

**J. HOWORTH**



**UNIVERSITY CAREER:**

Yale University: (Department of Political Science)  
01/2003 – 06/2004 Visiting Professor of Political Science

University of Bath: (Department of European Studies)  
1991-date Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics  
1985-date Professor of French Civilisation

**New York University, Columbia University & New School University:**  
2002 (Fall semester) Consortium Visiting Professor of European Politics

Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris:  
2001-date (Spring) Visiting Professor of European Politics

Harvard University: (Center for European Studies):  
2002-2004: Faculty Affiliate  
1981/2; 83/4; 85; Visiting Scholar

## **J. Howorth**

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### University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill: (Department of Political Science)

1998-date                      Adjunct Professor of Political Science

### University of Washington, Seattle:

2001 (Spring)                Marshall-Monnet Scholar in Residence (European Union Center)  
   Visiting Professor (Department of Political Science)

### Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris:

2001-date                      Senior Research Fellow in Strategic Studies  
1999-2000                      Visiting Fellow - European Strategic Studies

### Western European Union, *Institute for Security Studies*, Paris:

2000                              Senior Visiting Research Fellow (May-June)

### University of Aston: (Department of European Studies)

1976-1985                      Lecturer (1976-79); Senior Lecturer (1979-85)

### University of Wisconsin, Madison: (Department of History)

1974-1975                      Visiting Professor of European Social History

### Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HECJF) & Ecole des Affaires de Paris (EAP):

1970-1976                      Professeur

### University of Paris III, *Sorbonne Nouvelle*, (Institut du Monde Anglophone):

1969-1976                      Lecteur (1969-70); Maître Assistant (1970-76)

### **UNIVERSITY EDUCATION:**

1967-1971                      University of Reading (History)                      Ph.D.  
1963-1966                      University of Manchester (French Studies)      B.A. Hons

### **RECOGNITION/HONOURS:**

- Fellow: *Royal Society for the Arts* (UK)
- *Chevalier dans l'Ordre des Palmes Académiques* (France)
- Member, Scientific Advisory Committee, *European Institute of Public Administration*, Maastricht, (Netherlands)
- Fellow: *Institut Français d'Histoire Sociale* (France)
- Administrative Board: *Centre for Defence Studies*, MOD/Kings College, London (UK, 1994-2002)
- Advisory Board: *Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy*, University of Birmingham (UK)
- Scientific Advisor: *Centre National Jean Jaurès* (France)

## **J. Howorth**

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- Entry: *Debretts People of Today* (London)

### **PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP**

- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- American Political Science Association
- Royal Institute for International Affairs
- European Union Studies Association

## 1. Spending Patterns and Defence Budgets

The first factor to bear in mind when considering Europe's military potential is the *volume* of current and future expenditure. The EU-15, in 2002, spent almost US\$170 billion on defence, more than half the US defence budget for that year (\$329 billion). That is a very large sum of money. It is 3.5 times the defence budget of the second biggest military spender on earth (China – at \$48,380) and more than that of the *five* next biggest spenders put together (China, Russia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, India). And yet, the EU collectively gets very little bang for its bucks. There is no mystery here. Out of that sum, the EU is attempting to fund fifteen separate armies, fourteen separate air-forces and thirteen separate navies. For as long as it attempts to do that, the money will be largely ineffectual. A *massive* rationalisation of the EU's defence spending is long overdue. Hopefully, this will come about once the discussions over Constitutional arrangements are finalised. I shall return to this point later. The main lesson here, however, is that it is *not necessarily* greater spending that is required. *Wiser* spending would certainly help. But only once the EU has clearly established what it hopes to achieve, with what force levels, can it have any clear idea about how much money is needed to achieve that objective. To that extent, the current debate over the level of defence expenditure is a distraction. The point is: nobody knows. But first, some further general statistics are worth pondering.

If one includes in the equation the ten accession countries, the total EU spend rises to \$175 billion, equivalent to the *six* next biggest military spenders (the five cited above plus South Korea). The only one of the new accession states with any significant military clout however is Poland, which weighs in (at \$3,400 m) in tenth place out of the EU-25, marginally behind Belgium (at \$3,435 m) and way ahead of Denmark, Portugal, Finland, Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg among the existing member states. If one were to be blunt (which of course is not my style), one might ask exactly what the overwhelming majority of EU member states (present and future) believe they are buying with their *national* defence budgets. Twenty-one of the soon-to-be EU-25 are spending less than Israel (the vast majority of them *far less than* Israel). Israel does at least have a security problem...

Continuing to be blunt, one would have to note that *just three* countries in the EU (France, the UK and Germany) together spend 62% of the combined EU defence budget. That falls slightly – but only to 60% - if the ten accession states are put into the equation. In other words, three states alone spend 60% of the combined spend of the twenty-five. If Italy is added to the trio, the four nations alone contribute 77% of the EU's collective defence expenditure (73% of the EU-25 budget). Put another way, and including Italy in the top four, the remaining *eleven* EU member states contribute only 23% of current EU defence expenditure; the remaining *twenty-one* member states after enlargement in May 2004, will be contributing only 27% of the total Union spend. The average defence expenditure of those twenty-one states comes to just \$2.217 m. That is less than the defence budget of Myanmar! If we analyse more closely the tables for per capita expenditure, we

see that they reveal a number of wealthy member states (especially from Northern Europe) who appear to be spending quite liberally but who, in terms of *percentage of GDP* are clearly not pulling their weight; whereas analysing GDP percentages, we see that *the poorer accession states have been making a real effort*, even though, in absolute terms, their per capita contribution remains quite small. It will be interesting to see whether, after their accession to NATO later this year that effort will be sustained.

I give these figures just to make a simple and obvious point: the EU is wasting huge sums of money...Refusal to rationalise is not only regrettable: it is irresponsible. The problem for Europe is not one of limited budgetary, technological or military potential. It is overwhelmingly a problem of political direction and political will.

## **2. The Helsinki Headline Goal and Genuine Military Capacity**

Which brings us to the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG). In theory, we learned at Laeken, the EU could now muster the magic figures of 60,000 troops, 400 planes and 100 ships. But there are several major problems with the HHG.

**First** the methodology itself. Voluntary, bottom-up contributions might (just) secure the raw numbers. They do not constitute a coherent fighting force. By way of comparison, we should note that the most efficient and best equipped unitary member state – the UK – took *seventy* days (as opposed to Helsinki's prescribed sixty) to deploy a force of 45,000 combat troops (as opposed to Helsinki's 60,000) during the recent Iraq conflict. We know what forces have been theoretically committed to the Helsinki Force Catalogue by each member state. But we have no real idea to date *precisely* what such forces could collectively accomplish. The key concept is *usability*. There are just over 1.6 million troops in uniform in Europe. Of that number, only about 10% (160,000) are adequately trained for serious peace-keeping operations, and of those probably a maximum of 50,000 could be used for the type of *peace-making* operation we see in Iraq. When you factor in the requirements of rotation, then we are down to 20,000 maximum who are genuinely *usable* in serious military missions. This is, in part, why there has been so much agonising over the EU sending 7,000 troops into Bosnia next year. To repeat, bottom-up methodology can produce raw numbers. But that is not the same thing as genuine military capacity.

The solution to the methodological problem is to move as rapidly as possible towards a top-down mode. This could come both via the constitution of a formal Council of Defence Ministers and via the future Armaments Agency as well as via mechanisms such as structured cooperation. Only when such a top-down approach is adopted can we seriously hope to overcome the deficiencies which currently vitiate the collective endeavour. Meanwhile, peer pressure is practically the only tool that will work.

The statistics suggest how effective such pressure can be in persuading aspirant members of NATO to maximise their national efforts (look at scores for NATO aspirants in terms of % of GDP). But peer pressure alone will never suffice.

This leads us to the second problem with the HHG. Beyond raw numbers, the three Capabilities Conferences have allowed the EU to identify the main areas of *strategic deficiency* – currently ten<sup>1</sup>. But in order to generate an effective EU capacity in the area of unmanned aerial vehicles, or C4I, or strategic lift, or air-to-air refuelling, it is not enough to rely on voluntary efforts, or even to appoint a lead nation to chair a working group. These strategic enabling capabilities are, quite simply, unaffordable at national level, even for the best endowed nations. The problem is not one of science or technology. Despite spending – collectively – less than one third of the US spend on Research and Development (R&D), the EU faces no serious technological or scientific *impediment* to the pursuit of such high technology programmes<sup>2</sup>. But there has to be *collective political agreement* to drive the process forward towards the agreed target. That means top-down. It means pooling. It means specialisation. I shall return to these.

**The third** – and potentially biggest – problem with the HHG process is the absence of real debate about *the nature of the military operations the EU intends to mount*. The original thinking behind the Helsinki Headline Goal derived from Kosovo. Since both the US and the EU said “Never again!” to that experience, it is fair to assume that what the EU had in mind – especially in the context of the use, in the Saint Malo Declaration, of the notion of *autonomous* forces – was the ability to “do a Kosovo” with minimal reliance on US inputs. But this has two contradictory implications. The first would be that the EU could, *with its existing capacity*, mount a Kosovo-type campaign. It would be a different type of military operation from “Operation Allied Force”. It might, for example, involve the use of pilot skills instead of stand-off weaponry for the suppression of enemy air defences. It would almost certainly have called on the early use of ground forces. It would have involved casualties ...and body-bags. Many military analysts have insisted that such an operation was – and remains – within the present capabilities of the EU. The second implication of the “Kosovo objective” would be that the EU would need to develop a US-style capacity to fight high-level network-centric warfare. As we saw not only in Kosovo, but even more clearly in Afghanistan and Iraq, only the US currently has the capacity to engage properly in such war-fighting. Even the UK cannot fully interoperate with the most advanced US systems. The question is whether it is possible to acquire such a capacity “with half a loaf”. In other words, even spending half of what the US spends, and spending it with maximum efficiency, would probably not purchase the capacity to fight fully integrated network-centric warfare.

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<sup>1</sup> NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) defences; Unmanned Aerial Vehicle/Surveillance & Target Acquisition (UAV/STA) units; Special Operations Forces (SOF); Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR); Combat Search & Rescue (CSR); Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence; Headquarters (OHQ, FHQ, CCHQs); Strategic Air Mobility/Outsize Transport aircraft, General Cargo aircraft; Space; Interoperability.

<sup>2</sup> Robert P. Grant, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Europe can keep in step*, Paris, EU-Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper 15, June 2000

In any case, it is becoming more and more difficult to imagine Kosovo-type scenarios which might be fought – autonomously – by the EU. Ten years after their inception, some of the higher end “Petersberg tasks” are beginning to look like yesterday’s operations.

Should the EU even be planning for a US-style Kosovo scenario? According to one analysis<sup>3</sup>, the US soldier, trained for high intensity warfare, can operate at levels 8 to 10 on an intensity scale of 1 to 10. If forced to, he can “operate down” to level 6 but is uncomfortable with that, owing to lack of training in the art of peace-keeping and nation-building. Many UK and French troops as well as some crack German, Danish and Dutch special forces can operate up to level 8 but the vast majority are more comfortable lower down the intensity scale dealing with irregular forces in a peace-keeping environment. Most other EU troops cannot operate much above level 4 on the US intensity scale and are therefore incapable of assuming peace-keeping duties such as those currently required in Iraq.

Should the EU not address this issue head-on and decide that it needs to equip its combined forces for missions less ambitious than those involving full-scale network centric capacity? The discussion of this “what for?” series of questions is all the more urgent in that the EU *has* decided (Seville and the Solana Strategy Paper) that it wishes to engage in the global war on terrorism. *That* war requires very different instruments from those involved in driving the Serbian army out of Kosovo. These internal contradictions at the heart of the HHG process require urgent attention.

We should not be unkind to Helsinki. It allowed the EU, *in only four short years*, to be in a position to mount operations *Concordia* and *Artemis*. That is no mean achievement. It took the EU fourteen years to agree on a definition of jam! Implementing the HHG required the definition and refinement, by the Military Staff but under member-state co-ownership, of the crisis management procedures which underpinned both of last year’s EU operations. Whatever the limitations of those operations in terms of military footprint, without those agreed procedures, they could not have been mounted at all.

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<sup>3</sup> Julian Lindley-French, Paper at GCSP, September 2003

### 3. Recent breakthroughs

#### *a. Procurement*

We are now witnessing some genuine breakthroughs on capacity. If the UK and France, after a thousand years of uninterrupted mutual bloodletting and only one hundred and fifty years of “being allies”, can finally agree to cooperate in the building of aircraft carriers, then the rest of the EU member states can make much more effort to specialise and to cooperate. Of course it is a huge step for a sovereign state to agree to hand over to another sovereign state responsibility for, say, its military helicopter provision. But specialisation works both ways. That member state which might find itself vulnerable on the helicopter front, might well, by the same process, find itself charged with the provision of air-to-air refuelling facilities for the entire Union. *Donnant donnant...* Without rationalisation and specialisation, *no member state* (with the possible exception of two) will have either helicopters or air-to-air refuelling. The EU is moving towards the recognition of “coordination responsibility” for key procurement projects (Germany: strategic air lift; Spain: air-to-air refuelling; UK: Headquarters; Netherlands: PGMs for delivery by EU F-16s<sup>4</sup>). This approach needs further systematisation.

The decision taken at Thessaloniki in June 2003 to establish a *European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency* (EARMCA) is another positive move. The implications of this development have already been subjected to detailed scrutiny<sup>5</sup> and it is redundant to repeat the findings of that study here. However, the proposed EARMCA raises a number of crucial questions about European capabilities which deserve attention. First, and most significant is the extent to which any new Agency can substitute for political will and can short-circuit the powerful forces binding national governments and domestic clients. Some progress has been registered in this sphere – notably with the creation of the European Aeronautic, Defence and Space company (EADS) – but the current restructuring problems of the European armaments giant, which is seeking to break out of the “dual sovereignty” underpinning its foundation<sup>6</sup>, merely emphasise the nature of the problem. Hundreds of thousands of jobs are at stake and no government is likely to ignore that stricture. If the Agency were to restrict its activities to lowest common denominator programmes, there would be little point in launching it. Second, alternative agencies such as the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) embrace member states (Norway, Turkey) which might from bitter experience, fear marginalisation rather than closer involvement. Third, most of the major organisms

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<sup>4</sup> Five EU member states use a total of 430 F-16s (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal). Norway has a further 57.

<sup>5</sup> Burkard Schmitt, *The European Union and Armaments: Getting a bigger bang for the Euro*, Paris EU-ISS, 2003 (Chaillot Paper No.63). The author examines the implications for procurement, research and the defence market.

<sup>6</sup> The management structure of EADS scrupulously respects the need for balance between the company’s French and German partners.

promoting armaments cooperation, such as OCCAR or the Letter of Intent (LoI) group<sup>7</sup> currently operate outside of any EU framework. Their current members would see EUisation as a form of “dilution” of the muscular armaments regime they are currently seeking to produce. Fourth, any such Agency should not have its remit restricted to the procurement programmes of the Helsinki Headline Goal, but should be enabled to cover the full spectrum of the EU’s present and future potential armaments requirements. Fifth, the “consumer” countries (including all the accession candidates) will need to review their purchasing policies and recognise the advantages of introducing competition into the transatlantic armaments market. Although it is unlikely that general agreement will be reached to “buy European”, it should nevertheless be understood by all EU member states that the proposed EARMCA is broadly in everybody’s interests. The EU is poised to take a major step forward towards more rational procurement planning. The logic of ESDP/CSDP suggests that they progressively situate their national plans within a European framework.

### ***b. Operational Planning***

Another breakthrough has come in the field of operational planning. The UK, throughout the debate on EU planning arrangements, prioritised *national* headquarters as the most appropriate facility for EU-only operations almost certain to be led by a “framework” nation, as was the case with the French-led mission in Congo. The model here is the UK’s permanent joint headquarters (PJHQ) at Northwood in Middlesex. This contains elements of a rapidly deployable, in-theatre Joint Force Headquarters with the capability of commanding rapid deployment front-line forces and providing continuity of experience from the planning phase to the execution of an operation. It involves some 420 specialist tri-Service military staff who are involved, *inter alia* in monitoring designated areas of operational interest, preparing contingency plans, exercising operational control of overseas commands and conducting joint force exercises. It is a highly pragmatic joint headquarters, geared to operationality and readily multi-nationalisable, working directly with NATO planners at SHAPE.

French operational planning has recently assumed rather more ambitious objectives, which are explicitly presented as only being achievable at EU level. The previous division of responsibilities between the planning cell at Creil and the operational unit at Saint-Germain was scrapped in September 2002 with the creation of a merged *Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations pour la France et l’Europe* known as the “pre-CPCO”. This is intended both as a strategic and as an operational planning facility enjoying unprecedented access to the necessary intelligence, information and command structures (C3R) required of a major EU military operation involving up to 50,000 troops. Multinationalisation is taken as a given and great emphasis is placed on improvements in intelligence gathering. This will come via satellite observation through Helios II, featuring

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<sup>7</sup> The former coordinates procurement and the latter a regulatory framework for the main European armaments producing nations.

high resolution imagery and night-time observation, and through a major programme in theatre reconnaissance drones (UAVs) of the high altitude long endurance (HALE) variety.

The arrangements which were agreed at the European Council in Brussels in December 2003 involve a compromise between these two approaches which has its own distinctive flavour. They were only given the green light after prime minister Blair personally assured president Bush that they would remain entirely consistent with NATO. Two parallel developments are envisaged. An EU cell will be established inside SHAPE along the lines of the UK's August 2003 proposal. This will ensure total transparency between the EU and NATO in preparation for operations taking place under the Berlin Plus procedures. NATO will also establish liaison arrangements alongside the EU Military Staff. In addition, the autonomous EU planning cell, which will be overseen by Javier Solana and will grow from 30 to about 100 staff, will be established within the EU Military Staff facility in the rue Cortenberg. It will feature planning for both civil and military EU operations and will work in close cooperation with the existing *national* joint headquarters, which are explicitly recognised as constituting the facility of choice for EU-only missions. Under "certain circumstances", the EU Council of Ministers will be able to call upon the EU cell for missions with both a civilian and military component and where no national headquarters appears either available or appropriate. The cell will work in close cooperation with the NATO liaison officers. It will not have a standing permanent headquarters as such, but will have the ability rapidly to establish an operations centre for a particular mission<sup>8</sup>.

### ***c. Intelligence***

Another potential breakthrough has recently come in the field of *intelligence gathering*. The recent agreement between the EU and the US for the coordination of the Galileo satellite navigation system with the US's GPS system potentially constitutes a major step forward on the road to EU autonomy in intelligence gathering. I say "potentially" for two reasons. First, because Galileo is explicitly configured as a civilian programme. Although it has considerable military potential<sup>9</sup>, the political decision to develop that potential has yet to be taken. Secondly, for the EU collectively to forge an integrated intelligence capacity (not to mention an intelligence *agency*) several major hurdles would have to be cleared – not the least of which is the intimate relationship between the UK and the US intelligence services. However, even well short of any EU-dedicated intelligence capabilities, a recent report suggests that much can be done vastly to improve the current level of intelligence coordination, including expansion of the existing SITCEN, extending the competencies of Europol and establishing a European

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<sup>8</sup> See, on this, IISS, "EU Operational Planning", *Strategic Comments* Volume 9 Issue 10, December 2003

<sup>9</sup> Gustav Lindstrom, *The Galileo satellite system and its security implications*, EU-ISS, Occasional Paper 44, April 2003, pp. 7 & 21-22.

network connecting the National High Authorities of Intelligence (NHAI) and improving cross-agency cooperation at national level<sup>10</sup>.

#### ***d. Battle-Groups***

The recent Franco-British initiative, subsequently joined by Germany, for the deployment of intervention units or “battle groups” of 1,500 troops for combat in jungle, desert or mountain conditions can be seen as an attempt to move beyond the abstractions of the HHG arithmetic and to achieve something concrete. It is believed that this new development will become an EU initiative at the meeting of EU foreign and defence ministers in May 2004. The ground units will be joined by appropriate naval and air groups. The battle groups will be deployable within 15 days and sustainable in the field for up to 30 days. This poses, of course, the \$64,000 question: what are they for?

### **3. What Type of Missions for the EU?**

What sort of missions *could* the EU take on? Ever since Saint Malo, I have posed this question – the question of *scenarios* – to EU officials in various countries. Barely ever have I had a concrete response. With the experience of Operation *Concordia* the EU now knows that it can send 357 troops (from all EU states except Ireland and Denmark, and from 14 additional nations – i.e. an average of 13 troops per participating member state<sup>11</sup>!) into a small mountainous country such as Macedonia – and successfully keep the peace between small bands of lightly armed irregulars and the Macedonian “army” which boasts a defence budget less than half that of Luxembourg. This was an operation high in political symbolism and extremely modest in terms of military footprint. Initially expected to last for a period of six months, it was agreed by the Council on 21 July to extend the mission until 15 December 2003, on request of the FYROM government. The mission was challenged in early September by growing unrest in northern villages as well as by bombings in Skopje and the kidnapping of local policemen. Although only lightly armed for self-defence purposes, the EU forces moved close to the disturbances and successfully re-established order<sup>12</sup>. By the end of the mission, it was clear that the biggest problem in Macedonia was no longer armed conflict but criminality – hence the mission was succeeded by a police operation: *Proxima*. *Concordia*'s primary value was that it allowed the EU to test every aspect of the mounting of a military operation, from command and control, through use of force policy, to issues such as logistics, financing and legal arrangements and memoranda of understanding with host nations<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> Bjorn Muller-Wille, *For Our Eyes Only? Shaping an Intelligence Community within the EU*, Paris EU-ISS, Occasional Paper 50, January 2004

<sup>11</sup> In fact, more than half the “participating countries” sent fewer than ten troops: Finland 9; Portugal 6; Norway 5; Netherlands, UK and Romania 3; Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia 2; Luxembourg, Canada, Estonia, Iceland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia 1.

<sup>12</sup> Arie Farnam, “First Test for the new European Army”, *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 September 2003

<sup>13</sup> General Graham Messervy-Whiting, Paper for GCSP, September 2003

Operation *Artemis* may offer even richer lessons about EU capabilities. The initial assessment suggests that the mission, which involved rapid force projection to a distance of 6,500 kilometres into unknown and difficult terrain, was a genuine success. France was the framework nation, supplying 1,785 of the 2,200 troops deployed. Sixteen other “troop contributing nations” (TCNs) were involved, above all contributing strategic air lift (Germany, Greece, United Kingdom, Brazil and Canada) engineers (UK), helicopters (South Africa) and special forces (Sweden). Operational planning was conducted from the French *Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations* (CPCO) at Creil, to which were seconded officers from thirteen other countries, thus demonstrating the potential for multinationalisation of a national HQ. The operation was run in coordination with the COPS in Brussels. It was exemplified by rapid deployment (7 days after UNSC Resolution 1484 on 30 May), a single command structure, well and appropriately trained forces, clear rules of engagement allowing for tactical evolution in the theatre, good incorporation of multinational elements, excellent inter-service cooperation, a forward logistics base at Entebbe and adequate communications. NATO procedures were used throughout. The full report on this operation is still classified. It is nevertheless clear that the twin challenges of command chain and logistics were successfully met, even though deficiencies were noted in certain aspects of secure communications as well as transmissions and manning at the force HQ in Bunia. First reports suggest that the operation could be used to enhance the case for establishing a permanent EU operational planning cell in Brussels.

Next year’s transfer (from NATO to the EU) of responsibility for SFOR in Bosnia will constitute an even greater test of the EU’s military muscle. It ought to be entirely manageable out of the current Helsinki Force Catalogue with Britain as framework nation and with operational planning supplied by the UK’s PJHQ at Northwood. The biggest difficulty will probably come in negotiating with the US/NATO the division of ancillary quasi-political responsibilities – notably for the tracking down of war criminals – and over issues connected with overall ownership/leadership of the operation<sup>14</sup>. But Balkan-style peace-keeping operations are unlikely to constitute the main model for future EU military missions. What else is in store?

General Hagglund recently suggested that the European and US “pillars” of NATO will progressively (“over the next decade”) assume responsibility for territorial defence of their own areas<sup>15</sup>. Since there is currently no conceivable externally-generated threat to the strategic interests of the Union as a whole, collective defence assumes a somewhat elusive or abstract aspect. Withdrawal of almost all US troops from Europe is now inevitable. Yet the debate in the IGC over the EU’s assumption of an article 5 commitment was also characterised by a high level of abstraction. The proposal, emanating originally from Franco-German thinking, involved the establishment of a core group of countries issuing some type of “mutual defence” statement. That the EU *will* eventually decide on a common

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<sup>14</sup> Judy Dempsey, “US & Europe vie for control of Bosnia Force”, *Financial Times*, 08 March 2004

<sup>15</sup> *Nouvelles Atlantiques*, No. 3542, 21 January 2004, p.2

defence is written into the Constitutional Draft<sup>16</sup>. Meanwhile, however, the draft suggests that a core group of countries wishing to anticipate such a move should be authorised to do so<sup>17</sup>. The political symbolism of such a statement is more obvious than its practical value. It is highly unlikely that any member state not already a member of NATO or of the WEU would be interested in being associated with this move. Since mutual defence guarantees exist under both those bodies, a third guarantee seems redundant. The 28 November 2004 meeting between France, Britain and Germany agreed to settle for the Italian presidency's proposal of a more limited "solidarity clause" whereby all member states come to the assistance of a single member state suffering from a terrorist attack or a man-made or natural disaster<sup>18</sup>. The corollary to this compromise was an explicit assertion that NATO remains the body ensuring collective defence for its members. Whether the attacks in Madrid will demonstrate the validity of this approach remains to be seen. However, sooner or later, General Hagglund's proposal will have to be acted upon. There is virtually no reason to believe that the collective territorial defence of the Union is beyond the means of the current and future member states.

It would be highly regrettable, both in terms of military experience and in terms of political-historical reference, if the EU's principal field of operation were to be restricted to Africa (as is implicit in the texts accompanying the recent launch of the EU battle groups)<sup>19</sup>. Regrettable not only because this would limit the range of military experience and exposure of EU forces, but also because, politically, there is real sensitivity in the notion that European colonial powers should be once again policing their former possessions. However, the successful example of Operation *Artemis*, using a framework nation and a national operational planning HQ, suggests that missions in Africa under an EU flag could well become more frequent. Half of the civil wars currently raging in the world are in Africa. We have recently seen successful UK intervention in Sierra Leone and French intervention in Ivory Coast. After *Artemis*, it is likely that these sorts of missions will operate under an EU flag.

But stabilising failed/failing states in Africa should not become the principal stock in trade of ESDP. The potential range of EU missions will, to some extent, determine the theatre. The ball-park figure of 4,000kms (from Luxembourg), although devoid of any official status, has already entered the debate as "fact". In part, this hypothetical range derives from the technical capabilities of the future A400M transport aircraft which can fly between 2,500 nautical miles at maximum payload (50.6 tonnes) and 4,900 nm with a 20 tonne payload. However, the A400M is also capable of in-flight refuelling or stopovers and one of its promotional mission scenarios is a humanitarian aid operation following an Asian typhoon, with 20 A400Ms operating out of Australia and Timor (almost 9,000 nms).

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<sup>16</sup> Part I, Article 40, paragraph 2 goes beyond the timid conditionality of the TEU in this respect to declare: "The common security and defence policy *shall* include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This *will* lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides" (my stress).

<sup>17</sup> The procedures are spelled out in Articles I-40 & III-214

<sup>18</sup> The procedures are spelled out in Articles I-42 & III-231

<sup>19</sup> "Appropriate for, but not limited to, use in failing or failed states (of which most are in Africa)".

Operation *Artemis* involved a range of 6,500 kms, using C-130 transport planes. There is nothing sacrosanct about 4,000 kms. The “debate” about range is in fact a good illustration of the imponderables of ESDP military intervention. In the foreseeable future, for political rather than technical reasons, it is unlikely that the EU *per se* would undertake any mission outside its “near abroad” (South East Europe, the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa). Despite suggestions to the contrary in the December 2003 Strategy Document<sup>20</sup>, EU military operations in the Caucasus or even further afield are probably out of the question – for political as well as technical reasons. Imminent scenarios in which some EU input has been envisaged are in Afghanistan, the Middle East and even Iraq. But these would all be *NATO* missions using EU forces. Depending on the future evolution of relations with *NATO* and with the *NATO* Response Force, it is conceivable that EU missions anywhere in the world will eventually be feasible at technical/military level. However the politics of such missions will depend on a host of other factors which we will presumably discuss this afternoon.

Interviews with defence officials in London, Paris and Berlin have elicited a number of potential mission scenarios which give the flavour of current EU potential. Prior to recent shifts in Libyan policy, an EU intervention to overthrow Colonel Gaddafi was one such scenario. Intervention in Algeria, either to evacuate EU citizens in the event of political collapse or to project interposition forces into an escalating civil war is another scenario occasionally evoked. In summer 2003, the EU discussed with *NATO* and the *OSCE* the prospect of sending a peace-keeping mission to Moldova to assist in the stabilisation of Trans Dnestr<sup>21</sup>. In the event of Romanian accession around 2007, Moldova will become a border area for the enlarged Union. However, such an intervention was ruled out last year on the grounds of Russian sensitivities. Without close cooperation between Brussels and Moscow, EU intervention anywhere on its periphery from the Baltic to the Black Sea is almost impossible to imagine.

In the first semester of 2004, the Irish Presidency paper, *Europeans Working Together*, stressed the importance of integrating civilian missions into the overall ESDP portfolio. The document draws attention to the fact that, in most post-conflict situations, the priority should be given to policing, the introduction of judicial and administrative services and general restoration of civil order<sup>22</sup>. The two main current missions of the EU in the Balkans – in Bosnia and Macedonia – both involve policing. The assumption of peace-keeping responsibilities in Bosnia under *SFOR* will also involve considerable overlap

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<sup>20</sup> The document suggests that the EU should “now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus”, although it is not clear whether this implies military deployment. In Javier Solana’s address to the *IRRI* on 26 November 2003, he went even further and spoke of promoting “an arc of well-governed states in our neighbourhood [...] creating a circle of good governance on the perimeter of the Mediterranean to the Caucasus. Countries such as Georgia are neither remote nor distant”. Again, the role of military forces is discreetly rendered ambivalent.

<sup>21</sup> Judy Dempsey, “Troops may play peacekeeping role in Moldova”, *Financial Times*, 11 July 2003

<sup>22</sup> *Nouvelles Atlantiques*, No. 3538, 7 January 2004, p.3

between civilian and military tasks. This aspect of the EU's international role will become more and more significant. But it will not be the defining factor.

### **Conclusions: from the short to the medium term and beyond...**

Any overall evaluation of European military capacity has to be set within a very clear timeframe. Anyone who had predicted in 1999 that the EU would be mounting autonomous military missions by 2003 would likely have been laughed out of court. Much has been accomplished very rapidly. However, over the next five years (the short term), the EU will need to absorb the lessons of *Concordia*, *Artemis* and other such operations, concentrate on plugging the gaps in strategic assets, develop genuinely integrated operational capacity and perfect command, logistics and communications procedures. This will limit actual operations to the type and style of those we have already witnessed and are about to witness. During this period also, however, the EU will need to plan procurement projects for the medium term (the following fifteen years). This will necessitate tough political decisions about the ultimate size, scale and style of EU military ambitions. How far down the road towards US-style network centric warfare will the Union wish to go? How many new generation platforms and other strategic systems will it require – for what purposes? How far a field does it anticipate intervening? Only two factors prevent the EU from developing genuinely autonomous and seriously credible military muscle: its ability to cooperate and to integrate and the political will to implement its decisions and to act robustly in support of the values and interests outlined in its evolving security strategy. In the long term, the sky – in the form of space – could well be the limit. But then, in the long term, as Keynes noted, most people in this room will be past caring.

**Table 1**  
**EU Member States Defence Expenditure (2002)**

Country	US\$m	US\$ per capita	% of GDP	Forces (000)
<b>USA</b>	<b>329,616</b>	<b>1,138</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>1,414</b>
<b>1. France</b>	38,005	636 (1)	2.5 (2)	260.4
<b>2. UK</b>	35,249	590 (2)	2.4 (4)	210.4
<b>3. Germany</b>	31,465	383 (9)	1.5 (17)	296.0
<b>4. Italy</b>	24,210	421 (8)	1.9 (8)	216.8
<b>5. Spain</b>	8,253	206 (15)	1.2 (21)	177.9
<b>6. Netherlands</b>	7,330	459 (5)	1.6 (16)	49.6
<b>7. Greece</b>	6,154	579 (3)	4.4 (1)	177.6
<b>8. Sweden</b>	3,947	448 (6)	1.7 (13)	33.9
<b>9. Belgium</b>	3,435	332 (11)	1.3 (20)	39.2
<b>10. Poland</b>	3,400	88 (20)	1.9 (9)	163.0
<b>11. Denmark</b>	2,564	483 (4)	1.6 (14)	22.7
<b>12. Portugal</b>	2,945	294 (12)	2.3 (5)	43.6
<b>13. Finland</b>	1,970	378 (10)	1.4 (19)	31.8
<b>14. Austria</b>	1,699	209 (14)	0.8 (23)	34.6
<b>15. Czech Rep.</b>	1,401	136 (18)	2.1 (6)	49.4
<b>16. Hungary</b>	1,083	110 (19)	1.8 (10)	33.4
<b>17. Ireland</b>	718	187 (16)	0.6 (25)	10.5
<b>18. Slovakia</b>	439	81 (21)	2.0 (7)	26.2
<b>19. Slovenia</b>	311	156 (17)	1.5 (18)	9.0
<b>20. Lithuania</b>	233	63 (23)	1.8 (12)	13.5
<b>21. Cyprus</b>	227	245 (13)	2.4 (3)	51.0
<b>22. Latvia</b>	141	60 (25)	1.8 (11)	5.5
<b>23. Luxembourg</b>	193	438 (7)	0.9 (21)	0.9
<b>24. Estonia</b>	93	68 (22)	1.6 (15)	5.5
<b>25. Malta</b>	25	62 (24)	0.7 (24)	2.1
<b>EU-15 Totals</b>	168,137 m			1,605,900
<b>EU-25 Totals</b>	175,490 m			1,965,400
<b>EU-15 Av</b>	11,209	404.06	1.74	
<b>EU-25 Av</b>	7,019.6	284.48	1.75	

**J. Howorth**

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**Table 2**  
**EU Defence Expenditure as % of GDP (2002)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>% of GDP</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>3.3</b>
<b>1. Greece</b>	<b>4.4</b>
<b>2. France</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>3. Cyprus</b>	<b>2.4</b>
<b>4. UK</b>	<b>2.4</b>
<b>5. Portugal</b>	<b>2.3</b>
<b>6. Czech Republic</b>	<b>2.1</b>
<b>7. Slovakia</b>	<b>2.0</b>
<b>8. Italy</b>	<b>1.9</b>
<b>9. Poland</b>	<b>1.9</b>
<b>10. Hungary</b>	<b>1.8</b>
<b>11. Latvia</b>	<b>1.8</b>
<b>12. Lithuania</b>	<b>1.8</b>
<i>EU 25 Average</i>	<i>1.75</i>
<i>EU 15 Average</i>	<i>1.74</i>
<b>13. Sweden</b>	<b>1.7</b>
<b>14. Denmark</b>	<b>1.6</b>
<b>15. Estonia</b>	<b>1.6</b>
<b>16. Netherlands</b>	<b>1.6</b>
<b>17. Germany</b>	<b>1.5</b>
<b>18. Slovenia</b>	<b>1.5</b>
<b>19. Finland</b>	<b>1.4</b>
<b>20. Belgium</b>	<b>1.3</b>
<b>21. Spain</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>22. Luxembourg</b>	<b>0.9</b>
<b>23. Austria</b>	<b>0.8</b>
<b>24. Malta</b>	<b>0.7</b>
<b>25. Ireland</b>	<b>0.6</b>

**J. Howorth**

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**Table 3**  
**EU Defence Spending in US\$ per capita (2002)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>US\$ per capita</b>
<b>USA</b>	<b>1,138</b>
<b>1. France</b>	<b>636</b>
<b>2. UK</b>	<b>590</b>
<b>3. Greece</b>	<b>579</b>
<b>4. Denmark</b>	<b>483</b>
<b>5. Netherlands</b>	<b>459</b>
<b>6. Sweden</b>	<b>448</b>
<b>7. Luxembourg</b>	<b>438</b>
<b>8. Italy</b>	<b>421</b>
<i>EU 15 Average</i>	<i>404</i>
<b>9. Germany</b>	<b>383</b>
<b>10. Finland</b>	<b>378</b>
<b>11. Belgium</b>	<b>332</b>
<b>12. Portugal</b>	<b>294</b>
<i>EU 25 Average</i>	<i>284</i>
<b>13. Cyprus</b>	<b>245</b>
<b>14. Austria</b>	<b>209</b>
<b>15. Spain</b>	<b>206</b>
<b>16. Ireland</b>	<b>187</b>
<b>17. Slovenia</b>	<b>156</b>
<b>18. Czech Republic</b>	<b>136</b>
<b>19. Hungary</b>	<b>110</b>
<b>20. Poland</b>	<b>88</b>
<b>21. Slovakia</b>	<b>81</b>
<b>22. Estonia</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>23. Lithuania</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>24. Malta</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>25. Latvia</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>EU-25 Average</b>	<b>276</b>