



Conference

“Understanding how Jihadists in Indonesia rejuvenate themselves”

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Introduction

Jamaah Islamiyah, a pan-Southeast Asia jihadi network, has been weakened by arrests and other counter-terror measures put in place since the October 2002 Bali bombing, parts of the organizations, or even individuals, can continue to function in partnership with non JI groups¹. Since then, terrorists have struck with murderous effect, twice in Jakarta -- at the Marriott Hotel in August 2003 and in the vicinity of the Australian Embassy in September 2004 -- and once again in Bali last October. But which group and how are the partnerships forged?

In the wake of each of these attacks, Indonesia responded in the way a democracy should: balancing security needs, the democratic process and respect for human rights². However, Indonesia like other part of Southeast Asia provides conditions that allow terrorists to operate, such as weak state control, porous borders, and corruption³. Yet at the same time the Indonesian public is skeptical about the existence of an international terrorist problem. Not only is there general denial amongst the Indonesian population but Indonesian's political leader have had to tread carefully on the issue.

This essay mainly based on author's direct interviews with jihadists in Indonesia⁴ Martha Crenshaw reminded us that terrorism research lacks an empirical foundation of 'primary data based on interviews and life histories' of those engaged in terrorism⁵. Also, less effort has been put into listening what the terrorists themselves have to say.⁶ Moreover, interviews

¹ International Crisis Group report 2001. Apart from this report, the author has documented more than 300 arrested jihadi in Southeast Asia, most of them JI members.

² Wirayuda, Hasan, Islam and process of democratization in Southeast Asia, *The Jakarta Post*, December 8, 2005

³ Smith, L Anthony, 'The Politics of Negotiating the Terrorist Problem in Indonesia', in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28:33-44, 2005.

⁴ The author was a journalist for the Washington Post who interviewed hundred of jihadists in Southeast Asia. From 2002-2005

⁵ In Horgan, John, 'The case of first hand research' in Silke, Andrew, Research on Terrorism, Trend, Achievements and Failures.

⁶ Horgan, John, The Psychology of Terrorism (Routledge:London and New York : 2005) xv

yield rich insight into people's biographies, experience, opinions, values, aspirations, attitudes and feelings.⁷

Thus, it is not the ambition of this essay to come up with any new magic bullets to understand this complex phenomenon of terrorism in Indonesia rather to provide a study from first hand sources on how these jihadists rejuvenate themselves even though the high ranking members had been decapitated.

In the first section, the author explains briefly the concepts he uses and elaborates the importance of having a clear definition of terrorism for the on going counter terrorism measures in Indonesia. In the next part, he lays out on how to understand the Jihadis movement in Indonesia by looking at the existing Islamic resistance group, kinship, place of recruitment and distribution of militant books that forged them together. If the pattern outlined in this essay holds true, Indonesia will not be able to eradicate *Jamaah Islamiyah* or its jihadist partners, even if it arrests every member of the central command. Even if *Jamaah Islamiyah* closed up shop tomorrow, the terrorism problem would not go away - of those detained in Indonesia for terrorist activities, only about half are *Jamaah Islamiyah* members; the rest belong to other jihadist groups. Finally, he concludes that the potential recruit can be prevented and predicted by more attention to a few key measures and the threat would be able to contain.

Clarification of concepts and its implication

Terrorist and Terrorism

Compounding the problem of fighting terrorism in Indonesia is the fact that there is still widespread public disbelief about the threat posed by *Jamaah Islamiyah* and many in Indonesia still view the whole war against terrorism as a plan to weaken Islam. Some even say: the terrorist threat real of hocus pocus?⁸ Both the phenomenon of terrorism and our conceptions of it depend on historical context-political, social and economic and how the group and individuals who participate in or respond to the actions we call terrorism relate to world in which they act.⁹

The terrorist phenomenon has a long and varied history by lively debates over the meaning of the term. One of the problems is a simple: there is no widely agreed definition of terrorism. The solution, however, is elusive¹⁰. By ignoring this history, the Indonesian government runs the risk of repeating the plethora of mistakes that faced similar threats in

⁷ May, Tim, Social Research Issue, methods and process (Open University Press: Maidenhead:2003)

⁸ Zulaika, Joseba and Douglas A. William, Terror and Taboo The Follies, Fables and Face of Terrorism (Routhledge New York and London:1996) p 8.

⁹ Crenshaw, Martha, Terrorism in Context, (The Pennsylvania State University Press:1995) p3

¹⁰ Silke, Andrew, Research on Terrorism. Trends, Achievements and Failures (Frank Cass: Great Britain; 2004) p 3.

the past.¹¹ Certainly many candidates for universal definition have been proposed. Schmid and Jongman recorded 109 different definitions in their famous review in the mid 1980s, but an energetic compiler today would have little trouble gathering at least twice that number.¹² It is not in the scope of this essay to provide a profound discussion on this theme, thus the author will adopt a broad definition of terrorism as: “the use or threat of use of violence as a means of attempting to achieve some sort of effect within a political context”¹³ where the political dimension separates it from regular violence.

Of course, few terrorists call themselves terrorist; many are ‘freedom fighter’ or heroic defenders of a worthwhile cause.¹⁴ But what sort of freedom are they fighting for? Certainly not the kind we enjoy.¹⁵ Terrorism clearly is an extremely complex set of phenomena, covering a great diversity of groups with different origins and causes¹⁶.

Islamism and Global Salafi Jihad

Many Western observers and policy-makers have tended to lump all forms of Islamism together, brand them as radical and treat them as hostile. However, this monolithic concept is both fundamentally misconceived and misleading in its policy prescriptions. Islamism – or Islamic activism (we treat these terms as synonymous) – has a number of very different streams, only a few of them violent and only a small minority justifying a confrontational response¹⁷. In fact, Islamic activism has a number of very different streams, only a few of them violent. The starting point to understand the different streams of Islamic activism is to distinguish between *Shiite* and *Sunni* Islamism¹⁸. *Shiism* is the minority variant of Islam (Sunnis constitute over 80 per cent of Muslims) and the most widespread and natural form of *Shiite* activism has been communal -- defending the interests of the *Shiite* community in relation to other populations and to the state itself.¹⁹ For this reason, and because of the leading political role played by scholars and religious authorities, *Shiite* Islamism has remained unified to a remarkable degree and has not fragmented into conflicting forms of activism as has *Sunni* Islamism.²⁰

¹¹ Audrey, Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism, The Center of Strategic Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

¹² Schmid, Alex and Jongman, Albert, Political Terrorism, 2nd edn (Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988). Schmid spends more than 100 pages grappling with the question of a definition, only to conclude that none is universally accepted.

¹³ Horgan, John, The Psychology of Terrorism, (Routledge: London and New York: 2005) p 1

¹⁴ Whitaker J, David, Terrorism Understanding Global Threat (Great Britain:2002) p 4

¹⁵ Dobson, Christopher and Payne, Ronald, War without end the terrorist : an intelligent dossier, (Harry; UK 1986) p 338

¹⁶ Bjorne, Tore, eds, Root of Causes of Terrorism. Myth, reality and ways forward (Routledge: London and New York: 2005) p 1.

¹⁷ ICG Report on Islamism 2003.

¹⁸ For a constructive recent discussion of this issue, see Kennedy, Hugh, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphate(Pearson:2004) also see G.S, Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 3 vol. (University of Chicago:1974)

¹⁹ Milani M.Mohsen, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic (Westview Press/Boulder and London:1988).

²⁰ Shariati, A., Islamshinasi in Iran, Suroosh, Revolutionay Islam in Iran Popular Liberation or Religious doctrinship? P ix

In medieval times the war words waged by Western writers against Muhammad, Islam and The Koran is emphasized.²¹ Today, most Western emphasis is placed and most fears are held about *Sunni* Islamism, which is often viewed as uniformly fundamentalist²², radical, and threatening to Western interests. On the contrary, *Sunni* Islamism is diverse and its variant streams can be grouped into three main distinctive types, each with its own world view, modus operandi and characteristic actors:

- *Political*: Islamic political movements that generally accept the nation-state and operate within its constitutional framework, eschew violence (except under conditions of foreign occupation), articulate a reformist rather than revolutionary vision and invoke universal democratic norms. The characteristic actor is the party-political militant.
- *Missionary*: the Islamic missions of conversion (*al-da'wa*), exemplified by the highly structured Tablighi movement and the highly diffuse Salafiyya movement, whose overriding purpose is the preservation of the Muslim identity and the Islamic faith and moral order against the forces of unbelief. The characteristic actors are missionaries (*du'ah*) and the 'ulama.²³
- *Jihadi*: the Islamic armed struggle (*al-jihad*), which exists in three main variants: internal (combating nominally Muslim regimes considered impious); irredentist (fighting to redeem land ruled by non-Muslims or under occupation); and global (combating the West). The characteristic actor is, of course, the fighter (*al-mujahid*).

The interpretation of Jihad by Al Qaeda and its associates such as *Jamaah Islamiyah*, makes killing an obligation in the name of Allah.²⁴ Through developing a state of war between the righteous Muslims, 'we', and the infidels in the West, 'them', all civilians in the West are subject to attack.²⁵ They see the international actors as the enemies, which are opponents in a war, and consequently are outspoken and justifiable targets.²⁶ By waging a war against the 'far enemy', with maximum damage to these, they seek to reach maximum popularity among the Muslim masses²⁷.

The description given by Gilles Kepel that "Al Qaeda has become a franchise, with Bin Laden merely the logo for small-time operations managed by independent micro-entrepreneurs working under license to provide terrorism"²⁸, is largely agreed upon among students of al Qaeda, whereas Osama Bin Laden (OBL) and Ayman al Zawahiri provide the

²¹ Hitti, Philip K, *Islam and the West* (D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc : 1962) p 3

²² Tibi, Bassam, *The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalist: Attitude toward Modern Science and Technology*, in Marty E, Marty and Appleby R Scott, *Fundamentalism and Society* (The University of Chicago Press 1993). According to Tibi, contemporary Muslim thinkers have accepted a recently coined term in modern Arabic, *usuliya* ('fundamentalism), based on the concept of *usul* (fundamentals, 'roots of principles), which is as old as Islam.

²³ An interview with Tal'at Fuad Qosim by Hasyim Mubarak in Beinun Joel and Stork Joe, *Political Islam* p.37. Tal'at said: "Religion requires not just personal 'conversion'. We began by spreading our message but our goal has been the establishment of Islamic state".

²⁴ Bin Laden Osama, "*Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders*", p. 412

²⁵ Wiktorowicz, "*A Genealogy of Radical Islam*", p. 94

²⁶ Kepel, "*The War for Muslim Minds*", p. 123

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds – Islam and the West*, p. 141

extreme ideology for the true believers and the vanguard of the greater Islamic revolution. Looking at that characteristic posed by Al Qaeda and associates, therefore, the author concludes that *Jamaah Islamiyah* is part of global *Salafi* jihad that has been defined by Marc Sageman as “a worldwide religious revivalist movement with the goal of re-establishing past Muslim glory in a great Islamic states stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, eliminating present national boundaries”²⁹

Jihadist movement in Indonesia

Indonesia is still in process of transition. Islam, as a moral force in support of reform, has played a strong and positive role, although it must also be said that there have been times when Muslim militants and extremists loomed as part of the problems Indonesia grappling with. These people have been using ‘jihad’ as a way to appeal the support from Indonesian Moslems who feel alienated in the process of democratization.

Joining jihad is actually a process and not a single decision. The formal induction into Al Qaeda often took place in Afghanistan, when the novice pledged *baya*, a formal oath of loyalty, to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda³⁰. ‘Joining the jihad’ is understood here as the decision to go somewhere for training, whether Afghanistan (the most common destination), Bosnia, the Philippine, Malaysia or Indonesia³¹. It is important to note that everyone who participated in the training joined the jihad.

In this section, the author explains about social factors people joining jihad which according to the author are complex interrelation among the existing resistance movement of *Darul Islam*, the place of recruitment (conflicts areas), kinship, discipleship and distribution of militant books that could lead people to join jihad, forged the partnerships and rejuvenate the group.

Darul Islam: the spawning ground for ‘joining the jihad’

To understanding of jihadi movement in Indonesia, we have to understand the existing religious resistance movement called *Darul Islam* (DI) and its efforts to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia. Over the last 55 years, that movement has produced splinters and offshoots that range from *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) to non-violent religious groups. Greg Fealy points out that “former Darul Islam areas have proven a rich source of new members for JI and are likely to remain so in the future”³². Every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a new generation of young militants, inspired by Darul Islam's history and the mystique of an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life.³³ The Darul Islam movement that began as separate rebellions in West Java,

²⁹ Sageman, Marc, “Understanding Terror Networks” (University of Pennsylvania Press; 2004) p1

³⁰ Ibid 91

³¹ Ibid 92

³² Fealy, Greg, “Islamic Radicalisms”, pp. 111-112

³³ Author’s interview with Tajul Arifin. Arifin is one of young Darul Islam members who disappointed with their old leader within the organization. He tried to assassinate Indonesian politician. He served in jail for five years. An interview was conducted after his release on July 2005.

South Sulawesi, and Aceh in the 1950s is now one very loose but enduring web of personal contacts that extends to most of the major islands in Indonesia.³⁴

Over the years, younger, more militant members of Darul Islam have formed new groups, of which JI is one. The common Darul Islam heritage is so powerful a bond that it facilitates contacts and communication across the entire extended family. These people know and visit each other, go to school together, intermarry, and keep in touch across generations. They also feud, bicker, and not infrequently, inform on each other. But the network endures, even as its component parts are constantly changing³⁵.

Within days of the explosion, Indonesian police determined that two known Malaysian JI members, Azhari Husin and Noordin Mohammed Top, were involved³⁶. But it became apparent that they were working in partnership with an offshoot of Darul Islam called the Banten Ring, operating in old Darul Islam strongholds in western Java. Three of the young men recruited as suicide bombers from the Banten Ring, including one who died in the September bombing, had fathers in Darul Islam.³⁷

Place of recruitment

All senior members of the central command of *Jamaah Islamiyah* come from Darul Islam. The Indonesian had joined the global jihad in Malaysia, where the eventual leadership of *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI) has been exiled. They were trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, before Jama'ah Islamiyah formally existed. It was in the camps of the Saudi-financed Afghan mujahidin leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf that they developed jihadist fervor, international contacts, and deadly skills.³⁸

Afghanistan veterans became the trainers of a new generation of mujahidin when *Jamaah Islamiyah* set up a camp in Mindanao from 1996 to 2000 in a reciprocal arrangement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).³⁹ The recruits trained in everything from explosives to sharp-shooting and included not only JI members but also members of like-minded jihadist organisations from other parts of Indonesia, especially South Sulawesi and West Java. This means that Indonesia has to worry about other organizations as well, whose members have equally lethal skills but do not operate under the JI command structure

³⁴ Author's interview with Gaos Taufiq, Darul Islam leader, on July 2005 in North Sumatra, Indonesia. He is among the first generations of Darul Islam who still alive. He is in his late 60ies.

³⁵ Author's interview with Fauzi Islam, former member of Darul Islam. He was involved in rebellion in Sumatra in late 80ies. He served 10 years in jail. He is free now.

³⁶ Alan Sipress and Noor Huda Ismail, '3 Fugitives Muslim Militants Suspected in Jakarta Attack,' *The Washington Post*, September 11, 2004.

³⁷ Author's interview with the father of suicide bomber who is Darul Islam member in West Java July, 2005

³⁸ Author's interview with a Malaysian Nasir Abbas, the head of Jama'ah Islamiyah command for Malaysia in July 2005 in Jakarta. Abbas was arrested for two years for possessing gun and false document. He was trained and fought in Afghan in 1989.

³⁹ Author's interview with Muhammad Syaefudin on July 2003 in Jakarta Prison. Syaefudin participated *Jamaah Islamiyah's* training in Moro in early 2000.

In Maluku and Poso are the worst communal conflicts of the immediate post-Soeharto period. Soeharto was the Indonesia president who stepped down by force in 1998. Since then, Indonesia was in fragile situation where many religious conflicts between Islam and Christian community erupted. For Jihadists, the conflicts were seen as the best place to put into practice their military skills as well as to draw many regular Moslems to actually join the jihad. Maluku and Poso, but particularly Poso, have the potential to develop into a *qoidah aminah*, a secure area where residents can live by Islamic principles and apply Islamic law: in their view, such a base could then serve as the building block of an Islamic state. Maluku and Poso thus remain a focus for religious outreach and recruitment efforts.⁴⁰ For example, In September 2002, the State Intelligence Agency uncovered a cache of damning videotapes made by a Saudi-German extremist named Seyam Reda. One of the clips showed sermonizing Arabs spreading messages of hate and intolerance to rapt audiences in Sulawesi and Kalimantan. Another, dated Dec. 1, 2001, was of an Islamic prayer session in Central Sulawesi, during which weapons were distributed to militants as well as al-Qaeda member Umar Farouq. Yet another, filmed a few hours later, showed the militants pillaging and plundering on the outskirts of Poso⁴¹.

Kinship

The *Jamaah Islamiyah* network is held together not just by ideology and training but also by an intricate network of marriages that at times makes it seem like a giant extended family. For example, Ali Ghufron, one of key operatives in the first Bali bombing, is married with the younger sister of Nassir bin Abbas, the head of *Jamaah Islamiyah* commander for Malaysia. Two of Ali Ghufron's brothers: Ali Imron and Amrozi were deeply involved in Bali bombing. Ali Fauzi, one of Bali bombers who still at large, is Ali Ghufron's half brother⁴². Kinship bonds also extended to in-laws. Yazid Suffat became more religious thorough his wife's urging. He studied with senior members of *Jama'ah Islamiyah*, ended up joining that organization and was the host of the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda conference leading to Cole bombing and the 9/11 operation.⁴³ Haris Fadillah, a Moslem militia leader, arranged the marriage of his daughter, Mira Agustina, to Omar al-Faruq, an al Qaeda representative in Southeast Asia, in one day⁴⁴. Insufficient attention has been paid to the role the women of *Jamaah Islamiyah* play in cementing the network. In many cases, senior JI leaders arranged the marriages of their subordinates to their own sisters or sisters-in-law to keep the network secure.

Discipleship

According to Marc Sageman, The Southeast Asian cluster is unique⁴⁵. He argues that in Southeast Asia, teachers command strong personal loyalty from their students. This loyalty may be life long, as illustrated by the three *Jamaah Islamiyah* convicts incarcerated in Singapore, who testified against their former teacher Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in June 2003.

⁴⁰ Author's interview with a number of people who involved in that communal conflict in 2004 and 2005

⁴¹ Hendropriono, A.M, Enlisting Cleric is not enough, *The Jakarta Post*, December 5, 2005

⁴² Author's interview with Ali Imron in Jakarta prison, July 2005

⁴³ Ibid 112

⁴⁴ Author's interview with Mira Agustina in her house in West Java in 2003

⁴⁵ Ibid 114

Despite their damning testimony, two spontaneously started to cry at the sight of their teacher. They repeated that they loved him but urged him to tell the truth about his activities⁴⁶.

Jamaah Islamiyah also depends on a small circle of *pesantrens* – Muslim boarding schools – to propagate jihadist teachings⁴⁷. Of the more than 14,000 such schools in Indonesia, only a tiny number are committed to jihadist principles, but there is a kind of JI “Ivy League” to which JI members send their own children⁴⁸. Chief among these is *Pesantren* al-Mukmin, better known as Pondok Ngruki, whose founder, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, is believed to have been JI’s *amir* or top leader between late 1999 and 2002. Most members of the network share common characteristics: loyalty to *pesantren* or its founders; commitment to carrying on the struggle of Darul Islam rebellions of the 1950s; desire to create an Islamic state by first establishing an Islamic community or *jemaah islamiyah*, and shared experiences of political detention in the 1980s. The other *pesantren* is ‘Al Islam’ in East Java. Ali Imron, one of key Bali bomber was a teacher in that *pesantren*. While *pesantren* Darus Sya’adah in Central Java has been linked to some of the *al-Ghuraba* militants, arrested in Pakistan in 2003 and at least one of the October 2005 Bali bombers. Also, at least one *pesantren*, called Al Iman in Poso, Central Sulawesi, has raised eyebrows for its incendiary teachings.⁴⁹

The distribution of militant books

In 2003, the field commander of the first Bali blast, Imam Samudra released a 280 page jailhouse autobiography titled “Me against the Terrorist” contains harsh justifications for Bali attacks.⁵⁰ The book has been received highly response among militants and could inspire them. Achmand Michdan, Samudra’s attorney who wrote the forward said that thousand copies have been issued in at least seven cities across island of Java and Sumatra. Michdan said that the publisher is considering translating the book into English, French and Arabic⁵¹.

Samudra’s ideas can be traced back to the Egyptian radical Muhammad al-Faraj who was executed by Cairo in 1982 for his role in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. Faraj’s pamphlet, the Neglected Obligation, was influenced by works of al Banna, Maududi and Qutb that brought their incipient absolutizing ideas to their ultimate conclusion. Faraj asserted that the “Qur’an and Hadist were fundamentally warfare”. He also said that not just infidels but even Muslims who deviated from the moral and social dictates of *shariah* were legitimate targets for jihad⁵². While on Samudra’s global awareness such as his word: “Remember, the main duty of Muslims is Jihad in the name of God, to raise arms against the

⁴⁶ Author was present in that court in June 2003.

⁴⁷ Ismail, Noor Huda, ‘Is Ngruki a school of terrorism?’ The Jakarta Post 2004

⁴⁸ *Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous* (Jakarta/Brussels; International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 36, 26 August 2003).p26.

⁴⁹ Author visited this *pesantren* in 2005

⁵⁰ This year, Nasir Abbas, a reformed *Jamaah Islamiyah* member told the author that one of the Kuningan bombers was inspired by Samudra’s book to join 'the Jihad'. On last August 2005 in Ambon police detention, Asep Djaja (31), one of KOMPAK members who were involved in the police attack in Seram Island expressed the same thing to the author.

⁵¹ Author’s interview with Achmad Mihdan in 2003

⁵² Juergensmayer, Mark, Terror in the Mind of God: Global Rise of Religion Violence (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), p.81

infidels, especially now the United States and its allies” had been inspired by the teaching of charismatic Palestinian Abdullah Azzam, a key mentor of Osama bin Laden. Azam met the family of Qutb and was friendly with the “blind sheikh” Omar Abdur Rahman who would later be implicated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York.

Conclusion

The prevailing assumption has been that *Jamaah Islamiyah* is the only organization with the expertise, international ties, and ideology to constitute a likely partner in South East Asia for al-Qaeda or another international terrorist group. Interviews in the field indicate that this risk analysis of radical Muslim violence in Indonesia needs to be revised. *Jama'ah Islamiyah*, however, will continue to constitute a longer-term security threat for Indonesia. This is not only because its leaders believe that military force is necessary to achieve an Islamic state, but also because the religious indoctrination and recruitment efforts they are engaged in are likely to produce at least some cadres more hot-headed than their teachers, who look beyond Indonesia to a more international agenda. The arrest or the killing of the top leader of the group does not translate into the end of the group. Therefore, it is important to target mid-level terrorist leaders, discrediting top-level leaders and disrupting their support networks.

At the same time, it is increasingly clear that there are many smaller, local groups in Indonesia, some of whose members have Afghan or Mindanao training, whose deep-seated grievances could lead them to draw inspiration from the bin-Laden fatwa. It is, of course, one thing to draw inspiration and another to work with a group like al-Qaeda to pull off a major attack. It remains important to keep the threat of terrorism in perspective. Indonesia is not about to be overrun with jihadists. They remain the radical fringe of a radical fringe. Their capacity to do damage, however, continues to be cause for serious concern.

The counter-terrorism lessons include:

- Far more attention needs to be paid to understanding recruitment methods of jihadist organisations, not just JI but also local groups with more parochial concerns.
- More attention also needs to be given to the religious indoctrination these groups undertake, including books published by jihadists. While understanding that the same material taught by different teachers can lead in very different directions.
- Top priority should be to prevent the emergence of the kind of international training center that Afghanistan provided in the past. The personal bonds established there are almost certainly more important than ideology or money in facilitating partnerships among jihadist groups.
- Democratic reforms, especially an impartial, credible legal system, a neutral and competent law enforcement agency, and better access to justice, remain absolutely essential to preventing the kind of vigilantism that radical groups can manipulate.

