Jihadi Terrorism – Where Do We Stand ?
Second IRRI Conference on International terrorism
February 13, 2006

Gijs de Vries, EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator

"We are losing. Four years and two wars after the attacks on September 11, 2001, America
is heading for a repeat of the events of that day, or perhaps something worse. Against our most dangerous foe, our strategic position is weakening." So begins Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon's latest book, "The Next Attack". Are they right ? Are we indeed losing what many across the Atlantic still refer to as the 'war on terror' ?

From the vantage point of Al Qaeda, things may well look different. Notwithstanding the bloody efforts of Bin Laden and Zawahiri to prevent them, free and democratic elections have taken place in Afghanistan and Iraq. Millions upon millions of voters in Indonesia similarly ignored Jemaah Islamiyah's calls for a caliphate and strengthened parliamentary democracy in the world's most populous Muslim nation. Bin Laden's offers of a truce have been rejected out of hand by both Europe and America. Many leading terrorists in Europe, Asia and Africa have been killed or imprisoned. And Al Qaeda's key strategic objective, the overthrow of "apostate" governments in islamic countries such as Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia has proven elusive. Not much of a victory there.

But jihadi terrorism has not been defeated either. In fact, the terrorist threat has become more complex and hence more difficult to counter.

The current wave of terrorism perpetrated in the name of Islam has its genesis in the Afghanistan jihad. This provided the ideological underpinning for Al Qaeda's objectives of expulsion of infidels and establishment of a caliphate as well as the necessary training in terrorist methods. Denial of space to the terrorists in Afghanistan was therefore probably the most important act in the global fight against terrorism - and the continuing operation there is vital to consolidate the achievements so far. But success has also brought new challenges.
As the networks have gone underground and sought new theatres, they have become more diffuse and more difficult to trace. Bin Laden's biggest success has been to unite a series of hitherto disjointed and geographically dispersed struggles by small groups with different local agenda's into a global struggle with a common purpose. This has not been achieved through centrally directed structures but through ideology and inspiration. The result is an amorphous, fluid set of relationships between the various terrorist networks across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. There has been no linear progression from one to the other. Terrorism has spread on a global scale through a mix of informal contacts and the power of the Internet under the umbrella of a common - though diffuse - ideology.

The threat to Europe comes as much from these tenously linked groups as from core Al Qaeda itself. It can be categorized as a three tiered threat. At the first level is what is left of core Al Qaeda and its leadership. This has been severely degraded in recent years. Its ability to plan and organize attacks has been reduced and it is having difficulty raising funds. But it remains active and continues to represent a threat to Europe, particularly through the involvement of Abu Mussab Al Zarqawi. His organization is geographically close to Europe, it has a serious capability and Zarqawi has been involved in the planning of attacks as well as recruitment. In October, a judge in Düsseldorf sentenced two Jordanians, a Palestinian and an Algerian to up to eight years for their involvement in a plot inspired by Zarqawi to attack Jewish targets in Germany. Muriel Degauque, the Belgian convert to Islam who became Europe's first female suicide bomber in Iraq, had been recruited by groups linked to Zarqawi. In December, the Spanish authorities broke up a cell they believe was connected to Zarqawi. The Groupe salafiste pour le prédication et le combat (GSPC), which linked itself to Al Qaeda in 2003, has called for a jihad against France, declaring France to be its "number one enemy".

At the next level, there are groups with a loose affiliation to Al Qaeda, many of them with South Asian origins. Typically these groups will receive some sort of guidance on the targets they should attack, but they are left to plan and carry out the attacks independently. Links between European-based cells, particularly in the UK, and Kashmiri groups indirectly related to AQ, for example, remain strong. One of the London bombers is known to have been trained by the Kasmiri group Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen.

Finally, there are a number of Islamist groups not formally affiliated to Al Qaeda but who appear to draw inspiration from AQ's ideology and operations. A number of extremists from North Africa, particularly Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunesia fall in this category. Somalia is also of concern as a training ground.

Irrespective of whether there are links to Al Qaeda or not, the greatest threats in Europe now come from groups linked either to Kashmir/Pakistan or to North Africa. Even in cases of 'home grown terrorism' there often appear to be external links of some kind, even if these do not always extend to operational support. The threat is now more serious than it was several years ago because there has been a shift in the role of European networks of extremists from acting as a logistical support base for operations elsewhere to preparing to attack their home base. Although some of these networks have links to established terrorist organizations most of them act independently and have no formal membership structure. This means they have the flexibility to form different types of associations, and indeed cross-ethnic networks are becoming a feature of European based groups. Most of them have widened their agenda beyond national conflicts in Algeria, Morocco, or other countries of origin. International conflicts such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and now Iraq have helped spawn a new generation of extremists who have adopted a pan-Islamist agenda. Many of those who live in Europe have selected their country of residence as their target. The greatest threat comes from a combination of experienced veterans with recruits from local networks who are prepared to become suicide bombers. Not all groups are equally professional. Sometimes training and planning are unsophisticated and this has resulted in hurried operations which failed (21/7 in London appears to be an example of such an operation). Good work by law enforcement officials and security services - both domestically and across European borders - has resulted in several attacks being foiled. Overall, however, the threat to Europe certainly has not abated.

Since 9/11 and particularly since 3/11 the European Union has been expanding its role in the fight against terrorism. In December 2005 the European Council adopted a revised strategy against terrorism which the British Presidency and I had proposed. The Council identified four strategic priorities:

" to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment, in Europe and internationally;
" to protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to an attack, including through improved security of borders, transpost and critical infrastructure;
" to pursue and investigate terrorists across our borders and globally; to impede planning, travel, and communications; to disrupt support networks; to cut off funding and access to attack materials, and bring terrorists to justice; and
" to prepare ourselves, in the spirit of solidarity, to manage and minimise the consequences of a terrorist attack, by improving capabilities to deal with the aftermath, the co-ordination of the response, and the needs of the victims.

I would like to say a few words about the first strand of the EU strategy: preventing people from turning to terrorism. What can we do to stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging ?

Most people, including most Muslims, do not accept extremist ideologies. Even amongst the small number that do, only a few turn to terrorism. The decision to become involved in terrorism varies from one individual to another, even though the motives behind such a decision are often similar. There can be no excuse or impunity for such actions, but it is our responsibility to identify and counter the ways, propaganda and conditions through which people are drawn into terrorism and consider it a legitimate course of action.

There are practical steps an individual must take to become involved in terrorism. The ability to put ideas into action has been greatly enhanced by globalisation: ease of travel, transfer of money and communication - including through the internet - mean easier access to radical ideas and training. Governments can spot such behaviour for example through community policing and monitoring travel to conflict zones. We also need to disrupt such behaviour. This means limiting the activities of those playing a role in radicalisation, including in prisons, places of education or religious training and worship. We need to prevent individuals gaining access to terrorist training. This is one reason why European security and intelligence services are keeping a close watch on people who travel from Europe to conflict zones, including Iraq. The EU and the member states are also working to create the right legal framework to prevent incitement and recruitment; and they are examining ways to impede terrorist recruitment through the internet. We are pursuing political dialogue and targeting technical assistance to help others outside the EU to do the same.

There is propagation of a particular extremist worldview which brings individuals to consider and justify violence. In the context of the most recent wave of terrorism, for example, the core of the issue is propaganda which distorts conflicts around the world as a supposed proof of a clash between the West and Islam. This diagnosis distorts perceptions of Western policies ands feeds suspicions of hidden agendas and double standards.

There is a range of conditions in society which can create an environment in which individuals may become more easily radicalised. These conditions include poor or autocratic governance; states moving from autocratic control via inadequate reform to partial democracy; rapid but unmanaged modernisation; lack of political, economic, or educational prospects; and unresolved international or domestic strife. Within the Union these factors are not generally present but in segments of the population they may apply. Immigrant communities in Europe and the societies they join are also facing difficult issues of identity, as the debate over the cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed clearly demonstrates.

We must eliminate the structural factors supporting radicalisation both within the Union and outside it. As part of our response, within the Union we must target inequalities and discrimination where they exist and promote inter-cultural dialogue and debate to strengthen the social fabric of our societies. We must also promote long-term integration. Although responsibility for integration policy remains primarily with the member states, in the Hague Programme of 5 November 2004 the Council underlined the need for greater co-ordination of national integration policies, and common basic principles for immigrant integration policy were agreed later that year. As the Council recognised, "the failure of an individual member state to develop and implement a successful integration policy can have … adverse implications for other member states and the European Union." Much work in this field still lies ahead.

Outside Europe, the Union will continue to promote good governance, human rights, democracy as well as education and economic prosperity, including through co-operation and assistance programmes with third countries and work through international organisations. And we must work to resolve conflict. This the EU is committed to do through its peacekeeping missions, its engagement in the Middle East peace process, the African Peace Facility and other means. The Union and its member states already account for half of the world's official development aid; they are determined to increase aid levels further.

To fight terrorism effectively, governments need to ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism by engaging with civil society and faith groups that reject the ideas put forward by terrorists and extremists that incite violence. And Europe needs to get its own message across more effectively, to change the perception of national and European policies. Defeating terrorism is not only about stopping the terrorists; it is ultimately about winning hearts and minds. This means we must also ensure that our own policies do not exacerbate division. It is particularly important to maintain the balance between liberty and security. The measures taken to counter terrorism must be compatible with human rights law and humanitarian law.

Torture is unacceptable under any circumstances. In July 2005 the EU recalled "that there is an absolute prohibition placed on the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and that all states must ensure that they do not resort to these barbaric practices." As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in his annual Human Rights Day message last December, "torture can never be an instrument to fight terror, for torture is an instrument of terror".

The right to a fair trial is another non-derogable fundamental human right. To uphold it is not a sign of weakness but a source of strength.

A few years ago the Israeli Supreme Court had the following to say: "This is the essence of a democracy - it does not see all means as acceptable, and the ways of its enemies are not always open before it. A democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back. Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and the liberty of an individual constitute important components of its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to overcome its difficulties."

Despite warnings from Al Zarqawi and others that for Muslims support for democracy is "the very essence of heresy", support for democracy in the Muslim world remains strong. Many yearn for honest multi-party elections, a fair-handed judiciary and a free press to report without government censorship. Accountability and civil liberty are powerful instruments to counter the forces of extremism and terrorism. Of course democracy is not just about free elections, and a democratic culture does not emerge overnight. Free elections may result in radicals, even extremists gaining power, as happened in the Palestinian territories last December. However, Hamas will now have to face the fact that violence and democracy are incompatible - it cannot have it both ways.

Democratic reform is not a panacea: in and by itself democracy will not root out anti-Western sentiments or terrorism. But no strategy to win hearts and minds will be effective if freedom and equity are not at its very centre.

Jihadi-style terrorism thus presents us with difficult questions and dilemmas. To contain and reduce the threat consistent and determined efforts will be required for many years to come. In selecting our instruments we must take care to uphold the values we have pledged to defend. And moderate Muslims have a crucial role to play in delegitimising and isolating the extremists who claim to speak in the name of Islam.

In fighting terorism it is important to keep a sense of proportion. Bin Laden and those who follow him have failed to impose their ideas on the countries they have targeted. Democrats have not been cowed into submission. Freedom is proving stronger than fear. Our values are the true source of our strength. No doubt there will be further setbacks in the fight against terrorism, in Europe and elsewhere in the world. But the values of liberty and democracy will prevail.