The idea that the world is by nature invariably a place in which states have to be

rivals has a long history. The theory says that, because of this rivalry, a state’s

security dilemma can only be eased by increasing its power and cannot be

resolved by an alliance of different states linked by a common legal order or

values. This idea was bred in Europe but has found many advocates in the US

today. I consider this idea to be permanently and unalterably logical but

intrinsically wrong. This idea has been largely proved wrong by Europe’s postwar

development even if the traditional logic of power still holds sway over

many parts of the world.

I am aware of the fact that the Kantian world I am striving for is still in contrast to

the Hobbesian realities in large parts of the world. I am therefore convinced, like

American realists and in contrast to some Europeans, that the deployment of

military power is sometimes unavoidable. However, unlike these American

realists, I am also convinced that, with the prospect of a new reality in line with

post-war developments in Europe, we should not abandon hope of being able to

change the world. Otherwise, politics would be reduced to mere actionism

without the aim of creating a better world. It will take generations before

fundamental changes can be brought about in some other parts of the world.

However, acceptance of the reality of power and the pursuit of the rule of law,

realism and teleological action do not exclude one another.

Misperceptions slowly but inevitably undermine the transatlantic partnership. I

regard this as one of the main tasks of the elite of our time – politicians,

scientists, intellectuals and other enlightened individuals. They should do their

utmost to avoid the widening of the transatlantic gap caused by misperceptions,

mismanagement and eventually mistrust. Let me cite a few examples of those

differences, their impact on current policies and how we can ensure the stability

of transatlantic relations in the future.

Many in the US have ambivalent if not negative feelings concerning an ever

solidifying EU not only competing in global economic markets but also

organizing its military capabilities via ESDP and even recently, after long

negotiations, solving its headquarters question. The recurrent European

leitmotiv of ESDP being a strong European pillar of NATO and not a contender

in the wings does not find many believers in the US. Sometimes it seems that,

with certain US critics, the only acceptable reason for the existence of ESDP

would be that it might help Europeans spend more money on defence. In

addition, there is persisting uneasiness in the US over EU members of NATO

forming a European caucus and coming to the Atlantic table with a prefixed

non-negotiable European position. Experience shows rather, that the contrary is

true. Differences and disagreements hamper the European decision-making

process and lead to the frustrating experience that European influence in

Washington is less than normally adequate for a long-term acceptance of the

transatlantic Alliance in the self-confident European societies. It is time for a real

strategic debate within the Alliance. It is also time for a new transatlantic

bargain in which responsibilities and influence are rebalanced.

During the Cold War, the US was in favour of a strong European pillar of NATO.

That European pillar was desirable to the US on the assumption that it would

help counterbalance the Soviet threat, relieve the US of the danger of being

drawn into regional armed conflicts and would not represent a competing entity.

In view of the development which Europe has undergone in the last few years

and decades, it is understandable that there is growing concern, particularly in

the US, that this stronger Europe is transforming itself into a second rival pole in

the West. In the final analysis, I do not believe there is any real danger that

Europe will endeavor to define itself in opposition to the US. Nor is there a

majority for this following the enlargement of the European Union. Defining

Europe in opposition to the US would definitely not be in Germany’s interests.

However, I would also like to contradict those in the US who believe that

Europe’s increased strength in the sphere of foreign and security policy is a

negative development. The opposite is true! Europe’s lack of effectiveness is

one of the central problems in transatlantic relations. A Europe incapable of

taking effective action would have little global influence and would be of little

interest to the US as a partner. The US would quickly lose interest in a weaker

Europe. A weak Europe would also weaken transatlantic ties. A Europe which,

as a result of its weakness, sees no hope of exerting influence on the US would,

out of a sense of frustration, turn either away from or even against the US.

Some Euro-critics in the US are in line with President Bush stating that "the path

of safety is the path of action". Those critics find the EU risk-averse and status

quo oriented and castigate its lack of action concerning stability threats. Unlike

Robert Kagan in his article in the Washington Post of December 5, they fail to

recognize what a vital role Europe plays even when the set of cards it has is

different from US expectations. The EU’s "soft" approach of cooperation and its

political attractiveness has proved to be very effective in Europe.

On both sides of the Atlantic, there are diverging narratives as to which strategy

has suceeded in the end to bring about the fall of the Communist world. The

children of Ronald Reagan tend to attribute the fall of Communism to

unremitting, unwavering pressure on the Soviet Union based on military

deterrence and the drying out of resources. The children of Willy Brandt and

Helmut Schmidt attribute the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the East-

West-Conflict to the combination of a defensive strategy and an approach of

dialogue and cooperation based on the attractiveness of Western democracies.

In hindsight, both strategies, although conflicting in their time, have objectively

been complementary in contributing to the end of the Communist era. Perhaps

we should be circumspect enough to consider that today’s conflicting strategies

used, for example towards Iran, could one day prove complementary as well.

It is because we want to strengthen the basis for a joint transatlantic future that

Europeans are in favor of making Europe more effective. That also goes for the

military sphere. In keeping with the sentiment expressed by Joe Nye of Harvard

University, I would like to add: the US is the only true global power in the

military sphere. Economiccally, it is but one power among many. In economic

terms, the European Union is almost equal in weight, while in terms of population

and its share in world trade it even surpasses the US. At the level of

societal and non-state players, the US used to be more attractive than any other

country in the world. It was not the US's military power, but rather its

attractiveness that was its strongest advantage. After all, "soft power" is also a

form of power. In light of current developments in the US, Joe Nye has warned

America that it must not lose its social and political appeal by flexing its military

muscle too much, thus objectively also losing power, which is more than just

military might. I share his concern.

I agree as well with those who exhort Europeans and of course also Germans

to modernize and enlarge their military capabilities. I detect a growing German

consensus in that direction. Our security culture is changing, and as part of

Europe we are increasingly thinking globally or in security terms. But leaving

aside the question of military capabilities - most of us Europeans, even more so

us Germans, strongly believe that the soft approach pays off in the long run.

The fact that for a long time only within a NATO framework there was sufficient

European military clout is part but not all of the backdrop to this characteristic.

As Kagan puts it, the EU has become a "gigantic political and economic

magnet", its most attractive tool being enlargement or what Robert Cooper calls

"the lure of membership". That means the EU is gradually enlarging the zone of

peace, stability and prosperity along its expanding border.

The handling of the Ukrainian change of power is an excellent example of how

the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy acted in a smooth and concerted

way. The EU made sensible use of its new member Poland and the good

offices of High Representative Solana, backed by the presidency and member

states without locking the US out. I am convinced that such fine examples of

smart multilateralism will become more and more numerous.

Considering its short history, the EU’s defence policy has made considerable

progress. The EU started police operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and

Macedonia. We lead a military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo

and did so jointly together with NATO in Macedonia. With the military operation

ALTHEA, the EU has taken over from NATO’s SFOR in Bosnia and

Herzegovina.

Who in the US or even in our own countries is aware of the massive amount of

money the EU invests into Russia, Central Europe and the Middle East? Every

Euro invested in our near abroad is a stability anchor. Each Euro invested there

is a Euro that does not need to be spent on defence.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me identify some of the challenges ahead and some important items still on

the EU’s agenda from the past century.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the rift valley of the clash between the Western

and the Islamic world. In spite of European expertise and its contribution to the

Road Map and the Quartet – which again, many in the US mostly overlook -, it

is the US attitude and input that are crucial. For a lasting solution, nothing less

is required from the US than exerting leadership. With the democratic election

of a new legitimate Palestinian leader a new initiative would be timely.

Concerning Iran, the EU-3 effort to reach a long-term agreement in the area of

dual use nuclear technology has led to a satisfying set of contacts and

agreements. In the context of bringing peace and security to the Greater Middle

East, the EU specifically needs the US to engage in the Iran dossier to ensure

that a sustainable solution can be achieved.

The arc of crisis around the Black Sea with its frozen conflicts is an area where

European foreign policy is especially active. Nevertheless the complex will have

to be examined and addressed jointly with our transatlantic partner. This can

also not be done without engaging Russia.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

we alone cannot shape the ideal world that corresponds to our interests, values

and dreams. One thing is certain however, the EU needs the US, and vice

versa, be it in the war on terrorism, the fight against weapons of mass

destruction or any of the crisis areas mentioned or still lurking. What we most

ardently need is the common insight that the EU and the US, NATO and ESDP

have complementary approaches and powers. No problem in the world could be

solved faster and better when the transatlantic partners choose to approach it

without the other. Why not follow the recent proposal of a "double-track

initiative" fighting against terrorism and engaging the Islamic world? It should

include credible law enforcement, military containment and more of the tools of

the politics of power, while at the same time leading an active dialogue with

Muslim cultures and societies.

Back to the changing transatlantic relations: what has changed strategically?

The central locations for conflicts have shifted in US consciousness to other

problems and, in geographical terms, to the Middle East and to certain parts of

Asia. In a stable European order of peace, the centuries-old German question

has been resolved by united Germany's membership in the EU and NATO. Both

sides of the Atlantic can and should rejoice that Germany is no longer a source

and cause of crisis. Germany no longer has strategic importance for the US due

to its geostrategic location at the heart of a conflict. Germany’s main relevance

is due to its willingness and ability to help resolve problems in future crisis

regions. German politicians must now examine whether they want to reorient

either in order to be relevant to the US or because they, just like the US, believe

that their security and interests are at risk. Mind you, this is about the strategic

orientation of the US away from a global conflict with Europe at its epicenter.

We perceived this conflict as a European or local German crisis. The US is now

oriented towards other regions (for example, the Middle East) and towards other

issues (for example, the fight against international terrorism and the proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction). At the same time, we must seek a new

consensus in security policy on whether, where and under what conditions, we

are prepared to use military means to protect our security, interests and values.

There is another factor. In contrast to the situation during the Cold War in

Europe, the US is no longer dependent on its European allies and on Germany

in order to prevail in purely military terms in regional conflicts such as the one in

Iraq. In the final analysis, military victory in Iraq was not dependent on the

support of other European partners. This decrease in military dependency in

wars has not only military but also political consequences. A country which

believes it is no longer dependent on military support but seeks support for

political reasons will begin to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of

partnerships. That will influence the extent to which a country is prepared to

show consideration for the interests and viewpoints of potential partners.

During the Cold War, certain political and military decisions in the US would not

have been made against the express wishes of key European partners in

NATO. Although we Germans were completely dependent on the US for our

security at that time, we nonetheless welded much influence. Prior to the Iraq

war, there was a debate in Washington on whether, on political grounds, the US

should still show consideration to those who doubted not only the tactics but

also the goals and strategy of US policy. Or whether for the sake of protecting

the autonomy of US military action and the clarity of its own objective, it would

not be better, if need be, for the US to pursue its course alone and do without

critical and excessively self-confident partners. After all, there were other

partners who, although they did not support every tactical detail of Washington’s

decisions, did support its strategic orientation.

This change in thinking in some Washington circles was no longer based on the

premise that solidarity among all NATO partners was the key prerequisite for

military action. It was therefore no coincidence that the NATO offer to invoke

Article 5 of the NATO Treaty following 9/11 was not taken up in Washington. If

the US were to carry out an emergency unilateral action (which a priori the US

does not want but has not ruled out either) or if a Coalition of the Willing were to

replace action by NATO as a whole, this would have serious consequences for

NATO. One result of the difficult situation in post-war Iraq is that those in

Washington who are in favor of partners and alliances have again gained

ground. In view of this ongoing debate in Washington, we Europeans should

seize the occasion and, jointly with our American partners, develop concepts

and strategies to renew and intensify transatlantic relations.

This year, we are commemorating the 60th anniversaries of the end of World

War II and the beginning of the Nuremberg trials. After World War II and at the

request of all its neighbors, Germany linked its actions and thinking to

multilateral institutions and norms: to the United Nations, NATO, EU and

international law. International law is expressly given precedence over national

law in our Basic Law. During the last fifty years we have internalized these

framework conditions for German policy. Despite Germany’s "no" in the

concrete case of Iraq, the military dimension of German foreign policy will have

to be further developed. Ultimately, there is agreement on this in the Bundestag

and in the German Government. However, the question of the framework within

which we Germans want and have to act will keep arising. And due to its

geostrategic location, its integration in NATO and the EU, as well as its history,

multilateralism and international law play a greater role for Germany than for the

US when it comes to weighing interests and objectives rationally. For us,

multilateralism is a must, while for the US it is one of several options. This

difference in perspective is not new but it became evidently clear in the Iraq

war.

I would like to respond to the growing number of people in recent times who

take a skeptical view of transatlantic relations - and they are to be found on both

sides of the Atlantic - with the following argument: I believe that transatlantic

relations are just as important to Germany now as they were in the past, and

this applies even more so to Europe. The US rightly regards itself as an

"indispensable nation" but Europe should, with the same right, see itself as an

"indispensable partner". Incidentally, that goes not only for military and

economic issues but, ultimately, also for issues related to our democratic culture

and even for environmental protection. If Europe and the US were to oppose

each other, this would jeopardize the chance of achieving security and

democracy in many parts of the world. I foresee neither an end to the West nor

an end to the transatlantic alliance. Those who, in agreement with Oswald

Spengler, predict the "decline and fall of the West", will be proved wrong.

However, we find ourselves in the midst of a phase of adjustment and

reorientation. Time and again, whenever facts and thinking changed in the past,

so too was the West forced to redefine itself.

Beyond today, therefore, serious questions have arisen in the transatlantic

debate. We must try and answer them: many together with the Americans,

almost all together with our European neighbors and some of them on our own.

Ultimately, this is about what Germany should be in the European and global

context, what risks we are prepared to take, what influence and what power we

are striving to gain, what financial means and what instruments we are prepared

to employ for our priorities. The conclusions drawn from this German debate will

be influenced not only by the discussion among Germans but to a large extent

by the arguments put forward by our European and transatlantic partners.

Thank you.