

Strategy or Stratagem?

The European Security Strategy in Perspective

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The adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), *A Secure Europe in a Better World*,¹ by the European Council on 12 December 2003 was a major step for the EU, though not necessarily one with lasting impact. For the very first time the Member States solemnly adopted a common strategic vision for the whole of EU foreign policy. Yet reluctant Member States could still hope, as a number of observers did expect as well, that soon after its adoption the ESS would disappear into some dusty drawer – the key of which some would probably have liked to present to NATO for safekeeping. There was indeed a risk that the adoption of the ESS, which was accompanied by the necessary pomp and circumstance, would be nothing more than a one-off demonstration of regained unity after the intra-European divide over Iraq, a step of high symbolic value but with little impact on actual policy-making. A stratagem rather than a strategy...

The ESS has certainly not disappeared however. Quite the contrary, it is omnipresent in EU discourse. In many policy documents and decisions on different aspects of foreign policy, especially those relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its military dimension, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the guidelines fixed by the ESS are constantly being referred to. They also serve as the connecting thread throughout the trainings organized by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) for practitioners from the Member States.² In the decision-making process, Member States as well as the European institutions make good tactical use of the ESS: the more convincingly a proposed initiative can be linked to it, the more difficultly it can be opposed. A *strategic culture* is thus developing at the EU level, i.e. the habit of automatically referring to the strategic framework of the ESS when taking decisions, and the willingness to undertake the actions and commit the means required to achieve those strategic objectives.

A Strategy Is Born

Contrary to the views of those observers who are perhaps too strongly influenced by the ‘strategic studies’ of the Realist school,³ the ESS effectively is a strategy, as it is defined in public management terms. A strategy is a policy-making tool which, on the basis of the values and interests of in this case the EU, outlines the long-term overall policy *objectives* to be achieved and the basic categories of *instruments* to be applied to that end. It serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment and it guides the definition of the *means* – i.e. the civilian and military capabilities – that need to be developed. A strategy thus obviously is not meant to be an operational document, another reason used to dismiss the strategic claims of the ESS.⁴ It is a mission statement, which has to be translated into sub-strategies for specific policy fields and then into concrete policies and actions; it thus has an inspirational function vis-à-vis policy-making.⁵ This mission statement does contain a number of explicit choices.

Not all of these choices are new of course. The EU was able to build on an extensive foreign policy *acquis*, so many of the strategic choices contained in the ESS were already evident as emerging orientations in actual EU policies. Rather than adopting a fundamentally new orientation, to a large extent therefore the ESS must be seen as the codification of existing foreign policy guidelines. In other words, although the context of the Iraq crisis would suggest a deep division between Member States, the ESS actually builds on a strong consensus on the basic orientations of EU foreign policy. Because it builds on the past, on existing guidelines established during ten years of CFSP, and even before, the ESS has been able to transcend the context of its adoption. It thus has the potential to have a durable impact on the future of EU

foreign policy-making. A comparison can be made with the codification of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the predecessor of the CFSP, in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. The SEA did not really strengthen the informal mechanisms of EPC, but by giving them a legal basis did prevent that they would be weakened. Codification creates a framework from which it is afterwards more difficult to depart; it circumscribes the room for manoeuvre of future policy-making.

Naturally, the ESS is not perfect. It could only build on consensus in areas where that existed. On a number of issues it remains particularly vague because consensus was absent or not yet strong enough. Many issues are mentioned in the ESS, because not to do so would have invoked strong criticism, but no more than that. Most notably, no real choice has yet been made on the nature of the transatlantic partnership and the degree of autonomy of the EU as an international actor vis-à-vis NATO and the US. The real intra-European divide over Iraq did not concern the substance and principles of policy. Based on an assessment of past policies, it can safely be argued that all Member States agree that in principle the use of force is an instrument of last resort which requires a Security Council mandate. The real issue at stake was the nature of the transatlantic partnership. If the US reverts to the use of force in a situation in which the EU in principle would not do so, or not yet, what then has priority for the EU: steering an autonomous course, based on its own principles, or supporting its most important ally? This divide remains a fundamental obstacle to a fully cohesive and resolute CFSP.⁶ Nevertheless, the ESS does contain a number of clear choices and thus certainly has the potential to serve as a strategic framework for EU foreign policy.

An Integrated Strategy

The ESS can best be characterized as a holistic, integrated or comprehensive approach.⁷ This comprehensive approach can be conceptualized through the notion of global public goods (GPG), which emerged in the context of the UN at the end of the 1990s. GPG have traditionally been seen in the context of development, but currently the concept is being used more and more in more general political terms, e.g. by Joseph Nye.⁸ Starting point of this approach is the assumption that there are a number of ‘goods’ that are global or universal in the sense that it is generally felt – at least in Europe – that every individual is entitled to them.⁹ Like in the ‘human security’ approach, the individual is the point of reference. If to a certain extent the definition of the core GPG is a political and normative choice – Rotberg uses the term ‘political goods’¹⁰ – many elements have been recognized as being universal beyond any doubt, notably in the field of human rights. These goods are public in the sense that their provision cannot be left to the market but should be supervised by government at the different levels of authority (local, national, regional and global).

These core GPG can be grouped under four broad headings:

- physical security or ‘freedom from fear’;
- political participation, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- an open and inclusive economic order that provides for the wealth of everyone or ‘freedom from want’;
- social wellbeing in all of its aspects – access to health services, to education, to a clean and hazard-free environment etc.

These GPG are strongly interrelated: ultimately, one cannot be ensured or enjoyed without access to the other; the four categories are therefore equally important. Effective global governance means ensuring access to GPG; a system that fails to provide the core GPG lacks legitimacy. Global stability, and therefore the security of all States, depends on the availability of sufficient access to the core GPG. Rather than terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other military threats, the most important threat is the ever growing gap between haves and have-nots, a gap which can be best expressed in terms of access to the essential GPG. While this gap and the feelings of exclusion, marginalization and frustration resulting from it certainly do not justify conflict, they do help to explain it, which is a prerequisite for prevention and resolution of conflicts. The gap between haves and have-nots is foremost among the challenges of the globalized world, because it is a threat of a systemic nature, i.e. it results from the malfunctioning of, and impacts on, the global order itself. For unless mechanisms of governance are created or rendered more effective that can alleviate this situation, at a certain level of inequality, the resulting political upheaval, extremisms of all kinds, economic uncertainty and massive migration flows will become uncontrollable. Because of this interdependence GPG are non-exclusive, like true public goods: ultimately maintaining our access to GPG requires improving others' access. Since it denies access to core GPG to a large share of the world's population, the status quo is not an option.

Against this background, specific politico-military challenges do stand out. They include regions of chronic tension and long-standing disputes and conflicts, failed States and civil wars, proliferation of WMD and excessive militarization, and terrorism. These challenges directly threaten people, States and regions. They have to be tackled head-on, but as they are symptoms of the 'dark side of globalization', effective global governance, improving access to GPG, must be pursued at the same time as the key to *preventing* such threats. 'Security is the precondition of development', the ESS States, but this works the other way around as well. Of course, the strength of the causal relationship between, on the one hand, the gap between haves and have-nots in the broadest sense and, on the other hand, specific politico-military issues differs from case to case. Nonetheless, in the long term no durable solution of politico-military problems can be achieved unless the stability of the world system itself is assured.

Implementing a comprehensive or holistic approach, based on the notion of GPG, has evident policy implications.

The first is *integration*. Because the core GPG are inextricably linked together, action must be undertaken to address all of them simultaneously and in a coordinated fashion, by all relevant actors, in all fields of external policy, putting to use all the instruments at their disposal, including trade, development, the environment, police, intelligence and legal cooperation, diplomacy, and security and defence. In the words of the ESS:

Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

The same plea for a comprehensive approach could be found in the objectives of EU external action as formulated in the draft Constitutional Treaty (Article III-292), which put additional emphasis on aspects of global governance, such as sustainable economic, social and environmental development, the eradication of poverty, the integration of all countries into the world economy, and the abolition of trade restrictions. In its recent communications on

development, the Commission has explicitly mentioned the provision of ‘universal public goods’ as a basic factor.¹¹

Although policies in all of these fields must be integrated under the same overall objective of increasing access to GPG, in order to avoid contradictory actions being undertaken, each policy should continue to operate according to its own rationale and dynamic. ‘Securitization’, i.e. the instrumentalization of non-military dimensions of foreign policy in function only of ‘hard’ security concerns or ‘freedom from fear’, must be avoided, for it ignores the intrinsic importance of the other GPG. Here a difference can be seen between the ESS and the National Security Strategy of the US (NSS). The latter actually devotes more space to issues such as democracy, human rights and trade than the ESS, but these fields are all instrumentalized in function of the one near exclusive priority of US strategy: the ‘war on terror’. An integrated approach deals with all GPG simultaneously, but does not require that all issues must be put under the label of security. On the contrary, although this may raise their importance in the eyes of States, it also blurs the distinctions between policy areas. Poverty or HIV/AIDS are of a different nature than terrorism, proliferation or conflict: they can be life-threatening but they do not imply a threat of violence and cannot be tackled by politico-military means. Accordingly, rather than including all challenges under the label of security, issues must not be dealt with as security threats unless they pose an effective threat of violence. In that sense, the ESS has perhaps not really been aptly named. It really is a foreign policy strategy rather than just a security strategy, a title which apparently has been chosen in reference to the NSS.¹²

The second policy implication is that by thus addressing the root causes of conflict, a policy oriented on the core GPG emphasizes *structural conflict prevention*. This presents a formidable challenge: it implies dealing with more issues, related to all the core GPG, at an earlier stage, before they become security threats. Effective prevention is much more than mere appeasement: it demands a proactive stance, aiming to change circumstances that induce instability and conflict. Mark Duffield analyses how structural prevention in effect amounts to the ‘merging of development and security’:

[Development] is no longer concerned with promoting economic growth in the hope that development will follow. Today it is better described as an attempt, preferably through cooperative partnership arrangements, to change whole societies and the behaviour and attitudes of people within them.¹³

In this broad sense, development ‘not only leads to the reduction of poverty, more political freedom, and greater affirmation of human rights, but also lays the foundation for more durable peace and security’.¹⁴ In the terms of the Commission:

Development is crucial for collective and individual long-term security: they are complementary agendas and neither is subordinate to the other. There cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and sustainable development is the best structural response to the deep-rooted causes of violent conflicts and the rise of terrorism, often linked to poverty, bad governance and the deterioration and lack of access to natural resources.¹⁵

A policy oriented on GPG will thus in fact be quite intrusive, which can make it rather contentious with the target countries.¹⁶ But as it is in the very nature of GPG that pursuing them is in the mutual interest of all concerned, it is at the same time a very positive approach,

contrary to other, threat-based strategies. 'For whom' rather than 'against whom' is the question that determines policy. The sincere pursuit of GPG will bring greatly enhanced legitimacy. As Nye advises the US: 'we gain doubly from such a strategy: from the public goods themselves, and from the way they legitimize our power in the eyes of others'.¹⁷

Thirdly, as effective action in all policy fields concerned requires the cooperation of a wide range of actors at many different levels, a GPG-oriented policy implies *multilateralism*: an intricate web of States, regimes, treaties and organizations, i.e. multi-level governance, implicating all levels of authority in a coordinated effort to improve people's access to GPG. Although in the spirit of human security the individual is taken as point of reference, the State remains a primary partner, for no effective arrangements can be made with weak and failed States. In the words of the ESS: 'The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic States'. Third States must therefore be seen as partners for cooperation rather than as mere subjects of EU policies; the aim is to influence rather than to coerce, to use the carrot rather than the stick. There will be cases where the use of force is inevitable, for not all actors are amenable to preventive initiatives and security threats will arise. But in the framework of multilateralism, the use of force can only be a measure of last resort to be mandated by the Security Council. In those cases, the legitimacy acquired through the pursuit of GPG can be capitalized upon.

The EU is not the only actor pursuing an integrated approach. The *Outcome Document* of the UN's Millennium+5 Summit of September 2005 puts forward the linkages between security, development and human rights, dubbed the three freedoms by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his preparatory report.¹⁸ The important contribution of the EU to the debate on UN reform and its central role at the actual Summit has certainly influenced this outcome. Individual States as well are developing integrated approaches and have set up new structures in that light, such as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit in the UK and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the US. At the same time critics of the NSS are calling for an integrated approach.¹⁹ In the development of integrated or holistic policies and institutions, the EU undoubtedly is a trend-setter.

The Integrated Approach in Practice: The Neighbourhood Policy

The December 2003 European Council called for the mainstreaming of the ESS into all relevant policies. Integration, of all dimensions of foreign policy, is indeed the key to its implementation: 'coherence is the key to all success', in the words of Javier Solana.²⁰ Promoting everyone's access to the core GPG can serve as the overall objective. In fact, the EU has at its disposal the full range of instruments to that end; only it does not always manage to use them in a coherent manner. Trade policies often have negative implications for development e.g., or maintaining relations with certain regimes is sometimes difficult to reconcile with promoting democracy and respect for human rights.

Bringing the integrated approach of the ESS into practice seems furthest advanced in the context of long-term policy vis-à-vis the EU's direct neighbours: the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP was launched in the same period as the ESS with the aim of building a 'ring of friends' around the EU, the second objective mentioned in the ESS. With each neighbouring country a comprehensive bilateral action plan incorporating all dimensions of relations is negotiated. The founding principle is 'positive conditionality': in return for progressive liberalization of the movement of persons, goods, services and capital

(the ‘four freedoms’) the EU expects political, military, social and economic reforms and cooperation. The ENP, in spite of its contractual nature, thus reflects the intrinsically intrusive nature of the integrated approach. So far action plans have been agreed with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine; those for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia and Lebanon are in preparation.

Although the basic philosophy of the ENP seems sound, implementing ‘positive conditionality’ is far from evident, witness the fact that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) after ten years of operating along the same lines has only very limited results to show for it. On the one hand the proverbial carrot offered by the EU is probably not substantial enough to convince the target States to make significant concessions. Those measures that probably would have more potential for the time being surpass the political will of the Member States, e.g. accepting more immigration into the EU or abandoning protectionist agricultural policies. Furthermore most of the neighbours on the European continent really aspire to full membership. On the other hand even a substantial carrot will not produce any influence on policy without a stick, i.e. if allocation of the carrot is not effectively conditional on the achievement of the reforms subscribed to in the action plans. But for that purpose the action plans seem insufficiently operational: rather than providing specific actions, a timeframe and clear benchmarks, they list general principles. Also it is not always clear how the process will be judged.²¹ Effective conditionality requires a degree of political courage which the EU is not always able to muster and the corporate culture of the Commission seems averse to it. A common strategy on the use of conditionality must still be elaborated.²² Consequently, in many Mediterranean countries e.g. the EU is perceived as preferring stability over democracy and therefore as dealing mainly with the regimes, while the US is considered the true champion of freedom. In the sense that in practice therefore the link between different aspects of relations is not always made, the ENP is insufficiently integrated or holistic. Furthermore certain challenges, such as the excessive militarization of the Middle East, require multilateral dialogue, but the ENP does not offer any reinforcement of the weak multilateral dimension of the EMP.

It must be noted that ‘even though the carrot could be juicier, few partner countries haven chosen to absent themselves from the process’.²³ But perhaps there is an upper limit to what can be achieved through the consensual ENP. Many of the target States are ruled by authoritarian regimes serving only their own interests. In such States incremental progress can probably be achieved in terms of human rights and the rule of law without fundamentally attacking the regimes’ power base. Democratization however de facto amounts to regime change – and which regime would voluntarily abandon its power, regardless of the carrot on offer? The EU does not seem to have resolved what should be the desired end-state of the ENP: incremental progress while preserving stable relations with the regimes in place, or effective democratization and the at least temporary instability implied by every transformation? Recent events have highlighted the urgency of this dilemma. The gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine that marked the beginning of 2006 will probably lead to renewed attention on the part of the EU for its continental neighbourhood, notably the Black Sea area. In that sense, if Russia’s aim was to mark its sphere of influence, its actions seem to have been counterproductive. Bringing in the energy perspective, which hitherto was not very prominent in European strategic thinking, will however complicate the difficult balancing act of building relations with these States even further. In the EU’s Mediterranean neighbourhood, the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections on 25 January 2006 demonstrates that even the probably most democratic elections in the Arab world bring problems of their own. Building on established EU policies towards the region and the Middle

East peace process, careful diplomacy should stimulate the Hamas leaders to renounce violence and capitalize on their victory to effectively pursue their objectives via political means.

Effective Multilateralism: The Integrated Approach at the Global Level

Effective multilateralism is the third objective mentioned in the ESS: ‘the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’. This can be translated as a network of multilateral mechanisms and institutions that together manage to provide everyone access to the essential GPG or, in other words, effective global governance. Although this is the approach propagated by the UN as well, it proves to be even more difficult to implement at the global level than in the EU’s neighbourhood.

Much can be done at the country-specific or ‘global-bilateral’ level. As in the framework of the ENP, agreements between the EU and the ACP countries increasingly link different dimensions of relations through conditionality mechanisms and have thus become more ‘political’. At the Millennium+5 Summit the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was decided, which in the post-conflict phase would bring to the table all relevant UN and other actors on a country-specific basis. Although it should not be considered a panacea, as certainly in the first stage it will deal with only a few countries every year, the PBC creates the institutional forum to bring the integrated approach into practice. By contributing financially and operationally, the EU should play an exemplary role in this context. An issue meriting particular attention is the exchange of information on specific countries. Like the UN, the EU collects a wide range of country-specific data. The Commission’s Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit assesses the conflict indicators in the Country Strategy Papers, for which the Commission Delegations in the field are a vital source of information, and in close cooperation with the Council Secretariat and the Joint Situation Centre provides a watch list of potential crisis States. The watch list is confidential, but in the framework of EU participation in the PBC, an arrangement should be found allowing for the complete sharing of all information available, in order to ensure its optimal use. Ideally, joint action plans integrating different actors’ programmes would eventually be drawn up. It is not entirely sure thought that all actors involved subscribe to the integrated approach and the conditionality which, to a certain degree, it inevitably implies.

An integrated approach of *cross-border issues* is rendered problematic by the fragmentation of the multilateral architecture, which sees different organizations dealing separately with each policy field. Although objectively the agendas are often linked, decision-making in e.g. the World Bank or the IMF does not necessarily take into account the Security Council, nor does the WTO always look to the ILO. Ecosoc, the Economic and Social Council of the UN, has not managed to fulfil the coordinating role that in principle it has been assigned and essentially remains a talking shop without any impact on the ground, in spite of a multitude of reform proposals. Effective socio-economic governance thus seems notably far away. Yet the question is whether country-specific policies can be successful in the long term without reform of the multilateral structure. Perhaps in due course positive experiences in the PBC can stimulate integration at the ‘global-multilateral’ level.

A related problem is that the EU Member States still do not speak with a single voice in the different UN and multilateral bodies, even if there is a trend towards increasing coordination,

e.g. in the Security Council. The opportunity e.g. to have a single EU seat in the organizational committee of the PBC has not been grasped. The coordination between Member States' delegations in different bodies remains minimal, so that even when Member States speak with a single voice in one organization, the same States often take a different position in another.

Again as in the framework of the ENP, effective multilateralism demands an effort on the part of the EU, including financially, notably achieving the 0.7% target for ODA, increasing the efforts in the field of debt relief and abandoning dumping and protectionism in trade policies.

Crisis Management: An Integral Part of the ESS?

Since the adoption of the ESS the EU has launched several operations, military, civil and civil-military. In early 2006 no less than 11 EU operations were ongoing, which demonstrates a growing awareness of the possibilities and responsibilities of the EU as a global actor. It is often overlooked that if all operations are taken into account (EU as well as NATO, UN, national and coalitions of the willing), on average 50 to 60,000 troops from EU Member States have been deployed at any one time in 2003-2006, including 4 to 5,000 for UN-commanded operations (blue helmets) and another 30 to 35,000 for UN-mandated operations (ISAF in Afghanistan, Althea in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo); the remainder are mostly in Iraq.²⁴ EU Member States are thus certainly not averse to deploying their forces.

Yet the large majority is deployed on the Balkans, where the EU and its Member States logically assume responsibility, and in Afghanistan and Iraq, as a follow-up to the invasion initiated by the US and a number of EU Member States themselves. The number of European troops in sub-Saharan Africa on the contrary is marginal, certainly when set against the political and economic weight of the EU. Nevertheless, in sub-Saharan Africa except for the African Union the EU seems to be the only actor potentially willing – at least on paper – to implement peace support operations, reason why the UN is likely to appeal to Brussels. In January 2006 e.g. the UN requested the EU to consider making available a deterrent force during the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This request for a potentially risky operation was certainly not well-received by all Member States. Before Solana voiced a favourable reply – but stressing that the force might stay on alert outside the country – the German parliament e.g. was notably quick to voice its objections. In view of the responsibilities of the EU as a global actor, future force planning ought to take into account a greater contribution to peace support operations worldwide; that Member States prefer 'sub-contracted' operations under the EU-flag to contributing blue helmets to UN-commanded operations is less important as long as the boots are on the ground.

If Member States are indeed deploying their forces, there still is no consensus on deployment under the EU flag where crisis management is concerned. Although legally the Petersberg Tasks include all operations except collective defence, but including peace enforcement at the high end of the spectrum of violence, politically the Member States are still divided over the EU's level of ambition in this field. As long as in a crisis situation some Member States will look to Washington before taking a position, the EU cannot be a consistently resolute actor. Even though with Operation Artemis in the DRC in the summer of 2003 the EU has proven that it can mount high-risk operations if the political will is present, other EU-led operations are mostly low-intensity. To some extent therefore the criticism is justified that the EU takes on important but mostly 'easy' operations, in the post-conflict phase, in reaction to a

settlement of a conflict. The slow reaction to events in Darfur demonstrates that this criticism can in fact be applied to the international community as a whole. The EU should work proactively working towards conflict resolution, through its diplomacy, and when necessary contributing forces in earlier stages of a crisis or conflict. EU policy towards Iran is an example of such a proactive stance.

Nevertheless one must question whether in view of this lack of consensus on high-intensity operations, all Member States are willing to fully accept the implications of their strong diplomatic support for the principle of 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) that was endorsed at the Millennium+5 Summit. R2P implies that if a State is unable or unwilling to protect its own population, or is itself the perpetrator of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity, national sovereignty must give way to a responsibility to protect on the part of the international community. In such cases, the Security Council must mandate intervention, if necessary by military means. It is to be expected that to that end the UN will appeal to the recently created 'battlegroups', which are configured for high intensity operations and which the EU has declared will be primarily deployed at the request of the UN. Rapid reaction and use of force can be required in other scenarios as well, notably in the event of a renewed escalation on the Balkans. Will all Member States readily accept the risks associated with such per definition high intensity operations and will they be willing to contribute the forces and command & control capability required?

Integrated Capabilities

In the framework of ESDP the building of command & control structures and the transformation of Member States' armed forces is steadily progressing. There is however a missing link between ESDP and the ESS. Quantitatively, ESDP remains limited to the capacity of deploying a maximum of 60,000 troops, as per the original 1999 Headline Goal, which as shown above corresponds to the number of troops that the Member States are already deploying today. Together the five 'illustrative scenarios' as well, on which the EU Military Staff bases the definition of capability requirements, concern only 200,000 troops, one third of which to be deployed at any one time, in view of rotation, while the 25 have almost 2 million men and women in uniform. Setting aside this quantitative limit, and abandoning the customary comparison with the US, the political objectives of the ESS should be translated in a realistic military level of ambition, based on the full military potential of the 25 and on the responsibilities of a global actor of such weight. Which forces do the 25 want to have available at any one time for rapid response in crisis situations? Which forces do they want to contribute to long-term peacekeeping operations, on the Balkans and in Afghanistan, but also at the request of the UN, e.g. in Africa? Which over the horizon reserve does that require? Which capacity for territorial defence must be maintained? The long-term vision which the EU Military Committee is drafting should offer a first response to these questions in 2006. Essentially however this is a political choice.

On the basis of that choice, capability requirements for a comprehensive military capacity at the aggregate level of the 25 could be drawn up. No longer would each Member State separately have to invest in a wide range of capabilities organized at the national level, often in small and therefore inefficient quantities. Within such a framework, top-down coordination would allow those that are willing to opt for specialization, i.e. abandoning certain capabilities altogether, and pooling, i.e. offering a capability only through contributing to a multinational formation. Only the larger Member States, which have a sufficient scale by themselves,

should logically continue to offer a broader range of nationally organized capabilities. Top down coordination is the only way to end the fragmentation of and useless duplications within the European defence effort and generate more 'usable' forces within the current combined budget of the 25, which stands at about €180 billion. Such far-reaching integration is only possible in the framework of the wider political project of the EU, not in the exclusively intergovernmental context of NATO, although the integrated capabilities could of course still be deployed for NATO operations.

In the meantime the EU has taken the lead in building integrated civil-military structures in which both the Commission and the Council Secretariat are represented. After the joint Situation Centre, the Civil-Military Cell, including an Operations Centre, has become operational, and a concept for civil-military planning has been elaborated. Efforts are underway to improve the availability of police, civil protection and other civilian experts. As a consequence of its leading role, EU expertise is increasingly in demand, e.g. for the monitoring mission in Aceh, which became operational on 15 September 2005.

The clearest indication of the EU's success is perhaps the desire by some in NATO and the US to recuperate its achievements and gain access to EU civil-military capabilities. Faced with the necessity that even high-intensity military operations must incorporate a civil dimension from the start, to which is added the fact that many interventions currently in demand are of a primarily civilian nature, the Alliance has realized that it will need to adapt or risk obsolescence. The in itself very welcome relief operation in Pakistan following the earthquake of 8 October 2005, including airlifting supplies and deploying medical units and engineers from the NATO Response Force (NRF), must also be seen in this light. The same holds true for the NATO Katrina Support Operation in September 2005, following the hurricane that struck New Orleans, which also saw the deployment of NRF capabilities. NATO is limited however in what it can do in this area by its very nature, i.e. that of a military Alliance. Developing deployable civilian capabilities in such fields as police, the rule of law and human rights seems to be beyond its scope and would certainly not meet with the approval of all Allies. Hence the idea has been raised to create an 'inverse Berlin+' arrangement that would give NATO access to the EU's civilian capabilities, in particular the Civil-Military Cell and the deployable capabilities. This option has been rejected from the start by most EU Member States however, who do not want to relinquish control over civilian assets forming an integral part of the EU to a military organization. Thus a new duplication debate arises, for the other option would be for NATO to add on a civil element of its own to its command & control structure. Neither option would alter the basic fact that NATO covers only the politico-military dimension. Even if the Alliance were to be equipped with a civilian crisis management capacity, it could never acquire the development and trade instruments that are vital for the post-intervention stabilization and reconstruction efforts. In that sense the centre of gravity seems to be shifting to the EU.

The next challenge for the EU is to forge the link between the progressively integrated crisis management capabilities in the second pillar and the long-term policies in the first pillar, notably in the post-conflict phase of stabilization and reconstruction. Reinforcing the authority of the EU Special Representative vis-à-vis other EU and Member State actors in any given country seems the way ahead. A related question is how the EU presence will relate to the PBC if both are active in the same country. On a more fundamental level the integration of all EU institutions involved in foreign policy has suffered a serious setback with the non-ratification of the draft Constitutional Treaty. Without treaty basis, it is probably impossible to create the position of EU Minister of Foreign Affairs, who would join together the first and

second pillar at the highest level of decision-making. Steps could perhaps be taken though towards the establishment of the European External Action Service, which was envisaged to comprise all relevant services at the administrative level.

Conclusion: Strategic Reflection

The ESS certainly constitutes a most ambitious agenda: redrawing the multilateral architecture in order to assure effective global governance and, within that framework, stabilizing States and regions via intrusive bilateral partnerships. As the ESS states, the EU with 25 Member States, over 450 million people and a quarter of the world's GNP is inevitably a global player. To be a true global *power*, the EU must further strengthen its emerging strategic culture, i.e. muster the political will, including in demanding situations, to take decisions true to its strategic objectives and to put to use all necessary instruments to implement them. In this the EU can only succeed if all Member States come to recognize what really is an evident truth: individually no Member State, the permanent members of the Security Council not excepted, has sufficient impact to safeguard its interests. A balanced partnership with the US, global economic governance, strategic partnerships with China and India etc. require the weight of a united EU.

Institutionalizing the strategic reflection in the EU could contribute to the consolidation of its strategic culture. The drafting of the ESS, spearheaded by Solana and the Policy Unit, was a successful one-off exercise, including the three seminars organized in the fall of 2003, which brought together practitioners, academics and NGOs to discuss the draft document before its final adoption by the European Council. But the mechanisms and institutional capacity for permanent strategic reflection to feed decision-making seem to be insufficient. Certain specific initiatives notwithstanding, decision-making consequently tends to be mostly ad hoc and focussed on the short term, while issues such as energy security or relations with China and India demand fundamental reflection. The initiator of strategic reflection should be the EU Foreign Minister, but in the meantime, and eventually in combination with the Minister, a systematic strategic debate could be institutionalized.

Every two or three years the whole of EU foreign policy, across the pillars, could be evaluated in function of the objectives of the ESS.²⁵ On the one hand, this would result in a systematic overview of past policies. On the other hand, the aspects of the ESS still requiring further translation into concrete policies and actions, or the fields requiring further fundamental strategic debate, could be identified. On the basis of reports by all relevant Council and Commission services, the High Representative (eventually the Foreign Minister) and the Policy Unit could draft a paper for discussion. This could be presented to a seminar similar to those organized in 2003, and to the CFSP Committee of the European Parliament, which for the occasion could be expanded with invited national MPs. In combination with the Policy Unit paper, reports of both deliberations could then feed a strategic debate in the Political and Security Committee and the Council. The aim of such an exercise need not necessarily be to re-write the ESS – the identification of the priority challenges and actions will remain valid for at least the next few years – but to promote integration and stimulate new policy initiatives.

Without a strategy, without strategic culture, the EU can only react to events – with a strategy Europe can shape them.

¹ See <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

² The ESDC was formally created by Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP of 18 July 2005.

³ See e.g. François Heisbourg, 'The "European Security Strategy" is not a Security Strategy', in Steven Everts et al. (eds.), *A European Way of War*. London, Centre for European Reform, 2004, pp. 27-39. Asle Toje, 'The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal', in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 10, 2005, No. 1, pp. 117-133.

⁴ Hans W. Maull, 'Europe and the New Balance of Global Order', in *International Affairs*, Vol. 81, 2005, No. 4, pp. 775-99.

⁵ Alyson J.K. Bailes, *The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History*. Policy Paper No. 10. Stockholm, SIPRI, 2005, p. 14.

⁶ Martha Dassù and Roberto Menotti, 'Europe and America in the Age of Bush', in *Survival*, Vol. 47, 2005, No. 1, pp. 105-122.

⁷ Sven Biscop, *The European Security Strategy – A Global Agenda for Positive Power*. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 2005.

⁸ Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

⁹ GPG are sometimes defined more narrowly as comprising only those public goods which cannot be provided but through international cooperation, excluding public goods of which the State is or should be the main provider, such as education or political participation. See e.g. the International Task Force on Global Public Goods, <http://www.gpgtaskforce.org>.

¹⁰ Robert I. Rotberg, 'Strengthening Governance: Ranking Countries Would Help', in *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 28, 2004, No. 1, pp. 71-81.

¹¹ COM (2005) 132 final, *Speeding up Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. The European Union's Contribution*.

¹² Asle Toje, op. cit.

¹³ Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*. London, Zed Books, 2002, p. 42.

¹⁴ Roy Culpeper, *Human Security, Equitable and Sustainable Development: Foundations for Canada's International Policy*, NSI Paper on the International Policy Review. Ottawa, The North-South Institute, 2005, p. 4.

¹⁵ COM (2005) 311 final, *Proposal for a Joint Declaration by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the European Union Development Policy. 'The European Consensus'*, p. 8.

¹⁶ Agnès Hurwitz and Gordon Peake, *Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice Since the 1990s*, Conference Report. New York, International Peace Academy, 2004.

¹⁷ Joseph S. Nye, op. cit., p. 143.

¹⁸ *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*. Report of the Secretary General for Decision by Heads of State and Government in September 2005, 21 March 2005.

¹⁹ Richard N. Haas, 'The Case for "Integration"', in *The National Interest*, 2005, No. 81, pp. 22-29.

²⁰ Javier Solana, 'Preface', in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), *EU Security and Defence Policy. The First Five Years (1999-2004)*. Parijs, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004, pp. 5-10.

²¹ Karen E. Smith, 'The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy', in *International Affairs*, Vol. 81, 2005, No. 4, pp. 757-773.

²² Richard Youngs, 'Engagement: Sharpening European Influence', in Richard Youngs (ed.), *New Terms of Engagement*. London, Foreign Policy Centre, 2005, pp. 1-14.

²³ Michael Leigh, 'The EU's Neighborhood Policy', in Esther Brimmer and Stephan Fröhlich (eds.), *The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement*. Washington DC, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2005, p. 110.

²⁴ Sven Biscop, 'Able and Willing? Assessing the EU's Capacity for Military Action', in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 9, 2004, No. 4, pp. 509-527.

²⁵ Giovanni Grevi, *European Security: No Strategy Without Politics*. Idea No. 4. Brussels, Ideas Factory, European Policy Centre, 2004.