam entering into force with its possibilities for the European Union to become active as a military actor. Since the end of 1999, the European Union has developed at incredible speed – Xavier Solana very often talks about the speed of light at which the

European Union has moved in this area. The European Union has built up the institutional preconditions to become active in military operations. We have, over the years since 1999, set up the necessary institutions and relations.

Without going into details, I recap the most important:

- the Political and Security Committee, comparable to the North Atlantic Council, which is in charge of the political control and strategic direction of EU operations;
- an EU Military Committee, in charge of overseeing the military aspects;
- an EU Military Staff working for the Military Committee and for the High Representative and doing the strategic planning;
- something that is still developing, but the result of a very important decision that was taken at the European Council in Brussels in December, i.e. the development of an EU Operations Centre, that is the possibility for the EU to conduct autonomous operations out of Brussels.

But, of course, when we were looking into the possibility of autonomous EU operations, we looked very intensively at **EU-NATO relations** and, after very long negotiations, we have been able to agree on the Berlin Plus arrangements, which allow the European Union to draw on NATO assets and capabilities in conducting EU operations. And, although it is only a formal agreement, we have also developed a declaration covering **EU-UN co-operation**.

3. Political willingness

Two factors in addition to those already mentioned are:

- 3.1. Iraq and the situation the EU was in when several member states were of diverging views and the EU could not agree, in the end, on its policy and how to vote in the UN Security Council.

This was something that could be compared with the situation we faced ten years ago in the Balkans, where, again, you had divergence of views between European countries – in the early nineties, we had a very intensive discussion on whether Europe should recognize Slovenia and Croatia or not and we had divergent lines going to the centre of the EU.

Just as after the Kosovo campaign, the decision was made and carried through now actually to implement real Common Foreign and Security Policy. After the Iraq war, another decision was taken that, to me, was very important, i.e. the ministers of the major parties to this controversy (UK, France, Germany) got around the table and said: “What can we do to prevent a situation like the one we are facing right now in Iraq happening again?”. And at that moment, in Brussels, the idea was had to ask Mr. Xavier Solana, the High Representative, to draft a European Security Strategy. This was done during the second half of last year

and the European Security Strategy was then adopted by the European Council in Brussels.

The reason there was the question: “Can we try to have a common basis really to implement the strategy?” So, a strategy was then set out to look at the threats that the EU is facing, at the responses the EU should give, at what the objectives of its policy are and at the consequences for the EU policy. So, I hope that, with this document, and the process which went in parallel with it, as well as the implementation of this strategy, we are in the implementing phase now that will lead to a situation where there will be no further divergence in the political assessment of the situation.

- 3.2. A second element pertains to many countries that do not have a history of military operations that go beyond peacekeeping operations. As a matter of fact, according to the Treaty of Amsterdam, in which the range of operations was described, the EU has a mandate to look after the so-called Petersburg tasks, which not only cover peace-keeping operations, but also peace-making operations.

Here, we still have to overcome a certain reluctance within the European Union on the part of many member states, because they are not used to these kinds of decision. As a matter of fact, Belgium has taken decisions regarding peace-making, just as our British and French friends have, but there are many countries that don't have this experience and in these cases, it will still take some time for the EU actually to agree on operations that go beyond the operations that the EU has conducted until now, i.e. the peace-keeping operation in Macedonia and the autonomous operation in Congo, which was already a tougher operation, though only a few member countries actually participated on the ground. The next operation the EU is scheduled to pick up is the S-FOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where, again, I believe this will not be an operation of the peace-making kind, but rather an operation where, through your presence, you will achieve your objectives.

4. Military willingness (without taking capabilities into account)

Again, there are countries in the EU that have a tradition, but there are others that have not, that have been part of the NATO practice, which was one of territorial defence, a policy of deterrence and was never actually required to demonstrate its capabilities.

So, this also needs a certain translation and a certain rethinking. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain, we all thought that, in both political and military terms, this would now give us a peace dividend and that we would not need to invest and get ready for other interventions, but recent years have clearly demonstrated that this is not the case. Even the number of instances where a military intervention is necessary is increasing, as has recently been the case, for example, in Haiti and even Congo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan or other operations. - I recently saw a statistic from

the UN, from DPKO, indicating some 25 countries or regions where a UN operation is currently being conducted or is warranted. - So, this is something where our mentality also has to change, to prepare us to intervene.

5. The media

We have to take into consideration not only an active media policy, but – of course, linked to that - also what effects the media have on policy-making.

Here, I just want to put forward one striking example, i.e. in the context of the Congo mission of the EU in the late spring of last year, when Kofi Anan asked whether the EU was ready to help. There were a number of states, among them my country that were very reluctant to get engaged, because some of the preconditions were not there: there was no clear objective; the exit strategy was not clear. So, it was understandable why there was some reluctance and certain delegations were rather negative. But the next day, it was on the front pages of the newspapers, it was on the evening news and then, from one day to the next, the politicians changed their views and off it went, the operation then started.