Expert seminar
"Belgium and South Africa - partners in Africa"
Remarks by
Koen Vervaeke, Policy Unit, Council of the EU
Brussels, September 13, 2005
EU support to peace and security in Africa
Recent significant evolutions in Africa, within the EU and the UN converge and tend to indicate that the EU should take advantage of the momentum that seems to be building.
I. SHIFTING POLICY PRINCIPLES
Africa
- Increased efforts by African countries to resolve conflicts; ownership.
- Progress in setting up structures focussing on security (AU, African Peace and Security Council, NEPAD, also regional level ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC).
EU
- ESS : underlines that security is the first condition to development. But also important for Europe’s own security: state failure and conflicts not only sustain poverty, they can also fuel organised crime, illicit trafficking and terrorism. In addition : principles of effective multilateralism and advocating a proactive, comprehensive and integrated approach bringing together all instruments (development, trade, economic, diplomatic, politico-military). Tackling both root causes and crisis management.
- The Council common position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa is on the same line. It identifies specifically security issues (African peace support capabilities, SSR; DDR).
- The Cotonou Agreement and EDF provide already important support for broad range of peace building activities. About 55% of total world aid is annually provided by the EU. Addressing the shortcoming of previous agreements by reinforcing the political dimension of ACP-EU cooperation.
Conclusion: Interesting case of policy changes and shifting priorities. What was an almost exclusive focus on economic and social development has increasingly developed into a more complex and comprehensive policy, where the political and security has gained importance, partly due to the recognition of the “failure” of development policies. The link between peace, stability, development and respect for human rights, rule of law, democratic principles and good governance was reinforced.
UN
- UN has a direct and obvious interest in peace and security in Africa. It is assisting the AU in developing its peace and security capacity. It examines UN and bilateral roles and resources involved in restructuring and training of defence capabilities in the wider context of security sector reform.
- Trilateral co-operation (EU/UN/AU). The EU is the larges financial contributor to the UN system. It pays 37% of the regular budget and 2/5 of the costs of UN PKO. EU recognises a primary role for the UN in the management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. Unlikely that the EU would engage in major peace efforts outside the UN framework or without approval of endorsement of the UN SC.
II. STRENGTHENED TOOLS/CAPABILITIES
CFSP/diplomatic/political
- Growing involvement in Africa. Recognition that only comprehensive approach, combing first pillar and second pillar can lead to durable results.
- Growing role by PSC and HR Solana. How to attain more coherent and effective action by combining the different efforts of member states through the available mechanisms of the CFSP and ESDP. Even bigger Member states experience and recognise that they cannot deal with African crises on their own. Notion of “pré carré” loses importance; need to mobilise EU support. Logic continuation would be EEAS.
Peace Facility
- €250M allocated form the European Development Fund (EDF) to the Africa Peace Facility : principle of African solidarity. Can be seen as the centre of the EU-AU partnership. Should be combined with logistical and technical (ESDP) support. Financing such political delicate operations, requires operational awareness of what is happening.
ESDP
- Continuation of CFSP with civilian and military capabilities.
- Artemis June 2003: turning point. Ground-breaking in terms of the EU’s commitment to answering collectively the challenges of peace and security in Africa.
- The EU started assessing what additional capacity (military and civil) available through ESDP could be envisaged as a contribution to the integrated approach the EU pursues in conflict prevention and management in Africa.
- Following sectors for possible ESDP:
o Autonomous EU military and civil crisis operational means – Battle groups concept. While the long-term goal of both Europe and Africa is for African-led solutions (or UN), the EU needs to be prepared to respond to immediate crisies, especially when no one else can or will. EU must be able to deploy its forces at short notice to developing crises to save lives and to allow time for the UN and/or the AU to deploy appropriate forces to manage the situation.
o Strengthening African peace support operations capabilities: €35M of Peace facility for capacity building. A number of EU members are already involved in building the peacekeeping capabilities of various African states through bilateral or broader training assistance (Benin, G8, RECAMP). The nascent AU peace and security mechanisms, including the African Standy Force, will require far greater co-ordination and support throughout the continent to realise the AU’s ambitious vision.
o Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR) and SSR (Security Sector Reform (military and police). IPU/EUPOL-EUSEC. Developing a concept. Entails either the return of former combatants and adversaries to civilian life, or their integration into new security mechanisms. WB, UNDP and EC are focussing on the challenges of DDR, but attention is often lacking when former fighters are being integrated into new security organs. The enormity of security reform challenges in Congo require far greater co-ordination of efforts and comprehensive EU action.
o Other: early warning capacity, combating arms trafficking, removal of landmines.
III. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS
EU
- Issue of political will. Enlargement versus focus on Africa.
- Issue of EU capabilities: headline goals military and civilian.
o Military : Few member states, apart from France and the UK have the capacity to deploy, support and command operations such as Artemis. Battle group concept.
o Civil-military planning cell in Kortenberg which would allow the EU to better prepare for operations which require a mixture of civilian and military instruments.
o Civilian capabilities: area where EU has already developed considerable experience. It has established pools of national specialists in the area of police, rule of law, civil protection, civil administration and monitoring.
- Issue of financing for CFSP (very limited budget) and ESDP (purely intergovernmental and not covered by the EU budget) operations: crucial. Immediate implications but also longer term (Stability fund, ODA versus non-ODA).
o Military : one of the limitations of the “framework nation” concept is financial. Except some common costs, cost lay where they fall. New mechanism ATHENA for EU led operations with military and defence implications.
o Grey zone: SSR advisory mission – CFSP or not (cfr EUSEC). Military or not? Need to adopt our concepts: EU support to third organisations (logistic, technical, etc), SSR, DDR.
o Civil: police missions, in field of training, monitoring. Commission developed some competence (RRM/EDF funding) : training police, DDR.
AU
- Danger that political expectations will overstretch capacity and undermine the credibility and development of AU initiatives.
- MOU AU and REC.
UN
- Support to African peacekeeping capacity is in the interest of the UN as could be EU operations, but this does not replace, in the view of the UN, EU and African participation in UN operations.