Jihadi Terrorism – Where Do We Stand?
Second IRRI Conference on International terrorism
February 13, 2006

Jihadi Movements in North Africa: the Dynamics of Radicalisation, De-radicalisation and Redeployment
Dr. Hugh Roberts, International Crisis Group

Introduction and overview

In the report "Understanding Islamism" published in March of 2005, we suggested that it is useful to distinguish not only between the political, missionary and jihadi branches of Sunni Islamic activism, but also within the jihadi current of activism.. We distinguished three different variants: the irredentist jihad, fighting to redeem land ruled by non-Muslims or under occupation; the internal jihad, combating nominally Muslim regimes not recognised as Muslim and to which the jihadis do not recognise the obligation of loyalty; and the global jihad combating the West.

North Africa has been the theatre of an extremely large-scale experience of the internal jihad, in Egypt and Algeria. I think it is fair to say, looking at the current situation of the most important of those internal jihads, that they have been failures. And the North African Islamists themselves appear to agree that they were failures and are in a process of reflecting on the lessons of that.

Let me give you a brief overview of the position:

In Egypt the jihadi mainstream appears to be out of business for the time being. The two main organisations that were engaged in violent activities in the 1990s, Tanzim al-Jihad (the Jihad Organisation) and Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group), have both been entirely inactive since the horrific massacre at Luxor in late 1997. Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya has explicitly repudiated its previous jihadi activities in what was a very remarkable process of recantation; they called this "the correction of concepts". In the case of the Jihad Organisation, Tanzim al-Jihad, we have seen redeployment from the internal to the global jihad in Al-Qa'eda.

The other element of the picture in Egypt is, of course, the events in Sinai, the bombing at Taba, in October 2004, and even more appalling terrorist attacks at Sharm El-Sheikh last July. These events remain shrouded in mystery. All the Egyptian experts confessed to be puzzled by some aspects of them. It is very striking that the Egyptian authorities preferred not to be very forthcoming about them. What does seem to be clear is that they have nothing to do with the mainstream jihadi movements of the 1980s and 1990s. They most likely are overspill - certainly the Sharm El-Sheik affair exhibited features that suggest it has been overspill - from the Iraqi situation. There are big question marks about these incidents.

In Algeria, the situation is nothing like what it was a decade ago. Terrorism has been reduced to a low level; the vast part of the territory is quite secure. There are certain areas where it is inadvisable to go, certainly at night. The most important groups are spin-offs of the Armed Islamic Group: the 'Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat' (GSPC), in the eastern half of northern Algeria and also now in the Sahara, and the 'Guardians of the Salafi Call' in Western Algeria, which is not really very active. What is clear is that in Algeria these groups do not pose any specific threat to the state.

The third case is Morocco, which suddenly entered our category of countries suffering from terrorism with the extraordinary bombings in Casablanca in May 2003. Since then, analysts have talked about a particular group known by its French acronym as the GICM, the 'Fighting Moroccan Islamic Group' (Groupe Islamique Marocain Combattant). This is held responsible for the bombing in Casablanca and in Madrid. With Madrid in mind, it has to be taken very seriously as a significant terrorist threat in the European context.

Although I think that there are elements of fragility in the Moroccan political situation, I don't think that we are looking so far at the development of a jihadi movement within Morocco on anything like the scale or with anything like the striking power of the movements that occurred in Algeria or Egypt in the 1980s or 1990s.


Radicalisation, de-radicalisation and redeployment

Now, I want to talk about the dynamics of radicalisation, de-radicalisation and redeployment.

If we look at the Algerian and Egyptian movements over time, we see that they exhibit quite striking trajectories. Sometimes there is a trajectory of radicalisation, sometimes one of de-radicalisation. Sometimes, there is a rather greater degree of constancy in their outlook and activity.

In the case of Egypt for example, there is a contrast between Tanzim al-Jihad and Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya. There doesn't seem to have been any significant radicalisation or de-radicalisation of the Jihad Organisation, which engaged in activity in Egypt for a while and then redeployed to the global level. It hasn't really changed its agenda, outlook or perspective.
In the case of Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, there was a very clear process of radicalisation at the end of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, followed by intense violence, which was then followed by de-radicalisation.

How do we explain this contrast? I should like to make a suggestion here.

The Jihad organisation was from the outset extremely elitist and purely military. This is the organisation which assassinated the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat. Its 'handwriting', its hallmark, is pure terrorism. That is not true of Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, which always had an orientation to mass politics of some kind, whether conceived as the traditional religious mission or in a more modern, political, agitational manner. For that reason, its conversion to armed struggle was less doctrinaire and theoretical; it was a reaction to the repressive activities of the Egyptian state in a dialectic of challenge and response. Its original orientation to some forms of mass politics may very well have been a premise of its leaders' subsequent recognition that they made a mistake in going down the armed struggle road. Many of its leaders have recently expressed an interest in trying to find a way back into non-violent politics.

It follows that it is important to distinguish between different groups in terms of whether they are purely terrorist groups or whether their form of struggle is a more complex affair.


Contrast and contexts

If we compare the Algerian movement, the 'Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat' (GSPC), with the Moroccan group, the GICM, we can regard them both as 'terrorist'. Both came out of the broader ideology known as the Salafiyya and can be classified as belonging to the the Salafiyya Jihadiyya. But, looking more closely, we can see some striking differences.

The GSPC has never committed any terrorist attacks outside Algeria - the only exception I know of is the attack on a fort in northern Mauritania, which was a very mysterious and suspect affair. It hasn't engaged in the global jihad in Europe, despite the fact that it has networks across Europe. On the other hand, if we believe the media reports, the GICM was responsible for Madrid as well as for Casablanca.

Secondly, the GSPC has never engaged in suicide bombings. It is rather striking that the GICM should have engaged in suicide attacks in Casablanca but not in Madrid. How do we explain jihadi terrorists resorting to suicide attacks on the London transport system and not on the Madrid transport system, when they had already used suicide attacks in Casablanca? There are all kinds of peculiarities that we need to take account on in understanding what is really going on. I think that we need to take account of national contexts and their specificities.

In the case of the Algerian movements, we need to take account of the extent to which they locate themselves in a specifically Algerian tradition of a popular warfare. The GSPC came out of the earlier Armed Islamic Group and broke with it precisely on an issue of radicalisation and de-radicalisation. The GIA had radicalised its struggle from being a struggle against the Algerian state to a struggle against all Algerians who were not "good Muslims" - denouncing the society as "having left Islam". This was the theoretical rationale for the terrible massacres in 1997-1998. This was what precipitated the GSPC's breakaway, since it rejected that extremist doctrine.

It is not obvious to me that the GICM is the product of a similar national tradition. Its peculiar behaviour may be a function of the extent to which its roots are in Europe, through the Muslim diaspora.


The variable effects of repression

There are various other factors we need to take into account in order to understand the dynamics of radicalisation and de-radicalisation. A very important factor in both directions is state repression.

There is no doubt that the Egyptian state's treatment of the original, non-violent, movement of the Jama'at (the various Islamic agitational groups) in the late 1970s had a radicalising effect and pushed them in the direction of armed struggle.

There is also no doubt that when the Algerian state clamped down on a non-violent Islamist agitation in 1981-1982, this precipitated the formation of the first jihadi movement in 1982 - the forerunner of the main movement that conducted operations from 1992 onwards.

On the other hand state repression can have a de-radicalizing effect, such as the one on the Egyptian Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya in the 1990s.


The significance of debates within Islamism

We should not neglect the role of the other trends within Islamism in having a de-radicalizing effect on jihadi movements. This is something Western discourse tends to overlook almost entirely.

In fact there is an important argument going on within contemporary Islamism - arguments between jihadis and non-jihadis and arguments amongst jihadis - over to what extent strategies and tactics etc. are 'licit' (that is, valid in terms of Islamic law). One should not underestimate the role of the entirely non-violent Muslim Brotherhood in criticising the doctrinal underpinnings of the Egyptian jihadis.

It is such a mistake to employ crude categories, lumping all brands of Islamic activism together, as so often happens. This sabotages a productive debate going on within contemporary Islamism, and does so to the benefit of the most extreme jihadi tendencies as a rule.

Thank you.