"Belgium and South Africa - partners in Africa"
 

Mr. Henri Boshoff,
Military analyst, ISS.

Brussels, January 13, 2005

I'll give you a short introduction and then I'm going to look at the current situation in the DRC, then look at South African foreign policy and the question 'why cooperate?' and then 'coordination in the DRC'.

I'll quote the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister Zuma: "what we do on the continent is underpinned by our African agenda”. That is the position of the South African government. Included in this African agenda is the peace process in the DRC. It is important to take note that South Africa works in cooperation with the UN, the AU, the EU and the international community in the DRC. There is already an existing trilateral agreement between South Africa, Belgium and the DRC signed on 13th of December 2004, specifically in support to the DDR process or the Security Sector Reform process in the Congo.

What is the current situation in the DRC? I always refer to the “1+4” as the concept of the current government. Now, you’ll see different variations of this concept. The legislation is in place in the DRC. There are two pieces outstanding: the amnesty and the electoral act. The electoral act cannot be promulgated before the referendum has taken place. Then the transition has been extended. There were talks of protest on 30 June by the opposition, but it didn’t threaten the transition process. The voter registration has started on the 20^th of June. 2,4 Million voters were very quickly registered in Kinshasa. My last figures were 6 million. I’ve just been informed that now already 10 million people have been registered in the rest of the country. There is a detailed scheduled voter registration process that will run unto the end of September. The opinion of the IEC is that there still have to register around about 28 million voters.

Very important is that MONUC has drastically changed in the last year. Since some peacekeepers were killed in Ituri, MONUC established the MONUC divisional headquarters in the East. The deployed divisional HQs in Kisangani were three brigades: one in Ituri, one in North Kivu and one in South Kivu. The focus of the operations is on the East, basically in two faces: the first is Ituri where they managed to demobilise 14000 militias in a very short period. The process went very well to the DD, the problem is now the R. MONUC worries about the fact that the situation is not yet stable.  Then the focus moved to the Kivu’s, starting with robust operations against the FDLR. The end state of this operation against the FDNR is still unclear. What is the aim? If I ask them: “Do you want forcefully demobilising?”, the answer is no. They say: “Now, we want to encourage them to go back to Rwanda”.

MONUC is very worried about the unstable situation in Katanga and Kasai. The UN mission has asked the Security Council for an additional brigade to be able to deploy them in Katanga. Up to now, that hasn’t been approved. The plan B for MONUC is to use the reserve and unfortunately, that reserve is South African – Italian. The other option is to deploy them into the Katanga-Kasai area.

The DDR process started slowly. The six ‘brassage centres’ has been established with the support of Belgium, South Africa, Angola and the EU. Up to now, only three brigades have been integrated. The first brigade was trained by the Belgian government in Kisangani last year and has being deployed in the Ituri and it has actually a very good position. The second brigade was trained by Angolans at Kitona. The training of the third brigade has ended; it was done with the cooperation of South Africa and the Belgian government.

The idea of the “Emergency Plan” was to train 18 brigades before the elections. Then it came down to 12. Now they want to train 9 brigades before the elections to be able to deploy them as follows: three in Ituri, three in North Kivu and three in South Kivu. Because of the lack of resources, this process can be stopped. Before you can bring in the second wave of people to train, you have to equip the people that have just been trained to be able to deploy them. At this stage, the first brigade was equipped by the Belgian government; the second is in the process to be equipped by the Belgian government. But there is no further indication of any other equipment coming from the international community.

The DDRRR process, the demobilisation of the FDLR is not moving. After the Rome declaration, nothing happened. The leader group came back. The hardliners in Congo say they are not going back to Rwanda. They will only go back if the political space is open and we know the position of the Rwanda government.

On the issue of soldiers not being paid, this is now in the process of being addressed. The EU has deployed some financial advisers to the DRC, but also South Africa has deployed a group of 35 to do the counting. Between 40 and 60% of soldiers in the FARDC (AFDRC) are ghosts. That means they do not exist. That also means that the money allocated for paying the soldiers is going to be much more, so the possibility exists that you can pay the soldiers more and on a more regular basis.

Let’s have a look at the priorities of the South African foreign policy for 2005. Sustainable development is the other coin for democracy, referring to NEPAD. Burundi, DRC, Sudan and Somalia are on the list of priorities. The peace initiative taken up by South Africa is important to validate President Mbeki pledge to the G-8 that Africa can solve its problems and establish peace and security in the wider NEPAD framework. Peace, security, democracy and good political, economical governance are preconditions for sustainable development. African capacity should be improved by a system of peer review.

Now the question is “why to establish cooperation?” South Africa, Belgium and the DRC are already cooperating in the DDR process. South Africa understands the need for a sincere African intervention. It has set a formula for conflict resolution. If you look at the method the South African mediation uses in the DRC, Burundi etc., you’ll see that it is very much process-driven. You’ll see an inclusive process that tries always to get everybody as a part of the process.

What are the possible areas of cooperation? The first one is capacity building within the government. The government in Kinshasa does almost not exist. I think this is one of the areas where there is a possibility for South Africa and Belgium to cooperate. South Africa is already involved in bilateral agreements with other countries in helping to build capacity within government. There is a variety of areas in this capacity building worth for cooperation.

This important security sector reform will decide on the failure or the success in the DRC in the next few months. South Africa and Belgium are the driving force behind the SSR and to a big extent also with the Contact Group that is also pushing the Congolese government to cooperate. For the first time we have seen the so-called Congolese Strategic Plan. The Congolese give an idea on the way they want to go with the military. This SSR firstly involves a demobilisation process that already started with the six Brassage centres, the Emergency Plan… 

I think it will not be possible for South Africa and Belgium to ensure on their own that this process will be successful. You need all the partners in the Contact Group and the EU to participate, because at the end of the day the crucial issue is the funding of the SSR, of the 9 brigades that you want to deploy. In practical, if the brigades are not equipped, they will not be able to leave the Brassage centres. The whole process will be blocked. There is sometimes a problem of payment, food. Desertion occurs. Dissident groups of the Mai Mai as well as General Nkunda still exert their influence and that is a danger.

 

The elections are an important issue. The process of the voter registration started in June in Kinshasa. Everybody was ready to register. Due to logistical difficulties, the electoral process out of Kinshasa is a very expensive process. To get the electoral materials out to the field, you need to fly the equipment. MONUC is standing in for the moment. The UN SC has now approved further logistical support to help them with the transport of the equipment and the personnel to do the voter registration. A bigger problem is the voter education. I think there is an urgent need for voter education in the rural areas.

I think both South Africa and the Belgian government are already supporting the IEC. The equipment used for the voter registration is Belgian. South Africa sent some members from the IEC to help the IEC in Kinshasa with further training. In the field of supporting the IEC there is an opportunity for cooperation between the countries to move that process further.

 

The biggest problem is the repatriation of the FDLR. In 2002, there was an agreement between the Congolese government and Rwanda setting out a calendar for the withdrawal of the Rwandans. The agreement set up a Third Party Verification Mechanism consisting of South Africa and UN representatives (MONUC), tasked to monitor its application. The repatriation of the FDLR was supposed within 90 days. The first part happened within 20 days; within 20 days, Rwanda withdrew, but the FDLR is still there. We made various efforts for solving the problem of FDLR. MONUC suggested the voluntary repatriation, but they repatriated at maximum 3000 FDLR.

I think it is question of political space in Rwanda. The FDLR wants to have a discussion and to open the political space.  The funding for this repatriation process is not a problem: Rwanda has a lot of money for that and the international community has made millions available for this. It is more a political issue.

 

What will happen after the elections? Post-conflict reconstruction is very important for me. That brings me to the last point: “solving the coordination in the DRC”. The security sector coordination is better now, but is not been solved completely. There are basically three coordination mechanisms in the DRC: MONUC Security Sector Reform cell officially approved by the UN SC on the 9^th February 2004; the Contact Group consisting of European countries, the EU, South Africa and Angola; the EUSEC.

It was an open secret that this Security Sector Reform cell was not functional. The level of participation from the Congolese government was different every day and some governments didn’t attend the meetings. Since the establishment of the Contact Group and the deployment of the European section, there has been a big improvement on coordination. I think one of the advantages of the Contact Group is that they can prevent the Congolese government from playing games. In the beginning of this process, the Congolese went as well to South Africa as to Belgium asking the same thing. The Contact Group is a very good initiative. The next meeting will be on the 19^th in New York to ensure that the donor effort is well coordinated.

This only deals with the police and the military. My question is “how are you going to deal with the rest during the post-conflict reconstruction?

In conclusion, I think the cooperation between South Africa and Belgium is important because both countries have got interest in the DRC. South Africa has also a regional interest and it is interested in peace and stability in Africa. The coordination between the roles played is very important, otherwise we will not succeed. Lastly, if you bring stability and peace in the DRC, you will ensure it in the Great Lakes. The DRC is a part of the Great Lakes. I always say if you look at Africa and turn it to its side; it is like a revolver with the DRC the trigger. If you touch that trigger, everything around moves. It is very important to see it as a whole.

Thank you.