Handbook on CSDP

The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union

Volume I
4th edition
HANDBOOK ON CSDP
THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Fourth edition

edited by
Jochen Rehrl

with forewords by
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and Vice President of the European Commission

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Any views or opinions presented in this handbook are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the European Union and the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

### A
- **AF** Armed Forces
- **AFET** Committee on Foreign Affairs (EP)
- **AIES** Austrian Institute for European Security
- **AKU** Autonomous Knowledge Unit
- **AMIS** African Union Mission in Sudan
- **AMISOM** African Union Mission in Somalia
- **APF** African Peace Facility
- **ARF** ASEAN Regional Forum
- **ARGUS** Secure Rapid General Alert System
- **ASEAN** Association of Southeast Asian Nations
- **ASEM** Asia-Europe Meeting
- **AU** African Union

### B
- **BBC** British Broadcasting Corporation
- **BENELUX** Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg
- **BG** Battle Group
- **BIS** Budgetary Impact Statement

### C
- **C-IED** Counter Improvised Explosive Device
- **C2** Command and control
- **C3** Command, Control & Communications
- **C3I** Command, Control, Communication & Intelligence
- **CA** Comprehensive Approach
- **CAR** Central African Republic
- **CARD** Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
- **CBM** Confidence-Building Measure
- **CBRN** Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
- **CBSD** Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development
- **CCC** Civilian CSDP Compact
- **CCDP** Civilian Capability Development Plan
- **CD** Creative Destruction
- **CD** Cyber Defence
- **CDM** Capability Development Mechanism
- **CDP** Capability Development Plan
- **CDPF** Cyber Defence Policy Framework
- **CEDC** Central European Defence Cooperation
- **CERT** Computer Emergency Response Team
- **CF SEDSS** Consultation Forum for Sustainable Energy in the Defence and Security Sector
- **CHG** Civilian Headline Goal
- **CIP** Critical Infrastructure Protection
- **CivCom** Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
- **CMC** Crisis Management Concept
- **CMP** crisis management procedure
- **CMPD** Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
- **CoE** Council of Europe
- **COM** Commander
- **CONOPS** Concept of Operations
- **COPPS** Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL)
- **COREPER** Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States
- **COSI** Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security
- **COVID** Coronavirus disease
- **CPCC** Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
- **CPPB** Conflict Prevention and Peace Building
- **CRM** Crisis Response Mechanism (EEAS)
- **CS** Cyber Security
- **CSDP** Common Security and Defence Policy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civilian strategic options</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT/P-CVE</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism/Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
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<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDoS</td>
<td>Distributed Denial-of-Service (cyber attack)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>DG NEAR</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIF</td>
<td>Defence Industry Factories</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF-I</td>
<td>Doctrine, organisational, training/exercise, material, leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
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<td>DSG</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General</td>
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<td>ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>European Defence Action Plan</td>
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<td>European Defence Industrial Development Programme</td>
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<td>Emerging Disruptive Technologies</td>
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<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>European Institute for Gender Equality</td>
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<td>eLCIP</td>
<td>eLearning, Cyber Security and Internet Performance</td>
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<td>EU Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission</td>
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<td>European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation</td>
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<td>EUROSUR</td>
<td>European Border Surveillance System</td>
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<td>EU Special Representative</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>EU Training Mission</td>
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<td>FAC</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council</td>
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<td>FCAS</td>
<td>Fragile and Conflict-Affected States</td>
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<td>FHQ</td>
<td>Force Headquarters</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Framework Participation Agreement</td>
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<td>European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (see EBCG)</td>
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<td>FSJ</td>
<td>Freedom, Security and Justice</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
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<td>Foreign Terrorist Fighters</td>
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<td>Group of Twenty</td>
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<td>Group of Seven</td>
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<td>Geospatial Intelligence</td>
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<td>GFAP</td>
<td>General Framework Agreement for Peace</td>
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<td>Gender Inequality Index</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross national income</td>
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<td>GNSS</td>
<td>Global Navigation Satellite System</td>
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<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<td>HICGs</td>
<td>Short and medium-term High Impact Capability Goals</td>
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<td>HLGP</td>
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<td>Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative and</td>
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<td>High Representative (for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>IA Integrated Approach</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Industrial Control System</td>
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<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<td>IMD</td>
<td>Initiating Military Directive</td>
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<td>Imagery Intelligence</td>
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<td>INI</td>
<td>Own-initiative Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Integrated approach for security and peace</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
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<td>Internal Security Strategy (EU)</td>
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<td>Mine Action</td>
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<td>Managing Director (EEAS)</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and Northern Africa</td>
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<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur</td>
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<td>MERS</td>
<td>Middle East Respiratory Syndrome</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MFF</td>
<td>Multi-Annual Financial Framework</td>
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<td>MIA</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
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<td>MISCA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MMA</td>
<td>Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MSO</td>
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<td>Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation</td>
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<td>Operation Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSINT</td>
<td>Open Source Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Preparatory Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARP</td>
<td>Preparatory Action on Defence Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARSEC</td>
<td>Programme of support for Mopti-Gao enhanced security in the Mopti and Gao regions and for the management of border areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>Pre-deployment Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFCA</td>
<td>Political Framework for Crisis Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>PiP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace (NATO)</td>
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<td>PI</td>
<td>Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>PMG</td>
<td>Politico-Military Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>pMS</td>
<td>Participating Member States PolAd Political Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRISM</td>
<td>Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/security sector reform, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof</td>
<td>Professor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting</td>
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<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Research and development</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and technology</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Requirements Catalogue</td>
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<td>REACT-EU</td>
<td>Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>RELEX</td>
<td>Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors</td>
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<td>REV</td>
<td>Revision</td>
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<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
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<td>RoL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>RPAS</td>
<td>Remotely Piloted Aircraft System</td>
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<td>RRF</td>
<td>Recovery and Resilience Facility</td>
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<td>RTDI</td>
<td>Research, Technology Development and Innovation</td>
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<td>SOC</td>
<td>Security Operation Centre</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<td>SOMA</td>
<td>Status of Mission Agreement</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<td>SOR</td>
<td>Statement of Requirements</td>
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<td>SR</td>
<td>Strategic review</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>SST</td>
<td>Space Surveillance and Tracking</td>
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<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>Strategic Communication</td>
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<td>T</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
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<td>TWP</td>
<td>Working Party on Terrorism</td>
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<td>U</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNSC(R)</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council (Resolution)</td>
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<tr>
<td>US(A)</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Visegrad Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>V4</td>
<td>Visegrad Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vice-President (of the European Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VUCA</td>
<td>Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>Western Balkans</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>Western Balkans</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women, peace and security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Yearbook of European Security (EUISS)</td>
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</table>
The current state of world affairs has the potential to become a real ‘game changer’, though not in a positive sense. We are facing a number of new risks and global threats, such as climate change, an international pandemic and hybrid threats including disinformation, cyber-attacks and terrorism.

So far, the European Union has been at the forefront in managing these crises and helping protect European citizens. However, we need to be aware that not all EU Member States see the problems through the same lens, as they share neither the same history nor the same geography, and as a result they do not have the same strategic perceptions and priorities.

The Strategic Compass that is currently under development is aimed precisely at harmonising the perception of threats and risks, since at the end of the day, the EU Member States will need to develop a common European security culture.

The EU has difficulty claiming to be a ‘political union’ able to act as a ‘global player’ if it lacks the corresponding level of ‘autonomy’. Thus strategic autonomy is a key goal, as it denotes ‘the capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible.’ Strategic autonomy is not a luxury, much less an illusion. If we do not act together now, we will become irrelevant, as many have cogently argued. Strategic autonomy is not a magic wand but a long-term process intended to ensure that Europeans increasingly take charge of their own affairs. No-one else can or will take responsibility for our future.

The European Defence Fund and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) are very good illustrations of pragmatic strategic autonomy. Europe is creating mechanisms for cooperation and contributing to the financing of a European programme designed to strengthen Europe’s industrial base. However, the stakes of strategic autonomy are not limited to security and defence. They apply to a wide range of issues including trade, finance and investment.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the global ‘business card’ of our Union when it comes to crisis management. A well-functioning CSDP with its missions and operations is crucial to implement our priorities under the Global Strategy, namely security and defence, building state and societal resilience, taking an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, strengthening cooperative regional orders and establishing a rules-based system of global governance. These European efforts will need to be embedded in cooperation with our partners around the globe. Additionally, reviving effective multilateralism will be a top priority for the EU in 2021.

For 15 years now, the European Security and Defence College has provided education and training on the CSDP. Some 60 000 students from Europe and beyond have attended ESDC activities, receiving first-class training responding to real-time training needs. These events make a tremendous contribution to the establishment of the aforementioned common European security culture, which forms the basis for moving from vision to action.

For 10 years, the CSDP Handbook has been the main reference document for officials working on the CSDP. Published by the Austrian Ministry of Defence, it allows experts from the EU institutions, academia and officials from EU Member States to share their views, thoughts and assessments. I would like to thank all of these experts for their commitment and contributions. The CSDP Handbook is a success story that will be continued.
The world is full of risks and threats. While we can prepare for these risks, they still take us by surprise. Examples are manifold: the threat of extremist terrorism, the migration flow of 2015, caused by the deteriorating situation in Syria, cyber threats stemming from criminal, non-state or state organisations, and currently the Covid crisis. Furthermore, the possible impacts of climate change are yet to be considered. The world has changed in ways which many of us would have considered unimaginable just a few years ago.

Austria has faced these threats and learned its lessons: a process to transform our armed forces was initiated already a decade ago and today we are better prepared to counter these threats, contribute to our international commitments and assist, on the national stage, other institutions and agencies within our government in their efforts. For instance, the Austrian Armed Forces are a main actor in dealing with the Covid crisis. Nonetheless, as already expressed in the European Security Strategy back in 2003, no single country is able to tackle all those challenges alone.

Thus, all member states have realised that teamwork is key in security and defence to mitigate the present risks and threats. In comparison to global powers, the EU member states on their own are relatively small. United, however, the EU has the strength and weight to act as a global player.

The EU has never experienced revolutionary changes. Progress in European security and defence policy has always been achieved by negotiations and discussions driven by the desire to reach consensus, leading to pragmatic and incremental decisions; we have come a long way from basic crisis management. Today, the EU applies a framework of measures and activities to external conflicts and crises for a more coherent and holistic engagement, thereby promoting human security and increasing the security of the EU and its citizens.

Security and defence are an integral component of comprehensive security. Together with diplomacy, reconciliation, and reconstruction, all these elements contribute substantially and almost equally to stabilisation. The European Union’s comprehensive and integrated approach to crisis management is therefore the right approach. We have to guarantee a smooth and efficient interplay between all actors involved. For this, the EU needs a more capable, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable set of military and civilian capabilities and forces.

Therefore, training and education will play a major role in creating a common European security culture, which will lead to the strategic autonomy of the EU and to an even closer defence cooperation in the future. In this respect, the European Security and Defence College is a proverbial ‘spider in the web’. As the sole institution that provides activities focussed on the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, the ESDC can make the difference by bringing all different strands of this policy area together.

For 15 years, Austria has supported the ESDC by providing several hundreds of courses, seminars, and conferences within its network of more than 180 European institutions. Austria chairs two of the Executive Academic Board configurations, one for Military-Erasmus and the other on Security Sector Reform, and we will remain committed, because we believe in rule-based order, human rights, and democracy.

For 10 years, Austria has published the handbook series, which is an exemplary means of transferring knowledge, sharing best practices, and stimulating discussions on CSDP-related subjects. I wish the readers all the best in their professional work, good luck in future deployments in CSDP missions and operations as well as an instructive experience reading the articles by various European experts on security issues.

Klaudia Tanner
Federal Minister of Defence
of the Republic of Austria
The first edition of the CSDP handbook was published by the Austrian Ministry of Defence in 2010. Together with Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, the first Head of the ESDC and co-founder of the handbook-series, we collected articles on the Common Security and Defence Policy. The structure of the handbook mirrored the curriculum of a regular CSDP orientation course: basics, strategies, structures, capability development, crisis management procedures, missions and operations, horizontal issues and the future of the CSDP.

When editing the first handbook, we had several discussions about its status, whether it should reflect official and agreed positions or whether it should provide much more. We decided on the latter option in order to provide a handbook for students of the CSDP, adding critical remarks where necessary, and potential ways ahead where appropriate.

It was clear from the beginning that the content should not be seen as an official statement by the European Union, but as a fact-based collection of articles from well-known CSDP experts from various backgrounds. Such a publication is only as good as its contributors, and we were very glad to find dedicated and high-ranking officials and academics who were willing to share their experiences and knowledge right from the outset. It was in our shared interest to provide their contributions under their ownership and responsibility.

We have decided to have the handbook published by a recognized ESDC network partner, the Austrian Ministry of Defence. The Directorate for Security Policy, which was then under the leadership of Major General Johann Pucher, was immediately a strong partner in our endeavour. The first edition of the HANDBOOK ON CSDP was launched in the General Secretariat of the Council in Brussels on 21 April 2010 and two weeks later in the Federal Chancellery in Vienna.
The first handbook challenge of 2010 developed further over time. To date, we count five different volumes of publications: (1) Handbook on CSDP, (2) Handbook on missions and operations, (3) Handbook for decision makers, (4) Handbook on migration and (5) Handbook on cybersecurity. Some of these are already published in their second or third (revised) editions. These handbooks are distributed to all ‘students’ (mainly officials from EU member states and EU institutions) of the European Security and Defence College as reference documents once back in their national or EU administrations. In addition, several copies were sent to the libraries of European universities to facilitate the studies of European Affairs or related subjects.

In total, about 50,000 copies of the various editions of the handbook have been issued as hard copies over the past 10 years in Europe and beyond, thereby making it a remarkable success story and promoter of European values. In addition, the handbooks were also made available via the websites of both the ESDC (www.esdc.europa.eu) and the Austrian Ministry of Defence (www.bmlv.gv.at).

The present fourth edition of the handbook on CSDP was created during the various lockdowns of the COVID crisis in 2020. I was again able to rely on experts from all over Europe with a broad range of professional backgrounds. Saying ‘thank you’ is only a small sign of appreciation for their brilliant contributions and ideas. I must also apologise for putting pressure on them to meet deadlines.

The new publication covers current and new topics such as pandemics, digitalisation, disinformation and the green deal, as well as classical CSDP issues such as capability development, including the European Defence Fund, Civilian CSDP Compact and the European Peace Facility. The view on the CSDP from other EU institutions such as the European Commission, the European Parliament and the General Secretariat of the Council is particularly interesting.

Once again, there are many people to thank for their tremendous work for this edition. I would like to mention some of them here:

– Dr. Arnold Kammel, Head of the Cabinet of the Austrian Minister of Defence and Defence Policy Director;
– LtGen Franz Leitgeb, Austrian Military Representative to the European Union;
– Mr. Dirk Dubois, Head of the European Security and Defence College, and his team, in particular Dr. Ilias Katsagounos and Ms Alexandra Katsantoni;
– Mr. Roman Bartholomay, Head of the Austrian Armed Forces printing centre, and his team, in particular Mr. Axel Scala, Mr. Andreas Penkler and Ms Eva Kutika;

Lastly, I would also like to thank my family, Bernadeta, Julia and Maximilian, for their patience and indulgence during the Christmas holidays and the following weekends spent finalising the handbook.

In conclusion, I wish all recipients a wonderful, exciting and enriching reading-experience and a strong European conviction that a value-based society will be able to make the world a better place.

Jochen Rehrl
COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
1.1. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE CSDP

by Gustav Lindstrom

The origins of Europe’s security and defence architecture date back to the years following World War II. Beginning in the late 1940s, several initiatives facilitated increased cooperation across Europe. Examples include the signing of the Brussels Treaty (1948), which sowed the seeds for a Western European Union, and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, which placed strategic resources under a supranational authority.

In the late 1960s, the European Community (EC) began to explore ways to harmonise members’ foreign policies. At The Hague Summit, held in December 1969, European leaders instructed their foreign ministers to examine the feasibility of closer integration in the political domain. In response, the concept of European Political Cooperation (EPC) was presented in the October 1970 Davignon Report. The report defined the objectives of EPC, including the harmonisation of positions, consultation and, when appropriate, common actions. It also listed specific processes, such as biannual meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, as well quarterly meetings for the Political Directors forming the Political Committee. Overall, EPC aimed to facilitate the consultation process among EC Member States.

EPC served as the foundation for the Common Foreign and Security Policy introduced in the Maastricht Treaty. With its entry into force on 1 November 1993, the treaty created a single institutional framework, the European Union, based on three
pillars – the second of which was the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The CFSP went beyond EPC. It broke new ground through its Article J(4), which states that the CFSP includes “all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”.

While the European Union identified ambitious objectives in the area of external security and defence via the Maastricht Treaty, it would not be until the late 1990s, in the aftermath of the wars of secession in the Balkans – and a policy change in the United Kingdom – that concrete provisions were introduced for a common European Security and Defence Policy endowed with tangible crisis management capabilities. The UK’s evolving position was presented during the informal European Council held in Pörtschach (24-25 October 1998) under the auspices of the Austrian EU Presidency. A week later, the defence ministers of the European Union convened an informal meeting in Vienna, reinforcing the call for a more proactive Europe. These events paved the way for the bilateral meeting between France and the UK held in Saint-Malo, considered by many as the catalyst for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Following the Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998, numerous European Council summit meetings defined the military and civilian capabilities needed to fulfil the Petersberg tasks, consisting of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Examples include the Cologne European Council Meeting (1999), the Helsinki European Council Meeting (1999), which introduced the Headline Goal 2003, and the Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting (2000) which identified an initial set of four priority areas for civilian crisis management.

In 2003, the ESDP became operational through the first ESDP missions and operations. Since 2003, the EU has initiated over thirty-five crisis-management missions and operations. In addition, the EU presented its first ever European Security Strategy in December 2003, outlining key threats and challenges facing Europe. The strategy remained in place until the presentation of a follow-on EU Global Strategy in June 2016.

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the ESDP was renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Lisbon Treaty also established the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, merging the two positions of High Representative for CFSP and Commissioner for External Relations – symbolising the move away from an EU pillar structure.

The Lisbon Treaty formally endorsed the extension of the ‘Petersberg tasks’, which now include ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation’ (Article 43(1) TEU). In addition, these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by ‘supporting third states in combating terrorism in their territories’.

The expanded Petersberg tasks and related matters are currently enshrined in the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Among these is the aim of political and military solidarity among EU Member States through the inclusion of a mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU) and a solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU).

Through the EU Global Strategy of 2016, there was new momentum to further develop the Common Security and Defence Policy. In November 2016, for example, the Council adopted conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence. The conclusions identified three strategic priorities: responding to external conflicts and crises, building the capacities of partners, and protecting the European Union and its citizens. The November 2018 Council Conclusions, also in the context of the EU Global Strategy, provided guidance for further work, covering areas such as Civilian CSDP (Civilian CSDP Compact), the military planning and conduct capability (MPCC), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the coordinated annual review on defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Peace Facility (EPF), military mobility, and EU-NATO cooperation.

Of the defence and security initiatives listed above, the European Defence Fund represents a particular innovation. For the first time, it makes it possible to use an EU budget envelope – the
multiannual financial framework 2021-2027 – to fund efforts relating to innovation, research and development in the European defence sector. In a related development, the European Commission created a Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DEFIS) in January 2020. These responsibilities were previously carried out by the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW). Through this structural change, there is a clearer emphasis and demarcation of the Commission department responsible for EU policy on defence industry and space.

Building on the EU Global Strategy, an initiative for an EU Strategic Compass was unveiled in 2020. This aims to provide additional politico-military guidance for EU security and defence. The Compass, which will be finalised in around 2022, includes a common threat analysis combining EU member states’ views on threats and challenges. Besides promoting greater coherence, the Compass will set more precise objectives along four main pillars: crisis management, resilience, capability development, and partnerships.

From a historical perspective, the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum (Brexit) held in June 2016 also broke new ground. With the UK out of the EU, it will take time to fully gauge the security and defence related implications of Brexit on the CSDP, including the wider impacts on security and defence cooperation.

### BASIC TIME-LINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>End of World War II</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Churchill’s speech at the University of Zurich calling for a United States of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Launching of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan)</td>
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<td>1948</td>
<td>Signing of the Brussels Treaty (March), advancing the idea of a common defence policy for Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (April)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Unveiling of the Schuman Plan (May)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (April, <em>in force July 1952</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) (August)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty formally creating the WEU (October)</td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>Establishment of the Warsaw Pact</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>Suez Canal Crisis (October 1956 – March 1957)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Signing of the Treaties of Rome (March, <em>in force January 1958</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Presentation of the Fouchet Plan (not implemented)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>The Davignon Report introduces the idea of European Political Cooperation (adopted October 1970)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Adoption of the Helsinki Final Act (August)</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>Stuttgart Declaration (‘Solemn Declaration’) (June)</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>Fall of the Berlin Wall (November)</td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (November)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Official creation of the EUROCORPS (October)</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>Reinforcement of ESDI within NATO at the Berlin Summit</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>Signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (October, <em>in force May 1999</em>)</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>European Council held in Pörtschach, Austria (October)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defence (Saint-Malo) (December)</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>Cologne and Helsinki European Council Meetings lay the foundations for ESDP</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Santa Maria da Feira European Council (June)</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>Signing of the Treaty of Nice (February, <em>in force February 2003</em>)</td>
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<td>Establishment of the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)</td>
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<td>Establishment of the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC)</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>Signing of the Berlin+ arrangements (EU-NATO cooperation) (December)</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>First CSDP missions and operations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Adoption of the European Security Strategy (December)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Adoption of the Berlin Plus Arrangements</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA)</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Establishment of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Signing of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union (December, <em>in force December 2009</em>); new institutions, scope of activities, and decision-making in CFSP/ CSDP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>EU Battlegroups reach full operational capability</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Establishment of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) (August)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Signing of the Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty between the UK and France (Lancaster House Treaties) (November)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>The WEU ceases to exist as a treaty-based international organisation (June)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>The European Council held its first thematic debate on defence since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (December)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Activation of Article 42 (7) TEU (Mutual Assistance Clause) (November)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Presentation of the EU Global Strategy (June)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UK European Union membership referendum (Brexit) (June)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>First Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation (July)</td>
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<td>2017</td>
<td>White paper on the future of Europe and the way forward (European Commission, March)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Modalities to establish the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) (June)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Launching of the European Defence Fund (June; announced in Sept. 2016)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Establishment of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) (June)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Decision establishing the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) (December)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Launch of the European Intervention Initiative by France (autonomous initiative outside existing structures) (March)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Second Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation (July)</td>
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<td>Establishment of a civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) compact (November)</td>
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<td>2020</td>
<td>Establishment of the DG Defence Industry and Space (DEFIS) within the European Commission (January)</td>
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<td>Call for a Strategic Compass (March)</td>
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<td>Presentation of the first Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) (November)</td>
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<td>2021</td>
<td>End of the UK Brexit transition period</td>
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We need a stronger Europe.
This is what our citizens deserve,
this is what the wider world expects.

We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned. To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Economic growth is yet to outpace demography in parts of Africa, security tensions in Asia are mounting, while climate change causes further disruption. Yet these are also times of extraordinary opportunity. Global growth, mobility, and technological progress – alongside our deepening partnerships – enable us to thrive, and allow ever more people to escape poverty and live longer and freer lives. We will navigate this difficult, more connected, contested and complex world guided by our shared interests, principles and priorities. Grounded in the values enshrined in the Treaties and building on our many strengths and historic achievements, we will stand united in building a stronger Union, playing its collective role in the world.

**OUR SHARED INTERESTS AND PRINCIPLES**

The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders.

The EU will advance the prosperity of its people. Prosperity must be shared and requires fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals worldwide, including in Europe. A prosperous Union also hinges on an open and fair international economic system and sustainable access to the global commons. The EU will foster the resilience of its democracies. Consistently living up to our values will determine our external credibility and influence.
The EU will promote a rules-based global order. We have an interest in promoting agreed rules to provide global public goods and contribute to a peaceful and sustainable world. The EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core.

We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to promote a better world. Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead.

In a more complex world, we must stand united. Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world.

In a more connected world, the EU will engage with others. The Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats. To promote the security and prosperity of our citizens and to safeguard our democracies, we will manage interdependence, with all the opportunities, challenges and fears it brings about, by engaging the wider world.

In a more contested world, the EU will be guided by a strong sense of responsibility. We will engage responsibly across Europe and the surrounding regions to the east and south. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to promote human rights.

The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared. Responsibility goes hand in hand with revamping our external partnerships. In the pursuit of our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations. We will work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings. We will deepen our partnerships with civil society and the private sector as key players in a networked world.

THE PRIORITIES OF OUR EXTERNAL ACTION

To promote our shared interests, adhering to clear principles, the EU will pursue five priorities.

The Security of our Union

The EU Global Strategy starts at home. Our Union has enabled citizens to enjoy unprecedented security, democracy and prosperity. Yet today terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity endanger our people and territory.

An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders.

We will therefore enhance our efforts on defence, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, energy and strategic communications.

Member States must translate their commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity enshrined in the Treaties into action. The EU will step up its contribution to Europe’s collective security, working closely with its partners, beginning with NATO.
State and Societal Resilience to our East and South

It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and to the south down to Central Africa.

Under the current EU enlargement policy, a credible accession process grounded in strict and fair conditionality is vital to enhance the resilience of countries in the Western Balkans and of Turkey.

Under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), many people wish to build closer relations with the Union: our enduring power of attraction can spur transformation in these countries.

But resilience is also a priority in other countries within and beyond the ENP. The EU will support different paths to resilience, targeting the most acute cases of governmental, economic, societal and climate/energy fragility, as well as develop more effective migration policies for Europe and its partners.

An Integrated Approach to Conflicts

When violent conflicts erupt, our shared vital interests are threatened. The EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, and foster human security through an integrated approach. Implementing the ‘comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises’ through a coherent use of all policies at the EU’s disposal is essential. The meaning and scope of the ‘comprehensive approach’ will, however, be expanded. The EU will act at all stages of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, and avoiding premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts. The EU will act at different levels of governance: conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya have local, national, regional and global dimensions which must be addressed. Finally, none of these conflicts can be solved by us alone. Sustainable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, far-reaching and durable regional and international partnerships, which the EU will foster and support.

Cooperative Regional Orders

In a world caught between global pressures and local pushback, regional dynamics come to the fore.

Voluntary forms of regional governance offer states and peoples the opportunity to better manage security concerns, reap the economic gains of globalisation, express more fully cultures and identities, and project influence in world affairs. This is a fundamental rationale for the EU’s own peace and development in the 21st century, and this is why we will support cooperative regional orders worldwide. In different regions – in Europe; in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa; across the Atlantic, both north and south; in Asia; and in the Arctic – the EU will be driven by specific goals.
Global Governance for the 21st Century

The EU is committed to a global order based on international law, which ensures human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons. This commitment translates into an aspiration to transform rather than to simply preserve the existing system. The EU will strive for a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, and develop globally coordinated responses with international and regional organisations, states and non-state actors.

FROM VISION TO ACTION

We will pursue our priorities by mobilising our unparalleled networks, our economic weight and all the tools at our disposal in a coherent way. To fulfil our goals, we must collectively invest in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union.

A Credible Union

To engage responsibly with the world, credibility is vital. The EU’s credibility hinges on our unity, on our many achievements, our enduring power of attraction, the effectiveness and consistency of our policies, and adherence to our values. A stronger Union also requires that we invest in all dimensions of foreign policy. In particular, investment in security and defence is a matter of urgency. Full spectrum defence capabilities are necessary to respond to external crises, build our partners’ capacities, and to guarantee Europe’s safety. Member States remain sovereign in their defence decisions: nevertheless, to acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, defence cooperation must become the norm. The EU will systematically encourage defence cooperation and strive to create a solid European defence industry, which is critical for Europe’s autonomy of decision and action.

A Responsive Union

Our diplomatic action must be fully grounded in the Lisbon Treaty. The Common Security and Defence Policy must become more responsive. Enhanced cooperation between Member States should be explored, and this might lead to a more structured form of cooperation, making full use of the Lisbon Treaty’s potential. Development policy also needs to become more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities.

A Joined-Up Union

We must become more joined up across our external policies, between Member States and EU institutions, and between the internal and external dimensions of our policies. This is particularly relevant to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, migration, and security, notably counter-terrorism. We must also systematically mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions.

THE EUROPEAN UNION WILL BE GUIDED BY CLEAR PRINCIPLES

In a more complex world, we must stand united. Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world.

In a more connected world, the EU will engage with others. The Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats. To promote the security and prosperity of our citizens and to safeguard our democracies, we will manage interdependence, with all the opportunities, challenges and fears it brings about, by engaging the wider world.

In a more contested world, the EU will be guided by a strong sense of responsibility. We will engage responsibly across Europe and the surrounding
regions to the east and south. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to promote human rights.

**IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY**

To implement the EU Global Strategy, decisive steps have been taken on security and defence. The package consists of three major pillars: new political goals and ambitions for Europeans to take more responsibility for their own security and defence; new financial tools to help Member States and the European defence industry to develop defence capabilities ('European Defence Action Plan') and a set of concrete actions as follow up to the EU-NATO Joint Declaration which identified areas of cooperation. Together the three elements constitute a comprehensive package to boost the security of the Union and its citizens.

Terrorism, trafficking and smuggling, hybrid threats by state and non-state actors and other threats and challenges directly affect our internal security and often feed off the crises and instability in the regions surrounding Europe. 'For most Europeans security is a top priority today' says High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini. The EU has taken action to respond. It will become a stronger actor on the international scene to promote peace and security in its neighbourhood and beyond. HR/VP Mogherini has set out how to achieve this in a strategy ('A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy') adopted in June 2016. The three interlinked decisions on security and defence are turning this vision into concrete actions.

Ministers on 14 November 2016 agreed on a new level of ambition in security and defence. This focuses on three priorities: enabling the European Union to respond more comprehensively, rapidly and effectively to crises, in particular in our neighbourhood; helping to make our partners stronger when it comes to their security and defence; and strengthening the European Union’s capacity to protect European citizens, by working more closely together on security. To fulfil these goals, Ministers also agreed to a range of actions to strengthen civilian and military capabilities, as well as EU security and defence structures and tools.

The **European Defence Action Plan** was adopted by the European Commission on 30 November 2016. It comprises a European Defence Fund and other actions to help Member States boost research and spend more efficiently on joint defence capabilities, thus fostering a competitive and innovative industrial base for defence and contributing to enhance European citizens’ security.

The Council of the European Union and Foreign Ministers of NATO adopted in parallel on 6 December 2016 a common set of proposals for **EU-NATO cooperation**. This followed the Joint Declaration signed by EU leaders and the NATO Secretary General in July 2016. The set of actions comprises 42 concrete proposals for implementation in seven areas of cooperation. EU-NATO cooperation is thus taken to a new level, at a moment when facing common challenges together is more important than ever.

**CONCLUSION**

The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared. Responsibility goes hand in hand with revamping our external partnerships. In pursuing our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations. The European Union will work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings. We will deepen our partnerships with civil society and the private sector as key players in a networked world.

This Strategy is underpinned by the vision of and ambition for a stronger Union, willing and able to make a positive difference in the world. Our citizens deserve a true Union, that promotes our shared interests by engaging responsibly and in partnership with others. It is now up to us to translate this into action.
HANDBOOK ON CSDP

DIPLACED PEOPLE

Top hosting countries
85% of displaced people worldwide are in developing countries.

- 3.5m Turkey
- 979 400 Iran
- 2.6m Afghanistan
- 1m Lebanon
- 6.3m Syria
- 1.4m Pakistan
- 1m Sudan
- 2.4m Uganda

68.5 million forcibly displaced people
44 400 people are forced every day to flee their homes because of conflict and persecution.

102 800 refugees resettled in 2017
25.4 million refugees, over half of whom are under the age of 18.

57% of refugees worldwide come from 3 countries.

FAILED STATES

A failed state is a state that is unable to perform the two fundamental functions of the sovereign state: it cannot project authority over its territory and it cannot protect its national boundaries.

CLIMATE

Weather-related disasters account for 97% of all new displacements. 46% of which are due to floods.

+1.1°C

The average global temperature in 2018 was approximately 1.1°C above the average for the pre-industrial era.

In 2017 there were 18.8 million new displacements due to disasters.

Rising water scarcity affects more than 40% of the global population.

ACTIVE / FROZEN CONFLICTS

131 000 fatalities were incurred in state-based conflicts.
90 000 fatalities in organised violence.

Of the 84 crises in the world monitored by the International Crisis Group, 18 are in countries that are negotiating their accession to the EU or that have a European outlook (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Turkey) or in countries that are covered by European Neighbourhood Policy - ENP (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Palestinian Authority, Ukraine, Syria, Tunisia).

The International Crisis Group drew attention on the risk of escalation for Ukraine and Libya.

49 state-based conflicts in 2017
82 non-state conflicts in 2017

61% of those took place in Africa.
TERRORISM
The total number of deaths from terrorism declined for the 3rd consecutive year, falling by 27%.

CYBERSECURITY
Efforts to combat cyber crime are increasing, with security expenditures among international cooperations steadily rising.

The EU holds cyberdialogues with China, India, Japan, South Korea and the United States.

> US$124 billion will reach the worldwide information security spending in 2019.

2% of CO2 emissions come from Data Centers.

US$6 trillion annually by 2021 will cost the world cyber crime damages.

56.1% of the world’s people are connected to the internet.

70 million records were stolen or leaked from poorly protected cloud devices.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Suspension of INF Treaty threatens a new nuclear arms race in Europe.

The US will increase spending to US$500 billion over the next decade to maintain and modernise its nuclear forces.

Iran, China and DPRK’s kinetic and non-kinetic capacity has grown in the last decade.

14,935 nuclear weapons worldwide in 2017
93% of all nuclear weapons

United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea
The lack of cooperation between Member States in the field of defence and security is estimated to cost annually between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion. This is because of inefficiencies, lack of competition and lack of economies of scale for industry and production.

In 2015, the US invested more than twice as much as the total spending of EU Member States on defence. China has increased its defence budget by 150% over the past decade.

Around 80% of defence procurement is run on a purely national basis, leading to a costly duplication of military capabilities.

More Europe in defence will have a positive spill-over effect on the European economy. The European defence industry generates a total turnover of EUR 100 billion per year and 1.4 million highly skilled people directly or indirectly employed in Europe. Each euro invested in defence generates a return of 1.6, in particular in skilled employment, research and technology and exports.

The European defence industry generates a total turnover of EUR 100 billion per year and 1.4 million highly skilled people directly or indirectly employed in Europe. Each euro invested in defence generates a return of 1.6, in particular in skilled employment, research and technology and exports.
The European Union as we know it came into being in 1993, when the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force and the preceding European Economic Community (EEC) was absorbed into a more overtly political Union which aspired to pursue a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In 1999, a politico-military arm was added to the CFSP; originally the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), it is now known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

**ABSENCE OF STRATEGY**

However, the EU’s first strategy, the European Security Strategy (ESS), was only adopted a full four years later, in 2003. Before that time, Member States purposely avoided any strategic debate because of their widely differing views on the degree of autonomy of EU policy vis-à-vis the capitals themselves and vis-à-vis the US. That did not halt progress on other dimensions of foreign and security policy, however: to this day, Member States often pragmatically agree to disagree on one aspect, which allows them to move forward on the issues on which they do agree. It was in this way that they were able to create the CFSP and the CSDP.

**STRATEGIC ROOTS**

The absence of a formal strategy does not necessarily mean that all action is un-strategic. During the first decade of the CFSP, an implicit ‘European way’ of doing things emerged from the practice of EU foreign policy-making, characterised by cooperation with partner countries, an emphasis on conflict prevention, and a broad approach to aid, trade and diplomacy. This approach had its roots in the external relations of the EEC. Although it had had no formal competence in foreign policy, the EEC had developed dense worldwide trade relations and built up a larger network of delegations than the embassy network of any Member State.

This implicit strategy steered the development of EU partnerships and long-term policies, such as development policy. But it proved entirely insufficient when the EU was confronted with crisis. It was the EU’s failure to address the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s, and again in Kosovo in 1999, that drove the institutional development of the CFSP and the CSDP.

**TOWARDS THE ESS**

Even perfect institutions cannot, however, deliver, if there is no strategy on which they can operate on – and the Member States finally came to understand this in 2003. That year, the US invasion of Iraq created a deep divide within Europe, between those who wanted to stand by their most important ally no matter what, and those who felt that even an ally cannot be followed when it so clearly violates one’s own principles and, as would be revealed all too soon, acts against one’s interests. But whatever Europeans thought, it did not matter. This was the great lesson of the Iraq crisis: when Europe is divided, it has no influence.

This was the catalyst for the unexpected drive to finally hold a formal strategic debate in the EU and produce a strategic document. EU Member States needed to heal the wounds inflicted by the highly emotional debate over Iraq and project an image of unity to the outside world once
again. They also needed to send a message to the US. Those who had supported the invasion of Iraq wanted to signal that Europe was still an ally and that it cared about the same threats and challenges as the US. Those who had opposed it wished to make it clear that caring about the same threats and challenges did not mean wanting to address them in the same way.

DRAFTING THE ESS

This window of opportunity was not wasted. Javier Solana, then the High Representative, was tasked with producing a first draft, which was drawn up by a small team around him and put to the European Council in June 2003. Then, instead of discussing the minutiae and working his way up through the hierarchy of CFSP bodies, which is the normal procedure when drafting official EU foreign policy texts, Solana had three seminars organised where those same officials could give their input on the draft, but alongside representatives from national parliaments, from key allies and partners, and from academia and civil society. This approach created a much greater sense of ownership and produced a very readable text – concise and free of jargon.

The final document was formally adopted by the European Council as the European Security Strategy in December 2003. A strategy was born.

THE IMPACT OF THE ESS

The ESS certainly worked as a narrative. In 2003, many expected the ESS to be quickly forgotten – locked away in some drawer, with the key given to NATO. In fact, the opposite happened: EU foreign policy decisions continued to use the ESS as the overall framework, and EU and national officials continued to refer to it when explaining Europe’s role in the world, because it expressed it so neatly and concisely. This was important – and it continues
to be important today, because in a disparate organisation such as the EU, comprising twenty-seven Member States each with their own strategic culture, commonality must be stressed time and again.

But did the ESS drive a proactive EU foreign policy, and did it help the EU make the right decisions in moments of crisis? Here the picture is more mixed, for the simple reason that the ESS was not a complete strategy at all. In the ESS, the EU was very clear about its values, and it translated those values into very specific methods: Europe sought to tackle things in a preventive, comprehensive and multilateral manner. The ESS had little to say, however, about either the EU’s means – apart from a general acknowledgement that, in the military field especially, more resources were required – or, even more importantly, its objectives. The decision to prioritise assuming leadership in stabilising Europe’s own neighbourhood was an important one; opting for a more indirect approach at the global level was the logical corollary, for it is impossible to prioritise everything at once. In the ESS itself, however, neither broad objective was broken down into more specific priorities that could drive day-to-day decision-making. The ESS codified how to do things – but it did not really tell Europe what to do first.

CALLS FOR REVISION

The adoption of the ESS was a turning point, but after several years, calls for a strategic review began to sound. In the autumn of 2007, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt put the revision of the ESS on the agenda as an objective for their upcoming Presidencies. This idea was not met with universal enthusiasm. Not everyone was convinced that the ESS was already in need of updating, and some also feared that it would provoke excessively divisive debates, particularly on Russia, and that the EU would end up with a worse rather than a better document. Hence the somewhat cautiously expressed mandate given to High Representative Javier Solana by the December 2007 European Council: ‘to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view to proposing how to improve implementation and, as appropriate, how to complement it’.

The debate was concluded by the adoption of a ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World’ by the December 2008 European Council, which decided to leave the text of the ESS itself untouched. The Report ‘does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it’, and the ESS remained in force, while the Report was quickly forgotten.

TOWARDS A GLOBAL STRATEGY?

After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, a number of Member States again attempted to put a revision of the ESS on the agenda. However, no agreement was reached. To continue the debate, Sweden, Poland, Italy and Spain launched a think-tank process, which in May 2013 produced a report on a European Global Strategy (EGS). Member States remained strongly divided on the need for a new strategy, however, and Solana’s successor as High Representative, Catherine Ashton, was opposed to the idea.

Eventually, the December 2013 European Council, in the context of a debate about defence, could only agree on a veiled mandate for the High Representative to assess the impact of the changes in the geopolitical environment. In layman’s terms: write a strategy?

When the next High Representative, Federica Mogherini, assumed office in 2014, she gave renewed impetus to the strategic debate. When she submitted her assessment of the EU’s global environment to the European Council in June 2015, she finally received a mandate to produce an entirely new strategy.

Although grudgingly in many cases, Member States could no longer deny that the various crises in and around Europe, the US’ ‘pivot’ to Asia and the rise of China called for a new strategy. This ‘EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy’ (EUGS) was presented to the European Council by HR Mogherini on 28 June 2016. Many pundits portrayed it as an illustration of how disconnected Brussels was from reality – tabling an external strategy just a few days after the UK had created a huge internal challenge by voting to leave the EU. But would it have demonstrated a better sense of reality to pretend that, because of the UK’s decision to renounce its EU membership, the world around Europe would come to an end as well? The EU needed the EUGS and that was ‘even more true after the British referendum’, as HR Mogherini rightly stated in her foreword.

REALPOLITIK WITH EUROPEAN CHARACTERISTICS

The EUGS introduced a new overall approach to foreign and security policy, which can be interpreted as a corrigendum to the ESS. In 2003, the EU had stated that, ‘The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states’. Unfortunately, spreading good governance and democracy had proved more difficult than expected, and when their absence provoked crises, the EU had not always mustered the will and the resources to respond. Where the ESS had proved to be over-optimistic (and optimism is a moral duty, as Karl Popper said), the EUGS was more conscious of the limits imposed by the EU’s own capabilities and by others’ intractability, and therefore more modest. It charted a course between isolationism and interventionism, under the new heading of what the EUGS now calls ‘principled pragmatism’.

This represented a return to realpolitik. Not realpolitik as it has come to be understood, as ends justifying means, but realpolitik in German liberal Ludwig von Rochau’s original sense of the term as set out in 1853: a rejection of liberal utopianism, but not of liberal ideals themselves. Rather, it was about how to achieve those ideals in a realistic way. As the EUGS put it, ‘responsible engagement can bring about positive change’.

EU INTERESTS

The fact that, for the first time ever, an EU document listed the vital interests of the EU (which was a breakthrough in its own right) was a reflection of this new approach. Policy is about interests; if it isn’t, no one will invest in it. That applies to the EU as much as to an individual state, and ‘there is no clash between national and European interests’. The vital interests defined by the EUGS are vital to all Member States: the security of EU citizens and territory; prosperity (which, the EUGS stated, implies equality – otherwise we would not be talking about the prosperity of all citizens); democracy; and a rules-based global order to contain power politics.

Setting these interests off against the analysis of the global environment that HR Mogherini had presented to the European Council in June 2015, the EUGS identified five priorities: (1) the security of the EU itself; (2) the neighbourhood; (3) how to deal with war and crisis; (4) stable regional orders across the globe; and (5) effective global governance. The first three priorities in particular reflected the modesty or realism imposed by ‘principled pragmatism’, by emphasising our own security, the neighbourhood and hard power, and by no longer emphasising democratisation.

THE SECURITY OF THE EU

The EUGS focused on Europe’s own security (which was much less present in the ESS) and on the neighbourhood: ‘We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield’. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2015 and 2016, and the refugee crisis that followed the wars in Libya and Syria, addressing our internal and border security was indispensable for the EUGS to be credible with citizens and Member States alike.

The focus on the neighbourhood was also justified by the limits of EU capabilities. It was defined very broadly, however, going beyond what Brus-
sels now often calls our ‘neighbours’ neighbours’: ‘to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa’. Stabilising this part of the world is no mean task, but the EUGS achieved the right balance, since it did not ignore the challenges in Asia (‘there is a direct connection between European prosperity and Asian security’), nor those at global level (such as the freedom of the global commons).

THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

The EUGS placed much less emphasis on democracy. It stated that the EU would support democracies where they emerged, for ‘their success […] would reverberate across their respective regions’ – but in our broad neighbourhood, the EUGS mentioned only Tunisia and Georgia as positive examples. As many others do not wish to pursue closer relations with the EU, the EUGS placed the emphasis on reducing the fragility of these states rather than on changing their regimes, for which we have but limited leverage. However, since many of our neighbours are ‘repressive states [that] are inherently fragile in the long term’, this requires civil society to be targeted instead. The aim was to increase the resilience of people and societies, notably by fighting poverty and inequality, so that over time, home-grown positive change would emerge. This would, however, require considerable funds.

Lowering the EUGS’s level of ambition in terms of democratisation was simply an acceptance of reality. This is all about being honest with ourselves. The EU cannot democratise Egypt, for example, so it should not pretend that it can. At the same time, it should then also not feel obliged to pretend that the regime is a great friend – it is not. But the EU maintains diplomatic relations with (nearly) every country, not just with its friends, and it works with (nearly) every country whose interests coincide with its own. As long as authoritarian regimes exist, it may indeed be obliged to work with them in order to address urgent issues; the anti-IS coalition is a case in point. The EUGS did not say much about this dimension: how can we work with such regimes, in line with ‘principled pragmatism’, without further strengthening their hold on power?

This question demonstrates that resilience is a problematic concept. Increasing the resilience of a state against external threats can easily lead to increasing the resilience of a repressive regime. While the EU must be modest about its ability to change regimes, it should not be propping them up either. It makes sense, therefore, for the EUGS to simultaneously advocate capacity-building and the reform of the justice, security and defence sectors on the one hand, and human rights protection on the other. The strong emphasis on human rights (which is indeed to be distinguished from democratisation) is indispensable, for it is often against their own governments that people have to be resilient. But can the EU deliver on that promise? Perhaps ‘fighting inequality’ would have been a better heading for the new strategy towards our eastern and southern neighbours than ‘resilience’.

On a side note, if the EU wanted to be more honest with itself, then (with the exception of the Balkans) ‘a credible enlargement policy’ did not really belong in the section on the neighbourhood, for enlargement is no longer a credible project, least of all for Turkey.

WAR AND CRISIS

The EUGS showed a much stronger awareness of the indispensability of a credible military instrument. ‘Soft and hard power go hand in hand’, as HR Mogherini rightly pointed out in her foreword. The EUGS did not rediscover geopolitics per se – the ESS had already stated that ‘even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important’ – but it recognised to a greater extent than the ESS that some powers will not hesitate to use blackmail and force in what they consider to be a geopolitical competition. Hence the EUGS’ ambition ‘to protect Europe, respond to external crises, and assist in developing our partners’ security and
defence capacities’. Furthermore, our efforts ‘should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO’. This could be read as the EU constituting the European pillar that allows its Member States to act with the US where possible, and without US assets when necessary.

The ends to which the EU should apply this ‘strategic autonomy’ (as Mogherini called it) are mentioned throughout the EUGS. Firstly, ‘this means living up to our commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity’, i.e. Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222 TFEU. Secondly, where conflict is ongoing, the EU should ‘protect human lives, notably civilians’ and ‘be ready to support and help consolidate local ceasefires’, presumably in the broad neighbourhood as a matter of priority. This remains an ambitious undertaking, for it entails deploying on the ground troops that have serious firepower, are backed up by significant air support and ready reserves, and are not necessarily there to seek out and destroy an opponent, but will fight when the civilians for whom they are responsible are threatened. Thirdly, the EU ‘is seeking to make greater practical contributions to Asian security’, including in the maritime area. Finally, the EU ‘could assist further and complement UN peacekeeping’ as a demonstration of its belief in the UN as ‘the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order’.

On Russia, the EUGS essentially advocated strategic patience, while making ‘substantial changes in relations’ dependent on Russia’s respect for international law.

**EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM**

The fifth priority put global governance firmly back on the EU agenda, after ‘effective multilateralism’ (as the ESS phrased it) had more or less disappeared off the radar. The EUGS ambitiously set out ‘to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system’, in order to prevent ‘the emergence of alternative groupings to the detriment of all’. Also under this heading, an ambitious programme on free trade (envisaging FTAs with the US, Japan, Mercosur, India, ASEAN and others) and on the freedom of the global commons heralded a creative diplomatic initiative – and a more strategic use of EU trade policy, based on the view that it should be as embedded in overall strategy as it is in the US.

**CREATING A PROCESS**

Like all strategies, the EUGS had to be translated into sub-strategies, policies and action in order to achieve its objectives. In some areas, the EU has been very active, especially in the area of the CSDP, with the activation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the creation of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and a European Defence Fund (EDF). Some of the five priorities – global governance, for example – have, however, received far less attention.

The EUGS stated that a ‘new process of strategic reflection will be launched whenever the EU and its Member States deem it necessary’. Ideally, the EUGS should be systematically reviewed and a new edition adopted after every European election; the EUGS 2016 should be followed by the EUGS 2020, and so on. A strategic review is a way of forcing ourselves to think about grand strategy at least once every five years. Sometimes the EUGS
might be reviewed and the conclusion might be that not that much needs to be changed – but in that case, things remain the same because change has been considered unnecessary, not because change has not been considered at all. Furthermore, a strategic review at the start of the term would be a way for each High Representative to craft his or her own mandate.

In 2019, the new High Representative, Josep Borrell, decided to carry on with the existing EUGS 2016.

**A POLITICO-MILITARY SUB-STRATEGY OR ‘STRATEGIC COMPASS’**

Various sub-strategies operate one level below the EUGS (on terrorism, cyber security, the Sahel, etc.), but there is no specific strategy for the politico-military domain.

The Treaty itself lists the expeditionary tasks of the CSDP, to which the EUGS added the protection of Europe, even though the Treaty does not provide for CSDP operations inside the EU. Based on the EUGS, the November 2016 Implementation Plan on Security and Defence listed three tasks (crisis response, capacity-building, and the protection of Europe), but the EUGS also emphasised maintaining free access to the global commons as a military task. Within the task of crisis response, the EUGS prioritised the protection of civilians in armed conflict, but in reality, Member States undertake military operations primarily to safeguard their security and economic interests. The EU’s military task list is confused and inherently contradictory.

Moreover, it is unclear on what scale the EU would be willing to carry out these tasks, because Member States have refused to open debate regarding the Headline Goal. It is clear, however, that the stated aim (since 1999) of deploying and sustaining up to a corps (50 to 60,000 troops) is insufficient to carry out all of the tasks concurrently. The EUGS has also introduced strategic autonomy as an objective, but the debate over what that might mean in the area of defence is so far inconclusive. Meanwhile, in the area of capacity-building, PESCO actually looks beyond the CSDP, addressing the entirety of participating Member States’ armed forces with the aim of achieving their national, NATO and EU targets.

In 2019, Germany proposed drawing up a ‘Strategic Compass’. Ideally, such a document should provide a clear expression of the security and defence responsibilities the EU must be ready to assume (through the CSDP and other policies), for what purposes, through which types of operations (high- and low-intensity) and on what scale, and to what extent it would be able to assume those responsibilities concurrently. That means answering some sensitive political questions and (as regards the CSDP) translating those answers into precise military objectives. Such a politico-military Strategic Compass should therefore be co-authored by the civilian and military sides of the EEAS together.

In order to really have an impact on the CSDP, the Strategic Compass should subsequently lead to a new Headline Goal. There is no point in clarifying the tasks if there is no will to revisit the means in turn. This new Headline Goal can then help us
decide which *coherent full spectrum force package* (the term used in the November 2017 PESCO Notification) we are building – a package that allows EU Member States both to play their role within NATO and to act autonomously when necessary.

**STRATEGIC CHOICES FOR THE 2020s**

Since the adoption of the EUGS, the EU has taken important strategic decisions. In March 2019, for example, the EU announced that it sees China as a strategic partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival, all at the same time. Beijing correctly understood this as heralding a more transactional EU approach. No longer is the EU just saying to China, ‘Wouldn’t it be nice if you opened your market to us as we open ours to you?’ The new message is: ‘It would only be fair, and if you don’t, we will have to limit your access. Instead, therefore, let us achieve positive reciprocity by increasing openness and transparency on both sides.’ Washington also took note, because this was a message for the US as well: the EU and the US are and will remain strategic partners (and, for most EU Member States, formal allies), but that does not mean that other powers are Europe’s adversaries, even if the US treats them as such. How the EU deals with other powers will depend on Brussels’ assessment of their behaviour towards Europe, not just on Washington.

The approach to China can be summarised as follows: cooperate when you can, but push back when you must. When both parties are willing, cooperation is easy. Pushing back is more difficult, because there always seems to be a least one EU Member State that blocks consensus. But pushing back is vital in order to signal to China that any more aggressive use of its power will not work, as well as to uphold the EU’s position on human rights. If in practice the EU ends up cooperating with China without pushing back, that will encourage precisely the kind of assertiveness from China that EU engagement seeks to avoid.

The adoption of the EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy (September 2018) and the creation of a connectivity partnership with Japan (September 2019) together represent another important EU decision. Like all good strategies, the basic idea is simple: if the EU feels that China, through its Belt and Road Initiative (or in some places Russia, through the Eurasian Economic Union), is gaining too much influence in a country where European interests are at stake, Europe must put a better offer on the table. Thus the EU seeks to create connectivity through consent, convincing states that it is in their interest to create a level and transparent economic playing field and engage with various powers simultaneously rather than putting all their eggs in a Chinese or Russian basket. But mobilising sufficient public and private means, and generating viable investment projects to be sufficiently convincing, will be a huge challenge. The partnership with Japan will certainly help the EU achieve the scale required. Expectations have been raised, and the EU is making a concerted effort – but real strategic impact will not be easy to achieve.

Taken together, these and other recent EU decisions amount to a careful repositioning in international politics. Let us be bold and call it a glimmer of a Grand Strategy: an idea of the Union’s shifting place in the great power relations that determine international politics. Yet that nascent Grand Strategy is not equally shared by all EU Member States or even by all EU institutions, nor has it yet been incorporated into all relevant strands of EU policy. If the implications are not fully thought through and the repositioning stops here, the EU and the Member States risk ending up in a permanently ambivalent position: more than a satellite of the US, but not a truly independent power either. Such a half-hearted stance would alienate our allies and partners, while tempting our adversaries. For now, the EU has done enough to irritate the US but not enough to obtain the benefits sought: to further the European interest and to play a stabilising role in great power relations.
1.4. CSDP – STATE OF AFFAIRS

by Jochen Rehrl

The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union celebrated its 20 years of existence in 2018, following its political launch in 1998 at the informal European Council in Pörtschach, Austria. The first civilian missions and military operations were launched in 2003. Over time, the structures were streamlined by the establishment of the ‘Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability’ and the ‘Crisis Management and Planning Directorate’. The Treaty of Lisbon created the ‘European External Action Service’, which has housed the CSDP structures since then. The ‘EU Global Strategy’ gave new impetus and strategic guidance to the work of crisis prevention, intervention and stabilisation. At present we are facing major challenges as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, which has hit EU Member States with unprecedented force, and its consequences, which will change economies and budgetary options for the coming decades.

GLOBAL UNCERTAINTY

The pandemic is not, however, the only challenge. We will have to expect a global recession in the coming years, with ‘climate change’ another devastating situation if action is not taken immediately. In addition to these challenges, the old challenges have not gone away: terrorism, irregular migration, cyber-attacks, disinformation and hybrid threats. Moreover, the current rivalry between larger countries (e.g. the US vs China vs Russia) will increase as economic pressure fuels their differences and frictions. Overall, global uncertainty has never been higher than at present.

CSDP – THE ROCK IN THE SURF

The Common Security and Defence Policy is based on European lessons and experience derived from the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991 –
These roots have now become invisible as a result of developments over the past two decades. The EU has conducted several military operations, including three maritime ones, some military training missions and a majority of civilian missions, ranging from rule of law to advising on borders in three different continents. The structures and procedures have been adapted to current needs, tasks and missions, although the core structures comprising the Political Security Committee (PSC), the Politico-Military Group (PMG), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) have remained unchanged.

CSDP – PART OF SOMETHING BIGGER

When the CSDP was created, some used expressions such as ‘entry-force’ or ‘first-in / first-out’. These expressions showed the thinking behind the crisis management tools of the European Union, namely to be integrated into something bigger than the CSDP. Military operations were designed as door-openers, quick reaction forces and as a preventive tool. These ambitions were only realised twice, in DRC Congo 2003 and Chad 2008-2009, when the EU became involved first and handed over their operation to the United Nations after a certain period of time. In many other places, the EU took over missions from other organisations (e.g. UN, NATO) and was not in a position to keep the 6-months-in/out goal which was initially envisaged. The oldest CSDP operation is EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was launched in 2004.

However, these developments also show that the CSDP was created to contribute to something bigger, which was first described as a ‘comprehensive approach’ and most recently referred to in the EU Global Strategy as the ‘integrated approach’, which means being fully engaged in all stages of a conflict, from early action and prevention, wherever possible, to staying on the ground long enough for peace to take root. A particular emphasis is placed on early warning and risk assessment.

As soon as the EU has taken a decision to use the CSDP to respond to a specific situation, this policy becomes crucial for the success of the broader strategic ambition, which is to make Europe stronger: an even more united and influential actor on the world stage that keeps citizens safe, preserves our interests, and upholds our values. This strategic ambition requires the cooperation and coordination of all available tools and instruments within the European Union, while keeping in mind partner organisations such as the United Nations, the OSCE or NATO.

COHERENT STRUCTURES

The crisis response tools of the European Union were streamlined and a new structure was set up within the European External Action Service. One of the three Deputy Director Generals is assigned to the CSDP and crisis response only and is in command of both the ‘Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability’ (CPCC) and the ‘Military Planning and Conduct Capability’ (MPCC), including the ‘Joint Support and Coordination Cell’ (JSCC). Subordinate to him, a managing director responsible for CSDP and crisis response leads two directorates, one in charge of the ‘Integrated Approach for Security and Peace’ and the
other one responsible for ‘Security and Defence Policy’. Military expertise comes from the EU Military Staff, which is attached to the CSDP structures of the EEAS and integrated with its MPCC. This role will evolve further as soon as the MPCC develops into a fully fledged Operational Headquarters (OHQ) in the near future.

OPERATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

The CSDP is more than just a policy. The CSDP is crisis management with boots on the ground; therefore, it could also be seen as the business card of the EU in crisis areas or the tip of the iceberg as regards the EU’s external action. The CSDP is, however, an intergovernmental tool and the Member States are in the driving seat. Only those means and assets made available by the EU Member States and their partners can be deployed for missions (with a few exceptions on the civilian side). As a precondition, CSDP missions and operations can only be launched where there is a unanimous decision. Therefore, it is not surprising that German, which held the EU-Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2020, writes in its programme:

“All too often, individual Member States block the broad consensus among the vast majority of the countries – and that undermines our Union. That is why we will appeal for more willingness to engage in cooperation and compromise and to find a balance of interests and will also continue our efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the common foreign and security policy during our Council Presidency, supporting the High Representative.”

CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

One of the great achievements of the CSDP is the willingness of the EU Member States to provide the necessary capabilities for missions and operations. It is a shared understanding that close cooperation in the field of capability development will not only avoid duplication, but will also help to identify synergies and pool efforts. The Civilian CSDP compact brings together political ambition, strategic direction and necessary capability development targets. The Compact is a milestone in civilian CSDP development that will enhance the EU’s role as a comprehensive security provider.

On the military side, a new phase of capability development was launched with several interlinked processes such as the ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ (PESCO), the ‘Comprehensive Annual Review on Defence’ (CARD) and the ‘European Defence Fund’ (EDF), which was established within a newly created Directorate General of the European Commission, the supranational body of the European Union.

Independently of good intentions, at the end of the day the multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027 will show whether there will be an adequate budgetary envelope for the security and defence sector. A similar dilemma faces the future European Peace Facility, which should provide partner countries with the necessary (military) equipment. The rationale for this endeavour is clear: when you train people and expect them to contribute to the establishment of a value-based society and state, you also have to adequately equip them in order to facilitate the success of the mission.

EU-NATO COOPERATION

Mutually reinforcing and fruitful cooperation between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation should be expected, in particular bearing in mind that both headquarters are in Brussels, that there is a big overlap between the member states of the EU and NATO, that only a single set of forces exists, and that the values/interests of both organisations are largely shared. However, the implementation of cooperation is not as easy as one might expect. Based on the Berlin plus agreement signed in late 2002 and the political declarations of 2016
and 2018, the two organisations have increased cooperation and regularly hold joint meetings in various formats (e.g. the Political and Security Committee together with the North Atlantic Council), have identified numerous fields of cooperation and have organised regular staff-to-staff contacts. However, there has not yet been a practical breakthrough.

The new defence initiatives of the European Union (CARD, PESCO) have the potential to break the ice, but the root cause of the (political) frictions remains. Common exercises and common training could help to overcome certain difficulties, but as long as no political consensus is achieved, progress will be limited. However, the work on ‘military mobility’ would seem to create some room for improvement which will hopefully lead to sustainable development for the benefit of both organisations, with full respect for decision-making autonomy and procedures on the basis of the principles of transparency, reciprocity and inclusiveness.

**STRATEGIC COMPASS**

Over the next two years, a security policy document will be drawn up to further specify the EU’s strategic goals for the security and defence sector and make the EU’s activity more responsive, effective and plannable, within the framework of the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy and based on a joint threat analysis. The joint threat analysis will also be the feature that distinguishes it from previous projects. It will be intelligence-based and should lead
to a common strategic understanding. The conclusions derived from this threat analysis should facilitate further work on the level of ambition, priority setting within the capability development process and the selection of mission areas.

**BREXIT**

The decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU has already had a concrete impact on the CSDP. The Operational Headquarters for Operation Atalanta for EUNAVFOR Somalia has been relocated from Northwood, UK to Rota, Spain. The UK contributions to CSDP operations were traditionally modest, but what will be missed is the expertise (and, on occasion, the dissenting opinions) of British officials and officers in CSDP-related EU bodies, including the EU military staff.

However, BREXIT also offers the opportunity for more EU integration in the field of capability development (e.g. PESCO) and a European chain of command (e.g. MPCC and the potential for an EU OHQ). The UK was one of the watchdogs focused on maintaining the balance of ‘unnecessary duplications’ vs building EU assets/means in the context of EU-NATO cooperation.

**CONCLUSION**

The CSDP has been a fast evolving policy field. This momentum will become even more significant due to the blurring borders between internal and external security, the interface between climate change and security, and the nexus between development and security. The CSDP now needs to adapt to the new challenges; based on the experience it has gained over its years of engagement, it can make the difference in conflicts and crises around the world, and provide the necessary added value for a more secure Europe in a better world, which was already the EU’s strategic ambition in 2003.

**CSDP – PARTNERSHIPS AT ITS CORE**

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been an open project from the outset. An integrated approach means not only drawing on all of the EU’s strengths, but also working with international and regional organisations, such as the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the African Union, as well as with non-EU countries. The EU and these partners can mutually benefit from each other’s knowledge, expertise and specific capabilities, thereby bringing them closer to one another.

The two regions which contribute most to CSDP missions and operations as third parties are the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership. Most of these countries have Framework Partnership Agreements (FPA), which facilitate their potential contributions to missions and operations in practical terms. To date, 20 such agreements have been signed, and ten partners currently participate in 12 of the 17 established CSDP missions and operations. This also creates a common experience on the ground and brings the partners closer to the European Union.
The EU is facing new and increasing threats and challenges. To counter them, protect its citizens, and enhance its strategic autonomy to become a stronger global partner, the EU needs to define what kind of security and defence actor it wants to be.

### ADDRESSING THREATS TO THE EU’S SECURITY

As a first step to determine the direction of travel, the EU has conducted for the first time a comprehensive analysis on key threats and challenges to Europe, including:

- **Global and regional threats**
- **Conflicts in our neighbourhood**
- **Challenges by state actors**
- **Threats by non-state actors**

The Threat Analysis is a classified intelligence report identifying key trends:

- **Global level**: slowdown of globalisation, growing economic rivalry between global powers, climate change and competition for resources, migratory pressures, and threats to the multilateral system.

- **Regional level**: regional instability, conflict, state fragility, inter-state tensions, external influences, destabilising impact of non-state actors.

- **Threats against the EU**: state and non-state actors targeting the EU with hybrid tools, including disruptive technologies, disinformation, and other non-military sources of influence; terrorist threat.

### DEVELOPING A STRATEGIC COMPASS TO GUIDE OUR ACTIONS

The Strategic Compass will help strengthen a common European security and defence culture and help define the right objectives and concrete goals for our policies.

The Strategic Compass will address four different, inter-linked areas:

- **Crisis management missions**
- **Resilience**
- **Capabilities and Instruments**
- **Working with partners**

The timeline for developing the Strategic Compass is as follows:

- **June 2020**: Tasking by Council
- **1st half of 2021**: Strategic dialogue with Member States
- **November 2020**: Threat analysis
- **2nd half of 2021**: Development of Strategic Compass
- **Early 2022**: Adoption of Strategic Compass
2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
2.1. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (ROLES IN THE CFSP AND CSDP CONTEXTS)

by Luis Amorim and Georg Klein

2.1.1. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

The European Council provides the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and defines the Union’s general political directions and priorities, including in the fields of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).\(^1\)

Under Articles 22 and 26 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the European Council identifies the strategic interests and objectives of the Union in the area of the CFSP and in other areas of the external action of the Union. In doing so, the European Council acts on the basis of the principles set out in Article 21 TEU: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity, and respect for the United Nations Charter and international law.

The European Council is one of the Union’s seven institutions, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009\(^2\). It consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States (i.e. Presidents or Prime Ministers), together with its own President and the President of the European Commission. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative) also participates in European Council meetings where foreign affairs are discussed.

The European Council elects its own President by a qualified majority, for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. This ‘permanent’ nature of the post is one of the main innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon\(^3\). Besides convening and chairing its meetings and driving

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1 The CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP and is aimed at providing the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets, that the Union may use on CSDP missions and operations outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks is undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States. The CSDP is also expected to include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy, which will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously so decides, in full accordance with the Member States’ constitutional requirements (Article 42 TEU).

2 The European Council was created in 1974 and formalised by the Single European Act in 1986. Between 1961 and 1974, seven summits meetings of Heads of State or Government had been convened to assess different turning points of the European Community’s history.

3 The expression ‘permanent’ should be read in opposition to the mandate of the Presidency of the Council of the EU, which is held by each Member State for periods of six months at a time, on a rotating basis.
forward the work of the European Council, as well as ensuring the preparation and continuity of its work in co-operation with the President of the European Commission, the President of the European Council also ensures, at his level and in that capacity, the external representation of the Union on issues concerning the CFSP, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative. It is worth noting that the High Representative is nominated by the European Council and is expected to ensure, inter alia, the implementation of European Council decisions in the area of the CFSP and CSDP.

Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council has had three ‘permanent’ Presidents: former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy (2009-2014), former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk (2014-2019), and former Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel, who took office in December 2019.

The European Council does not exercise legislative functions and, unless stated otherwise in the Treaties, takes its decisions by consensus. In the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Council usually acts unanimously. If a vote is taken, neither the President of the European Council nor the President of the Commission take part. The General Secretariat of the Council assists the European Council.

The European Council meets at least twice every six months. The President may decide to convene special meetings of the European Council if the situation so requires. This has been the case during the migration crisis, under the Presidency of Herman Van Rompuy, but also in the context of CFSP-relevant developments in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, such as the Eastern Mediterranean or Central Europe, under the Presidency of Charles Michel.

The European Council has always been particularly attentive to CFSP matters, including the CSDP. The following political milestones in the specific context of CSDP are worth highlighting:

**Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of 12-13 December 2003** (doc. 5381/04): The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS), which provided the conceptual framework for the CFSP, including what would later become the CSDP.

**European Council Conclusions of 11-12 December 2008** (doc. 17271/1/08 REV 1, Annex 2): Declaration by the European Council on the enhancement of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
European Council Conclusions of 19-20 December 2013 (EUCO 217/13): For the first time since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council held a thematic debate on defence, which was preceded by a meeting with the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The European Council identified at this meeting priority actions for stronger cooperation under three main areas: (1) increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the CSDP; (2) enhancing the development of capabilities, and (3) strengthening Europe’s defence industry.

European Council Conclusions of 25-26 June 2015 (EUCO 22/15): The European Council tasked the High Representative to continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing a EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with Member States, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016.

European Council Conclusions of 28 June 2016 (EUCO 26/16): The European Council welcomed the presentation of the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy by the High Representative and invited her, the Commission and the Council to take the work forward. The European Council also discussed EU-NATO cooperation in the presence of the Secretary General of NATO and called for further enhancement of the relationship, in light of their common aims and values and given the unprecedented challenges from South and East. At this meeting, it was also announced that the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission would issue a declaration together with the Secretary General of NATO, at NATO’s ministerial meeting in Warsaw on 8 July 2016.

European Council Conclusions of 15 December 2016 (EUCO 34/16): The European Council emphasised that Europeans must take greater responsibility for their security. In order to strengthen Europe’s security and defence in a challenging geopolitical environment and to better protect its citizens, and confirming previous commitments in this respect, the European Council stressed the need to do more, including by committing sufficient additional resources, while taking into account national
circumstances and legal commitments. It also urged swift action to follow up on the Council conclusions of 14 November 2016 on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence and the Council conclusions of 6 December 2016 implementing the Joint Declaration signed in Warsaw by EU and NATO leaders.

**European Council Conclusions of 22-23 June 2017 (EUCO 8/17):** In light of a number of terrorist attacks in the UK that year, the European Council reiterated its commitment to strengthening EU cooperation on external security and defence so as to protect the Union and its citizens and contribute to peace and stability in its neighbourhood and beyond. Highlighting the importance of joint capability development within the Union, it welcomed the proposals for a European Defence Fund and for a European Defence Industrial Development Programme, and agreed on the need to launch an inclusive and ambitious Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

**European Council Conclusions of 14 December 2017 (EUCO 19/17):** The European Council welcomed the establishment of PESCO and stressed the importance of quickly implementing the first projects. It further called for the timely adoption of the European Defence Industrial Development Programme to allow for the funding of first capability projects in 2019. It also requested that the Council adopt a recommendation on a new dedicated instrument covering all requirements for Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (CBSD) after 2020. Finally, it asked to continue work on the implementation of the common set of proposals agreed in the framework of the two EU-NATO Joint Declarations.

**European Council Conclusions of 28 June 2018 (EUCO 9/18):** The European Council reiterated that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security and underpin its role as a credible and reliable actor and partner in the area of security and defence. With reference to the notion of strategic autonomy, it detailed how the Union was taking steps to bolster European defence by enhancing defence investment, capability development, and operational readiness. It also called on the Council to complete the institutional framework of
PESCO, in particular with regard to third state participation, and asked for work to proceed on the implementation of the common set of proposals in the context of EU-NATO cooperation.

(EUCO 9/19): The European Council highlighted, under the header of “A new Strategic Agenda 2019-2024” that the EU’s CFSP and CSDP must become more responsive and active and be better linked to the other strands of external relations. The EU also needs to take greater responsibility for its own security and defence, in particular by enhancing defence investment, capability development and operational readiness; it will cooperate closely with NATO, in full respect of the principles set out in the Treaties and by the European Council, including the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and decision-making autonomy of the EU.

Relations with strategic partners, including our transatlantic partners, and emerging powers have to be a key component of a robust foreign policy. To that end, there need to be far more synergies between the EU and the bilateral levels. The EU can only engage with other global powers on an equal footing if it avoids a piecemeal approach and presents a united front, backed up by EU and Member State resources.

2.1.2. THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Council of the European Union (“the Council”), in conjunction with the European Parliament, is the Union institution that exercises legislative and budgetary functions. It carries out policy-making and coordinating functions as laid down in the Treaties. It consists of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, who may commit the government of the Member State in question and cast its vote. The Council acts by a qualified majority\(^4\) except where the Treaties provide otherwise. In the area of the CFSP/CSDP, the Council usually acts by consensus and unanimity\(^5\). The adoption of legislative acts is excluded (Article 24 TEU)\(^6\).

Currently, the Council of the EU meets in the following 10 configurations:
1. General Affairs
2. Foreign Affairs
3. Economic and Financial Affairs
4. Justice and Home Affairs
5. Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs
6. Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry, Research and Space)
7. Transport, Telecommunications and Energy
8. Agriculture and Fisheries
9. Environment
10. Education, Youth, Culture and Sport

The General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) assists the work of the Council. It is headed by its Secretary-General, who is appointed by the Council. The Secretary-General bears responsibility for

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\(^4\) A qualified majority is reached if 55% of Member States representing at least 65% of the EU population vote in favour.

\(^5\) Atypical acts without specific legal basis in the Treaties, such as Council conclusions, are in practice approved by consensus, while legal acts in the area of the CFSP/CSDP are mostly adopted by unanimity. In this policy area, the Council may act by qualified majority when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision or following a specific request of the European Council to the High Representative, when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position, and when appointing a EU special representative (Article 31.2 TEU). In addition, some decisions in relation to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the CSDP may be taken by qualified majority voting (Articles 46.2 and 46.3 TEU).

\(^6\) The exclusion of the adoption of legislative acts does not deprive CFSP Decisions of their binding nature, which is confirmed by Article 28.2 TEU. The exclusion of legislative acts is mostly linked to the exclusion of the legislative procedure from the area of the CFSP, and hence with the inapplicability of the role of the Commission and the European Parliament in this procedure.
the organisation and execution of the services provided by the GSC to the rotating and ‘permanent’ presidencies of the Council and its preparatory bodies, and to the President of the European Council, including the administrative management of the GSC in terms of its human and financial resources. The Secretary-General takes part in Council meetings as appropriate. The Secretary-General of the Council is also the Secretary-General of the European Council, attends European Council meetings and takes all measures necessary for organising its proceedings. The current Secretary-General is Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen. He was appointed on 21 April 2015 for the period from 1 July 2015 until 30 June 2020. Mr Tranholm-Mikkelsen was appointed for a second term on 29 April 2020. The new five-year term will run from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2025.

Despite the fact that it meets in different configurations, the Council of the EU is a single legal entity. This has three important consequences for its work:

1. Any legal act concerning any subject falling with the Union’s competence can be formally adopted by any Council configuration, whether or not it falls under its remit.

2. There is no hierarchy among the different Council configurations, although the General Affairs Council has a coordinating role and is responsible for institutional, administrative and horizontal matters.

3. The office of the Presidency of the Council is also a single office. This means, in practice, that the rules applicable to the Presidency apply to any person chairing any one of the Council configurations, including the Foreign Affairs Council ‘permanent’ chair, or, as appropriate, any person chairing one of the Council’s preparatory bodies.

It is not unusual for the members of the Council to continue their discussions at the meals that are organised on the occasion of Council meetings. However, such events do not form part of the official Council meetings and any decisions taken or conclusions reached must be formally adopted at the official meeting.

Ministers also meet to reflect and exchange views freely on topics of general scope. These informal meetings are outside the framework and procedural rules laid down by the Treaties, and discussions thereof cannot give rise to the production of documents, before or after the meeting, or to the draft-
ing of conclusions or formal decisions. In the area of foreign affairs, ministers usually meet informally once per semester, at ‘Gymnich meetings’, so called following the first meeting of this nature held in the namesake German town in 1974. Ministers of Defence also meet informally once per semester.

The General Affairs and Foreign Affairs configurations are the only ones specifically mentioned in Article 16 TEU.

The General Affairs Council ensures the consistency in the work of the different Council configurations. It prepares and ensures the follow-up to meetings of the European Council, in liaison with the President of the European Council and the European Commission.

The Foreign Affairs Council elaborates the Union’s external action on the basis of the strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensures that the Union’s action in this area is consistent. This includes foreign policy, security and defence, trade, as well as development cooperation and humanitarian aid. The Council can launch CSDP missions and operations, both civilian and military, as part of the EU’s integrated approach to external conflicts and crises. It can also adopt measures needed to implement the EU’s foreign and security policy, including possible sanctions.

The Foreign Affairs Council is usually composed of the foreign ministers from all EU Member States. Depending on the agenda, however, the Council also brings together defence ministers (CSDP), development ministers (development cooperation) and trade ministers (common commercial policy). Ministers from these policy areas usually meet twice per year under the Foreign Affairs Council configuration. In the case of defence ministers, they sometimes meet back-to-back with foreign ministers.

The High Representative chairs the Foreign Affairs Council in its foreign policy, defence and development formations. The representatives of the Member State holding the six-monthly rotating Presidency chair the Foreign Affairs Council in its trade formation as well as all other Council configurations. The Foreign Affairs Council meets once a month, with the exception of August and September, unless the situation warrants a meeting during one of those two months.

A Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (Coreper) prepares the work of the Council and carries out the tasks assigned to it by the Council. Moreover, Coreper ensures the consistency of the Union’s policies and actions. The chief role of Coreper is to coordinate and prepare the work of the different Council configurations, including Foreign Affairs, and to attempt to find, at its level, an agreement that will subsequently be submitted to the Council for decision or adoption. Coreper’s central role is illustrated by the fact that all of the items on the Council’s agenda must be examined beforehand by Coreper unless, for reasons of urgency, the Council decides otherwise. Coreper is divided in two parts, 1 (deputy Permanent Rep-

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7 It must be noted that the High Representative does not chair ministerial meetings that fall under the Foreign Affairs Council remit which deal with common commercial policy issues; these are chaired by the six-monthly rotating Presidency of the Council. As it is an exclusive competence of the EU, the Council adopts measures implementing the EU’s common commercial policy together with the European Parliament.

8 This acronym derives from the French abbreviation for ‘Comité des représentants permanents’.

9 It is worth noting that any agreement worked out by Coreper can always be called into question by the Council, which alone has the power to make decisions.
representatives) and 2 (Permanent Representatives). Coreper 2 prepares, *inter alia*, the work of the Foreign Affairs Council\(^\text{10}\).

The **Political and Security Committee** (PSC), provided for in Article 38 TEU, plays a central role in the area of the CFSP and CSDP. It performs two main functions: (1) it monitors the international situation in areas relating to the CFSP and contributes to the definition of policies, delivering opinions within the Council, without prejudice to the work of Coreper; (2) under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative, it exercises political control and strategic direction of civilian and military CSDP missions and operations and may, when appropriate and if so empowered by the Council, take decisions in this area. A representative of the High Representative chairs the PSC\(^\text{11}\).

Beyond Coreper and the PSC, more than 150 different preparatory bodies, in the form of committees or working groups, support the work of the Council\(^\text{12}\). Some 35 Council thematic and geographic preparatory bodies support the work of the Foreign Affairs Council. Below is a selection of those that are more closely associated with the area of the CSDP.

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\(^{10}\) Coreper 2 is assisted by members of the ‘Antici Group’, so called after its first chairman. It was set up in 1975 to review the agenda for Coreper 2 and settle technical and organisational details. This preparatory stage makes it possible for the Presidency to have an initial idea of Member States’ positions, possibly to be taken when Coreper 2 meets.

\(^{11}\) The work of PSC is prepared by the ‘Nicolaidis group’, so called after its first chairman.

\(^{12}\) For the full list of Council preparatory bodies, see the following document: *List of Council preparatory bodies*, doc. 9199/20.
The EUMC has a permanent chair, selected by the EUMC meeting at the level of military representatives, and appointed by Coreper. The **European Union Military Committee Working Group/Headline Goal Task Force** (EUMCWG/HTF) is a group of experts dealing with military capability development. It is the EUMC’s working body with regard to all aspects of capability development where it has a responsibility. Beyond that, it has been given tasks encompassing a wider range of capability related issues in the preparation of EUMC decisions. The EUMCWG/HTF has a permanent chair, selected and appointed by the EUMC meeting at the level of military representatives.

The **Politico-Military Group** (PMG) carries out preparatory work in the area of the CSDP for the PSC. It covers the political aspects of EU military and civil-military issues, including concepts, capabilities and operations and missions. The PMG prepares Council conclusions and provides recommendations for the PSC, monitors their effective implementation, contributes to the development of horizontal policy and facilitates exchanges of information. It has a particular responsibility regarding partnerships with non-EU countries and other organisations, including NATO, as well as exercises. It is chaired by a representative of the High Representative and is composed of Member States’ delegates.

The **Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management** (CivCom) provides information, formulates recommendations and gives advice to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management (Council decision 2000/354/CFSP of 22 May 2000). It prepares planning documents for civilian CSDP missions and deals with the development of strategies for civilian crisis management and for civilian capabilities. It is chaired by a representative of the High Representative and is composed of Member States’ delegates.

The **Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors** (RELEX) deals with the legal, financial and institutional issues of the CFSP. Its priorities include sanctions, CSDP missions and operations, EU special representatives, the financing of external activities, non-proliferation matters, and other crosscutting issues in the area of the CFSP/CSDP. In 2004, a new formation called ‘Sanctions’ was created within the working party. Its main task is to share best practices, and to revise and implement common guidelines to ensure effective and uniform implementation of EU sanctions regimes. RELEX is chaired by a representative of the rotating Presidency of the Council.

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**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION**

To learn more about the work of the Council of the EU in the CFSP/CSDP domain go to:

2.2. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN CSDP

by Diego de Ojeda

Although – contrary to most other EU policy areas – the role of the European Commission in the CSDP is secondary to that of the High Representative and the Member States, the Commission remains an essential actor in fully attaining CSDP goals. Indeed, Article 21(3) of the Lisbon Treaty calls upon the Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative, to cooperate to ensure consistency between the different areas of the Union’s external action, and between those areas and its other policies. This is without prejudice to the distinctive competences of each institution and both CFSP and non-CFSP decision-making procedures, as per Article 40.

The ‘consistency’ principle was established in the December 2013 Joint Communication on the EU Comprehensive Approach and the ensuing May 2014 Council Conclusions and further developed in the June 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. The idea is simple: the CSDP is not to act in isolation from other EU external actions and instruments. On the contrary, a strategically coherent use of EU tools and instruments requires that it acts in sync with non-CFSP instruments managed by the Commission as a result of its responsibility to implement the EU budget (Articles 317 and 318 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU).
During the 2014-2020 budgetary cycle, non-CFSP EU external instruments included the geographic Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI), as well as the extra-budgetary European Development Fund (EDF). The thematic Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the Partnership Instrument (PI), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation (INSC) and the DCI thematic programmes also belong to this category.

In addition, under the authority of the High Representative acting in his/her capacity as Vice-President, the Commission also implements the CFSP budget, which finances CSDP civilian missions, EU Special Representatives and non-proliferation and disarmament projects.

Furthermore, the Commission manages other, somewhat related external action policies such as international trade and humanitarian assistance, as well as internal policies with substantial and growing external dimensions – security, migration, climate, energy, transport, space, defence internal market, etc. – which are relevant to the Union’s foreign, security and defence policy.

Thus, the Commission fully participates in the PSC and all Council bodies – including CivCom, PMG and the EUMC – discussing and preparing the decisions of the Foreign Affairs Council in its different configurations: FAC, FAC Defence, FAC Development and FAC Trade.

Through a number of mechanisms, Commission services are increasingly able to make their input available to the EEAS when preparing CSDP interventions. Examples include the Crisis Platform chaired by the EEAS, which brings together all of the relevant services when necessary, and the Political Framework for a Crisis Approach (PFCA), which is now a mandatory step in the process that may lead to deciding to establish a CSDP mission following the completion of all other planning steps, to which Commission services also contribute.
In short, the Commission is not only an important actor when it comes to implementing the CSDP, directly – managing the budget – and indirectly – ensuring coordination with non-CSDP instruments – but it is also a substantial contributor to the interdepartmental process leading to the preparation of CSDP interventions and their discussion in the Council.

Of course, there is still much left to do to fully deliver a truly comprehensive EU approach. The double-hatting of the HR/VP and the establishment of the EEAS by the Lisbon Treaty were revolutionary steps that, with hindsight, inevitably required some time for the intended gains to emerge. In addition to the non-negligible human, logistic and organisational aspects, the full assimilation of and adjustment to the changes in roles and competences could not take place overnight. However, it can be argued that the transition period was completed in the autumn of 2014, when Jean-Claude Juncker took office as President of the European Commission and included the goal of making the EU a stronger global actor as one of the ten political priorities of his Commission. In parallel, he decided to set up the Commissioners Group for External Action, chaired by HR/VP Federica Mogherini, to discuss all EU external action issues with other relevant Commission Vice-Presidents and Commissioners as appropriate, without prejudice to the decision-making competences of the college of Commissioners.

More recently, President Von der Leyen made a stronger Europe in the world one of the six headline ambitions of the new Commission with a view to ensuring a coordinated approach to all of the EU’s external action, from development aid to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, working hand in hand with HR/VP Borrell to this end, including – in her words – “an integrated and comprehensive approach to our security” and “further bold steps in the next five years towards a genuine European Defence Union.

Indeed, the greater consistency achieved at the political level now trickles down to services and to regional, national and thematic common strategies that the High Representative and the Commission discuss and prepare with a view to their submission for endorsement to the Council and the Parliament and which increasingly guide EU external action, including the CSDP.

There should be no room for complacency, however, at least not at this stage, so soon after the Lisbon Treaty (in historical terms). Substantial ground has been covered already: now, the left and right hands of EU external action are aware of what the other is doing. But the goal is for them to go forward hand in hand, not merely in parallel, and the plurality of intense international crises, particularly within the Union’s neighbourhood, suggests that the Integrated Approach must be deepened further in order to reap the synergies that remain to be attained.

The military dimension is particularly important in this respect. On the one hand, the Commission does not have competence in the area of defence or military resources. In addition, Article 41.2 TEU explicitly forbids EU budgetary funding of any expenditure directly or indirectly arising in the context of military operations.

Nonetheless, in December 2017 the Council and the Parliament adopted the Commission proposal to amend the regulation of the IcSP (see above) so as to allow the funding of “Capacity Building in support of Security and Development”
interventions as a last resort under very specific circumstances (e.g. ‘failed’ states), where military actors may be the only ones available to carry out developmental activities, in line with recent policy developments in the context of the OECD development policy.

Moreover, the Council is discussing the proposal of the High Representative, supported by the Commission, to establish the off-budget European Peace Facility that will substantially expand the scope of the military assistance that the EU will be able to provide to its external partners, part of which will be implemented by Commission services. In parallel, the services of the Commission will continue to actively contribute to bring forward the implementation of the 2016 and 2018 EU-NATO Joint Declarations and the Set of Common Proposals including on Countering Hybrid Threats, cybersecurity or disinformation, to name but a few.

Finally, the Commission is actively implementing the two pilot defence research and capability development programmes – the Defence Research Preparatory Action and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme – that will give way to the more ambitious European Defence Fund as of 2021. These programmes are already enhancing cooperation between Member States’ defence industries and promoting a greater pooling of national defence industries for the joint development of defence capabilities.

The direct relevance for the CSDP of all of the above initiatives is quite clear, as is the European Commission’s role in developing them or contributing to their implementation in its areas of competence. The security of the Union and of its citizens is obviously also a top priority for the European Commission, both externally, including through the CSDP and non-CFSP instruments, and internally, by enhancing synergies with the external dimension of the Union’s internal policies and with other relevant policies. In this context and with full respect of the competences assigned to each institution, the Commission plays, and will continue to play, a fully active role in this area in the best interests of the EU and its citizens.
2.3. THE CSDP AND THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

by Jérôme Legrand

It is a commonly accepted view that the European Parliament has little power as far as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is concerned, and even less with regard to its defence component, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, a detailed examination of the evolution of the CSDP over the last decade reveals a different, more complex, reality.

LEGAL BASIS AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The Common Security and Defence Policy is an integral part of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as framed by the Treaty on European Union (TEU). As a matter of fact, in its preamble, the TEU underlines the Member States’ resolve to ‘implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence (…)’. While Article 41 TEU outlines the funding of the CFSP and CSDP, the policy is further described in Articles 42 to 46, in Chapter 2, Section 2 of Title V (‘Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy’), and in Protocols 1, 10 and 11 and Declarations 13 and 14.

Decisions relating to the CSDP are taken by the European Council and the Council of the European Union (Article 42 TEU). They are taken by unanimity, with some notable exceptions relating to the European Defence Agency (EDA, Article 45 TEU) and the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO, Article 46 TEU), to which majority voting applies. Proposals for decisions are normally made by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who also acts as Vice-President of the European Commission (the ‘HR/VP’).

The Lisbon Treaty introduced the notion of a European capabilities and armaments policy (Article 42(3) TEU), which will be at the core of the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP). The latter, presented in 2016, is based on four pillars: supporting defence research with the launch of the preparatory action on defence research in 2017; unlocking EU tools to invest in the entire European defence supply chain (especially SMEs); working towards a possible European Defence Fund; and improving the functioning of the single market for defence.

The Lisbon Treaty also establishes a link between the CSDP and other Union policies by requiring that the EDA and the Commission work in liaison when necessary (Article 45(2) TEU). This concerns in particular the Union’s research, industrial and space policies. This link has created opportunities for the European Parliament (EP) to seek and develop a much stronger bearing on the CSDP than it had in the past.

1 See Title V (‘General Provisions on the Union’s External Action and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)’) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); see also 6.1.1 on the EU’s foreign policy.
The specific role of the European Parliament in the CFSP and CSDP is described in Article 36 of the TEU. It has the right to scrutinise the policy and to take the initiative in addressing the HR/VP and the Council thereon it (Article 36 TEU). It also exercises authority over the policy’s budget (Article 41 TEU). Twice a year, the European Parliament holds debates on progress in implementing the CFSP and the CSDP, and adopts reports: one on the CFSP, drafted by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and including elements relating to the CSDP where necessary; and one on the CSDP, drafted by the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE).

Since 2012, the European Parliament and the Member States’ national parliaments have organised two interparliamentary conferences every year in order to debate matters of common foreign and security policy. Interparliamentary cooperation in these areas is foreseen by Protocol 1 to the Lisbon Treaty, which describes the role of the national parliaments in the EU framework.

Innovations in the Lisbon Treaty have provided an opportunity to improve the political coherence of the CSDP. The HR/VP occupies the central institutional role, chairing the Foreign Affairs Council in its ‘Defence Ministers configuration’ (the EU’s CSDP decision-making body) and directing the EDA. The political framework for consultation and dialogue with the European Parliament is evolving in order to allow the Parliament to play a full role in developing the CSDP. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament is a partner shaping the Union’s external relations and is in charge of addressing the challenge of ensuring popular support to the CSDP, as described in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy.3

3 ‘Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home’. 
In particular, the European Parliament examines developments under the CSDP in terms of institutions, capabilities and operations, and ensures that security and defence issues respond to concerns expressed by the EU’s citizens. Deliberations, hearings and workshops are held regularly, devoted to topics including:

- the current (June 2020) 17 civilian and military CSDP missions in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood of the EU (Kosovo, Ukraine, Georgia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moldova, Libya, the Mediterranean), in Africa (especially the Sahel), and in the Middle East;
- international crises with security and defence implications, and security sector reforms in the aftermath of crises;
- non-EU multilateral security and defence cooperation and structures, in particular regarding NATO or the UN;
- EU and international developments with regard to arms control and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- combating international terrorism, piracy, organised crime and trafficking;
- strengthening the European Parliament’s role in the CSDP through EU policies with implications for security and defence (such as internal and border security, infrastructure development, research, and industrial and space policies);
- good practices to improve the effectiveness of security and defence investments and to strengthen the technological and industrial base in the EU, ‘smart defence’, and ‘pooling and sharing’;
- institutional developments with regard to: EU crisis management structures, including military structures; security and defence cooperation within the Union; the new Commission role and the Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS); the EDA; and other EU agencies and structures in the area of security and defence;
- legislation and political resolutions relating to security and defence, particularly as they pertain to the above-mentioned topics.

The European Parliament holds regular Joint Consultation Meetings (JCMs) with the Council, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission. These meetings allow for the exchange of information on CSDP missions and operations, on implementing the CFSP budget, and on areas of interest and concern. They are part of the consultations between the Parliament and the other EU institutions involved in the CFSP and CSDP that have been taking place since the HR/VP’s declaration on political accountability in 2010. The European Parliament has concluded a series of inter-institutional agreements on the CSDP: of note is the Inter-institutional Agreement of 20 November 2002, which allows the European Parliament to have access to sensitive information of the Council in the

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4 *Inter alia*, the EU Satellite Centre (EU SatCen), the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR).
field of security and defence policy and is currently under revision, and the 2013 agreement on Budgetary Discipline and Sound Financial Management, which has led to regular political dialogue with the chair of the Political and Security Committee (PSC).

Given the key role that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) plays in underwriting European security, the European Parliament participates in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly with a view to developing EU-NATO relations while respecting the independent nature of both organisations. This is particularly important in theatres of operation in which both the EU and NATO are engaged, such as Iraq, Kosovo, and combating piracy off the Horn of Africa and human trafficking in the Mediterranean. This also applies to new areas of cooperation, however, such as hybrid threats and particularly cybersecurity.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSDP

The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) states in its Article 42: “2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.”

After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, and in particular since Commission President Juncker’s proposals with regard to defence, and the EU Global Strategy by HR/VP Mogherini, in 2016, several initiatives have materialized and led to huge progress in the field of the CSDP (EDIDP, proposal for a European Defence Fund, activation of PESCO, project on military mobility, Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, etc…).

The European Parliament has welcomed and encouraged this process via resolutions, such as the 2016 resolution on the European Defence
Union\(^5\), or the December 2018 resolution on the annual report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy\(^6\).

With many of the priorities the European Parliament supported being highlighted in the HR/VP documents of 2015-2016 (e.g. more strategic autonomy for the EU, a high level of cooperation between Member States, a better use of existing CSDP tools and EU-NATO cooperation), the Parliament was meant to intervene in the follow-up phase.

Nevertheless, despite many good intentions, a number of opportunities to advance the CSDP were missed in those years: attempts to launch operations either failed, as in Lebanon and Libya, or lagged, as in Mali. As a result, EU Battlegroups\(^7\) have not been deployed, and the permanent headquarters for EU operations, although in the making with the reinforced MPCC, has yet to be instituted.

From a wider perspective, and if one is to categorise the key issues at stake, the CSDP could be further advanced, the related institutional framework developed, and cooperation among Member States and with the Union’s structures enhanced by a number of orientations, which the EP has advocated in its reports and would like to see becoming reality:

* Maintain the levels of ambition set out in the EU Global Strategy, including the role of the EU as a global security provider, and the sense of urgency for investing in security and defence at EU and Member State levels;

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7 The EU Battlegroup Concept provides a CSDP instrument for early and rapid military crisis responses. A Battlegroup is a force package — composed of about 1 500 (normally multinational) personnel (a minimum to ensure military effectiveness) — capable of standalone operations or of conducting the initial phase of larger operations. EU Battlegroups have been operational since January 2005.
* Maintain and further enhance the principles of cooperation, coordination, and solidarity between EU Member States as far as developments in security and defence are concerned; and this in a deep, sustained and long-term manner;
* A swift implementation of the decisions taken, in the field of CSDP, with sufficient means (funding) available, and respect for principles of cohesion at decision making level, and coherence in actions;
* Lessons learnt from the first steps, to be taken into account for future decisions (e.g. EDIDP for the EDF);
* A Strategic approach/framework to be given to cover all CSDP developments in the possible form of an EU Security and Defence ‘White Book’; this would permit common EU security interests to be conceptualised;
* Cooperation between the EU and NATO, to be complementary and respectful of each other’s specificities and roles; since the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO is fundamental to addressing the security challenges facing the EU and its neighbourhood; and a stronger EU and NATO would reinforce each other;
* Maximisation of synergies between civilian and security and defence/military dimensions and assets, in particular with regards to space industries;
* Institutional developments to match policy developments: a permanent “Council of Defence Ministers” configuration of the Council (chaired by the HRVP), a Directorate General for Defence in the Commission (now created by Mrs von der Leyen), and a fully-fledged Committee on Security and Defence in the EP;
* A stronger Parliamentary dimension in all areas of security and defence, including oversight, a reinforced cooperation between the EP and National Member State Parliaments, as one of the ways to ensure appropriate democratic accountability of decisions taken in the field of defence; – Definition of the relationship between the various elements of the CSDP: a capabilities and armaments policy (Article 42(3) TEU), permanent structured cooperation (Article 46 TEU), the ‘mutual assistance’ clause (Article 42(7) TEU, which reads like a mutual defence clause), the mutual solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU), the Union’s commitment to progressively framing a common EU defence policy (Article 42(2) TEU), and the EU-NATO relationship8.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S DRIVING FORCE

While recent developments have been moving things into the direction supported by the EP, political will and coherent and sustained initiatives will continue to be required to address this list of enhancements to the Common Security and Defence Policy in the long run. The European Parliament has, for its part, demonstrated its will to act and to pursue political initiatives in this field.

As a first practical outcome, the Parliament proposed funding a pilot project on CSDP research using the EU’s 2015 budget. This pilot project, approved by the Parliament and the Council in December 2014, and then followed by the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR, 2017-2019), meant that, for the first time, EU funds would be transferred to the EDA to conduct research on military requirements. Some research projects were selected and successfully implemented (e.g. ‘Unmanned Heterogeneous Swarm of Sensor Platforms’, for the Pilot Project, and the “Open Cooperation for European mAritime awareNess” OCEAN 2020, and “Generic Open Soldier System Reference Architecture” projects for the PADR). The importance of research has been underlined

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8 See own initiative report (2012/2223(INI)) on ‘the EU’s mutual defence and solidarity clauses: political and operational dimensions’.
in the CSDP on many occasions, for instance in the EP resolution ‘on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy’ approved in May 2015, where the Parliament called on Member States ‘to achieve the collective target of 2% of our defence spending on research funding’.

The European Parliament has taken the lead in scrutinising the advancement of the CSDP and analysing the policy’s setbacks. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it has solicited in over twenty resolutions the effective implementation of the CSDP. One of the latest examples of its proactive role is the own-initiative report ‘on the European Defence Union’, which has been important in setting the guidelines for a more coherent CSDP. The report encourages the European Council to lead the framing of the European Defence Union and calls for greater and more systematic European defence cooperation among Member States. Among its various recommendations, it also advocates the establishment of multinational forces under the PESCO framework, and an enhanced role for the EDA.

The Parliament has also acted as a motivating force by stimulating the debate and questioning Member States’ actions. In this sense, its informal role has been as important as the formal one foreseen by the treaties. It is undeniable that the mutually beneficial interchange between the Parliament and important international think tanks has produced ‘food for thought’ in current debates on the CSDP.

One example of timely debate was the workshop organised by the SEDE on a study: ‘On the way towards a European Defence Union – A White Book as a first step’, coordinated by former NATO Secretary General and EU High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana, and released in April 2016. This report sets out a concrete proposal for an EU White Paper on defence and specifically recommends that the European Parliament upgrade the Subcommittee on Security and Defence to a fully-fledged Committee and strengthen cooperation with national parliaments. In that regard, the European Parliament could take advantage of the provisions for inter-parliamentary cooperation set out in Protocol 1 of the Treaty of Lisbon.

More recently, Parliament has examined and debated the situation of CSDP missions, in particular in the Sahel, in the light of the Covid19 crisis and on the basis of external expertise (“How the COVID-19 crisis has affected security and defence-related aspects for the EU”).

The issue of “Strategic Autonomy” is certainly also at the heart of debates in the EP, in all its dimensions. The latest SEDE requested research work (to be issued in December 2020) is entitled: “The European Space sector as an enabler of EU Strategic Autonomy”.

The European Parliament also plays an important role in parliamentary diplomacy and recently developed further its capacity for mediation. Its President is invited to speak at or participate in major events, be they internal to the EU (such as European Council meetings) or international; at global or regional level; and in institutional or informal formats (UN General Assembly, G7 and G20, NATO meetings, Munich Security Conferences, etc.). Interparliamen-
tary dialogue with strategic partners of the EU, such as the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue with the USA, or in the framework of EU-NATO relations\(^{12}\), also allows the EP to engage in open discussions on fundamental developments in the western security and defence environment. This is yet another way for the EP to exercise its legislative scrutiny and budgetary role and contribute to shaping EU policies in the field of security and defence.

**A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY? THE 2019 GEOPOLITICAL COMMISSION AND HR/VP BORRELL**

In both her Political Guidelines for the 2019-2024 Commission (which she baptised herself ‘Geopolitical’), and her mission letter for the HRVP Borrell, Ms von der Leyen stated that ‘We need to take further bold steps in the next five years towards a genuine European Defence Union’. She also pledged more transparency and communication towards the EP (in particular as far as the process of negotiation of International agreements between the EU and other countries is concerned), and support towards some degree of right of initiative for Parliament.

For his part, Josep Borrell, an experienced politician, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain and former President of the European Parliament, is the third, and most ‘EP-knowledgeable’, High-Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Beside recognising the important role of the EP in ‘shaping the Union’s foreign policy’, as well as ‘the potential of parliamentary diplomacy’, he made important commitments towards Security and Defence during his EP Hearing in October 2019:

- **Article 42.7 TEU** (i.e. the Mutual Defence Clause) must be made operational. It should be “protocolised” in order to specify how it should be implemented;
- We must be more operational on the ground and deploy forces, e.g. in our neighbourhood;
- We must play our part to extend the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
- The 2008 Common Position on Arms Export control has to be renegotiated to increase transparency on exports, and harmonise control over arms exported;
- We need to make further progress as far as EU protection against hybrid threats is concerned, in particular to counter cyber-attacks and disinformation.’

It should be no surprise that in this context, Parliament expects both that further progress will be made on the CSDP in the next five years, but also its own voice and contributions to be more heard and taken into account in the Commission, the EEAS, and even the Council.

**CONCLUSION**

As illustrated above, in reality, the European Parliament exercises much more influence on the CSDP than is commonly known. The follow-up to the EU-NATO joint declarations of 2016 and 2018 on cooperation for instance, is an important development which the European Parliament will monitor closely. In 2020, despite the Covid19 pandemics, Parliament continued to work within its competences to achieve the EU’s objectives as a security provider in an effective and visible manner. By investing in its expertise, including foresight and strategic thinking, Parliament upgrades its capacity to perform policy oversight, but also to shape concretely the CSDP. This is a key role at a time when our citizens demand for increased security is also one of the few uncontested demands for more Europe.

\(^{12}\) Members of AFET and SEDE participate in the EP permanent delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
2.4. THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE AND THE CSDP

by Arnold Kammel and Jochen Rehrl

The idea of setting up a European diplomatic service dates back to the unratified Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe of 2004, which provided for the creation of a European External Action Service (EEAS) to assist the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009 and amended the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the holder of which is also a Vice-President of the European Commission, was established, replacing the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. This is particularly important because, while there is one service specifically dedicated to external action, the EEAS, various directorates-general of the European Commission are also involved in the implementation of the EU’s external policies.

MANDATE OF THE EEAS

The competences of the EEAS remained unchanged, however, and Article 27(3) TEU stipulates:

_in fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission._

In March 2010, the High Representative presented to the Council a proposal for a draft Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS. Following negotiations with the European Parliament, the EEAS Decision was finally adopted on 26 July 2010. The EEAS was established as ‘a functionally autonomous body of the European Union, separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the Commission with the legal capacity necessary to perform its tasks and attain its objectives’ (Article 1(2) of the EEAS Decision).

TASKS AND STRUCTURE

In general, the tasks of the EEAS include: ensuring the consistency and coordination of the EU’s external action, preparing policy proposals, and implementing the policies once the proposals have been approved by the Council. The tasks of the EEAS are quite complex as described in further detail below.

Firstly, the EEAS is required to ‘support the High Representative in fulfilling his/her mandates’ (Article 2(1) of the EEAS Decision). These mandates, as set out in Article 2(1), reflect Articles 18 and 27 TEU and include conducting the CFSP and the CSDP (Article 18(2) TEU), ensuring the consistency of the EU’s external action (Article 18(4) TEU), presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council (Article 18(3) TEU), and acting as Vice-President of the Commission. As Vice-President, the High Representative is responsible within the Commission not only for ‘responsibilities incumbent on [the Commission] in external relations’ but also for ‘coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action’ (Article 18(4) TEU).
**Secondly**, the EEAS should ‘assist the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations’ (Article 2(2) of the EEAS Decision).

**Thirdly**, the EEAS is required to ‘support, and work in cooperation with, the diplomatic services of the Member States as well as with the General Secretariat of the Council and the services of the Commission, in order to ensure consistency between the different areas of the Union’s external action and between those areas and its other policies’ (Article 3(1) of the EEAS Decision, also reflected in Article 21(3), second paragraph TEU). It must also ‘extend appropriate support and cooperation to the other institutions and bodies of the Union, in particular to the European Parliament’ (Article 3(4) of the EEAS Decision).

The EEAS is organised into individual geographical and thematic desks and also includes the EU delegations that fall under the authority of the High Representative. Furthermore, the EU currently operates some 140 EU delegations and offices around the world, which ensure the EU’s presence beyond its borders. In particular, the delegations and offices are responsible for presenting, explaining and implementing EU policy, analysing and reporting on the policies of and developments in the host countries, and conducting negotiations in accordance with a given mandate. EU Special Representatives (EUSR) also fall under the High Representative’s office, as they promote the EU’s policies and interests in troubled regions.

In addition to the EEAS, various directorates-general of the European Commission are also involved in the implementation of the EU’s external policies, e.g. trade and development policies remain the responsibility of the relevant Commissioners. It is therefore crucial that the High Representative is also a Vice-President of the European Commission, in order to ensure consistency and coherence between the various services involved in the field of external action.
**ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

**EEAS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES**

Charles Fries, Deputy Secretary-General of the EEAS, is responsible for the Common Security and Defence Policy and for crisis response. These areas include, in particular, the Managing Directorate for CSDP and crisis response (MD-CSDP-CR), the Integrated approach for Security and Peace Directorate (ISP), the Security and Defence Policy Directorate (SECDEFPOL), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN), which reports directly to HR/VP Josep Borrell.

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**High Representatives of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**

**1999 – 2009**

Javier SOLANA ESP  
High Representative and Secretary-General

**2009 – 2014**

Catherine ASHTON GBR  
High Representative and Commission Vice-President

**2014 – 2019**

Federica MOGHERINI ITA  
High Representative and Commission Vice-President

**2019 –**

Josep BORRELL FONTELLES ESP  
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission in charge of a stronger Europe in the World

EU’s ambassadors conference brings together all Head of EU Delegations around the world.
A new managing directorate was created as part of the restructuring that took place in 2019. It leads the work of the two newly created directorates:

1. ISP – Integrated approach for Security and Peace
2. SECDEFPOL – Security and Defence Policy

The Managing Directorate is supported by the EU Situation Room. This is an EEAS division, directly attached to the Managing Directorate, which supports EU external action by providing global, comprehensive and timely situational awareness. The EU Situation Room is a permanent standby body that provides worldwide monitoring and current situation awareness 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, year round. It acts as a situation information hub for all relevant stakeholders from the European institutions. It operates alongside the EEAS switchboard (which primarily manages the HR/VP’s phone calls with world leaders) and contributes to situation reports and flash reports by incorporating all crisis-related information provided by open sources, but also by EU delegations, EU Member States, EU CSDP missions and operations, EU Special Representatives’ teams and international organisations. The EU Situation Room is the first point of contact for all information on crisis situations.

**INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR SECURITY AND PEACE DIRECTORATE (ISP)**

The Integrated approach for Security and Peace Directorate (ISP) is responsible for coordinating and managing the overall EEAS contribution to the EU’s Integrated Approach, as established by the EU Global Strategy, combining security, development and diplomatic actions in support of a common set of agreed objectives.

In this context, and in cooperation with both geographical and thematic EEAS services and
other EU institutions, such as the European Commission, the ISP:

* ensures effective coordination of the EU response throughout the entire conflict cycle, from early warning and horizon scanning to political-strategic planning for crisis management and stabilisation, including as regards the security of EU citizens in crisis areas, where necessary;
* ensures that the EU response is conflict-sensitive and based on accurate analysis with a focus on delivering stabilisation and peace.

The ISP comprises four divisions, namely:
1. Concepts, knowledge management and programmes
2. Conflict prevention and mediation support
3. Integrated strategic planning for CSDP and stabilisation
4. Consular affairs

SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY DIRECTORATE (SECDEFPOL)

The Security and Defence Policy Directorate (SECDEFPOL) is responsible for coordinating and managing the overall EEAS contribution to addressing external security threats. The directorate supports efforts to implement the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence, in particular as regards the development of policies and tools appropriate to the EU’s level of ambition in this area, and the further development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.

This includes work on strategic issues and policy areas such as cybersecurity, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats, hybrid threats, maritime security, counter-terrorism, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms export control. The directorate is also responsible for contributing to defence policy and to initiatives designed to strengthen defence cooperation and develop civilian and military capabilities in order to further the EU’s role as a security provider. In this role, the EU should be able to address both long-standing and new security threats and contribute to global peace and security. The directorate is also responsible for promoting the EU’s relations with third countries and with international and regional organisations in the context of the CSDP, through CSDP partnerships.

SECDEFPOL comprises four divisions, namely:
1. Security and defence policy
2. Partnerships and agreements
3. Counter-terrorism
4. Disarmament, non-proliferation and arms export control

The EU Military Staff (EUMS) is the source of collective military expertise within the EEAS. It works under the direction of the Chair of the European Union Military Committee and under the authority of the High Representative. The EUMS coordinates the military instrument as part of the EU’s Integrated Approach, with a particular focus on military missions and operations, as well as the creation of military capabilities. Its enabling activity includes early warning, situation assessment, strategic planning, communication and information systems, concept development, training and education, and support to partnerships through military-to-military relationships.

The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was established on 8 June 2017 with the aim of allowing the EU to react faster, more efficiently and more effectively as a security provider outside its borders. The MPCC is part of the EUMS and is responsible for the operational planning and conduct of the EU’s non-executive military missions. It has the potential to become a fully-fledged military HQ in the near future and could, as such, take the lead for all military operations and missions.
To date, the MPCC has led the EU Training Missions in Mali, Somalia and the Central African Republic. On 19 November 2018, the Council gave the MPCC the additional responsibility of planning and conducting, as necessary, an executive military operation the size of an EU Battlegroup.

**EU Military Staff and MPCC**

The **Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)**, the permanent headquarters for civilian CSDP missions, assists the Civilian Operations Commander (CivOpsCdr, who is also Director of the CPCC) in the operational planning and conduct of civilian CSDP missions.

The CivOpsCdr is mandated by the EU Member States to exercise command and control at strategic level for all civilian CSDP missions, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the overall authority of the High Representative. Assisted by the Chief of Staff, who is also deputy CivOpsCdr for the purpose of maintaining continuity of command and control, the CivOpsCdr is the overall commander of all civilian Heads of Mission and has a duty of care to the personnel deployed in the field.

The CPCC supports CSDP advance planning, in cooperation with the ISP, and leads the operational planning of civilian missions. It also ensures that adequate support is provided to the missions and supervises the implementation and delivery of mandates.

**Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability**

The Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC) brings together civilian and military expertise at the strategic level to further strengthen civilian-military coordination and cooperation in the operational planning and conduct of CSDP missions.

**EU INTELLIGENCE AND SITUATION CENTRE (EU INTCEN)**

The EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) cooperates with its military counterpart, the Intelligence Directorate of the EU Military Staff (EUMS INT) within the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC). The two entities are together the unique source of civilian-military strategic intelligence support for all EU institutions and cover a wide range of issues that go beyond CSDP matters. In line with these developments, a new restructured EU INTCEN has been established, which focuses on intelligence-based situational awareness and reports directly to the High Representative and Vice-President, hence connecting the SIAC directly to the top level of decision-making.

**Other entities** within the EEAS which are relevant for crisis management and the CSDP include the EEAS Crisis Management Board and the geographical, multilateral and global EEAS managing directorates.
2.5. EEAS CRISIS RESPONSE MECHANISM

by Pedro Serrano

The EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM) is an internal EEAS procedure consisting of arrangements and structures for responding in a coordinated and synergic way to crises and emergencies – including hybrid threats – of an external nature or with an external dimension, potentially or actually impacting the interests of the EU or any Member State.

WHAT IS A CRISIS?

For the purposes of the CRM, a crisis or an emergency is a sudden, serious deterioration of the political, security and/or economic situation or an event or development in a given country or region that might have an impact on the security interests of the EU or the security of EU personnel or citizens.

Responses to crises and emergencies implemented through the CRM should envisage the use of all available resources in a coordinated and synergic manner, in line with the EU’s comprehensive approach.

ACTIVATION

Upon the occurrence of a serious situation or emergency concerning or in any way involving the external dimension of the EU, the Deputy Secretary General (DSG) for Crisis Response consults with the High Representative/Vice President (HRVP) or the Secretary General (SG) and EEAS senior managers and, if the situation so warrants, activates the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism.

The Deputy Secretary General for Crisis Response can also be requested to initiate the Crisis Response Mechanism by the HRVP, the SG or another DSG or Managing Director (MD). In the DSG’s absence, responsibility is transferred to a designated representative; for practical purposes, the latter will by default be the Director of INTCEN.

ELEMENTS OF THE CRISIS RESPONSE MECHANISM

The fundamental elements of the Crisis Response Mechanism are: the Crisis Meeting; the catalogue of possible Immediate Action; the Crisis Cell; the Crisis Platform; and the Task Force.

The CRISIS MEETING gathers EEAS, Commission and Council senior managers directly affected by the crisis in question. It assesses the short-term effects of the crisis and may decide to implement one or more of the following courses of action: (A) taking immediate action; (B) activating the Crisis Cell; (C) convening a Crisis Platform. Those courses of action can be implemented in any time sequence.

The Crisis Meeting may agree on some immediate action to be taken, including providing guidance and support to the EU Delegation, providing guidance to CSDP missions and operations, intensifying international contacts and action, issuing public messages, initiating CSDP prudent planning and launching fact finding missions, among other things.

The CRISIS CELL provides support to the EEAS Headquarters’ decision-makers and ensures that decisions taken in the Crisis Meeting are imple-
mented. It is co-directed by a representative of the DSG for Crisis Response and a representative of the services primarily involved in the crisis. It is composed of a number of workstations manned by representatives of the EEAS, Commission and Council services involved in the response to the crisis.

The aim of the CRISIS PLATFORM is to gather together relevant EEAS, Commission and Council services to assess the medium and long-term effects of crises and agree on action to be taken. It is chaired by the HR/VP, the Secretary General or the DSG for Crisis Response. The Crisis Platform may agree on activating the Task Force, evaluates its implementation reports, decides on possible further measures and discusses proposals for Council action. The Crisis Platform is an ad-hoc configuration; therefore, it is not permanently activated.

The TASK FORCE is directed by the competent geographic MD and composed of representatives of the services involved in the response. Its aim is to follow and facilitate the implementation of the EU response. The Task Force evaluates the impact of EU action, prepares policy documents and options papers, contributes to the preparation of the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA), develops its own action plan, establishes a roadmap and reviews it periodically, contributes to the communication strategy, and adopts any other arrangements that can facilitate the implementation of the EU response.

The Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements are activated by the EU Presidency or upon request from one or more Member States. They allow for rapid consultation of EU Member States at political level in the event of emergencies or crises of political significance and with a wide-ranging impact, taking place either inside or outside the EU.

The EEAS contributes to the IPCR process, including by providing input for Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis (ISAA) reports. The Situation Room is the EEAS central 24/7 IPCR contact point.
Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements.
### 2.6. THE SINGLE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CAPACITY (SIAC)

by Jose Morgado and Radoslaw Jezewski

The Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) is the working arrangement whereby the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INT-CEN) and the EU Military Staff Intelligence Directorate (EUMS INT) jointly provide intelligence analysis and early-warning and situational awareness to the EEAS leadership and also to the EU institutions and Member States.

SIAC is the single point of entry for the civilian and military/defence intelligence and security services of EU Member States when they provide strategic classified documents or briefings to the EU institutions.

**HOW DOES SIAC WORK?**

SIAC delivers a unique joint service, combining intelligence from all participating Member States’ military and civilian intelligence and security services within the SIAC framework.

Built on an ‘all-sources approach’ and supported by the OSINT Division and the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen), SIAC analyses, processes and distributes strategic intelligence. The SIAC analysts work on all regions and all areas of major foreign and security policy interest to the EU. Since 2016, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, created by decision of the European Council, provides intelligence support to all EU actors.

**WHO ARE SIAC’S CUSTOMERS?**

SIAC provides intelligence support to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP) and all EEAS structures. It supports various EU decision-making bodies in the fields of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), counter-terrorism and countering hybrid threats, including the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). Since its inception in 2007, SIAC has provided intelligence to the Council, the Commission and the Member States, in order to create a common basis of understanding.

**SIAC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS**

SIAC products, ranging from top level Flash Briefing Notes to in-depth Intelligence or Threat Assessments, are based on intelligence provided by EU Member States’ intelligence and security services, reports from EU delegations, CSDP missions and operations, satellite imagery analysis from SatCen, as well as on a wide range of open sources.
EU INTELLIGENCE AND SITUATION CENTRE (EU INTCEN)

EU INTCEN is the exclusive civilian intelligence body of the EU, providing in-depth analysis for EU decision-makers. EU INTCEN is a directorate of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EU INTCEN Directorate is directly attached to the HR/VP.

EU INTCEN comprises the Intelligence Analysis and Reporting Division and the Open Source Research and Support Division.

EU MILITARY STAFF INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (EUMS INT)

EUMS INT is a directorate within the EUMS that is staffed by intelligence professionals seconded from the Member States. It is reliant upon the support of a broad network of Member States’ Defence Intelligence Organisations (DIOs).

EUMS INT consists of three branches: Production, Policy and Support. The Production Branch is the key component of EUMS INT, combining all sources’ and DIOs’ intelligence contributions. The Policy Branch is responsible for developing intelligence-related concepts in close coordination with relevant EU civilian bodies. It also contributes to the planning of EU CSDP missions and prepares scenarios and intelligence specifications for exercises. The Support Branch serves as information manager and provides a central communication hub to efficiently distribute, share and archive information and products.
3 CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
3.1. HOW TO PLAN AND LAUNCH A CSDP MISSION OR OPERATION

by Fernando Moreno

Under the Lisbon Treaty, the purpose of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) is to provide the Union with an operational capacity to conduct missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. These missions include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. The civilian and military capabilities required to conduct these missions are to be provided by the Member States. Decisions relating to these missions are to be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State.

In order to make this a reality the EU adopted crisis management procedures (‘Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations’). These procedures were endorsed by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in June 2013 following a comprehensive review of the original ‘Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU Crisis Management’ dated July 2003. The 2013 review took into account both lessons learnt over the first decade of the ESDP/CSDP
and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), including the development of new CSDP structures, as a consequence of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.

The crisis management procedures (CMPs) describe the process through which the EU engages in a crisis with the CSDP instrument as part of its overall integrated approach. All of the steps in the process are described in full, and the process is designed to address crises of the highest degree of complexity. The procedures are very detailed and iterative, but this should not constrain the EU’s ability to approach any crisis in the most flexible and effective manner.

The CMPs are designed to ensure that any CSDP activity is conceived, planned, launched, conducted and closed with direct political control and strategic direction being exercised by the PSC, under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative (HR). These procedures therefore provide the framework for the decision-making and planning processes for preparing and launching CSDP missions and operations, as part of the wider integrated EU approach, providing common ground for interaction between the EU Member States, the EEAS, the CSDP C2 structures, the Commission and other relevant actors.

The CMPs describe the decision-making and planning processes for establishing CSDP actions, including the responsibilities of the various actors and their interaction, attending to the specificities of the CSDP instrument. They also set out the relevant documents to be prepared and adopted throughout the process and their scope, devoting special atten-
tion to the civil-military nature of the CSDP. The CMPs also include provisions for engagement with partners and other international organisations.

The CMPs set out a five-phase approach to decision-making, crisis response planning, and the conduct and review of missions and operations. Although these steps are presented in a sequential manner, in reality some of the processes overlap or may even be merged or skipped if appropriate. In addition, the drafting of particular documents such as crisis management concepts, strategic reviews, concepts of operations or operation plans is a complex process that involves interaction with other actors, fact-finding missions, formal and informal consultations with Member States, partners and local authorities, technical assessment missions, etc., making every mission or operation a unique planning challenge.

**PHASE 1: IDENTIFICATION OF CRISIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF OVERALL EU APPROACH**

During the first phase of the process the HR, assisted by the EEAS, contributes to conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security through monitoring and early warning.

This phase is neither CSDP-focused nor CSDP-led, but aimed at examining **WHY** the EU should engage, identifying the EU interests affected by the given crisis and the options and objectives for an integrated EU response. The outcome of this phase would be the presentation of a political framework for crisis approach (PFCA) to the PSC (Member States' representatives) to inform discussions on how the EU should address the sit-
The PFCA is drafted by the respective geographical desk with support from other EEAS and Commission services. CSDP input to the PFCA is provided by the Integrated Strategic Planning department, supported by the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). The drafting of a PFCA could be skipped, if the PSC agrees, in urgent situations or if there is already a strategic framework for the potential CSDP response (i.e. a regional strategy). The PSC could then invite the EEAS to draft a crisis management concept (CMC) for CSDP action. In this phase, consultations with NATO, the UN and other international organisations and partners are conducted systematically.

**PHASE 2: DEVELOPMENT OF THE CMC AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MISSION/OPERATION**

Following the discussions on the PFCA, the PSC could decide to proceed with the specific planning steps for CSDP action and to invite the EEAS to draft a crisis management concept. This is the politico-strategic part of the process and it is aimed at defining **WHAT** is going to be done with the CSDP instruments. The result will be the approval of the CMC by the Council, following its presentation to the PSC by the HR or his or her representative and the adoption of a Council decision establishing the mission/operation (referred to as the mandate). This phase, led by the Integrated Strategic Planning for CSDP and Stabilisation Unit (ISP3), encompasses frequent interactions with partners, international organisations, local authorities, Commission services and other relevant actors, as well as the necessary fact-finding missions. During this phase, military and/or civilian strategic options could also be drawn up to complement the CMC. Council bodies (the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the Politico-Military Group (PMG)) will be involved throughout the process to provide their advice and recommendations to the PSC before any document is agreed. The CMC is the linchpin of the CSDP decision-making process, translating political ambition and needs into clear CSDP options for engagement. The CMC is drafted by ISP3 with support from the EUMS and the CPCC and in consultation with other EEAS and Commission services, taking into account other

Although planning for civilian and military CSDP responses follow harmonized paths, there are some specificities as a consequence of the different nature of both tools, such as the financial regulations, the C2 structures or the capabilities employed.
EU instruments and partners’ responses. At this stage, the EEAS will provide a recommendation to the PSC on the possibility of inviting third states to participate in the CSDP mission/operation.

On the basis of the Council decision and the parameters defined in the CMC (complemented by any civilian and/or military strategic options), the third phase commences.

**PHASE 3: OPERATION PLANNING OF THE CSDP MISSION OR OPERATION AND DECISION TO LAUNCH**

For military missions/operations an initiating military directive (IMD), drafted by the EUMS on the basis of the previous documents, is issued to the operation or mission commander (normally designated at the end of the second phase) by the EUMC. During this phase, the civilian and/or military operation/mission commander conducts planning, identifying how he or she intends to implement the mandate received. In the case of military executive operations an operation headquarters (OHQ) would have been identified in the previous phase and its activation would be ongoing; the CPCC and MPCC (Military Planning and Conduct Capability) will, if necessary, be augmented for civilian or military missions. The operation/mission commander drafts and presents for PSC approval the concept of operations (CONOPS) and the operation plan (OPLAN); this planning will be informed by the necessary technical assessment missions dispatched to the field and will include the force generation process. Following the OPLAN’s approval by the Council, a second Council decision to launch the mission/operation will be adopted.

**CSDP command and control structures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politico-strategic</th>
<th><strong>Under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political and Security Committee (PSC)</strong></td>
<td>shall exercise the political control and strategic direction</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military C2 structure</th>
<th>Civilian C2 structure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not part of the Command and Control</strong></td>
<td><strong>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Military Committee</td>
<td>provides advice to the PSC, BUT is not part of the command and control structures of CSDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shall monitor the proper execution of the military mission/operation and the Chairperson EUMC shall act as the primary point of contact with the EU mission/operation Commander</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>Strategic</th>
<th>Operation Headquarters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Option 1: NATO</td>
<td><strong>CPCC</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 2: National HQ</td>
<td>The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability is the permanent Operation Headquarters for all civilian CSDP Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option 3: MPCC</td>
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<th>Operational</th>
<th>Force and Mission Headquarters</th>
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<tr>
<td>Example: EUFOR ALTHEA</td>
<td><strong>Mission Headquarters</strong></td>
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<td>Example: EUNAVFOR SOMALIA</td>
<td><strong>EUMM</strong></td>
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<td>Example: EUTM MALI</td>
<td><strong>EULEX</strong></td>
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Operation Planning is conducted by the Civilian and Military Operation Commanders under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC. Although the levels of command are the same, the generation of C2 structures differs for civilian and Military Missions and Operations.
establishing the date of effective launching of the mission/operation. A fast-track option is set out in the CMPs, with the number of steps and documents being reduced (only the CMC, IMD and OPLAN would be required to launch a mission/operation) if a rapid response is required; the PSC can always decide to apply it. During this phase, the EEAS negotiates the agreement between the EU and the host country regarding the status of EU mission/operation (SOFA/SOMA) while the Council bodies continue to provide advice and recommendations to the PSC on the various documents to be presented for approval.

PHASE 4: DEPLOYMENT OF THE MISSION OR OPERATION

The fourth phase would probably commence in parallel with the third and would encompass the deployment of forces and the execution of the mandate, as well as periodical reporting to the PSC, which, under the authority of the Council and the HR, exercises political control and determines strategic direction. In conducting CSDP missions and operations the EEAS continues to engage with third states and international organisations to ensure the coherence of CSDP action with other responses, while the operation/mission commanders coordinate the execution of their mandates with the other actors involved. Notwithstanding the fact that EU heads of delegation and EU special representatives do not form part of the chain of command of CSDP missions/operations, they can provide local political guidance regarding CSDP actions.

CONCLUSIONS

The essential feature of the CMPs is the control exercised by the Member States throughout the process, in line with the Lisbon Treaty provisions for the CSDP; the Council or the PSC can, however, decide at any point in the process to reduce the number of steps or the number of documents to be produced.

In 2013 the PSC agreed that the CMPs should be routinely reviewed. There is now a need to review the CMPs in order to (i) reflect the changes that have been made in the EEAS CSDP structures and the new Commission instruments that have been created since 2013; (ii) incorporate the concept of the integrated approach; and (iii) link the CMPs to the crisis response mechanism. The review should preserve the coherence between civilian and military planning.

PHASE 5: STRATEGIC REVIEW OF THE CSDP MISSION OR OPERATION

The fifth phase (not a phase in the strict sense) consists in reassessing the parameters around the CSDP mission/operation (scenario, situation, EU interests and objectives, CSDP added value, needs and opportunities, other parties’ engagement, local commitment, etc.) with the aim of providing options for a Council decision on extending, refo-cusing and/or terminating the CSDP action. Strategic reviews (SRs) are conducted by the EEAS (ISP3) under the authority of the HR when the end of the mandate approaches or whenever circumstances indicate that there is a need to review the parameters of the CSDP action. The SRs are presented to the PSC by the HR, or his or her representative, for a decision regarding the future of the mission/operation. When a CSDP mission or operation is established the Council usually authorises the PSC to take all relevant decisions, while the decision-making powers with respect to the objectives and termination of the CSDP action remain vested in the Council.
3.2. CHALLENGES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS

by Georgios Tsitsikostas

Since 2003, the European Union has launched 13 military CSDP missions and operations. Deployed on two continents, on land and at sea, these missions and operations constitute the military contribution to the European Union’s comprehensive approach to crisis management. Their objective, regardless of the geographical area in which they are deployed, is to support efforts to restore stability and build security in states and regions on the Union’s periphery. Today, six EU-led military missions and operations are active.

The mandates of these missions and operations, established through a resolution of the United Nations Security Council or via a request by the host nation, have been diverse. This underpins the inherently flexible and adaptable nature of the military approach which allowed and enabled the smooth development of the EU’s engagement, following developments in the country in question. The example of the gradual development of the executive EU military operation the in Central African Republic (EUFOR CAR) into a non-executive Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM CAR) and later into a Training Mission (EUTM CAR) has educational value in this sense.

STABILITY PROJECTION AND SECURITY BUILDING

The lack of quick and spectacular results may create frustration. Nevertheless, ‘quick wins’ were never anticipated or expected, although they would definitely be welcome. The nature of the
military engagement in the current CSDP missions and operations is fundamentally different from common military tasks, as undertaken under national control and within national borders. Although the military is linked to the 'hard' element of the power nations or organisations possess, and rightly so, in this unique EU approach, it is wrapped in a 'velvet glove'.

Its presence in the host nation or in the seas adjacent to unstable regions is intended to project stability rather than power, and to increase security.

The European Union's commitment to peace and security in Africa is growing, and the deterioration of the security environment in parts of that continent – which is very important for Europe – namely the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia, creates challenges and threats that must be adequately and effectively addressed. From the European side it is acknowledged that the key to achieving a sustainable Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) is to encourage, enable and support the local security institutions in building up their own capacities. To this end, creating ownership of the endeavour and enjoying the extensive support of all concerned stakeholders in the nation in question are 'sine qua non'.

In this context the tasks entrusted to the military include supporting indigenous security building, providing advice to the respective security institutions in areas such as operations, plans, logistics, administration and legal affairs, as well as providing specialised training to the Armed Forces of the respective host nation.

Great emphasis is placed on advancing constitutional and democratic order over the military apparatus and on strengthening the rule of law. The strengthening of the local armed forces' effectiveness, reforming them into a modernised, ethnically balanced and democratically accountable institution and the restoration of their credibility and overall image among the population is fundamental for a security environment that will stand the test of time. Although the mandates of each of these three non-executive EU military missions differ, reflecting the different needs and priorities of the respective host nation, they are similar in that the focus is on operating in the background and doing an in-depth job, which requires patience, persistence and commitment: these qualities are encoded into the DNA of the military.

EXECUTIVE CHARACTER AND MANDATE

The same approach can be unmistakeably identified in the EU’s military operations. Their executive character and mandate prioritise the relevant tasks. The wording used here is stronger: ‘[...] maintain a Safe and Secure Environment’ in the case of EUFOR ALTHEA, ‘[...] protection of shipping, deterrence projection, repression of acts of piracy’ in the case of EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, ‘[...] disrupt the business model of human smugglers and traffickers’ in the case of EUNAVFORMED SOPHIA. Here again, there are no quick fixes: EUFOR ALTHEA took over responsibility for maintaining a Safe and Secure Environment from the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in 2004; EUNAVFOR ATALANTA has been operating in the Indian Ocean since 2008. EUNAVFORMED SOPHIA is likely to be active for quite a long time as well. Here
again, the flexibility and adaptability of the military instrument has proven its importance. Over time, and following developments on the ground and the initial phased concept of the operation, the operations evolved to incorporate amended or additional tasks.

In certain instances, these tasks are of a rather non-executive character, such as an operation to ‘support the capacity building and training of the coastguard’.

**TRANSNATIONAL, MULTIDIMENSIONAL AND DYNAMIC THREATS**

Over the last decade, the security environment in the regions adjacent to Europe has changed significantly. New challenges and threats have surfaced to join conventional, persistent ones. These include terrorism, cybersecurity [hybrid threat], the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, transnational organised crime, piracy and armed conflicts. The European Union’s Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy accurately identifies these challenges and threats and offers a vision for the European Union’s role as a credible security provider.

New threats call for new responses. Most if not all of these are transnational, multidimensional and dynamic threats that blur the boundaries of the traditional internal/external security division; a joined-up civilian-military response is thus required in order to successfully tackle them. The European Union must be inventive, adaptable and strong-willed in order to become a recognised strategic actor.

Making better use of the instruments already in its extensive tool box, as well as fine-tuning and supplementing these with a number of additional features to bridge identified gaps or cover shortfalls will be sufficient to enable the Union to fulfil this role.
Military CSDP missions and operations are faced with challenges that are internal as well as external to the European Union, adding to the overall complexity. All of these are quite well known and have been thoroughly analysed. The European Union has been extensively criticised over the alleged slowness of its responses. Even more criticism was generated by the reluctance it has shown to use its rapid response forces, namely, the Battlegroups. It cannot be denied that the established decision-making procedures within the European Union are indeed time-consuming. It could be argued, however, that they are designed in this way precisely in order to facilitate this process, in an institution that currently brings together 27 sovereign nations with equal votes. At the same time, whenever time was of critical importance, such as in the case of Operation Artemis or EUPFOR CAR, adequate flexibility was demonstrated and decisions were made in a very timely fashion, a fact that has been widely acknowledged. This proves that the specific challenge can be addressed, provided that the political will to do so is present.

The same argument could be used in favour of the potential deployment of the Battlegroups, an instrument that this year celebrates its tenth anniversary but has never been used, despite the fact that on several occasions it could have constituted the proper response. Ten years after its inception, it is high time to revisit the Battlegroups concept and examine how relevant it still is to contemporary challenges. It is time to ask ourselves some hard questions, such as whether we still need (or want) to have this kind of rapid response capability and, depending on the answers, to take the respective decisions. If the outcome of this debate is that the challenges and threats the European Union faces require that sort of capability, then it must not only be preserved, but developed into something that is meaningful and useful. And if it is useful, then it needs and deserves to be used. Like the issue of decision-making, this one is also a matter of political will.
COLLECTIVE FUNDING UNDER ‘ATHENA’ ¹

Adequate financing is another challenge EU military missions and operations face. Military operations are usually financed through national funding, although some can be financed through collective funding under the provisions of the ‘Athena’ mechanism. This arrangement does not make participation in the missions and operations attractive, and for the most part discourages the smaller Member States, or those affected by the financial crisis, from making a more active contribution. The upcoming review of the ‘Athena’ mechanism in 2017 provides a unique opportunity to address this issue, which increases and to a certain extent explains, the reluctance to deploy the Battlegroups. In the case of the EU military missions, financing should also cover the provision of relevant material support to the recipients of their training programmes, if the latter are to be of any meaning operationally. It should be noted that the overall cost of the CSDP to the European Union budget is minimal, in stark contrast with the importance placed upon it. The revision of the ‘Athena’ mechanism in this way is likely to produce secondary effects that will improve the attractiveness of potential contributing nations, facilitating the creation of follow-on forces and improving the sustainability of the endeavour. The expectation is that this opportunity will be seized and a political decision will be made to facilitate the operation and maximise the effectiveness of military engagement under the CSDP.

PERMANENT EU HEADQUARTERS

The way the European Union will address the identified shortcomings and gaps in the way CSDP military missions and operations are currently planned and conducted constitutes a dif-

¹ The current financial mechanism can be found under chapter 3.5. The European Peace Facility on page 103.
ferent kind of challenge. Amongst these shortcomings are the extended periods of absence commanders are obliged to take from their posts in order to be in Brussels. They also result in the loss of the valuable, hard-won experience, lessons learnt and valuable expertise gained after a mission or operation concludes. The procedures followed so far in the EU, which are tested, proven and coherent, differ from those used by national defence institutions. The creation of a permanent EU planning and management structure and an operational headquarters have been clearly identified as the corrective steps, streamlining EU practices with well-established and proven norms. The challenge is to strike a balance between those Member States that call for a more ambitious development of European Union military capabilities, and those that express scepticism on the grounds of avoiding unnecessary duplication with NATO, a subject on which there is unanimous agreement.

Agreement also exists on deepening cooperation with NATO in a number of commonly identified areas of mutual interest. This is also a field that presents a challenge, taking into account the different nature of each institution and the prevailing political sensitivities of certain Member States. Practical cooperation is exercised at the tactical level, by solving problems on the ground and maximising the effectiveness of the respective missions and operations.

**INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY**

The blurring of the boundaries of the traditional internal/external security division and the acknowledgement of the need to address the internal/external security nexus demand, rather than require, closer cooperation between the military and security forces. This has already been witnessed in a number of Member States, which mobilised their national Armed Forces in order to respond to situations such as the migrant crisis, whose intensity overwhelmed the capacities of the responsible civilian authorities. In the future there may be a request for an EU military mission to provide this kind of support to a Member State, as some have already implied.

The invocation of Article 42.(7) (mutual assistance clause) of the TEU by France, following the deadly November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris raised the issue and fuelled discussions about the ways in which the European Union might provide assistance to a Member State in a similar situation in the future. This discussion also included Article 222 (the solidarity clause) of the TFEU.

The explicit reference of the latter to the use of the military resources available to the European Union (‘[…] mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States […]’), presents an additional opportunity to reflect on the ways this could be made possible, in particular because Article 222 TFEU is not part of the Common Security and Defence Policy and therefore does not fall under the responsibility of the EUMC.

**EU: GLOBAL ACTOR AND SECURITY PROVIDER**

The European Union is a global actor and a security provider. As such it enjoys great respect and is highly regarded. Nevertheless, this cannot be taken for granted: an actor’s position in the international system and its relative power is constantly evaluated and recalculated, based upon its decisions and its positions. In the contemporary security environment, characterised by instability and revisionism, new actors – state and non-state alike – have emerged. If the European Union wishes to be acclaimed as a respected security provider it needs to decisively and convincingly position itself as such. At the conceptual level, the presentation of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy and the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence was very timely. It is now time for action.
3.3. CHALLENGES FOR CIVILIAN CSDP MISSIONS

by Kate Fearon and Sophie Picavet

Civilian CSDP missions promote stability and build resilience in fragile environments by strengthening rule of law institutions and key leaders. They are just one tool in the EU’s toolbox for dealing with security and defence matters, and they work together with EU delegations in theatre, military CSDP missions and Operations and with Commission Directorates such as Development Cooperation. Thus they work to link up the three essential elements of the EU’s integrated approach as articulated in its Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016) (hereinafter the ‘Global Strategy’) – diplomacy, security and defence, and development.

TEN CIVILIAN MISSIONS ON THREE CONTINENTS

In 2016 there were ten civilian missions on three continents (Kosovo,1 Ukraine, Georgia, Niger, Mali, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya), with around 2500 staff deployed in theatre and a budget of around EUR 200 million. These missions are supported by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which is the Brussels-based Operational Headquarters. The CPCC is a directorate of the European External Action Service (EEAS).

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1 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
Mission mandates are set by the Council of the European Union and agreed with host states, which invite missions to assist them. Though the mandates vary from place to place, they usually involve supporting local institutions and key leaders in law enforcement. Specifically, the institutions concerned usually include the public prosecution services, the police, border management, the coastguard, customs, prisons and the judiciary. Thematically, they work on issues such as public order policing, community policing, organised and transnational crime, irregular migration, anti-corruption, human resources management, human rights and gender concerns in the criminal justice system.

Civilian missions are concerned with increasing the capacity of law enforcement institutions by monitoring, mentoring and advising on their organisation and on the legislative and policy framework in which they operate, and by training personnel. One mission has an executive mandate, and so it also investigates, prosecutes and adjudicates criminal cases.

Several missions operate in high-threat security environments – in 2016 the Afghanistan, Niger, Mali and Libya missions operated in theatres with a HIGH security risk rating. The Civilian Operations Commander, acting on behalf of the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission, owes a ‘duty of care’ towards all staff.

Before getting into the challenges, we will first present a whistle-stop tour of mission achievements in 2016. Thus, for example, in Kosovo the EULEX mission implemented EU-facilitated dialogue agreements on integrated border management, vehicles and licence plates, civil protection, police and judicial integration, thus promoting normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia, as well as arresting high profile public figures, demonstrating that no one is above the law and that everyone must abide by it.

In Ukraine the mission (EUAM) facilitated the Minister of the Interior’s rolling out of a nationwide community policing programme, based on its successful pilot programme in one police station.

In Georgia the mission (EUMM) reduced tension and facilitated agreements between the conflicting parties through its hotline and its ability to quickly deploy staff to remote locations where incidents occurred.

In Niger, the mission (EUCAP Sahel Niger) completed a revision of the training manual for the police force, and facilitated the operationalisation of the ‘PC Mixte’ Command post concept – a mechanism that will enhance coordination between the various internal security forces.

In Mali the civilian mission (EUCAP Sahel Mali) supported the complete overhaul of the national training curriculum for police, thus ensuring sustainable, standardised and high quality training for all new recruits and seasoned officers alike, which will in the future include modules on human rights and gender as standard.

In Palestine the missions (EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah) supported increasing the capacity of the key border management institution, and we saw progress on forensic skills and community policing with the Palestinian Civil Police.

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2 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
In Afghanistan the mission (EUPOL) facilitated the signature of two key agreements on a Police Ombudsman which will protect citizens against human rights abuses by the police, and on Police-Prosecutor Cooperation, which will be key to the efficient detection and investigation of crimes.

In Somalia the civilian mission (EUCAP Nestor) saw the production of a new National Security Policy, facilitated meetings of the Somali Maritime Security Coordination Committee, and, with partners, supported the opening of an Operations Room for the Somali Coast Guard.

In Libya, despite a challenging political and security situation, the mission (EUBAM Libya) was able to engage the Government of National Accord, and locate itself as a key player for future security sector reform, in part by facilitating the renewal of the National Team for Security and Border Management.

And, for the first time ever, we achieved a 50:50 gender balance of our civilian Heads of Mission, with five women and five men leading the ten civilian missions.

**SHORT-, MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM CHALLENGES**

While logistics, security, communications, transport, mandate delivery, changes in the personnel of local partners, the transfer of trained personnel to other roles, political interference, weak local institutions, absorption capacity and transition and exit strategies all present short-, medium- and long-term challenges for the civilian CSDP missions, four key challenges were identified: two on both the operational and strategic level, and two on a purely strategic level. These are (1) responsiveness, (2) visibility, (3) adapting to the wider, evolving security context and (4) output, impact and influence.
DEVELOPMENT OF INDICATORS

Force generation and deployment speed in terms of both personnel and technical and administrative support are the main requirements to ensure responsiveness. The Global Strategy takes the position that more ‘rapid and effective’ CSDP action is needed and that this can be achieved ‘by encouraging force generation [and] speeding up deployment’.

Missions are comprised of a blend of seconded and contracted international staff and contracted local staff. The majority of the international staff are seconded by Member States. This represents an important and welcome political commitment to the missions and the CSDP by Member States, but the staff are at times vulnerable to demands made on domestic institutions (such as the police, the judiciary, the prosecution or corrections service), with the result that the right people are not always available for the right posts at the right time. Thus managing this situation is a challenge.

In order to mitigate this, the CPCC invested in reviewing and revising its job descriptions, distilling multiple texts to around 80 job functions and sharing these with Member States. This is to enable early force sensing, improve recruitment procedures and increase transparency, and – on a very practical level – to assist Member States with their own forward planning.

Standing civilian CSDP capacity

Genuine rapid response raises the issue of a standing civilian CSDP capacity, that is to say, having a ‘first responder’ team that consists of in-house staff (from the Operational Headquarters) for fast interim deployment at very short notice to key posts – as is the case with the standing capacity of police and rule of law staff at the United Nations – and that, following deployment, take part in the early planning processes for any envisaged CSDP mission (which today frequently have complex mandates related to capacity building in the police, migration and criminal justice authorities).
However, having a standing capacity will be of little benefit unless they are able to operate in the field.

Therefore personnel, technical and administrative support is necessary, and the development of standard protocols and procedures across all missions is a challenge for the coming year.

Of these, the secure use of information technology is important, as is the ability to deploy equipment such as vehicles and computers at short notice: a new concept for storage and management of strategic stock – ‘Warehouse 2.0’ – has been developed for this reason.

Its implementation will be a challenge, particularly given current levels of resources. Thus, the creation of a standing civilian capacity and the concomitant mission support would allow for a qualitative leap forward in terms of the responsiveness of civilian CSDP, but the key challenge will be to gain access to the additional resources to reflect such an upscaling in action and responsiveness.

**VISIBILITY**

The Global Strategy defines the EU’s vital interests as ‘peace and security, prosperity and democracy’. The Global Strategy identifies the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as a core delivery instrument, alongside diplomacy and the development of its global engagement and influence. It exhorts the CSDP to become ‘more responsive and effective’, to be more joined up with the EU’s other external policies and instruments, and to be more visible.

**Strategic communication**

Specifically in relation to strategic communications, it clearly states that ‘The EU will enhance its strategic communications [...] in order to connect EU foreign policy with citizens and better communicate it to our partners’. In this, the Global Strategy echoes and affirms the policy asserted in the Council conclusions (2013, 2014, 2015), for example by underlining the importance of
effective communications to raise public awareness, and working on a more effective, visible and results-oriented CSDP.

In-theatre, adequate provision is made. Each mission (with the exception of Libya) has a specific budget line for visibility and produces up to ten media and/or communication products and posts them on up to 15 platforms in 12 languages. The bigger missions have around ten people dedicated to this work, with smaller missions having between two and four people.

Public communication

However, the CPCC, the Brussels-based Operational Headquarters for the missions – and the key interface between the missions’ work and the EU institutions, Member States and the general public – has no budget or full-time personnel dedicated to strategic communications. The central public communication output is thus limited to updating posts on the CSDP and EEAS news pages with stories about missions. Key audiences in Brussels (Member States’ Permanent Representatives, other EU institutions) and in Member States (Foreign Ministries and Ministries of Defence, Justice and the Interior) should also be kept up to date. The Operational Headquarters of the missions is well aware of this challenge and has already taken steps to address it.

ADAPTING TO THE EVOLVING SECURITY CONTEXT

How should we adapt to the evolving and challenging security context? The Global Strategy notes the following challenges: ‘energy security, migration, climate change, violent extremism, and hybrid warfare’. The priority areas for civilian engagement envisaged by the 2000 Feira European Council encompassed assistance to fragile or post-conflict countries in areas related to policing, the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection; however, the last two tasks were never implemented. Since then, the external dimension of EU internal security instruments (Justice and Home Affairs) has been developed in the areas of anti-corruption, the fight against organised crime, illegal migration and terrorism. Closer links between the external dimension of Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) and civilian CSDP crisis management were also developed.

In November 2016, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted conclusions for the implementation of the three strategic priorities identified by the EUGS: (a) responding to external conflicts and crises, (b) building the capacities of partners and (c) protecting the Union and its citizens. The conclusions pointed out the need to revisit the Feira priority areas with a focus on irregular migration, hybrid threats, cyber security, terrorism, radicalisation, organised crime and border management. But whereas previous civilian CSDP missions focused mainly on capacity building activities, CSDP missions within the new framework of the EUGS would be even more intertwined with internal security activities. The review of Feira should address the added value brought by the CSDP in the comprehensive approach model throughout the entire conflict cycle. This requirement has implications both for strengthening ties with FSJ actors and for enhancing cooperation with military instruments.

Responding to external conflicts and crises

With regard to the more classic strategic priorities set out for the CSDP (responding to external conflicts and crises and building the capacities of partners), the conclusions mainly focus on the EU’s awareness and responsiveness in the conflict prevention phase, its rapid and decisive capacity response tools as well as on an increased use of strategic communication.

Building the capacities of partners

The ability to contribute more systematically to the resilience and stabilisation of partner countries along the nexus of security and development, including through training, advice and/or mentoring within the security sector, is highlighted. The use of internal instruments to deal with external security with reciprocity is also recommended.
Protecting the Union and its citizens

The third strategic priority is quite new for the CSDP. It covers the contribution that the EU and its Member States can make from a security and defence perspective outside the EU to protect its domestic interests in various areas: the protection and resilience of EU networks and critical infrastructure, the security of EU external borders, building partners’ capacity to manage their borders, civil protection and disaster response, access to the global commons including the high seas and space, countering hybrid threats, cyber security, preventing and countering terrorism and radicalisation and combatting people smuggling and trafficking. The nexus between internal and external security and cooperation with (FSI) actors is once again underlined in this area.

The EU is called upon to continue its broad range of civilian crisis management activities, including in areas related to capacity building for the security sector, police reform, rule of law and border management. The EU then aims to be more Europe-centric (the protection of Europe). This paradigm shift may imply new challenges for CSDP missions with regard to local buy-in and local ownership requirements. This constraint will need to be addressed through finely tailored CSDP activities.

The new Level of Ambition (LoA)\(^3\) will need to be evaluated against realistic criteria. In addition, the implementation of the EUGS for civilian CSDP missions also implies a review of planning and conduct structures and capabilities, as well as the enhancement of civilian/military synergies. The need to rethink our mandates through a better combination of tools, including combined military and civilian tasks in the same mandate, could be explored using the model of existing military missions with a law enforcement component (for instance, the anti-smuggling mandate of Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden).

\(^3\) The previous LoA was: The EU should be able to deploy a dozen CSDP civilian missions of varying formats, inter alia in a rapid reaction situation, including a major mission (possibly up to 3 000 experts), which could last several years. This was set out according to a methodology transposed from the military system.
OUTPUT, IMPACT AND INFLUENCE

The fourth, and main, challenge faced by civilian CSDP missions relates to the impact both on the ground and at the strategic level. Whilst pursuing political-strategic objectives in the framework of the EU’s CSDP, civilian missions aim to foster sustainable changes in countries and regions affected by conflict.

The lack of baseline data to make optimal use of indicators is a recurrent problem in post-conflict countries where the ability to collect information is often undermined by limited national capacities and data systems. The accountability of the CPCC in terms of reporting to Member States on mandate delivery represents a unique opportunity to increase its efforts to strengthen operational effectiveness. At the same time, it highlights the difficulties of measuring the impact of activities: these difficulties are generally greater than in the military area (where the operational objectives are more easily assessed). Advisory tasks are, by their nature, difficult to measure, and capacity-building activities can take time before yielding results. As a result, the CPCC retains the methodology used for measuring the outcomes of the missions under constant review.

Significant efforts have been made in recent years to strengthen impact assessment tools. However, the development of a common methodological approach across missions must be finessed. During the summer of 2016, missions were provided with new Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) guidelines and a template aimed at reinvigorating a standardised and simplified approach during the entire mission lifecycle.

Carrying out an impact assessment anticipates a strong role for the CPCC. In particular, it is recommended that the CPCC should promote the consistent use of standard terminology and templates in order to rely on durable trend analyses without reconstructing post facto indicators. The delivery of training to missions for the implementation of impact assessments is done in the country concerned and in Brussels. The impact assessment can be performed by desk officers and other CPCC staff deployed to the country. The communication on findings is important. Last but not least, harmonisation between the strategic reviews of the timing and the scope of the impact assessment would be beneficial.

The methodology should also help to strengthen EEAS/CPCC analysis of operational and implementation obstacles. The greater the local buy-in and local ownership, the greater the impact on the ground of mandate delivery by the CSDP mission.

CSDP missions may indeed face reluctance from governments to implement agreed reform commitments without being able to use effective leverage to oblige these authorities to fulfil their commitments. Activities focusing too much on training and not enough on institutional reform can lead to this kind of outcome. Therefore, a blend of activities on both the strategic and operational levels is usually needed.

DEVELOPMENT OF INDICATORS

A more comprehensive approach to the formulation of the strategic framework of CSDP operations within the EU family (Missions, European Commission, EU Special Representative, Member States) should also be further explored, including through the development of indicators and measures of indicators. Based on the model of the indicators used by the EU Delegations when developing state-building contracts (budgetary support), CSDP missions could explore benchmarks drawing on the conditionality and discontinuation of activities. Such a tool would allow missions to determine the stage at which working with the government would allow them to promote reforms most effectively. Some emphasis could also be placed on the broader perspective by viewing the impact assessment within the overall conflict situation. Lastly, coordination at central level could help to develop a more strategic impact assessment.
3.4. THE CIVILIAN CSDP COMPACT

by Crista Huisman and Deirdre Clarke Lyster

Following a negotiation process that lasted a year, the Civilian CSDP Compact was formally established by the Council of the EU and Member States on 19 November 2018, with the aim of strengthening the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). To be implemented by early summer 2023 at the latest, at its heart is a set of 22 coherent commitments by the Council and MS to make civilian CSDP more capable, more effective, flexible and responsive, and more joined-up with other EU instruments and with partners. Bringing together for the first time political ambition, strategic direction and the necessary capability development targets, the Compact is a milestone in civilian CSDP development that will enhance the EU’s role as a comprehensive security provider. This paper will trace the development of the Compact, highlight the key elements that make it markedly different from its predecessors, and note progress on its implementation so far.

BACKGROUND

Building on principles elaborated in Feira in 2000, civilian CSDP initially focused on areas related to policing, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. Three years later, the establishment of the first EU civilian mission, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH), saw the operationalisation of civilian CSDP. Civilian missions now account for eleven out of the EU’s seventeen civilian and military missions and operations across Europe, the Middle East and Africa.

By 2016, the external security environment in which the civilian CSDP was conceived had evolved considerably, with new threats identified in the EU’s neighbourhood and beyond. The EU Global Strategy, adopted that year, recognised this altered security context, giving emphasis to new approaches, such as the Integrated Approach to Conflict and Crises, and new imperatives, such as the internal-external security nexus, while providing a new level of ambition in terms of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and, particularly, the CSDP.

In light of this new Global Strategy, policy-makers saw the need to strengthen the civilian CSDP including by expanding and deepening the foundational Feira principles (and the subsequent Civilian Headline Goals of 2008 and 2010) in order to be able to address new and emerging challenges. Following a year-long negotiation process, the Civilian CSDP Compact was formally adopted on 19 November 2018.

THE COMPACT COMMITMENTS

The Civilian CSDP Compact is structured into three parts:

a) Strategic guidelines,
b) Commitments by the Council and the Member States, and
c) the Way Forward.

The first part, strategic guidelines, sets the political priorities. While retaining the core functions originally identified in Feira – strengthening police, rule of law and civil administration as well as security sector reform (SSR) and monitoring tasks – this initial section moves beyond these agreed principles, stressing for the first time the importance of providing support for the EU’s wider response to new and emerging security challenges. Recognising security challenges related to irregular migration, hybrid

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1 Civil protection was later removed as a core CSDP task, while security sector reform (SSR) and monitoring tasks were added.
threats, cyber security, terrorism and radicalisation, organised crime, border management and maritime security, as well as preventing and countering violent extremism, and the protection of cultural heritage, the Compact will support the fulfilment of the Global Strategy’s strategic priorities.

The core of the Compact is the second part, the set of political commitments by the Council and, especially with regard to capability development, the Member States. Identifying three clusters key to strengthening civilian CSDP – (a) capabilities, (b) effectiveness, flexibility and responsiveness and (c) a joined-up approach with other EU instruments – these commitments signal a comprehensive development of civilian CSDP not undertaken since Feira.

The first cluster focuses primarily on civilian capability development (‘a more capable civilian CSDP’). Significant ambitions envisaged in these commitments include an increased contribution by MS to civilian missions and the 70% staffing of civilian Missions by EU Member States. To realise this goal, all MS committed to a review of their national procedures, through National Implementation Plans, while progress on civilian capability development is tracked through a Civilian Annual Report on Capabilities.

To increase synergies with other stakeholders, the third cluster (‘a more joined-up civilian CSDP’) entails several commitments to further support the EU’s Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises and further strengthen cooperation with third countries and partners such as the UN, OSCE and NATO. It emphasises the importance of cooperation with JHA actors, both JHA agencies and MS actors, in terms of sustainable operational output. It also calls for targeted ‘mini-concepts’ to map the possible scope of civilian CSDP efforts in specific fields, such as organised crime and maritime security.

COMPACT IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW

To facilitate the effective implementation of the Compact, Member States committed to developing National Implementation Plans, complemented by a Joint Action Plan agreed by the EEAS and Commission services. Progress towards implementation, which should take place as soon as possible and not later than summer 2023, is to be supported by an Annual Review Conference.

The second Annual Review Conference (ARC) took place in November 2020, and included the presentation of the Civilian Annual Report on Capabilities.
bilities. MS welcomed the positive overall progress in implementation of the Compact and the strong commitment to deliver on all aspects of it.

A series of ‘waypoints’ to guide the implementation of the Compact in 2021 were presented at the ARC and were subsequently endorsed by the Council. These waypoints include in particular but not exhaustively: jointly increasing the number of seconded experts to missions and increasing the representation of women, strengthening synergies between the civilian and military dimension of CSDP, exploring ways to evaluate the operational impact of the missions and promoting more joined up action, including between civilian CSDP and JHA actors (including relevant ministries, agencies and Council working parties).

RESULTS OF THE COMPACT

Only two years and a half after its adoption, the results of the Compact have already become visible. The first civilian CSDP mission to be launched under the Compact, EUAM RCA, has included key elements of the Compact such as a modular and scalable mandate, as well as a specific focus on one of the new priority challenges identified therein (hybrid threats). Work is also ongoing to strengthen the links between CSDP and JHA actors, with conceptual work on how to increase synergies with JHA agencies such as Frontex, Europol and CEPOL to form the basis for increased interactions on the ground. These efforts, based on the principle of mutual added-value, are being pursued through the mini-concepts envisaged in the Compact. Within the institutions themselves, more joint Council meetings have been organised, combining working groups dealing with the CSDP, such as PSC and CivCom, with other relevant Council working bodies such as those dealing with legal and financial matters (Relex) or those dealing with internal security (COSI and COSI Support Group).

At national level, a group of Member States has established a Centre of Excellence on Civilian Crisis Management to, inter alia, further support implementation of the Compact. In the field of capability development, all Member States are developing or have already finalised their National Implementation Plans, a process that has helped strengthen inter-ministry and inter-institutional coordination and communication. Several Member States have even already succeeded in increasing their contribution to civilian missions.

The EEAS is actively supporting national processes in a variety of ways, including by encouraging MS to share their lessons learned and good practices. Additionally, work is ongoing to centrally review CSDP recruitment policy and procedures to optimise the use of the human resources made available by Member States, to speed up recruitment and to better align with national systems. Finally, from a communications perspective, work is underway to enhance the visibility of civilian CSDP, with the aim of highlighting the work of civilian CSDP missions both in partner countries and in Member States’ national administrations.

CONCLUSION

Through the development of the Civilian CSDP Compact, the EU has affirmed its commitment to being a comprehensive security provider and has strengthened one of its unique foreign policy tools. Both strategically and operationally ambitious, the Civilian Compact is a key element of the EU’s Global Strategy, enabling it to better address new and emerging security challenges. With implementation well underway, supported by a built-in review process, and an ambitious timeline, the Civilian CSDP Compact is well on track to move from political commitment to operationalised reality by early summer 2023 at the latest.
3.5. THE EUROPEAN PEACE FACILITY

by Sebastian Puig Soler

An ambitious approach to security and defence is paramount to respond to unprecedented external challenges linked to instability and fragility in the EU’s neighbourhood and beyond. As stated in the EU Global Strategy, this approach implies doing more to prevent conflict, promote human security, address instability and work towards a safer world. Concretely, and in line with the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, as well as the progress made on several EU Defence Initiatives (PESCO, CARD, CDP, EDF and the upcoming Strategic Compass), we should enhance our ability to respond to external conflicts and crises, build partner capacities and protect the EU and its citizens.

In June 2017, EEAS Secretary General Helga Schmidt established a Task Force (TF) to review all of the current financial instruments at the disposal of the External Action Service, in order to better align funding with political priorities, based on current experience, and focus on results. One of the most relevant elements of this revision was the need to improve financial support for our peace and security goals, which can be advanced either through the EU budget or through off-budget means.

On 13 June 2018, the development of the European Peace Facility (EPF) was publicly announced by former HR/VP Federica Mogherini with the support of the European Commission. The EPF is a new off-budget instrument aimed at enhancing the Union’s ability to prevent conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security, by enabling the financing of operational actions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that have military or defence implications. Starting in 2021, it will replace and enlarge the current financial instruments in this area, namely the Athena Mechanism and the African Peace Facility.

WHAT WE HAVE HAD UNTIL NOW

The operational experience acquired in recent years in the area of security and defence has taught us that while the EU budget is a key component of our response on peace and security issues, it has not been able to fund all categories of actions that the EU needs to undertake. Even taking into account existing off-budget mechanisms, there have consistently been relevant gaps in the current EU financial support architecture that have somewhat limited the effectiveness of overall EU peace, security and defence efforts, especially in three key areas:

* **CSDP military missions and operations:** the EU’s ability to financially support CSDP military missions and operations is still limited. They have thus far been funded outside of the EU budget by the participating Member States, including their common costs through the so-called Athena Mechanism, established in 2004. Successive Athena reviews have not led to a marked evolution in this financial coverage. The EPF aims to improve the scope of common costs by financing key capabilities for missions and operations, based on lessons learned (e.g. strategic advisers, force protection, helicopters, ROLE 2, etc.).
In a more challenging global environment, the European Union needs to step up its actions to enhance its ability to preserve peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen international security. By proposing a new European Peace Facility (EPF) the European Union is taking on more responsibility as a global security provider.

The EPF is a proposal by the High Representative to set up a new off-budget fund, a fund outside of the Union’s multi-annual budget, potentially worth €8 billion. It will enable the financing of operational actions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that have military or defence implications. It proposes to draw together existing relevant off-budget mechanisms, namely the Athena mechanism and the African Peace Facility, addressing their gaps and limitations.

WHY IS THE EUROPEAN PEACE FACILITY NEEDED?

The aim of the EPF is to:

**Increase effectiveness of operations**: the EPF aims at funding the common costs of EU military Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. It will ensure that EU funding is available on a permanent basis, thus facilitating rapid deployment and enhancing flexibility. So far, through the Athena mechanism, a relatively small fraction – ranging from 5% to 10% – of costs for military operations are covered through common financing. The EPF proposes greater solidarity on common costs.

**Support partners**: the EPF will give the Union the capability to contribute to the financing of military peace support operations led by international partners on a global scale. Up to now, the African Peace Facility only allowed for financing of African-led peace support operations.

**Carry out broader actions**: Currently the EU has a limited capacity to engage in military or defence actions, such as capacity building, provision of training, equipment or infrastructure. The EPF will assist in building the capacities of partner countries’ armed forces to preserve peace, prevent conflict and address security challenges. For example, EU Military Training Missions are sometimes faced with the reality that partners cannot benefit sufficiently from the lessons learned during training, due to lack of often very basic equipment or facilities. The EPF will allow the EU to provide comprehensive support through integrated packages, which can include training, equipment and other means of support. This will help enable partners to address crises and security challenges by themselves.

The EPF will only cover expenditure with military or defence implications that are not be funded under the Union’s budget. It will thus help maximise the impact, effectiveness and sustainability of the EU’s external actions in peace and security.

Through the EPF, the EU will be able to do more and to act more swiftly by using military and defence means as required.
FINANCING

The EPF will be financed through contributions by EU Member States based on a Gross National Income distribution key. Its ceiling proposed in the latest proposal by the President of the European Council is €8 billion over a period coinciding with the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

The EPF should simplify and streamline previously different funding arrangements, notably the Athena mechanism and the African Peace Facility, while allowing for greater flexibility. Actions funded by the Facility will be decided by the Council and Member States’ control ensured through a management committee.

WILL THE EUROPEAN PEACE FACILITY REPLACE OTHER EU FINANCING INSTRUMENTS?

1. The EPF builds on the African Peace Facility and the Athena mechanism. It will continue financing actions currently supported through these instruments, but will allow the EU to overcome geographic and thematic limitations, building on the experience of the last years.

2. The EPF is not designed to finance expenditure that is eligible for funding under the Union’s budget.

3. Support to partners under the EPF will pursue EU foreign and security objectives, as reflected in the Treaty on the EU. It will be subject to strict controls, including conformity with democratic principles, human rights law and International Humanitarian Law.

4. In line with the EU’s Integrated Approach, consistency will be ensured between the actions financed under the EPF, and other actions undertaken within the CFSP or other instruments of the Union’s external action, including relevant Capacity Building for Security and Development (CBSD) mechanisms.

\(^1\) The Africa Peace Facility is today financed from the extra-budgetary European Development Fund. The Athena mechanism is an off-budget financing arrangement.
* Support to partners’ military peace support operations: such support is currently limited to African-led operations. Financing has been provided outside of the EU budget through the African Peace Facility (APF) as part of the European Development Fund (EDF). Due to the budgeting of the EDF from 2021, the APF instrument is about to disappear. The EPF will give the Union the capability to provide operational support directly to third countries and international and regional organisations around the world, not just in Africa and to the African Union.

* Broader actions of a military / defence nature in support of CFSP objectives: at present, there is limited capacity to engage in such actions, in particular capacity-building activities for military actors and the provision of military training, equipment and infrastructure. A major weakness of current Capacity Building for Security and Development (CBSD) provisions, as set out in the current Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and – from 2021 – in the future Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), is that their scope is restricted to actions that primarily have a development cooperation objective, in very specific circumstances. In EU Military Training Missions (EUTMs), the limited provision of capacity-building elements has so far mostly been funded via voluntary contributions from Member States. The EPF would explicitly allow for ‘train and equip’ activities in support of third country partners in pursuit of CFSP objectives.

The EPF comprises two financing pillars in a single instrument, thereby simplifying decision-making procedures, bringing greater unity and coherence to EU actions in this context:

* Operations Pillar: to finance the common costs of Union military missions and operations.

* Assistance Measures Pillar: to finance the following Union actions under Article 28 TEU, where the Council decides unanimously that the operating expenditure arising therefrom shall be charged to the Member States:
  • actions to strengthen the military and defence capacities of third countries and regional and international organisations;
  • support to military aspects of peace support operations led by a regional or international organisation or by third countries.

As the EPF allows for CSDP military missions and operations to directly implement or support the implementation of assistance measures if the Council so decides, they would also be able to provide integrated packages within the scope of their mandates, combining security, training, equipment and direct military assistance, with the aim of delivering full, comprehensive engagement in theatre.

The provision of military equipment through the EPF will be in accordance with the highest international standards for the export of such equipment, in full respect of international law, including international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL), and with adequate assurances regarding its end use.

WHAT WE WILL HAVE

At the time of writing this article, the political discussion on the Council Decision establishing the EPF and some accompanying elements is about to be concluded, pending several details regarding financial provisions, implementation safeguards, political guidance and the scope of common costs. But the main elements of the instrument are in place.

MANAGEMENT

The EPF will be managed under the authority and direction of a single Facility Committee composed of a representative of each Member State, chaired by a representative of the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council. There will be two Administrators, one for operations and another for assistance measures, who will act as the legal representatives of the Facility in matters pertaining to their respective responsibilities. Specific financial
rules will be developed for the implementation of the expenditure, building on the existing provisions within the Athena Mechanism and the APF.

**FINANCIAL AMBITION**

For the EPF, the amount of EUR 5 billion was agreed in the July 2020 European Council Conclusions. The European Council did not provide a breakdown of this amount per year. This amount will be broken down into annual ceilings for the period from 2021 to 2027, taking into account the estimations for military missions and operations and for continuing the current level of support provided under the APF, as well as an assumption of a growing trend until 2023-2024, when the Facility will reach a ‘cruising speed’, according to its global scope.

**CONCLUSION: A PROMISING FUTURE**

The EPF aims to close existing gaps in the EU’s toolbox, enabling the EU to do more and to act more swiftly by using military and defence means if required. In order to reach this objective, the EPF will offer improved flexibility, drawing on lessons learned from current instruments and mechanisms. It will also ensure that EU funding is available on a permanent basis and with a long-term perspective, while allowing for rapid response to crises and other urgent requests. Finally, the EPF foresees the provision of integrated packages that will include military training provided by EUTMs, military equipment and support.

This is a true game-changer in the military CSDP framework, which would allow the EU to become a far more effective and influential partner in international crisis management.
4 EVOLVING SECURITY CHALLENGES
In his speech on the ‘State of the Union 2016’,¹ the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, said that we should start our reflection with a sense of realism and with great honesty.

‘First of all, we should admit that we have many unresolved problems in Europe. There can be no doubt about this. …

Secondly, we should be aware that the world is watching us. …

Thirdly, we should recognise that we cannot solve all our problems with one more speech. Or with one more summit’.²

This is also a good starting point for the topic of migration, which highlights the inextricable link between internal and external security. In the past few years we have seen a massive influx of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, and realised that no single country can face this challenge alone.

Migration is not necessarily the biggest challenge in Europe and for Europe, but the migration challenge is very present in our daily discussions, in the mass media and on the streets. Hence the public put it on the agenda of our politicians, who – since then – have been seeking common solutions.

Migration is not a seasonal phenomenon; the pressure will likely stay. Our systems were not built with this scenario in mind. Therefore we are seeing overstretches of capacity, loss of trust and credibility in our democratic governments and as a result the rise of populist political parties taking advantage of this situation. Moreover, the soli-

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2 Jean-Claude Juncker, p. 7.
darity between EU Member States, which is elo-
quently laid down in Article 2 and Article 3(5) of the Treaty on European Union, seems to have been weakened. This results in a decrease in cohesion inside the Union.

Our answers to the migration challenge must be comprehensive, credible and strategic. We should not forget our values or our interests. How the Union tackles the migration crisis will be the stress test for the structures in Brussels and national capitals.

HOW CAN WE MANAGE MIGRATION?

Migration is an issue combining humanitarian aspects, employment, social welfare, security and many other areas. The main responsibility for managing it lies with the EU Member States. The European Commission and its agencies are performing well, but much more has to be done.

Nor has the EU stood idle in the face of this crisis. Making use of all of the policy tools at its disposal, a number of important actions have been

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3 Article 2 TEU: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’

4 Article 3(5) TEU: ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’
launched for a coordinated and coherent European response. A new approach to better manage migration through the establishment of partnership frameworks was set out at the European Council on 28-29 June 2016, fully embedding the issue of migration in the EU’s overall foreign policy.

The European Global Strategy, which was welcomed at the same Council meeting, states very clearly, that ‘Together with countries of origin and transit, we will develop common and tailor-made approaches to migration featuring development, diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and return. We will work with our international partners to ensure shared global responsibilities and solidarity.’

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), a Member State tool to manage external crises, is most probably not the main instrument to tackle this complex issue. It should, however, remain part of the comprehensive crisis management toolbox, and we should examine how CSDP instruments could complement current activities. In a number of theatres the EU has already deployed CSDP missions and operations with the objective of complementing other EU efforts to address irregular migration, in particular in the Central Mediterranean and the Sahel.

At the same time we should also be aware that the CSDP is meant to be deployed outside EU territory; hence assistance and support to other

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6 Article 42(1) TEU: ‘The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.’
EU Member States via the CSDP is not currently possible in our legal framework.

Securing the external borders of the EU and its Member States is one key policy area of the Commission under which numerous initiatives have been launched. The European Agenda on Migration, the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation, Smart Borders and EUROSUR are amongst the significant measures taken to reinforce the management of European borders.

And when we come to the point where we are willing to deploy a CSDP mission and/or operation, we should pay attention to the existing structures, instruments and mechanisms outside the scope of the CSDP, ensuring they are not duplicated or hindered in their valuable work.

For example, since 6 October 2016 the European Border and Coast Guard has provided a missing link in strengthening Europe’s external borders, so that people can continue to live and move freely within the European Union – helping to meet Europe’s commitment to get back to the normal functioning of the Schengen area and the lifting of temporary internal border controls.

Nevertheless, some of the existing instruments and structures are currently being reinforced (e.g. the European Border and Coast Guard) and in the short- to mid-term, shortfalls could be identified. CSDP tools could be used to fill these gaps and thereby support civilian entities.

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Migration is not necessarily the biggest challenge in Europe and for Europe, but the migration challenge is omnipresent in our daily discussions, in the mass media and on the streets.

### The Common European Asylum System (CEAS)

**Asylum is granted to people fleeing persecution or serious harm**

- An application for asylum is made.
- Asylum applicants benefit from common minimum material reception conditions, such as housing and food. (Reception Conditions Directive)
- The asylum applicant is interviewed to determine whether he/she may qualify for refugee status or subsidiary protection (Qualification Directive and Asylum Procedures Directive).
- The applicant is fingerprinted. The information goes to the Eurodac database (Eurodac Regulation). This data is used to help identify the country responsible for the asylum application (Dublin Regulation). The database is managed by eu-LISA (European Agency for the Operational Management of large-scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice).
- Asylum applicants benefit from common minimum material reception conditions, such as housing and food. (Reception Conditions Directive)
- The asylum applicant is interviewed to determine whether he/she may qualify for refugee status or subsidiary protection (Qualification Directive and Asylum Procedures Directive).
- Asylum is not granted to the applicant at first instance, but this refusal may be appealed in court.
- Confirmation of the negative decision by the court. The applicant may be returned to the country of origin or transit.
- Refugee or subsidiary protection status is granted. This gives the person certain rights, like a residence permit, access to the labour market and healthcare (Qualification Directive).
CSDP HAS PROVED TO BE USEFUL

The CSDP is already being used and has proved to be a useful tool in assisting the EU and its Member States in the management of migration flows. Needless to say, it is only one of the tools at the EU’s disposal to address the migration challenge. In many CSDP missions and operations, migration is implicitly or explicitly mentioned in the mandates. Tasks include supporting host countries by providing training and advice for military and security forces, building institutions for the sustainable rule of law, and thus building local capacity with the main objective of creating the conditions for economic growth and prosperity. EUFOR ALTHEA, EUCAP SAHEL NIGER, EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA, EUTM MALI and many more could be listed as examples.

Nevertheless, as the CSDP mainly focuses on the security aspects of the EU’s support to our partner countries in managing migratory flows at their borders, there are several key areas in which CSDP support could have an added value. CSDP missions and operations could work alongside the European Border and Coast Guard as well as other specialised EU agencies to enhance border protection and maritime security with the objective of fighting cross-border crime and disrupting smuggling networks and thus saving more lives.

Possible areas of enhanced CSDP support as described above could be:

- border surveillance and the prevention of uncontrolled border crossings, in particular for land and sea borders;
- the processing of irregular migrants, in particular by providing training and technical assistance as well as capacity building for so-called ‘hotspots’;
- law enforcement activities against smugglers’ networks by strengthening intelligence sharing;
- security sector reform in countries either of origin or transit.

A certain amount of time will be needed between a fully-fledged CSDP mission or operation being launched and starting to fully deliver its support. This could be an issue in a rapidly changing situation where smugglers are fast to respond and adapt to any law enforcement action. It could therefore be worth considering whether existing crisis management procedures and mechanisms could be used more rapid-
ly and flexibly. Alternatively, if the members states decide that CSDP should play a more active role in providing support to our partners, an entirely new mechanism for more rapid CSDP deployment could be designed for cases where urgent assistance or flexibility would be needed – as some member states have already called for in the course of the current crisis.

HOW CAN WE HELP EU MEMBER STATES IN NEED?

One way could be to establish a clearing-house function at EU level in order to have a clear picture of the national, bilateral, multilateral and regional initiatives. Additionally, the clearing house could gather requests from member states and forward them to entities which could offer support. The question remains open as to where this clearing-house function should be located; at the European Commission (e.g. DG HOME), the External Action Service (e.g. CMPD or EUMS) or one of the relevant agencies.

Another possible solution could be to refer to Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The so-called ‘solidarity clause’ has a solid legal basis and covers natural and man-made disasters as well as terrorism (both prevention and consequence management). The procedure and structures for its implementation are in place and could be used immediately. The Union must mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the member states.

CONCLUSION

The abovementioned proposals were developed by experts from EU member states and the EU institutions in the margins of the panel discussion on migration, held at Egmont Palace. The driving factor for implementing one proposal or another is political will. Legal obligations are man-made and can be changed in the same way as they were created. Solutions must bear in mind the humanitarian dimension of the migration crisis, European values and the European population that is eager to see results.

The root causes of the migration challenge must also be addressed, and better today than tomorrow. In general, the security situations in the countries of origin are not at the top of the list. There we find economic and personal reasons for migration.

And one core element in addressing the root causes must be education. Without giving young people in the countries of origin or transit a credible vision for their future, the migration flow will never end.

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<th>MIGRANT</th>
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<td>The term ‘migrant’ is understood as covering all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of ‘personal convenience’ and without intervention of an external compelling factor. This definition indicates that the term ‘migrant’ does not refer to refugees, displaced or others forced or compelled to leave their homes.</td>
<td>Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention defines a refugee as an individual who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence who is unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on his or her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.</td>
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We have to act now and we have to be innovative in our thinking. The former Secretary General of the European External Action Service, Pierre Viemont, advocates the same, saying it is ‘time to be ambitious’.9

Jean-Claude Juncker said in his speech that the next twelve months are the crucial time in which to deliver a better Europe: ‘Therefore we are in need of
• a Europe that protects;
• a Europe that preserves the European way of life;
• a Europe that empowers our citizens;
• a Europe that defends at home and abroad; and
• a Europe that takes responsibility.’10

The main responsibility for tackling the migration challenge lies with the EU Member States.

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**Migration**

*Migration* is the crossing of the boundary of a political or administrative unit for a certain minimum period of time. It includes the movement of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people as well as economic migrants.


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**Asylum Seeker**

*Asylum seekers* are people who move across borders in search of protection, but who may not fulfil the strict criteria laid down by the 1951 Convention. The terms ‘asylum seeker’/‘asylee’ and ‘refugee’ differ only in regard to the place where an individual asks for protection.

Europe needs to be able to effectively manage its external borders and provide a high level of security within the Union. This is why President Juncker proposed in his 2018 State of the Union Address to further reinforce the European Border and Coast Guard to give it the right level of ambition to respond to the common challenges Europe is facing in managing migration and borders. With this proposal now adopted by both the European Parliament and the Council, the Agency will soon have the necessary resources and capabilities to support Member States on the ground – constantly and reliably.

**A REINFORCED EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD**

November 2019

What is new?

A 10,000-strong standing corps

The new standing corps of 10,000 border guards – to be rolled out gradually – will ensure sufficient resources for the Agency.

Own equipment

The Agency will acquire its own equipment, such as vessels, planes and vehicles, available to be deployed at all times.

Expanded tasks and powers

The standing corps will be able to carry out executive tasks such as identity checks and authorising or refusing entry – only under the authority and control of the host Member State.

Antenna offices

Temporary antenna offices can be set up in EU Member States and third countries to support operational activities of the European Border and Coast Guard.

More support on return

The Agency will support Member States in return procedures, including in collecting information necessary for issuing return decisions and identifying non-EU nationals who have no right to stay, acquiring travel documents from non-EU countries, as well as by organising and financing return operations.

Cooperation with non-EU countries

The Agency will be able to launch joint operations and deploy border guards to countries outside the EU and beyond the neighbouring countries.
A NEW STANDING CORPS OF 10,000 BORDER GUARDS

WHY 10,000?

The 10,000 standing corps was carefully designed – including its size and composition – to be able to address Member States’ current and future needs.

It is weighted on:

- Additional tasks of the Agency
- Previous staff and equipment gaps
- Experience from the migration crisis

WHEN?

The new standing corps will be ready to be deployed starting from 2021, gradually reaching its full capacity of 10,000 border guards.

HOW?

All operations of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will take place under the command and control of the host Member State. The teams deployed from the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps will carry out their duties and tasks in accordance with instructions of team leaders from the host country.

Stronger European Border and Coast Guard will NOT:

- Diminish national sovereignty
- Take over Member States’ responsibility to protect borders
- Replace national border guards
- Unilaterally launch operations at Member States’ borders

DID YOU NOW?

- During the migration crisis the European Border and Coast Guard had to increase its deployments across Europe 5 times.
- EU operations at sea, including operations coordinated by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, contributed to saving almost 760,000 lives since 2015.
- All the costs arising from the deployment of the standing corps will be covered by the Agency.
- Standing corps will be able to intervene only following a request by a Member State.
- The 10,000 border guards will represent only 8.7% of the total 115,000 Member States operational staff in charge of border management across the EU.
Since 2001 civilian CSDP missions have been developing as important tools of the EU common foreign and security policy, operating with post-conflict and conflict-prevention mandates in a variety of countries and regions abroad. Whilst these missions are generally well documented and analysed, there is one angle few have considered to date, which is the link with the EU’s counter-terrorism (CT) efforts that have also been an important part of the EU’s external and security policy dimension. It appears that, even within the EU institutions, there has been little if any interaction between the relevant bodies, which is striking given the similarities in aims, objectives, and geographical priorities; nor has there been any coordination between respective approaches, despite the great potential for synergies.

This article seeks to analyse these similarities in greater detail, with a view to making the case for more interaction and coordination between the two EU external policy instruments, which would enhance the much sought-after ‘comprehensive’, or ‘integrated’, approach that the newly adopted EU Global Strategy advocates. The article also argues in favour of much stronger investment in CSDP, specifically with a view to addressing more systematically the CT requirements in third countries when there is a link to Europe’s security.

**SIMILARITIES**

The first similarity is the shared objective of enhancing the rule of law: civilian CSDP missions with a capacity-building mandate usually focus on mentoring, monitoring, advising and training for the host country’s police and judiciary. They help countries with weak law-enforcement institutions to adapt their national legislation,
they assist them with security sector reform, and they contribute to improving related inter-agency cooperation and coordination, and enhancing the performance of the state apparatus and relevant personnel. Typical of this is the civilian nature of the efforts: civilian CSDP uses civilian expertise from Member States’ active police and judiciary personnel to carry out tasks relating to enhancing the rule of law in third countries.

The EU approach to CT is based on the rule of law, in so far as terrorist acts are criminalised and thus investigated, prosecuted and the perpetrators sentenced in accordance with the rule of law and international standards. Ever since the first EU Framework Decision on combating terrorism in 2001, and following the adoption of the EU CT strategy in 2005, the EU’s external CT action has continuously advocated this civilian approach. The EU has been an active contributor to various landmark resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE) that seek to criminalise terrorist acts and to strengthen the police and judicial systems dealing with terror. The EU was a founding member of the Global Counter terrorism Forum (GCTF), which is a civilian platform for politicians and practitioners involved in CT. The EU continues to proactively shape its numerous policy initiatives, best practice documents, advocacy and coordination of capacity-building in countries in need. In 2016 the EU contributed around EUR 224 million to CT/P-CVE (Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) assistance programmes in partner countries and EUR 175 million to CT/P-CVE-related assistance programmes, making a total of around EUR 400 million of capacity-building in relation to the rule of law abroad.
Another similarity is the proactive bringing of international standards and best practice to partner countries: the use of international standards is a recurrent feature in the planning documents for civilian CSDP missions. The fact that civilian CSDP missions use active service personnel means that they can draw on the state-of-the-art best practice and policy of their sending countries when helping to reform local services and local legislation.

Another important dimension of the EU’s external CT action is advocacy and diplomacy, for example through the numerous CT political dialogues held with a variety of countries and regional organisations such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union (AU). The EU also takes and active part in the GCTF (which includes co-chairing one of its working groups) as well as sponsoring numerous workshops and seminars on CT- and CVE-related topics in priority countries and regions. The network of CT experts deployed in various EU delegations since 2015 also contributes to the mainstreaming and promotion of globally agreed standards and policies.

Looking at the geographical focus of civilian CSDP and EU external CT efforts, there seems to be far less overlap than might be expected considering that in many regions terrorism is the root cause of instability or, conversely, it is likely to arise where the state apparatus is weak and conflict endemic. Some more detailed examples are:

- **Western Balkans**: EULEX Kosovo, which is focusing on police reform and capacity-building: CT expert deployed since the end of 2016 to cover the entire region and help coordinate a major initiative in the Western Balkans to address CT and radicalisation;
- **Pakistan**: no CSDP mission but considerable CT engagement, including deployment of a CT expert and a major programme currently in the pipeline (CT STRIVE);
- **Afghanistan**: significant CSDP effort (EUPOL Afghanistan, soon closing), but currently no CT expert;
- **Middle East**: Iraq CSDP mission now closed, but CT expert deployed since 2015 helping to coordinate a number of key assistance projects including intelligence services capacity-building;
• **Palestine**: a CSDP mission focusing on police reform and capacity-building, but no CT expert deployed;
• **Lebanon and Jordan**: no CSDP mission, but considerable CT assistance efforts and CT experts deployed since 2015;
• **Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco**: no CSDP mission, but considerable CT assistance for Tunisia (Algeria and Morocco still pending), and CT experts deployed since 2015;
• **Sahel**: two civilian CSDP missions ongoing, all in the field of Security Sector Reform; two CT experts deployed (Chad and Nigeria), with a number of CT-related assistance programmes ongoing.

The overview shows that there is currently almost no coordination between the two instruments. To put this in more positive terms, the instruments avoid duplication and thus complement each other. However, this is to assume that the decision is deliberate. The reality is that there is no coordination when an instrument is decided on, or at least that this has not been happening enough.

Nevertheless, there are examples in the past where counter-terrorism considerations have played a role in the design and inception of a civilian CSDP mission:

The first was the **AMIS Support Mission** (2005-2006), which supported the command and control operations of the first ever AU-led peacekeeping mission to counter the effects of the militant groups laying waste to Darfur, which at the time were not categorised as ‘terrorists’.

Some years later (in 2012), the **EUVSEC** mission in South Sudan was clearly conceived in the context of the perceived threats posed by weak security at Juba airport, where the main risk was its potential use by terrorists to hijack planes. The newly established landlocked state of South Sudan was then heavily reliant on massive air transport to support state-building, and its only international airport was a lifeline.

**EUCAP Nestor**, which was planned and set up in parallel (in 2012), was to help counter the increasing threat posed by Al-Shabaab and its links to piracy groups operating in the Indian Ocean. Whilst this was clearly the context, the mandate of the mission ultimately focused on helping build effective coast guards for the countries in the region, without a specific reference to terrorism.

**EUCAP Niger**, planned and set up later in 2012, is so far the only mission that explicitly refers to counter-terrorism as part of its mandate, which includes mentoring, advice and training for local security services in legislative and other matters.

**EUBAM Libya**, planned in 2013, fell short of explicitly referring to terrorism, albeit terrorism was again part of the context at the time.

### CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER INTERACTION AND COORDINATION

The above explanations of linkages (or non-linkages) between CSDP and CT so far clearly show two things. On the one hand, the link does not have to be explicit: aims and objectives where the emphasis is on (re-establishing) the rule of law serve the same purpose, be this through civilian CSDP or through the EU’s classical external CT efforts such as dialogues or European Commission-financed assistance programmes. On the other hand, there is clearly scope for civilian CSDP missions to be used more specifically to achieve external CT objectives.

The changing global environment in fact points to a need to redouble the EU’s efforts in this area, given the following main factors.

First, territorial gains in Iraq and Syria will sooner or later lead to a situation where remaining Da’esh fighters will move to ‘safe havens’, including in Yemen or Somalia, but also in Sudan, Libya and the wider Sahel.

The CSDP is well established in the Sahel, mainly through the two EUCAP Sahel missions (Mali and Niger), and possibly soon a new mission in Libya that is currently being planned. All three missions could easily see their mandates
adapted to more explicitly help the respective host countries cope with the growing threat posed by terrorism. The same applies to EUCAP Nestor on the eastern coast of Africa. Tasks would for instance include adapting national legislation to international standards (e.g. UNSC resolutions and conventions), mentoring and training in relation to CT cases in the courts, enhancement of CT threat assessments, information exchange and evidence collection, etc.

Ongoing discussions about the ‘regionalisation’ of the civilian CSDP missions in the Sahel through the deployment of CSDP experts in all Sahel EU delegations also create an ideal opportunity for synergies between CT experts already in the field and Commission-funded projects that either directly or indirectly pursue the same objectives as the CSDP.

Current planning of a possible new civilian CSDP mission for Libya likewise provides an ideal opportunity to combine efforts, as the aim of this new mission would be not just to help law enforcement agencies address terrorism and radicalisation, but also to tackle the links to migration – in full recognition of the fact that terror and migration have the same root causes and require similar measures by state authorities.

This is achievable and warranted, perhaps even more so now in view of the possible diminution of US engagement in these regions, which is the second main factor to consider in this context.

In summary, it seems that some opportunities could certainly arise to establish more systematic links between the CSDP and CT, with more targeted and specifically CT-related mandates for civilian CSDP missions. This would meld the work already done by other EU services on external CT measures/capacity-building with the CSDP-specific methodology of ‘hands-on’ mentoring and advice/training.

Despite these positive considerations, there is still one major challenge to the ideas outlined in this article, and that concerns the issue of resources: the civilian CSDP relies on the secondment of active service personnel from EU Member States. Security and judiciary services are already under severe strain given the heightened threat to the European mainland.

Making additional resources available for enhanced civilian CSDP missions would be very difficult, if not impossible, without a major policy shift making the links between internal and external security more explicit.

**CONCLUSIONS**

There can be no doubt that there is in principle scope for the civilian CSDP to consider aspects of terrorism more specifically in the definition of mandates, since the civilian CSDP is perfectly suited to helping countries’ authorities cope with growing threats that are ultimately linked to our own EU internal security, including migration issues (same root causes).

But it is not enough to ensure good policing or the rule of law. It is necessary to address more specific aspects of counter-terrorism in order to deal effectively with the phenomenon: this means CT-related information exchange, adapting national legislation to international standards, developing CT-specific best practices for law enforcement and the judiciary (see GCTF work), etc.

These are less familiar areas for current EU CSDP structures, but this can easily be addressed so as to ensure that future CSDP mandates include, subject to available resources, targeted objectives and tasks relevant to CT.

Clearly this would be in the interest of the EU and in line with the prerogatives of the recently adopted global security strategy for the European Union, which calls for a more integrated approach using EU external instruments to address both internal and external security needs.
4.3. CYBER SECURITY/DEFENCE AND THE CSDP

by Jan Peter Giesecke

Our modern information society is deeply dependent on the availability of free and secure access to cyberspace and to the internet. This is true in nearly all areas of our lives, including, of course, in foreign and defence policy. The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) activities, including civilian and military missions and operations, are no exception. They benefit from the digital world and their success is directly linked to the availability of assured information and functioning communication and information systems.

THE NEW THREAT LANDSCAPE

Cyberspace and the internet are increasingly becoming a new battlefield. Cyber-attacks are part of daily business, and at the same time are becoming more sophisticated, ranging from massive denial-of-service attacks to advanced and complex intrusions aimed at gathering, stealing, encrypting or manipulating and compromising information. Adversaries vary from ‘script kiddies’ and hacktivists to criminals, terrorists and state actors – or are supported by them. They have identified our dependencies and target our vulnerabilities, using the cyber domain to gain an asymmetric advantage and accomplish economic, political or military objectives anonymously and unattributed, while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict.

The EU institutions’ networks too are constantly being probed and tested, and although there is no evidence yet of their being targeted, CSDP operations and missions are already facing a growing cyber dimension. Today’s conflicts are increasingly supported by disinformation campaigns based on social media, or by destabilisation operations with cyber-attacks on enabling sectors. Cyber activities must therefore be considered as part of all future scenarios, comprehensively examined, and integrated into the broader crisis response and taken into account when countering hybrid threats. With this in mind, what can we do and what has been done so far, in particular in the area of CSDP?
POLITICAL FRAMEWORKS

In 2013, recognising the need for increased cyber security and for an ‘open, safe and secure cyberspace’, the EU institutions developed the EU Cybersecurity Strategy. Based on this, the European External Action Service (EEAS), as the home of CSDP, developed an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (CDPF) in 2014. The aim of the policy framework was to improve cyber defence resilience and capabilities for the implementation of CSDP activities, by tracking, interconnecting and coordinating all of the work carried out by the various stakeholders at the EEAS and beyond.

Recently, the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy designated cyber security and defence as a priority, focusing on both resilience and protection, and addressing in particular the need to cooperate and to share information among Member States (MS) and also with military and civilian partners.

These strategic documents form a valuable foundation and framework for cyber security and defence in CSDP. But what does this all mean in a practical sense?

CYBER SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN PRACTICE

Cyber security and defence have been taken into consideration in CSDP operations and missions for several years, but to varying degrees. Cyber capabilities depend primarily on what mission or operation commanders request, mainly based on the situation, their perception of the cyber threat and their decision on how much to ‘invest’ in various capabilities. Thus cyber security and defence measures in ongoing operations and missions vary from rather basic security and information assurance measures to well-established, state-of-the-art protection and resilience to defend command and control and communication and information systems.

In future, all CSDP missions and operations will have to give appropriate consideration to cyber security and defence. For the three most recent of them (EUMAM RCA, EUNAVFORMED SOPHIA, EUTM RCA) this has already been done. However, for the moment the topic has been introduced only on a best practice...
level. There are as yet no formal structures or pro-
cedures for the assured and effective consideration
of cyber threats in planning which could form a
basis for defining appropriate requirements for
the cyber defence capabilities to be made available
for missions and operations.

THE CYBER DEFENCE CONCEPT

In view of this, in 2016 the EUMS, as the EU’s
and the EEAS’s provider of military expertise,
developed a new version of the EU Concept for
Cyber Defence for military operations and mis-
sions, reflecting the specific organisational and
procedural aspects of military planning and mili-
tary force generation and addressing requirements
for MS’ provision of cyber capabilities for CSDP
activities. As civilian missions do not depend on
MS’ capabilities, work has started on a comple-
mentary concept for the implementation of cyber
security in purely civilian missions, addressing the
specific aspects thereof and taking into account
the military concept.

At this point, we must understand that the
EU and the EEAS use the term ‘cyber security’
mainly in the civilian context and link the term
‘cyber defence’ to military action, even though the
two concepts are closely connected, covering the
same threats, relying on the same basic principles
and using similar measures. While the statements
made in this article are, in principle, valid for the
broader term ‘cyber security and defence’, it will
focus on cyber defence and the principles and
guidance reflected in the Cyber Defence Concept.

Planning cyber defence

The first principle for ensuring effective cyber
security and defence, similar to a lesson identified
during recent planning activities, is to consider
cyber aspects as early as possible in the EU’s cri-
sis management and planning processes. Cyber
aspects must therefore be considered and included
in the overall threat evaluation for the planned
operation or mission. Information in the form of
a cyber threat landscape should be provided by
the EU’s strategic intelligence structures, based
around EEAS INTCEN and the INTEL Director-
ate of EUMS, and should be supported by infor-
mation sharing, for instance with the EU’s cyber
information hub (CERT-EU), military partners
such as NATO, and of course MS’ cyber informa-
tion providers.

Together with INTEL experts, the EUMS
cyber defence team will assess the information
provided and support the operation/mission
planning teams, inserting a cyber narrative into
initial planning documents (notably the Crisis
Management Concept and the Initiating Mil-
tary Directive) and thereby providing a sound
basis for further planning. On that basis, the
designated operation or mission commander
and his or her staff – supported by further intelli-
gence and a more in-depth analysis of threats and
risks from cyberspace in the area of operations
– is able to take a decision on the importance
of cyber defence and to define, in the concept
of operations and the operation or mission plan,
how an effective defence against potential threats
from cyberspace can be achieved, requesting the
necessary capabilities to ensure the resilience and
protection of the IT systems and networks to be
used for the mission or operation.
Since the EUMS does not provide or deploy any operational cyber capabilities, these must generally be requested from the MSs which are supporting the CSDP activity in question and are willing to provide forces. Therefore, in general, MSs are responsible for providing capabilities. They are given guidance and advice on this in the Cyber Concept. But what is meant by this general term ‘cyber capabilities’?

Implementing cyber defence

The implementation of cyber security and defence in the CSDP involves far more than simply providing some protection mechanisms in networks. The term ‘capabilities’ has therefore been considered in the Cyber Defence Concept in a broader context, covering doctrinal, organisational, training/exercise, material, leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperability aspects (using the DOTMLPF-I scheme). Besides ‘simple’ material protection it is mainly concerned with the preparation of systems, structures, procedures and, especially, the people involved, to ensure their resilience against threats from cyberspace. This cyber resilience and the related capabilities must in fact be established and put into practice long before the planning processes start.

Information and communication technology (ICT), which is the basis for the systems and networks used in CSDP action, cannot be made cyber-resilient when being handed over to a commander. ICT providers, whether they are MS, EU institutions or contractors in general, must develop their systems in compliance with standardised basic design requirements and necessary security and assurance rules (‘design-to-security’).

As during the planning phase, organisational elements and procedures to ensure effective cyber defence must also be put in place during the conduct phase of operations and missions. Therefore, structures known as ‘cyber cells’ should be established within every OHQ/FHQ, to provide a continuous assessment of the cyber threat information received from the supporting intelligence structures. A cyber cell should advise decision-makers in the HQ, providing agreed and appropriate actions or reactions. Therefore, the cells work closely with the security operation centres (SOCs), which are responsible for running the risk management for the mission’s networks, observing the networks and identifying, prioritising and mitigating risks. Standardised operations procedures (SOPs) are needed to complement these organisational elements, and will ensure that both the strategic and the operational level of missions and operations act and react appropriately and without delay and allow for ‘defence in depth’.

Mitigating the human risks

The most important aspect of resilience is to prepare the people involved. The most common ‘cyber-vulnerability’ remains the human element. Mitigating the human risks essentially requires a change in culture and behaviour in handling and working with ICT, to be achieved through constant education and training. This must be supplemented with up-to-date knowledge and awareness of the threat environment through regular cyber awareness training. In addition, between this basic education for all ICT users and the training for deep specialists (the ‘geeks’) at the other end, there are various specific training requirements, for instance for cyber advisers, for specialists in the definition of cyber capability requirements and in cyber intelligence, and in particular for decision-makers and their planners, including legal and political advisers. They must be able to understand detailed cyber-related information and intelligence reports and to know about the impact of cyber operations when immediate decisions are required on how to react in the event of an incident. It is therefore essential to provide them with training and exercises on these issues, so as to bridge the typical ‘mind gap’ between the higher-level decision-makers and the real specialists, and to build up broader operational excellence for an effective posture against threats from cyberspace.
While the Cyber Defence Concept addresses the various aspects of an effective cyber defence capability at a fairly high level, this must be translated into actionable work packages.

One major aspect of this is the development of more concrete requirements and specific cyber capability packages which can be implemented by potential providers – mainly the MS, but also civilian contractors.

As a basis for building the new capability requirement catalogue in the framework of the implementation of the Global Strategy, cyber aspects and a threat landscape must be injected into existing scenarios, considering cyber as an operational domain.

Subsequently, concrete and detailed cyber capabilities must be defined, supported and flanked by the studies carried out by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and its cyber defence project team.

Although the new Cyber Defence Concept already provides a basic understanding for appropriate action and reaction, SOPs must be developed as a next step in cooperation between the EUMS and operational stakeholders from HQ level.

This also comprises the development of business continuity and recovery plans, to ensure that operations can continue even in a degraded and contested cyber environment.

A third aspect is of course education, training and exercises and the streamlining of the EU’s cyber defence education and training landscape.

Supported by the EUMS and the MSs, the cyber discipline within the EU Military Training Working Group, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the EDA are working hand-in-hand on new initiatives for the design, development, conduct and evaluation of training activities and exercises, from awareness training up to courses for high-level decision-makers.
COOPERATION WITH PARTNERS

A key enabler for the implementation of these aspects is cooperation with civilian and military partners. While cyber expertise from industry and academia is linked to the processes mainly by the EDA and the ESDC, the EUMS interacts closely with NATO on military aspects of cyber defence, although this remains rather informal as yet. The implementation plan of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration, which was adopted by Council conclusions in December 2016, gives huge impetus not only to the common use and development of training and exercises by the two organisations, but also on exchanges and involvement in cyber policy work and cyber information sharing, to increase synergies, avoid duplication and allow the organisations to understand each other’s mechanisms.

Besides this, some first steps have also been taken towards closer cooperation between cyber security and defence in CSDP and cyber security in civilian sectors (counter-terrorism and crime, energy and aviation) which are covered by the Commission and related agencies like the Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) or the European Cyber Crime Centre in Europol (EC3), for instance in pooling and sharing training and mutual attendance of and support for exercises (such as ‘Multi Layer’ and ‘Cyber Europe’).

CONCLUSION

The success of cyber security and defence in CSDP operations and missions remains dependent on a well-balanced combination of state-of-the-art technology, well-functioning structures and procedures, and of course educated, aware and competent staff. But more than ever this has to be enabled by cooperation and information-sharing agreements, both with external partners such as NATO and internally across MS and EU institutions. Facing the upcoming structural changes and the integration of civil and military elements in crisis management and response, there is a strong need for an integrated approach to counter cyber threats (including hybrid threats), and hence to merge the somewhat divided cyber security and cyber defence efforts and measures to allow for a stronger posture across all military and civilian CSDP activities.
4.4. HYBRID THREAT AND CSDP

by John Maas

Countering hybrid threats – a European Union response through Joint Communication

A year ago, the term ‘hybrid’ was just entering the European Union lexicon. Commentators, politicians, planners all had a sense of what ‘hybrid’ might mean but not necessarily a full understanding of the true nature of the threat. Indeed, in terms of reaction, one of the first steps was to internally digest the fact that hybrid threats really were a challenge to the European Union both at the level of Member States and also in the Brussels’ institutions.

Just to reinforce what is meant by the terms ‘hybrid’ and ‘hybrid threat’: the concept of hybrid threat relates to the deliberate use and blending of coercive and subversive activities both conventionally and unconventionally across the diplomatic, information, military, economic spectra – with the hybridity coming from the coordination by a state and/or non-state actor to achieve specific objectives, while remaining hidden, and below the threshold of formally declared warfare.

It is important to understand that there is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of society and on generating ambiguity in order to hinder decision-making processes at a political level – and thereby gain leverage. These often insidious attacks are frequently masked by massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors who can in turn be used as vehicles for delivering a hybrid strategy.

To respond to these challenges, the European Union Member States, through the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council, have taken action and mandated the High Representative in close cooperation with Commission services and the European Defence Agency (EDA), to forge a credible European response.

The hybridity in ‘hybrid threat’ refers to coordination by a state and/or non-state actor to achieve specific objectives while remaining hidden and below the threshold of formally declared warfare.

A COMPREHENSIVE JOINT FRAMEWORK

The consequent extensive joint work has resulted in a comprehensive Joint Framework that sets out 22 actionable proposals across the full spectrum of European Union competences to counter hybrid threats. These proposals focus on four main elements: improving awareness, building resilience, prevention, responding to a crisis.

As such, the European Union goal was to develop a significant response with a real priority given to the political level in responding to the dramatic change in the European Union’s security environment, particularly in the eastern and southern neighbourhood. Furthermore, given that key challenges to peace and stability continue to underscore the need for the Union to adapt and increase its capacities as a security provider, a strong focus is placed on the close relationship between external and internal security, which requires close cooperation with partners. Here, as NATO is also working to counter hybrid threats, the Foreign Affairs Council proposed to enhance current EU–NATO cooperation.
Turning to the key tenets of the framework: as a direct result of the often very subtle and difficult to detect methods of deploying a hybrid threat, improving awareness is essential in supporting the early identification of changes in the security environment related to hybrid activity enacted by either state or non-state actors. To support this goal, action has been undertaken in three main areas:

First, the creation of a European Union Hybrid Fusion Cell, established within the European Union’s Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN), offers a one-stop shop for information collation to support the analysis of potential hybrid threats. This Cell, once at full operating capacity, will be capable of analysing information specifically related to indicators and warnings concerning hybrid threats with the aim of then rapidly disseminating the products to inform the European Union’s strategic decision-makers. This work will also help bring an input to European Union Member States’ security risk assessments.

Moreover, the Cell is in direct contact with the Council’s Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) mechanism which, through regular meetings of Commission DGs, collects ‘signals’ of ongoing events from the different areas of expertise (energy, trade, competition, telecommunication, etc.) and is thus able to detect changes. If, for example, one country produces two or more signals, that will trigger the mechanism to a higher alert.

The second element concerns strategic communication. It is absolutely critical that the European Union has an ability to respond to misinformation campaigns that deliberately target both the European Union as an institution and individual Member States. A sound strategic communications strategy (which makes full use of social media tools, as well as the traditional visual, audio and web-based media and is delivered by professional communicators with the appropriate language and cultural
awareness) is essential. In direct response, two task forces – Stratcom East working in the Russian language and Task Force South running a counter Da’esh narrative – have been set up to counter active disinformation campaigns. Their products are disseminated through weekly publications that factually set the record straight and are complemented by the use of modern media methods such as Twitter.

EU Mythbusters (@EUvDisinfo) is one such outlet which has a growing number of followers.

Thirdly, building on the experience of some Member States and partner organisations, and in order to fill a gap at the strategic level, Finland has accepted the European Union challenge for a Member State to establish a European Centre of Excellence. This work should start in early 2017 and the Centre’s tasks will be specifically focused on research and training on how hybrid strategies have been applied and, thereafter, on encouraging the development of new doctrinal concepts to help Member States and allies improve the advice given to strategic decision makers. This will likely lead to a real-time capacity for exercising demanding scenarios designed to improve decision-making in situations blurred by ambiguity. The research should also help contribute to aligning European Union and national policies, doctrines and concepts, and help to ensure that decision-makers can respond better when faced with complex challenges posed by hybrid threats which by their nature are designed to create uncertainty.

CAPACITY TO WITHSTAND STRESS AND RECOVER

Turning to the longer-term action, the fourth domain is that of building resilience. Resilience in this context is the capacity to withstand stress and recover, ideally through actioning of lessons identified. To effectively counter hybrid threats, the potential vulnerabilities of key infrastructures, supply chains and society need to be analysed and vulnerabilities addressed. For success in this area to be achieved, it is imperative that a comprehensive approach be adopted to allow all European Union instruments and policies to be brought to bear, and for Member States to be offered the best guidance on critical infrastructure design in order to ensure an overall improvement in resilience across the Union and with partners. To offer a flavour of the scope of this work, actions have been outlined to build resilience in areas such as cybersecurity, critical infrastructure protection, financial systems safeguards against illicit exploitation, and the countering of violent extremism and radicalisation. In each of these areas, the implementation of agreed strategies by the European Union institutions as well as by Member States themselves fully applying existing legislation are key factors for success.

The European Defence Agency has a paramount role in driving forward another form of resilience – that of building defence capabilities. Here it is absolutely essential to stay abreast of technological innovation to ensure that the European Union’s capacity to act as a defence and security provider remains relevant in a dynamically and rapidly changing world. Here the European Union is seen as being able to play a key role in helping Member States develop those capacities that will be needed in the future to counter the full spectrum of potential threats. The first step on this path has been to identify the relevant key capability areas of surveillance and reconnaissance as catalyst areas for future military capability development. Technological advances can also be complemented by shortening capability development cycles, focusing investment on technological prototypes, and encouraging both innovation and innovative commercial technologies. When it comes to building resilience to hybrid attacks, commercial operators have very often through years of experience developed best practices that the European Union could exploit rather than seeking bespoke military solutions. Cyber security is one such area.
CYBERSECURITY

While the European Union greatly benefits from its interconnected and digitised society – considered as a real strength and economic driver – there are serious considerations linked to over-reliance. As regards hybrid attacks, the very connectivity that drives European Union society is by definition a centre of gravity and may appear a rewarding target for a would-be aggressor. Strong cyber security is therefore absolutely critical in the context of countering hybrid threats. Specifically, improving the resilience of communication and information systems in Europe is vital in supporting the digital single market. The European Union Cybersecurity Strategy and the European Agenda on Security provide the overall strategic frameworks for European Union initiatives on cyber security and cybercrime. Moreover, the European Union has been very active in developing awareness in Member States and in building inter-mechanism cooperation.

However, the European Union cannot in today’s interconnected world operate alone. There is an inbuilt reliance on partners and neighbouring countries, be it from global economic ties, shared resources or simply the natural intertwining of cultures. Therefore, when we look to the European neighbourhood, building capacities in partner countries in the security sector is essential. Taking a holistic approach by building on the nexus between security and development, the European Union is actively developing the security dimension of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy.

In this respect the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) can offer tools for use on missions and operations that can be melded to complement other deployed European Union instruments or used independently. A couple of such examples might be advisory support for key ministries under stress from hybrid threats or additional support for border management agencies that are at risk of being overwhelmed by an engineered emergency.

MUTUAL ASSISTANCE CLAUSE AND SOLIDARITY CLAUSE

Let’s go back to the issues relating to preventing, responding to and recovering from hybrid threats. One of the actionable proposals is to examine the feasibility of applying the Solidarity Clause in Article 222 TFEU (as specified in the relevant Decision) and Article 42(7) TEU, in the event of a wide-ranging and serious hybrid attack occurring – and specifically examining the potential European Union actions to support a Member State seeking such assistance.

Early work has seen the development of a European Union operational protocol. The simple flow chart aims to help build better links between the European Union’s already well-developed but often diverse response mechanisms. The aim too is simple, to link information and the analysis of information to be fed swiftly and coherently to key decision-makers within both the Commission and the External Action Service. By establishing this common protocol, the time taken from the initial identification of a potential threat to a decision being taken to react should be considerably shortened. Furthermore, this protocol outlines the modalities for better coordination between structures, improved intelligence fusion and analysis to better inform the political, operational and technical levels charged with making policy recommendations.
In the European Union, coordination of crisis management occurs at three levels: political, operational and technical. It addresses the full crisis management cycle: prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Dedicated procedures govern the implementation of the Commission system (ARGUS), the Council arrangements (IPCR) and the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM). Within the CRM, identified points of entry allow coordination with EU actors and international partners. When there is a need for wider/emergency consultation on hybrid threats among Commission services, the EEAS and European Union agencies, appropriate use is made of these crisis management procedures.

Given the nature of hybrid threats, the purpose and design of which is often to stay below the threshold of activity that might trigger a recognisable crisis, the European Union may need to take appropriate action in the pre-crisis phase. The attached table gives an indication of the interaction required to better inform and speed up decision-making.

**COOPERATION AND COORDINATION**

Finally, the Council proposes to step up cooperation and coordination between the European Union and NATO in common efforts to counter hybrid threats, not least as the two organisations share common values and face similar challenges. European Union Member States and NATO allies alike expect their respective organisations to support them, by acting swiftly, decisively and in a coordinated manner in the event of a crisis. Of course, in a perfect world they should ideally be able to prevent the crisis from happening.
Therefore, an effective response calls for there to be an active dialogue and close coordination both at the political and operational levels of both organisations. Closer interaction between the European Union and NATO would improve both organisations’ ability to prepare for and respond to hybrid threats effectively in a complementary and mutually supporting manner.

It is fundamental that this cooperation be based on the principle of inclusiveness, while respecting each organisation’s decision-making autonomy and data protection rules. Closer European Union–NATO cooperation in a number of areas has been endorsed at the highest level by both organisations.

These areas include situational awareness, strategic communications, cyber security, and crisis prevention and response.

There has also been political agreement that the two organisations should conduct parallel and coordinated exercises organised in this cooperative framework.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the European Union’s response to hybrid threats largely depends on Member States’ willingness to share detected signals and their vulnerabilities; The more general point, which is important for all to grasp is that countering hybrid threats requires everyone to take a different intellectual approach to security issues. The traditional internal and external, civil and military, public and private separations in the European Union approach to security and defence matters are no longer sustainable and a necessary step change in mindset was needed. The European Global Strategy has gone some way to updating security and defence thinking in Europe, and the Joint Communication on Countering Hybrid Threats represents a first step towards building a safer Europe. More needs to be done, including planting the seed in all those who work in the European Union institutions or serve in delegations or on missions and operations that hybrid threats are real, and that they themselves have a role to play in supporting efforts to create a safer society.

**Graph:** Jochen Rethl

**Hybrid Threat**

combined, centrally designed and controlled use of covert/overt, military/non-military and conventional/unconventional means and tactics

**Regular forces**

**Special forces**

**Irregular forces**

**Economic pressure**

**Diplomacy**

**Cyber attacks**

**Propaganda**

**Information operations**

**Disinformation campaign**
5 CROSSCUTTING CSDP ISSUES
Women, men, girls and boys experience and are affected by armed conflicts differently. Violence, displacement, disruption of support services, economic insecurity and the unravelling of social structures and judicial and security institutions are some of the long-term consequences that people in post-conflict settings have to endure, and each has a gender dimension.

International interventions, in the form of crisis management missions or post-conflict reconstruction programmes, need to be implemented in a gender-sensitive manner, so as to ensure that the measures in question are non-discriminatory and do not exacerbate existing inequalities but benefit both men and women.

**DEFINITION OF GENDER**

*Gender* refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialisation processes. They are context- and time-specific, and changeable.

*(European Institute for Gender Equality, EIGE).*

Societies with a high level of gender equality tend to be more stable than those with a wide gender gap.
THE EU’S GENDER POLICY

The EU’s gender policy in the area of crisis management is based on mainstreaming, i.e. systematically integrating a gender perspective in all areas of the CSDP, from planning and implementation of missions and operations to reporting, evaluation, training and lessons. The ultimate objective of the CSDP gender mainstreaming policy is gender equality, one of the core values of the European Union that is enshrined in the Treaty on European Union. The EU’s external actions, including the CSDP, are guided by the Union’s core values and principles.

Promoting gender equality contributes to stability. Studies show that societies with a high level of gender equality tend to be more stable than those with a wide gender equality gap. Similarly, gender inequality is closely associated with armed conflict. For example, all but one of the ten lowest-ranking countries in the UN Development Programme’s gender inequality index (GII) were either experiencing or emerging from conflict (HDR 2015).

GENDER MAINSTREAMING

Gender mainstreaming is also applied for reasons of operational effectiveness. The underlying reasoning is that applying a gender perspective will increase the EU’s crisis management capacity by mobilizing additional resources and exploiting the full potential of the available human resources, and will make the missions more effective in terms of establishing peace and security and strengthening democratic values (11932/2/05). Other pragmatic reasons include improving situational awareness and reaching out to the host civilian population, in particular on issues such as conflict-related sexual violence or gender-based violence.

A new key document, which provides a comprehensive policy framework for gender equality and women’s empowerment in the EU’s external activities, is the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) for 2016-2020. It renews the EU’s commitment to gender equality, human rights, the empowerment of women and girls and the eradication of gender-based violence.
Gender balancing in CSDP missions
by Maline Meiske

In October 2015, the UN Security Council conducted a High-Level Review aiming at assessing progress in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. The Review provides an opportunity to take a closer look at the developments and progress made in the context of the CSDP. Ensuring women’s participation in CSDP crisis management operations is still a major challenge, particularly in military operations. Endeavours at the EU-level alone, however, are insufficient, and can only succeed in conjunction with member states’ efforts.

The EU has increasingly recognised that conflict and crisis management are not gender-neutral affairs and has introduced numerous gender policies and initiatives to forward the aims of UNSCR 1325. The key phrase is ‘gender mainstreaming’ – the process of assessing the implications of any planned action for men and women, which includes the proportional representation of both genders in conflict resolution and crisis management operations (also referred to as ‘gender balancing’).

Boosting women’s participation began as an equal rights issue, but it has developed into a functionalist argument about improved operational effectiveness of crisis management and sustainability of conflict resolution. Adequate representation of female personnel is thought to help combat sexual violence, promote gender awareness among the host nations’ populations, and improve relationships between peacekeepers and local citizens.

With the gradual release of gender-disaggregated data on women’s participation in crisis management operations, research on gender balance and the impact on operational effectiveness is on the rise. EEAS data on 16 civilian CSDP missions between 2007 and 2013 reveal an increase in women’s participation, suggesting that gender policies and initiatives have had some success. Overall, the proportion of women participating in civilian CSDP missions rose from 20% to 26% and the absolute number of female civilian personnel increased from 240 to 869.

For CSDP military operations, no gender-disaggregated data is retained – a shortcoming that is in the process of being addressed. The EU Military Staff, however, estimates that only 3%-8% of the deployed personnel in CSDP military operations are female.

Mind the gap
To understand why women remain underrepresented in CSDP missions and operations, the methods of recruitment must be examined. Personnel are mainly supplied through national secondments, meaning that the decision-making authority in the allocation process lies with each member state. The underlying characteristics of each state thus determine women’s participation in CSDP missions and operations.

Since then the UN Security Council has adopted six more resolutions: 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122 and 2242. The women, peace and security agenda is based on these eight resolutions.

The European Union is a strong supporter of the women, peace and security agenda. The Union has consistently called for its full implementation, stressing the need to combat violence against women in conflict situations and to promote women’s equal and meaningful participation in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction.

IMPLEMENTING THE WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA

The key EU document for implementing the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda is the ‘Comprehensive Approach to the EU Implementation of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security’ (15671/1/2008).

This document offers a holistic approach, which recognises the close links between peace, security, development and gender equality and lists a range of EU external action instruments. The guiding document ‘Implementation of UNSCRs on women, peace and security into CSDP mission and operations’ (PSC document 7109/2012) focuses on the implementation of the WPS agenda in CSDP missions.

In 2010, the EU adopted 17 indicators to identify both progress and gaps in implementation based on the Comprehensive Approach; five of these indicators focused specifically on the CSDP.

The indicators were revised in 2016 (12525/16) and grouped under four thematic headings: prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery.

UNSCR 1325 WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

The United Nations Security Council’s adoption in 2000 of the landmark Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security highlighted women’s rights and gender equality for the first time as key factors in establishing international peace and stability. This was followed by Resolution 1820 (2008), which focused on sexual violence as a tactic of war and a possible war crime.
5.2. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CSDP

by Taina Järvinen

In the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law are considered essential for lasting peace and security.

Over the years the EU has mainly deployed missions focusing on capacity-building, training, advising and supporting security sector or other institutional reforms in post-conflict situations, where human rights are part of broader reconstruction efforts.

However, CSDP missions increasingly operate in complex and hostile conflict settings where national institutions are fragile or non-existent and civilians are often deliberately targeted by armed groups – a clear violation of international humanitarian law.

NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK

The European Union is committed to promoting and protecting human rights worldwide and the development of EU human rights policies in its external action, including the CSDP, has a strong normative basis. Human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principles of equality and solidarity are founding principles of the EU embedded in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In accordance with Article 21 TEU, the EU is guided by and seeks to advance these principles in its external action. Furthermore, Article 21 TEU places the EU’s external activities within a broader international normative framework by including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law among the guiding...
principles. In other words, even when a CSDP mission mandate does not explicitly refer to human rights, the mission operates in the framework of international and EU human rights standards and indirectly aims to promote human rights.

**HUMAN RIGHTS MAINSTREAMING**

To ensure the effective implementation of human rights commitments in CSDP, the EU early on adopted a policy of mainstreaming.

In June 2006 the Political and Security Committee endorsed a paper entitled ‘Mainstreaming of Human Rights into ESDP’ (11936/4/06). The document outlines the basic principles of human rights mainstreaming in CSDP and lists a number of implementation measures for the missions, Member States and the Commission, which include:

* ensuring the necessary human rights expertise at headquarters and in missions;
* providing human rights training to mission personnel;
* integrating human rights aspects as part of flanking measures or technical assistance provided in the context of missions and operations;
* ensuring appropriate mission-specific reporting procedures and integrating lessons learned on human rights aspects in missions and operations;
* cooperating with other international stakeholders.

In the context of CSDP operations and missions, human rights mainstreaming means that human rights aspects are systematically integrated into all phases of CSDP missions and operations, from the early planning phase to implementation and review.

The mainstreaming policy should pay special attention to the needs and situation of children affected by armed conflict and other vulnerable groups.
**ENHANCING EFFECTIVENESS AND COHERENCE**

The European Union reaffirmed its commitment to human rights in 2012 when the Council adopted the package entitled ‘Human Rights and Democracy: EU Strategic Framework and EU Action Plan’. The second action plan on human rights and democracy for the 2015 – 2020 period was adopted in 2015. The strategic framework and the consecutive action plans aim to further enhance the effectiveness and coherence of EU policies by setting out objectives, principles and priorities, and to ensure a comprehensive approach to preventing and addressing conflicts and crises.

**INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO THE CSDP – TAKING STOCK**

Considerable progress has been made and many of the measures identified in the 2006 document have been implemented over the past ten years. The EU and Member States have adopted new policies and developed a body of guidelines, checklists, handbooks and other toolkits for mainstreaming human rights and other human rights–related fields such as transitional justice and international humanitarian law into the CSDP.

Human rights aspects have been integrated into the 2013 crisis management procedures, and there has been an increase in human rights expertise and resources. Human rights advisers or focal points are present in most CSDP missions and operations, and human rights components are included in CSDP training courses organised by various Member States under the framework of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). Specialised training on human rights, gender, children and armed conflict, protection of civilians and conflict prevention is also available through ESDC and other Member State initiatives.

However, after ten years it was necessary to take stock of the progress made and identify areas where more should be done. In April 2015, 20 Member States drafted a non-paper encouraging the EU to enhance its efforts to mainstream human rights, gender, women, peace and security into the CSDP. In May 2015, the Council welcomed the initiative for a baseline study that would allow progress and delivery on human rights, gender and related fields to be measured over time. In response, the EEAS conducted a baseline study on the integration of human rights and gender into the CSDP during 2016. The 21 baselines were developed based on existing policy commitments for integrating human rights, gender, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and the protection of children affected by armed conflict into CSDP missions.

The study focused on both human rights and gender, as CSDP policies have consistently promoted human rights and gender together. However, efforts were made to separate human rights from gender so as to differentiate the complementary importance to the CSDP of, on the one hand, human rights and, on the other, gender and UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security.

The final report of the baseline study was approved by the High Representative and submitted to the Council in December 2016. The findings and recommendations of the study will provide an informed basis for further integration of human rights in the CSDP.
5.3. RULE OF LAW AND THE CSDP

by Daphne Lodder

The rule of law is a principle of governance whereby all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable under laws that are publicly promulgated, enforced and independently adjudicated.

Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, Lisbon, 2009) states that:

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights [...]. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”

Article 3(1) TEU stipulates that:

“The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.’, and adds to this in Article 3(5) ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values [...]. It shall contribute to peace, security [...] (and) the protection of human rights [...].’

Article 21 TEU deals with the principles that inform EU foreign policy and extends Member States’ values on which the Union is based to its external action, where it aims equally to uphold and promote these values:

“The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.’

Furthermore: ‘The Union shall define and pursue
common policies and actions, and shall work for [...] cooperation in all fields of international relations', (Article 21(2) TEU) in order to 'consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law'. (Article 21(3) (b) TEU).

Upholding the rule of law has a twofold effect on the EU: as a foundational and common value (internal dimension), and as a guiding principle for international action (external dimension). These dimensions – as also mentioned in the EU Global Strategy1 – are ever more intertwined: this is becoming most evident in the nexus between internal and external security, stressing that our security at home ‘entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions’.2

RULE OF LAW AS A PRINCIPLE OF GOVERNANCE

The rule of law is a principle of governance3 whereby all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable under laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It is closely linked to the principle of justice, involving an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs.4

The initial emphasis within the rule of law area at international level was on justice, to address war crimes and corruption that threatened the stability of countries emerging from conflict. With an independent judiciary still central to the delivery of that justice, the modern – broader – concept of the rule of law, as defined above, also encompasses the executive (mainly the police) and the legislative branch of a state’s authority. However, against the backdrop of the link between the ‘rule of law’ and ‘justice’ these terms have at times been used as synonyms: the rule of law is often applied in the sense of ‘justice system/judiciary’, or referring to the (criminal) ‘justice chain’ composed of police, courts, prosecution services and the penitentiary. In the next paragraph the meaning of the rule of law within the CSDP context will be outlined.

As to the relationship between human rights and the rule of law, while human rights have to do with the substance of rights and freedoms, the rule of law has to do with their just and effective protection and promotion. Or, as stated in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, ‘human rights should be protected by the rule of law.’ There is also an important relationship between Security Sector Reform (SSR)5 and the rule of law, as SSR is aimed at gradually providing individuals and the state with more effective and accountable

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5 The concept and process of SSR as such will be elaborated upon in the next chapter of this handbook (5.4).
security in a manner consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principles of good governance.6

EU PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS RELEVANT TO THE RULE OF LAW ON CSDP MISSIONS

At the Feira European Council of 2000, the ‘Rule of Law’ was identified as one of four priority areas for civilian crisis management alongside police, civilian administration, and civil protection – effectively equalling ‘justice (reform)’ in recent terminology. However, with the adoption of the Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence7, it is proposed that the priority areas of civilian CSDP missions should be reviewed in the light of evolving political priorities and in order to better respond to current and future security challenges. This review should address where CSDP can have added value in line with the EU’s comprehensive approach throughout the entire conflict cycle.8 A review of priorities could also provide a good opportunity in terms of further clarifying the concepts of ‘rule of law’ and ‘justice’, and how those are applied in a CSDP context. In this context consideration could also be given to reviewing the existing EU concepts, primarily those relating to police strengthening missions and justice missions9 (as referred to in this article).

EU concepts for CSDP missions cover diverse state functions and policy fields in the broader rule of law area, such as police and justice, civilian administration, customs, border management, anti-corruption, human rights and gender. Those concepts should be read in conjunction with the ‘core concept’, the ‘EU Concept for CSDP Justice Missions (within the Rule of Law Framework)’ (18173/10). Amongst the main imperatives for the design, planning and conduct of CSDP missions, as laid down in these concepts is that of ensuring sustainable, transparent, effective and accountable institutions in the host countries, set up in a democratic fashion, being free from corruption, upholding human rights, in particular the rights of women, children and other vulnerable groups, operating within a coherent legal framework, developed via due legislative process, and in line with international norms and standards. These institutions should include an independent and impartial justice system, to which there is unhindered access, one that is capable of dealing – without fear or favour – with the legacies of the past and the needs of the present, in coexistence with informal or alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms. When promoting these standards and concepts it is of utmost importance that CSDP missions themselves operate in strict compliance with applicable rules and regulations as well as with professional and behavioural standards. A strong internal accountability measure is the Code of Conduct and Discipline which is applied by all civilian CSDP missions equally and holds mission members to account for their professional behaviour. Another example of an accountability mechanism but with an external/public dimension is the Human Rights Review Panel as established by EULEX Kosovo, to hold the mission accountable to the local population, given its executive tasks and direct impact of decisions.

Missions must pursue a tailored, systemic and comprehensive approach under local ownership, and with a shared vision, in coordination with EU institutions and actors, and with the wider international community. In the end, CSDP rule of law and justice missions take place as part of a wider, coherent EU action, and should be supported by or lay the ground work for the

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7 14149/16, 14 November 2016.
8 14149/16, p.7, para.11(a).
9 15031/09 and 18173/10 respectively.
deployment of other, broader EU institutional support through other EU external assistance instruments, as well as those of Member States in capacity building and development tools. This will significantly enhance the successful conclusion of strengthening missions and/or substitution missions.  

**TYPES OF MISSIONS WITHIN THE RoL FRAMEWORK**  

There are two generic types of CSDP mission in the area of the rule of law: firstly, strengthening missions, whereby qualified justice personnel are deployed to monitor, mentor, advise (MMA) and to train if appropriate host country justice officials, including judges, prosecutors and lawyers, with the aim of ensuring that the host country’s legal system meets international standards. The second generic type of rule of law mission is at the level of executive/substitution functions for the local judiciary/legal system. This type of mission can be deployed in a crisis or post-conflict situation, where host country structures have failed, or do not exist, and where judicial personnel are deployed to carry out executive functions, to rebuild the rule of law and thereby contribute to restoring public order and security. CSDP (justice) missions can take the following forms. This is further illustrated by the table on the next page:  

- CSDP justice strengthening missions (monitoring, mentoring and advising justice officials, including in the context of justice system reforms);  
- CSDP justice missions that carry out both strengthening and executive/substitution activities;  
- CSDP integrated rule of law missions comprising several components (e.g. a justice component and a police component);  

SSR missions, comprising the initial reorganisation and reform of military, police, justice, governance structures and relevant civilian administration, could involve a multiplicity of actors and agencies, in a holistic approach.  

Depending on their mandates, missions may take on a combination of these generic types, and may address a variety of the state functions and policy fields outlined above. Even though not all missions have a clear RoL component or pillar, care is always taken to ensure that rule of law as a principle of governance is promoted across the various activities. Under the current concepts, executive/substitution missions would never stand alone, but would always be complemented by strengthening activities – see the example of EULEX Kosovo, the only current CSDP mission whose mandate includes executive functions.

**OTHER REFERENCE FRAMEWORKS & DOCUMENTS**  

In addition to the documents already referred to in the text of the article and in the footnotes, the overarching EU rule of law framework conceptually includes:  

- Council conclusions on Ensuring Respect for the Rule of Law, 16682/14: ‘(…) respecting the rule of law is a prerequisite for the protection of fundamental rights’.  
- Council conclusions on fundamental rights and rule of law, 10168/13.  
- Comprehensive Concept for ESDP Police Strengthening Missions (Interface with Broader Rule of Law), 15031/09.  
- Comprehensive Concept for Police Substitution Missions – Revised Version, 8655/5/02.  
- Comprehensive EU concept for missions in the field of Rule of Law in crisis management, including annexes, 14315/02 and 9792/03.  
- EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR), 12566/4/05.
Rule of law in civilian CSDP missions:
an overview of activities and some examples of achievements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSIONS WITH A RULE OF LAW COMPONENT</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EUPOL COPPS (Palestine)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2006 – ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support for the Palestinian Criminal Justice System</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Support for the local authorities in the delineation of competences of the Ministry of Justice, the Office of the Attorney General and the High Judicial Council with the overall aim of adopting a new Law on Judicial Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Support for the Palestinian Judicial Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Support for legislative drafting initiatives, including amendments to the Law on anti-corruption, to the Code of Criminal Procedure or to the Law on the Protection of Families from Violence</td>
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**Support for police-prosecution cooperation**

• Development of an MoU between police and prosecutors
• Support to the Working Group on the MoU implementation

| **EUPOL Afghanistan**                |
| 2007 – 2016                          |
| Increase cooperation between police and prosecution |
| • Support for the development and use of a Police and Prosecutors Coordination Training Manual |

| **EULEX Kosovo**                     |
| 2008 – ongoing                       |
| Use of executive judicial competencies in specific areas (organised crime, war crimes, corruption, property issues) |
| • Mission judges delivered more than 43,600 judgements |
| • Mission prosecutors have reviewed more than 2,300 case files on war crimes and serious and organised crime, resulting in 250 indictments or investigations |

**Strengthening Rule of Law institutions**

• Mission advice through MMA and peer-to-peer case management (mixed panels) has enabled the judicial authorities to develop and reinforce their capacity to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases
• Support for legislative reform drafting

Missions must pursue a tailored, systemic and comprehensive approach under local ownership, and with a shared vision.
## MISSIONS WITH A RULE OF LAW COMPONENT

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Support Details</th>
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| **EUCAP Somalia**<br>(former EUCAP NESTOR)<br>2012 – ongoing | Support for the drafting and implementation of maritime security legislation  
- Support for the review and drafting of relevant maritime security legislation in compliance with international human rights standards (Law on the Organisation of the Police, Somali Maritime Security, Counter Piracy and Coast Guard legislation)  
- **Support for maritime security agencies and relevant judicial/legal institutions (establishment & development, organisational capabilities and professional skills)**  
  - Advice to high-level officials in the Ministries of Justice, Supreme Courts (and other courts), Attorneys General’s Offices, Maritime Police Units and Coast Guard  
  - Organisation of a regional conference on maritime security as well as regular regional workshops and legal seminars for prosecutors, judges and other legal practitioners on piracy trial exercises in Nairobi, Djibouti, Mogadishu, Puntland and Somaliland |

| **EUAM Ukraine** | Provision of strategic advice, notably in relation to criminal investigations (including prosecution)  
- Advice on clarifying investigative and prosecutorial responsibilities incorporated in the Code of Criminal Procedure  
- Advice on developing the framework for vetting in the General Prosecutor’s Office  
- **Operational support to ensure implementation of strategic advice for reform**  
  - Enhancement of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau’s/Specialised Anti-Corruption Office’s capacity for international legal cooperation  
  - Training of national police and prosecutors’ office in investigation techniques for money laundering and cross-border crime |

## MISSIONS STREAMLINING RULE OF LAW ACROSS MISSION COMPONENTS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Advice to the Mission on Rule of Law matters</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EUCAP Sahel Niger</strong>&lt;br&gt;2012 – ongoing</td>
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</table>
- Review of training curricula for the Nigerien security forces and the justice sector focusing on the reinforcement of the Rule of Law and Nigerien capacities to fight terrorism and organised crime  
- Inclusion of key EU standards in Security Sector Reform in national training curricula for sustainability of efforts |

| **EUCAP Sahel Mali**<br>2014 – ongoing |  
- Review of training curricula for the Malian internal security forces (ISF), notably for the modules on the fight against terrorism, organised crime, judiciary police, criminal investigation, custody and interviews procedures, complaint filing and victims support  
- Distribution of codes (penal and penal procedure) and manuals to ISF |
Security Sector Reform (SSR) can be translated as ‘transforming a country’s security system so that it gradually provides individuals and the state with more effective and accountable security in a manner that is consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principles of good governance.’

The EU has been supporting Security Sector Reform in numerous countries for many years by using external action instruments and crisis management tools. In 2015, foreign ministers asked the High Representative and the Commission to review the existing policy framework and to maximise the impact, efficiency and consistency of the EU’s support. This led to the development of the new EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform, which was issued in the form of a Joint Communication by the High Representative and the Commission in July 2016 and subsequently endorsed by the Foreign Affairs Council in November of the same year.

This new SSR policy framework merges and updates previous policies from 2005 and 2006¹ that have been guiding EU action in the field of Security Sector Reform and includes new elements in line with international trends, such as the recognition of the increasingly strengthening links between security and development as explained in the Agenda 2030 and more explicitly in sustainable development goal 16.²

**OBJECTIVES FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM**

This SSR strategic framework sets clear objectives for EU engagement in the security sector:

* support partner states in concretely improving security for individuals and the state;  
  *This means, in particular, addressing the security needs of different groups (including women, minors and minorities) as perceived and experienced by them.*
* improve the legitimacy, good governance, integrity and sustainability of the security sector in partner states;  
  *This means encouraging and supporting the security sector in partner states to respect internationally accepted human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles, apply the good governance principles of transparency, openness, participation, inclusivity and accountability, respect public finance management rules and procedures, fight corruption and be fiscally sustainable.*

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² Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015; UNGA A/RES/70/1); Goal 16: ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’.
SCOPE OF SSR

The SSR strategic framework has a very broad scope as it applies to all EU actors and instruments, including political/diplomatic, external actions instruments, crisis response and CSDP civilian and military actors. It also applies in all contexts, not only in conflict or post-conflict situations or any specific geographical region. It is designed to be broad enough to guide a variety of situations encountered throughout the various phases of EU support from identification, planning and programming to the implementation of activities.

The starting point for any EU action in the security sector of a partner country should be an understanding of the security sector and the context in which it is situated. EU delegations will therefore be requested to report more regularly on security sector developments as part of the regular political reporting to headquarters. Where there are CSDP missions and operations present in the field, such security sector analysis and reporting should be done jointly. If the situation calls for substantial security assistance, specific and in-depth security sector assessments could be undertaken to identify security needs as perceived and experienced by the different groups of the population (for instance women and minority groups) and to what extent the security sector addresses them.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

EU assistance should therefore be based on a solid understanding of the features and actors of the security sector and be built on ongoing national debates and initiatives and, where existing and credible, on national strategies, policies and plans. This will enhance national ownership, which is essential for achieving any sustainable changes in the partner country. National actors should steer the reform process and take over-
all responsibility for the results of interventions, which should result from an in-depth political and policy dialogue on the security sector with all national stakeholders, including oversight entities such as legislative bodies, and civil society. Issues of good governance, human rights, the rule of law and democracy are also part of such dialogues, as the respect for these principles is particularly critical in the security sector.

Transforming any security sector is a complex and lengthy process which requires long-term engagement and flexibility, because the political and/or operational environment may change rapidly and the EU must be able to adapt its political, technical and financial support.

Moreover, in many situations the population may have pressing security needs. It is therefore fundamental to contribute to immediate solutions to these needs while gradually progressing towards longer-term systemic changes in the security sector.

**COOPERATION AND COORDINATION**

One key aspect of the new strategic framework is the enhancement of the effectiveness and impact of EU action through better coordination of EU support, including with EU Member States. The new framework therefore proposes the mapping of all EU SSR activities and the development of *coordination matrices* that set common EU objectives and identify links and the sequencing of diplomatic, development cooperation and possible CSDP actions to achieve them.

Involvement with other relevant international actors is also necessary to avoid duplication and to increase a shared understanding of needs and objectives.

An essential part of any form of support is monitoring and evaluation, as well as understanding the risks linked to assistance/intervention. The most important risks can be categorised under broad headings related to 1) insufficient national political commitment to change, 2) negative unintended consequences, 3) reputational risks, and 4) the risks of non-intervention.

Context analysis and conflict-sensitive analysis are important tools with which to generate an understanding of the context in which support is provided. Additionally, a solid risk management and risk mitigation framework will be developed to guide any future EU assistance in the security sectors of partner countries.

To maximise the EU’s effectiveness in providing SSR support, EU SSR expertise will need to be developed both at the level of headquarters and in the field. Following the endorsement of the strategic framework a permanent, informal, inter-service task force has been established with staff from relevant thematic EEAS and Commission services.

The function of this task force is to develop methodological tools, oversee EU SSR activities and provide support and advice to EU Delegations, EEAS and Commission services and CSDP missions.

In the field, CSDP missions should assist the EU Delegation on SSR-related issues and all EU actors – including Member State diplomatic missions – and should share information and analysis, participate in joint analysis and contribute to the formulation of SSR coordination matrices.
6.1. EU INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES

by Gustav Lindstrom

The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is the Union’s agency dealing with the analysis of foreign, security and defence policy issues.

MISSION AND STRUCTURE

The Institute was established in July 2001 as an autonomous agency under the CFSP (Council Joint Action 2001/554, now regulated by Council Decision 2014/75/CFS) to foster a common security culture for the EU, support the elaboration and projection of its foreign policy and enrich the strategic debate inside and outside Europe.

Based in Paris with an office in Brussels, the EUISS is an integral part of the EU structures that underpin the further development of the CFSP/CSDP. The Institute acts as an interface between the EU institutions and external experts – including security actors – to develop the EU’s strategic thinking.

The EUISS together with the EEAS, European Commission, European Cybercrime Center and EU Agency for Cybersecurity - ENISA hosted the second edition of the EU Cyber Forum. The event - organised as part of the EU Cyber Direct project - was opened by Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission.
EU Member States fund the Institute according to a GNI-based formula. It is governed by a Management Board, chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). The Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises political supervision – without prejudice to the intellectual independence and operational autonomy of the EUISS.

PUBLICATIONS

As part of its mission to promote a common security culture for the EU, help develop and project the CFSP/CSDP and enrich Europe’s strategic debate, the Institute’s activities focus on policy-oriented analysis through its publications and events. The EUISS conducts its research both by theme and by region. In addition to the work produced on the CFSP and CSDP proper, the EUISS addresses the various dimensions of the Union’s common external action – from
hybrid threats to sanctions, from cyber issues to conflict dynamics. Particular emphasis is placed on the Union’s neighbours to the east and the south, as well as on the Sahel, Russia, the Middle East and Asia.

The Institute’s flagship publication is its series of Chaillot Papers, which are based on focused, in depth research. Each year, the Institute publishes a ‘What If’ series of foresight scenarios to encourage decision-makers to think outside the box on security issues. The EUISS also regularly publishes reference works such as the annual Yearbook of European Security (YES), which serves as a record of the CFSP/CSDP for the public and policy-makers. Together with its series of Briefs, the Institute has become an authoritative source of analysis and information for EU policymakers, think tanks and academics the world over.

EVENTS

EUISS events such as conferences, seminars, and expert workshops are intended to enhance the Union’s analytical capacities and facilitate the shaping of common approaches. They bring together EU officials, national experts, academics, decision-makers, media and civil society representatives from the EU Member States as well as the rest of the world. The EUISS also organises task forces to monitor events in a particular region and/or specific policy developments, and often to deliver targeted advice. Issues requiring more sustained attention may be covered via Track 1.5/2.0 events. Participation in EUISS events is by invitation only.

Each year, the Institute holds an annual conference which brings together senior policymakers and the broader think tank community. Addi-
tionally, at the beginning of each year the EUISS organises a high-level event to showcase the Institute’s analysts with a view to thinking about the year ahead in European security.

**COOPERATION**

Collaboration with EU institutions and the other agencies continues to expand, and in the past the Institute has led projects conducted for the European Commission, the European Defence Agency and the European Parliament. Cooperation with the EU’s Satellite Centre (SAT-CEN) was formalised through a dedicated memorandum of understanding signed in 2016.

The EUISS also enjoys excellent working relations with the European Security and Defence College (ESDC): the Institute offers its expertise and support for courses and events (including the alumni network), and, the EUISS sits on the Executive Academic Board of the College. Finally, the Institute also cooperates closely with Council of the EU bodies such as the Integrated Political Crisis Responses (IPCR).

Finally, cooperation with the Member States – through the PSC and the Board, as well as the Permanent Representations, the rotating EU Presidencies and, occasionally, the Working Groups – is also a key part of the work of the EUISS. Indeed, the Institute is regularly involved in each Council of the EU Presidency cycle and it organises high-level conferences and other events with each EU member state in order to stimulate strategic reflection on security and defence, crisis management and other issues of interest.
6.2. THE EUROPEAN UNION SATELLITE CENTRE

by Sorin Ducaru

The EU SatCen provides products and services derived from the exploitation of space assets and collateral data to the European Union (to support its decision making, missions and operations), EU Member States, third States’ and international organisations. It was founded in 1992 as part of the Western European Union and was incorporated into the European Union as an agency on 1 January 2002.

ROLE

Under the supervision of the Political and Security Committee and the operational direction of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, SatCen is a decentralised EU agency which provides decision makers with early warning of potential crises to allow timely diplomatic, economic and humanitarian measures to be taken, including generic planning and conduct for intervention.

SERVICES

Geospatial Analysis

In close coordinating with its partners and by request of its official users, SatCen produces geospatial analysis services. These range from brief descriptions when a quick response is required to detailed studies on complex areas, installations and activities.

Geospatial Analysis specifically comprises Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), a discipline that uses the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on Earth.

Depending on the requests received, SatCen analyses satellite and aerial images for activities related to EU crisis management operations, arms control, non-proliferation and treaty verification, counter-terrorism, counter-crime, migration, humanitarian aid, contingency planning and general surveillance.

SatCen is also the entrusted entity for the Copernicus operational service in Support to EU External Action. This is part of the Copernicus service for security applications, which aims to strengthen European Union policies by providing information in response to Europe’s security challenges.

1 Third States are non-EU NATO members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU.
Additionally, SatCen supports the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) as operational service provider for the Copernicus border surveillance programme.

**Training**

SatCen offers specialised training to image analysts and related seminars for expert users. For this purpose, it is constantly developing applied training techniques and products, such as multimedia tutorials, remote sensing imagery processing and data fusion.

**Capability development activities**

SatCen executes projects and participates in programmes aimed at developing new – or improving existing – capabilities:

* Activities under the Copernicus programme, supporting in particular EU external action, SatCen’s GEOINT activities, and cooperation in the areas of maritime and border surveillance.
* Space surveillance and tracking (SST) services, which contribute to the protection and enhancement of space assets. SatCen serves as the front desk for the EU SST and distributes the consortium’s services to users.
* Research, technology development and innovation (RTDI) activities to identify and assess technical and programmatic solutions to incoming and transversal issues.

**PARTNERS**

SatCen cooperates with national and international entities in the space and security sector. It works closely with the European Commission, the European Defence Agency and the European Space Agency, as well as other institutions and international organisations.

**STAFF**

SatCen employs staff from EU Member States. In addition, experts seconded from Member States work at SatCen for periods ranging from six months to three years, and temporary staff is recruited locally as needed.
SUPPORT TO CFSP

As a unique operational asset in the field of space and security, SatCen serves a variety of institutional users, ranging from the EU’s high-level decision makers, such as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP) and the crisis management and situational awareness structures of the EEAS, to the personnel on the ground involved in EU missions and operations.

Within the EEAS, the main users of SatCen products are the CSDP and crisis response directorates, the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the EU intelligence and situation centre (INTCEN) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). Furthermore, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defence of the EU Member States, the Commission, third States and international organisations such as the United Nations can request the support of the Centre.

SatCen distributes its products, with various levels of confidentiality, both to central planning entities (e.g. INTCEN, EU Military Staff) and to the Operations Headquarters (OHQs). Every product
is systematically disseminated to all Member States to facilitate cooperative decision making in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), particularly Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). SatCen provides support in near-real time and, when necessary, around the clock.

**SatCen Governance**

SatCen is a concrete example of the pooling and sharing of services and know-how in the sensitive field of foreign, security and defence policy. Each Member State, paying only a fraction of the SatCen budget but receiving 100% of the output, benefits directly from the operational work and from the shared information for common decision making.

The Centre’s geospatial analysis provides its users with support services tailored to their individual duties ranging from diplomatic, economic and humanitarian measures to mission planning or intervention.

The Treaty of Lisbon and the Global Strategy have increased and diversified the EU level of ambition. This is a key driver for the constantly
The European Union Satellite Centre is located in Torrejón de Ardoz, in the vicinity of Madrid, Spain.

The evolving demand for SatCen products and services and consequently the Centre is continuously working to maintain its cutting-edge support capacity.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- SatCen website: https://www.satcen.europa.eu/
- SatCen videos: https://www.satcen.europa.eu/about_the_eu_satcen/videos
6.3. THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY (EDA)

by Jiří Šedivý

The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established under the Joint Action of the Council of 12 July 2004 “to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy – now Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – as it stands now and develops in the future”. To implement the Treaty of Lisbon, this Joint Action was replaced by a Council Decision on 12 July 2011, which was then revised by Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 on the statute, seat and operational rules of the EDA.

STRUCTURE AND MANDATE

The Head of the Agency, who chairs the EDA’s Steering Board, is also the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as Vice-President of the European Commission (currently Josep Borrell). The EDA Chief Executive (Jiří Šedivý, as of April 2020) is appointed by the Steering Board. In addition to the Defence Ministers’ meetings, which are held at least twice a year, the Steering Board also meets at the level of national armaments directors, R&T directors and capabilities directors.

The EDA’s staff is composed of experts in capability development, research and technology, armament cooperation and industrial matters; it combines bottom-up expert level initiatives (the EDA connects around 2,500 nationally based experts) and top-down political direction. The Agency is organised into three operational directorates: Industry Synergies & Enablers (ISE), Capability, Armament & Planning (CAP) and Research, Technology & Innovation (RTI). It also has a Corporate Services directorate which ensures the smooth and efficient functioning of the Agency.

The EDA acts as a catalyst, promotes collaborations, launches new initiatives and introduces solutions to improve defence capabilities. It is also a key facilitator in developing the capabilities necessary to underpin the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy. The main tasks of the EDA are to

* support the development of defence capabilities and military cooperation among Member States;
* support the implementation of the EU defence initiatives: Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), European Defence Fund (EDF);
* stimulate defence research and technology (R&T);
* strengthen the European defence industry;
* act as a military interface to EU policies;
* provide support to CSDP operations.

In 2017, Ministers agreed to reinforce the Agency’s mission, making it

* the main intergovernmental prioritisation instrument at EU level in support of capability development;
The EDA works "à la carte", from a minimum of two EU Member States to all (except Denmark), and also works with partners such as Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Ukraine (the third countries which have concluded an administrative arrangement with the EDA). Depending on their strategic priorities, their operational requirements or their interest in a specific project, Member States decide themselves when and to what extent they wish to participate in the Agency’s projects, programmes and activities.

The EDA has around 170 staff, working closely with expert counterparts in Member States, industry, EU institutions – notably the European Commission – and other multinational organisations and entities, such as the European Space Agency (ESA) and the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR). The EDA functions with a relatively small annual budget (currently just over EUR 36 million) sourced directly from the Ministries of Defence, which nevertheless, combined with its in-house expertise, enables it to act as a powerful lever: projects and programmes launched and managed by the EDA generate several hundred million euros worth of ad hoc investments. Since the creation of the Agency in 2004, approximately 1 billion euros has been invested in defence research and programmes through the EDA.

The EDA provides a platform where Member States keen to enhance and develop their defence capabilities through cooperation with other Member States can do so. The Agency thereby helps to develop European military capabilities, adopting a through-life approach: from harmonising requirements to the delivery of capabilities, from research and innovation to the development of technology demonstrators, and from training and
exercises to maintenance, support and operations. In this respect, the capabilities developed through the EDA can be used in EU CSDP and NATO operations as well as in other multinational or national engagements.

The EDA also acts as a facilitator between Member States’ military stakeholders and wider EU policies. The Agency represents and defends military views and interests in the process of shaping and implementing EU policies while at the same time offering a platform for the European Commission and other EU bodies to hold a dialogue with the Ministries of Defence. It can also facilitate the access of Ministries of Defence and the defence industry, notably SMEs, to EU instruments and tools, including EU funding.

The Agency plays prominent roles in the various EU defence initiatives launched over the past years. For instance, it acts as the PESCO secretariat (together with the European External Action Service, including the EU Military Staff) and serves as a platform where PESCO participating Member States can identify, assess and consolidate possible projects – guaranteeing focus on capability priorities and avoidance of unnecessary duplication with existing initiatives. The EDA also acts as the CARD secretariat, together with the EU Military Staff (EUMS), where it is responsible for gathering information from Member States on defence plans, including spending.

**SUPPORT FOR CSDP OPERATIONS**

The Agency offers a variety of services to Member States, military and civilian CSDP missions/operations as well as other EU bodies, institutions and agencies. This has already been the case for CSDP military operations in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA and EUTM RCA), the Mediterranean Sea (EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia), Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea), Mali (EUTM Mali), Somalia (EUTM Somalia and EUNAVFOR Atalanta).
The EDA is also collaborating with CSDP civilian missions in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), Georgia (EUMM Georgia), Somalia (EUCAP Somalia), Iraq (EUAM Iraq) and Libya (EUBAM Libya). Most recently, the EDA started working with the newly established Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC).

The EDA’s support is hereby twofold: it offers access to existing projects as well as contracted support solutions.

On the project side this has so far included cyber awareness seminars, maritime surveillance, personnel management as well as management of geospatial information. As an example, EDA’s ‘Geohub’, a software tool for safe sharing of geospatial information, was deployed to EUNAVFOR MED in Rome (HQ).

Contracted support extends from satellite communications or air-to-ground surveillance to wider logistics support. In 2019, the EDA concluded multiple framework contracts for the provision of air medical evacuation services to missions. The aim is clear: providing support that is cost-effective and efficient. The EDA sees itself as an intermediary body that facilitates the establishment and running of any EU mission/operation in every possible way with a view to achieving civil-military synergies in the CSDP framework.

The Agency does this in full cooperation with a number of actors supporting CSDP operations and missions in the EEAS, in particular the Chairman of the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, EU SatGen, the Athena Mechanism and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments.

**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**

For more information on the EDA’s activities, see: www.eda.europa.eu

**Publication: EDA Annual Report 2019**

https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/publications

**Publication: Support to CSDP Operations**

COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION
7.1. PARTNERSHIPS IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE

by Alison Weston and Frédéric Maduraud

Common challenges call for the responsibility for addressing them to be shared. The European Union Global Strategy states that ‘the EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared and requires investing in our partnerships’.

Partnerships on security and defence are both an essential instrument for enhancing EU security and are of practical relevance for EU partners’ security. Beyond this, EU partnerships can also be seen to have a positive impact on: (i) the consolidation of the multilateral rule-based order; (ii) regional security; (iii) reform in partner countries as regards the development of good governance structures, including democratic accountability; (iv) respect for the rule of law; and (v) the participation of partner countries and the EU in multinational cooperation as members of the wider international community.

The CSDP has been an open project from the outset. A comprehensive approach means not only drawing on all of the EU’s strengths, but also working with international and regional organisations,

EUROPEAN UNION GLOBAL STRATEGY

‘The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared and requires investing in our partnerships. Coresponsibility will be our guiding principle in advancing a rules-based global order. In pursuing our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations. We will work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings.’
such as the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the African Union, as well as with non-EU countries. The EU and these partners can mutually benefit from each other’s knowledge, expertise and specific capabilities, thereby bringing them closer to one another.

The increasingly challenging security environment and the efforts made over the last few years to overhaul EU policy in the area of security and defence, in particular following the presentation of the EU Global Strategy in June 2016, highlight the need to review the EU’s partnership framework in this area. The EU has responded to pressing demands from a number of partners to revisit, and in some cases enhance, its relations with them in these fields by offering guidance (in particular in the Council Conclusions of May 2017 and June 2018), stressing the need for a more strategic approach to partnerships. The new High Representative, Josep Borell, identified building security and defence partnerships as one of his key priorities for his mandate.

Europeans must deal with the world as it is, not as they wish it to be. That means relearning the language of power and combining the EU’s and its partners’ resources in a way that maximises their geopolitical impact. There are multiple crises surrounding Europe where the EU urgently needs to step up its operational engagement both jointly with its partners and where other synergies can be found.

The world is witnessing the return of geo-strategic competition between major powers, in particular the US, China and Russia, in a multi-polar world. In this context, many third countries see value in enhancing their engagement with the EU. EU citizens also want a Europe which protects them in a context that is becoming increasingly challenging both within EU’s borders and abroad. Moreover, dealing with new security challenges and emerging threats goes beyond what we understand as traditional defence. Hybrid threats, cyber-attacks, foreign interference, disinformation, vulnerable critical infrastructures and challenges linked to space, climate change and disruptive technologies – including artificial intelligence – are areas where the EU needs more decisive and effective engagement.
1. EU-UN cooperation in crisis management and peacekeeping is constantly developing. It adds value to both organisations and is focused on bringing operational benefits to efforts on the ground. Cooperation in Mali and the Central African Republic are good examples of the EU and the UN coordinating support for national security and defence sectors, with EU missions deployed alongside UN peacekeeping operations. EU bridging operations have also been conducted to support UN peacekeeping missions, such as the EUFOR RCA operation in the Central African Republic.

13 of the EU’s 17 CSDP missions and operations have been deployed alongside UN peacekeeping operations: in Mali, the Central African Republic, Somalia, Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Western Balkans. EU cooperation with the UN on peacekeeping places the EU’s CSDP missions within a broader political and operational framework, making them more effective and efficient and enabling the EU to play its role in supporting effective multilateralism. In addition to cooperation on the ground, there is also regular dialogue between the two organisations on planning, strategic reviews and the implementation of mandates.

Operational cooperation is accompanied by multiannual initiatives through which the UN and the EU continue to strengthen their partnership. In 2019, the two organisations identified new priorities for the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management for the period 2019-2021. Building on the priorities from the previous period, 2015-2018, the key principles and priorities have been updated in line with recent developments within both the UN and the EU and in international security (conflict prevention; sustaining peace; youth, peace and security; the nexus between security and the environment). The scope has been extended beyond peacekeeping to look more broadly at peace operations and crisis management. Eight priority areas have been identified (three of which are new), and under each priority specific actions are outlined. The overall focus is on improving efficiency, capitalising on comparative advantages and enhancing complementarities, synergies and reciprocity.

The partnership also involves regular high-level dialogue, including the biannual EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management, regular meetings between ambassadors from the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the UN Security Council, the participation of the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

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1 The 2015-2018 priorities included rapid response, security sector reform, information and analysis exchange, and support for the African Peace and Security Architecture.
2 The eight priorities are: 1) women, peace and security (new); 2) strengthening cooperation between missions and operations in the field; 3) transitions (new); 4) facilitating EU Member States’ contributions and support to UN peace operations and the UN Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative; 5) conflict prevention in peace operations and support for political processes and solutions (new); 6) cooperation on policing, the rule of law, and security sector reform (SSR); 7) cooperation with and support for African peace operations; and 8) training and capacity building.
COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION

1. High-level meetings and visits are key elements of the EU's cooperation with the UN Security Council. EU representatives participate in high-level meetings of the EU Member States (e.g., informal meetings of defence ministers meetings, PSC) and an annual visit by the High Representative to the UN Security Council.

2. The EU and NATO are key partners in security and defence. In the current strategic context, characterised by the return of ‘power politics’, transatlantic cooperation – Europe and North America standing together – remains important. For the EU, this is a mutually reinforcing equation.

The first element of this equation is that a stronger NATO can contribute to making the EU stronger too. In their London Declaration of December 2020, Allied leaders reaffirmed their unity, solidarity and cohesion. This is of fundamental importance for European citizens and, more broadly, for the defence of Europe.

The second element is that a stronger EU also makes NATO stronger. EU defence initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) will deliver more capabilities not only by spending more, but also by spending better, together. This will enhance the European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) and therefore European security more broadly. In view of the principle of a single set of forces, these efforts also reinforce the European pillar of NATO and support the development of interoperable capabilities by Member States, in full coherence with NATO’s requirement that those capabilities be potentially available for NATO operations. All in all, the EU’s defence efforts are strengthening NATO and contributing to transatlantic security and burden-sharing.

EU-NATO cooperation, which constitutes an integral pillar of the EU’s work on defence, remains a key political priority for the new EU leadership.

The EU has already put in place a very close cooperation agenda, building on the framework established by the two Joint Declarations of 2016 and 2018 and the ensuing 74 common actions. EU-NATO cooperation covers a broad range of areas, such as:

EU cooperation with ASEAN countries.
countering hybrid threats;
• operational cooperation (including at sea and on migration);
• cybersecurity and cyber defence;
• defence capabilities, industry, research and exercises;
• building partners’ defence and security capacities;
• political dialogue.

These actions continue to build upon the key principles that underpin and guide EU-NATO cooperation, namely openness and transparency, inclusiveness and reciprocity, and full respect for the decision-making autonomy of both organisations, without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any Member State. In the past couple of years, much has been achieved and an unprecedented level of cooperation has been reached. In view of the multitude of challenges faced by these two organisations, it remains important that the EU and NATO continue their collaboration.

3. Regarding multilateral cooperation, the Eastern Partnership Panel on CSDP, launched in 2013, complements bilateral relations and allows all six Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) to be involved in numerous workshops, seminars, field visits and other training activities. Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine remain the most active partners and contribute regularly to CSDP missions and operations.

All CSDP training activities are organised in cooperation with the national authorities of partner countries and are financially supported by the EU (under the European Neighbourhood Instrument). Since 2013, the EEAS’s CSDP Crisis Response structures, together with the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and EU Member States, have conducted more than 30 different CSDP activities for Eastern partners, including outreach events in Kyiv, Tbilisi, Chisinau, Minsk and Yerevan. In addition, all partner countries take advantage of the regular training and education events organised by the ESDC.

In the short and medium term, the EU and its partners are looking for opportunities to expand cooperation in the field of security. Cooperation with the EaP countries at both regional and bilateral level focuses on the implementation of targets set in the EaP 20 Deliverables for 2020, with emphasis on CSDP, through activities aimed to develop those countries’ resilience to security threats, including hybrid threats and disasters. Developing cooperation and capabilities is a key part of all EaP governments’ approaches to tackling hybrid threats, cybersecurity, strategic communication and protection of the critical infrastructure.

4. Partnerships with regional organisations also play a critical role. For example, the EU’s partnership with the African Union (AU) and African actors in peace and security and crisis management was put on a strategic footing by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, signed in 2007, which made peace and security a priority across the eight thematic partnerships to be developed in a comprehensive manner between the EU and Africa. EU support for capacity building for peace and security in Africa, under various instruments and policy areas, has gradually increased over the last few years. This includes both longer-term structural support and support of a more time-bound nature. Activities may be financed under the general budget of the Union, by the EDF or bilaterally by EU Member States. CSDP activities in Africa are the main EU defence and security tools for cooperation with African security and defence forces, be it within national forces or in close coordination with UN or AU contingents. Civilian and military missions in the Sahel, Central Africa and the Horn of Africa cooperate with African forces on a daily basis.

In May 2018, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Peace, Security and Governance was signed between the African Union and the European Union. The MoU foresees strengthened cooperation throughout the conflict cycle, from conflict prevention to crisis management and governance. It also commits both parties to
taking practical steps towards a more coordinated approach in order to ensure effective multilateralism, including building a stronger partnership with the UN to address peace and security and other related challenges. Discussions are ongoing on implementation.

5. The EU has expressed its willingness to step up cooperation with its Asian partners, setting itself the objective, in the Council Conclusions of May 2018, of enhancing security cooperation in and with Asia. This has resulted in new momentum in bilateral engagement, as evidenced by the conclusion in October 2019 of a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with Vietnam, the first ASEAN country to conclude such an agreement with the EU and only the second in Asia (after the Republic of Korea).

This commitment also translates into multilateral activities. EU-ASEAN cooperation is wide-ranging and encompasses many areas. In 2020, the EU and ASEAN agreed to upgrade their relationship to a Strategic Partnership. As practical steps towards closer cooperation, the EU aims to obtain the status of observer of the activities of certain Expert Working Groups under the ADMM Plus format and to join the East Asia Summit. An EU-ASEAN Work Plan to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime has been adopted for the second time, covering the period 2018-2020. The EU and ASEAN have also agreed to increase the involvement of ASEAN member states in CSDP missions by taking forward bilateral FPAs. Both parties continue to enhance political and security dialogue and cooperation, including at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in an ever-widening range of non-traditional security fields. In 2019, the EU co-chaired the ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on maritime security and counter-terrorism and actively participated in others (cyber, non-proliferation and disaster relief). Its offer to co-chair the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime for the period 2019-22 was approved by the ARF Ministerial Meeting on 2 August 2019 in Bangkok.
II. EU PARTNERSHIPS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES

Since 2017, the Council has stressed the need to work towards a more strategic approach on partnerships on security and defence, building on present practice and learning from past experience. This new approach is guided by the following objectives:

- improving EU and partners’ security by developing common strategic interests on security and defence objectives;
- translating this into actual support for the EU’s and its partners’ shared objectives and notably contributions to EU (CSDP) missions and operations;
- increasing international legitimacy and acknowledging the EU’s and its partners’ role as security providers, as well as the EU’s global strategic role;
- securing the effective implementation of partnerships by promoting inclusiveness, buy-in and mutual accountability between the EU and its partners.

The EU has therefore started developing more comprehensive CSDP partnerships with third countries. These partnerships go beyond crisis management and participation in EU CSDP missions and operations to also address multifaceted challenges such as hybrid threats, climate security, strategic communications, disinformation, foreign interference, maritime security, counter-terrorism, capability development, maritime security and capacity building.

These partnerships are organised around three key areas of cooperation:

- enhancing dialogue and cooperation on security and defence issues in a manner tailored to address the concerns of both the EU and the partner country, and using to the extent possible existing fora of cooperation in the area of security and defence;
facilitating the participation of third country partners in CSDP missions and operations;
* reinforcing mutual support between the EU and its partners, including through EU CSDP missions and operations and capacity-building support programmes.

For example, the EU concludes FPAs with selected partner countries to facilitate their contributions to CSDP missions and operations. As of today, 20 such agreements have been signed, and 12 partners currently participate in 10 of the 17 established CSDP missions and operations. Beyond cooperation in the framework of CSDP missions and operations, the EU organises bilateral dialogues on a regular basis with more than 20 countries, covering a broad range of security- and defence-related topics. In addition, the EU invested more than EUR 900 million in assistance programmes with priority partner countries in 2017 alone. On countering hybrid threats, a programme survey aiming to identify vulnerabilities and build resilience has been proposed to all six Western Balkan partners, as well as to countries in the broader neighbourhood such as Georgia, Moldova and Jordan.

The EU has also taken steps to enhance its capabilities on the ground to engage in security and defence issues with partners, through the deployment of specialised experts to selected EU Delegations. To date, the EU has deployed 18 counter-terrorism advisers and is in the process of deploying the first wave of uniformed military advisers to EU Delegations to the US and Canada, China, Serbia (mandate to be progressively expanded to all Western Balkans), Indonesia, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Kenya. This initiative will allow the further development of EU partnerships on security and defence by engaging with the defence and security authorities of third States, reinforcing the profile of the EU as a security actor, enhancing coordination with Member States locally and providing support to Member States that have no defence or security advisers in situ.

* FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 14 NOVEMBER 2016

‘The Council is committed to strengthening the Union’s ability to act as a security provider and to enhance the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as an essential part of the Union’s external action. This will enhance its global strategic role and its capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible.’

* FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 25 JUNE 2018

‘Recalls its conclusions of 18 May 2017 and stresses the importance of enhancing cooperation with partners, both with third countries and other international organisations. In this context, the Council invites the relevant preparatory bodies to take work forward and to present concrete recommendations in due time on the basis of the recent proposals made by the High Representative to develop a more strategic approach for EU Partnerships on security and defence with third countries. The Council underlines that partnerships between the EU and third countries should be of mutual benefit and should contribute to strengthening the EU’s security and defence efforts, while fully respecting the EU’s institutional framework and its decision-making autonomy.’

* NEXT STEPS

Under the guidance of the new High Representative, work will continue to implement the Council Conclusions of 25 June 2018: ‘the Council invites the relevant preparatory bodies to take work forward and to present concrete recommendations in due time on the basis of the recent proposals made by the High Representative to develop a more strategic approach for EU Partnerships on security and defence with third countries.’

In the post-Brexit scenario, creating the conditions needed for a close and solid cooperation with the UK on security and defence matters will also be a priority.
Demand-driven training programmes have been established for the remaining two regional partnerships (EaP and WB). Common features of the two programmes include their security and defence dimension, their inclusiveness (open to all EU Member States and partners) and the fact that they are conducted under the auspices of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). At the end of the day, our partners should be ready to join our efforts in crisis management using civilian and military instruments around the world.

CSDP TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR THE WESTERN BALKANS

The EU has close links with the countries of the Western Balkans. The Union aims to secure stable, prosperous and well-functioning democratic societies on a steady path towards EU integration. In 2006, Austria, Germany, Hungary and Slovenia established a training programme which should help the countries of the region to prepare for accession talks and in particular for the negotiation of chapter 31 (foreign, security and defence policy) of the Union acquis.

The Western Balkans is the region in which the common security and defence policy (CSDP) made its first operational footprint in 2003 with its first CSDP missions (EUPM, EUPOL Proxima) and operations (Concordia). Since then, the EU has

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1 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine
2 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia
3 Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestine, Syria (suspended), Tunisia and Turkey.
retained a key supporting role in stabilising Bosnia and Herzegovina through a military-led mission (EUFOR ALTHEA). Between 2003 and 2012 the EU also deployed a police mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Kosovo4, the EU has deployed a mission to support the Kosovo authorities in upholding the rule of law (EULEX). CSDP missions and operations have also been deployed in North Macedonia (Concordia, Proxima).

The training programme was initially a ‘copy’ of the ESDC high level course, including four modules, but it was only open to Western Balkan partners. Over time, the number of modules was reduced to three, and the last module was conducted in Brussels. Although content-wise it was highly appreciated by the beneficiaries, the training had a massive impact on the travel expenditure budget of the sending authorities. Therefore a lack of nominations for the three-module course resulted in a reflection phase by the organisers and a restructuring of the content.

As a result of these discussions, the programme was restructured and updated into a three-module training programme, which included an eLearning course (module I), a regular CSDP orientation course (module II) and an interactive reflection seminar (module III), in which the participants were guided to use the knowledge gained throughout modules I and II.

Austria, Croatia and Hungary volunteered as organisers of the updated training programme. In addition, the training programme

4 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
was brought under the auspices of the ESDC in 2010. The latter initiative resulted in several win-win-situations:

* The training audience was widened by bringing in EU Member States, which would sit in the same room, learn the same content and discuss the same issues with the Western Balkan partners at the same level.
* The training was provided within the academic programme of the ESDC and followed standardised curricula. Therefore, the students received a certificate of attendance which is recognised by all EU Member States and the EU institutions.
* The organisers initiated cooperation with the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) instrument of the European Commission. TAIEX supports public administrations with regard to the approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation as well as facilitating the sharing of EU best practices. This cooperation allowed the Western Balkan beneficiaries to attend the training instead of having to refuse the training offer due to budgetary constraints.

The training programme is currently in its 14th cycle and can count about 500 alumni from the public administration of the Western Balkan partners. The names of alumni are recorded in a database and the list is updated on a regular basis via alumni seminars and conferences. Through the training provided under the auspices of the ESDC, besides first-class information about CSDP, the participants also receive a first glimpse of a common European security culture, which will help the European countries and others in a coherent and credible way to establish strategic autonomy.

The first positive result of the training programme was the accession of Croatia to the EU in 2013. Montenegro and Serbia have begun membership talks. North Macedonia and Albania are candidate countries, while the others are potential candidates for EU membership.

### CSDP TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

Due to the success of the training programme for the Western Balkans, Austria developed the idea of providing a similar activity for the Eastern Partnership countries. In the margins of the Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2013, Austria started the three-modular training programme using the experiences gained so far. However, the training programme is demand-driven and therefore had to be adapted to the ambitions of the region, keeping in mind the cultural, religious and political differences between the six countries.

In general, the Eastern Partnership aims at building a common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation. Additionally, bonds forged through the Eastern Partnership help strengthen state and societal resilience: it makes both the EU and the partners stronger and better able to deal with internal and external challenges.

The CSDP is only one part, but a crucial one, of the cooperation with the partner countries. Security and defence issues are discussed within the EaP panel on ‘security, CSDP and civil protection’, which convenes its meeting twice a year in Brussels and supports deliverable 12 ‘stronger security cooperation’ of the 20 deliverables for 2020. Within the meetings, a work plan (‘living document’) is established, which comprises all activities in various fields, provided by one EU Member State, a coalition of the willing, or under the umbrella of the ESDC. Financial support is granted through a separate budget line in the EU budget, which cov-

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5 The new deliverables will be based on the ideas laid down in the Joint Communication: EaP policy beyond 2020: Reinforcing Resilience - an Eastern Partnership that delivers for all (JOIN(2020)7 final of 18.03.2020).
ers travel and accommodation expenses of the EaP participants and some experts as well as the costs for the meeting rooms and catering.

So far, training activities have been conducted in all six EaP countries. Besides the three-module training programme, Austria also provides activities in the fields of ‘hybrid threat’, ‘strategic communication’, ‘human security’, ‘cyber security’ and ‘conflict analysis’. Alumni seminars and conferences keep the former students up-to-date on current CSDP issues and facilitate networking between the former students.

POSITIVE SIDE EFFECTS

Networking is one of the positive side effects of training for partner regions. The former alumni can rely on a network within the EU Member States (both former participants and experts) and the partner region (both inter- and intra-institutional). The latter is a clear added value and helps to strengthen capacity building and good governance. Personal contacts, face-to-face meetings and exchanging telephone numbers facilitate decision-making processes and information exchange. Due to the regular courses, seminars and conferences for alumni, the former students expand their network year after year.

In addition, the training courses take place under the principle ‘in the region, for the region’, which helps those involved to understand local traditions, habits and culture. This also helps the participants to understand each other’s way of thinking, living and working, and those of their neighbours. Understanding each other is also crucial in order to avoid misunderstandings, to build confidence and to build good neighbourly relations.

CONCLUSIONS

The training programmes for both the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership are well-established activities. The success of regional activities is based on the standard curricula of the ESDC, and the continued efforts of the organisers and the high level speakers, who support the events by sharing their experience and expertise.

Although the programmes have been conducted for more than a decade, the content is up-to-date. In light of hybrid threats, cybersecurity, strategic communication and climate change, the security and defence agenda of the EU will remain one of the crucial elements for further cooperation with the partner countries.

The line between internal and external security has become blurred, and there is an undisputed nexus between security and development, and climate change and globalisation are topics of general concern. Therefore, training for a common security and defence policy will never be outdated, will never be useless and will never be a waste of time.

Providing training for our partners will strengthen them, which will make the European Union together with its partners stronger in the world.
In response to the EU’s neighbourhood and beyond becoming increasingly unstable, work is ongoing to strengthen the internal-external security nexus. The tasks of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions/operations and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies have grown closer: Europol, Eurojust, CEPOL and especially the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) increasingly operate outside EU borders, while CSDP has taken on tasks that also include EU security interests such as irregular migration, counter-terrorism and organised crime. Whilst most missions and operations already cooperate in some form with JHA agencies, a more structured approach is needed to increase synergies, based on their respective focus and background.

**CSDP-JHA COOPERATION: WIN-WIN**

The benefits of cooperation are clear for both instruments. CSDP missions and operations, whilst deployed outside the EU, inter alia assist partner countries to improve the effectiveness of their law enforcement, judiciary, border management procedures and military capability to
promote internal stability and fight terrorism and organised crime. As such, they also contribute to the protection and security of EU citizens. Enhanced cooperation between CSDP and JHA agencies, including through information sharing as appropriate, offers opportunities to increase the effectiveness of these actions. Similarly, for JHA agencies, an improved awareness of external security threats is vital to their role in enhancing the internal security of the European Union. CSDP actors frequently work directly with key security stakeholders in third countries and have good knowledge of the local security and political context that is often relevant to the internal security of the European Union, the mandates of JHA agencies and the wider law enforcement interests of EU Member States. The relationships developed by CSDP actors with host authorities could facilitate opportunities for enhanced collaboration between EU law enforcement actors and these local authorities. As the tasks of CSDP often require specific, security-related expertise, synergies with JHA actors in Member States also takes place through the secondment of staff.

**CSDP-JHA COOPERATION: LONG-LASTING**

Actions to strengthen ties between CSDP and the area of Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ), including the JHA agencies, were set up many years ago, and linkages have over the years been established between the external and internal security of the EU. Member States have on several occasions stressed the importance of further increasing coop-
eration. In 2011, EU Member States agreed for the first time on a ‘Roadmap to strengthen ties between FSJ and CSDP actors’, which was subsequently updated by a Food for Thought paper in 2016. This was followed up by an EEAS non-paper on enhancing cooperation between CSDP missions/operations and JHA agencies (2017).

The Civilian CSDP Compact (2018), which also underlines the importance of the internal-external security nexus, highlights that civilian CSDP missions should also contribute to the EU’s wider response in tackling ‘new’ security challenges that could hinder the stabilisation of the host country or the region and hamper the achievement of the mission’s mandate. These new challenges include security threats linked to irregular migration, hybrid threats, cyber security, terrorism and radicalisation, organised crime, border management and maritime security, as well as preventing and countering violent extremism, while taking into account the need to preserve and protect cultural heritage. The role of civilian CSDP in contributing to addressing such security challenges could be seen as a deepening of the core priority areas of police, rule of law and civilian administration as defined in Feira (Conclusions of the Presidency, Santa Maria da Feira European Council June 2000). Commitments 20 and 21 of the Compact specifically call for increased cooperation with JHA actors (MS and JHA agencies) and the development of targeted mini-concepts on these new security challenges.

CSDP-JHA COOPERATION: STATE OF PLAY

CSDP missions and operations do not act in a vacuum and have an interest in establishing good mutually-reinforcing working relations with other efforts undertaken, such as existing dialogues and operations of the EU with partner countries, relevant EU programmes under JHA and Member States’ initiatives. The CSDP cooperates in various ways with Europol, Frontex, CEPOL, Eurojust, Interpol and the EGF. Various cooperation agreements between the EEAS and JHA agencies provide the strategic framework for all operational and strategic collaborations. Cooperation takes place in the field, and at political, strategic and policy levels. For example, the EEAS is invited to attend the regular meetings of the JHA agencies’ network, including the directors’ meeting, and regular staff-to-staff meetings are organised, for example between the EEAS and Frontex. Additionally, the EEAS keeps in regular contact on CSDP-related operational and strategic issues that are of relevance to specific JHA agencies.

There have been numerous interactions in the field between CSDP and JHA agencies. Concrete examples of cooperation exist in Libya, where associated Frontex experts within EUBAM Libya support the mission on a needs-driven and rotational basis, or in the Sahel, where strategic information is exchanged between the EUCAP Sahel missions and Frontex. Since 2009, EULEX Kosovo has remained the operational and strategic focal point for the communication between Kosovo police and Europol. On the military side, the Crime Information Cell (CIC) is a prime example of cooperation. The CIC was set-up in EUNAVFOR MED Sophia, an executive military CSDP mission, and is now replicated in EUNAVFOR MED Irini. In the CIC, specialised personnel from EU agencies Europol, Frontex, and the CSDP operation exchanged information on criminal activity in the Central Mediterranean and facilitated the direct exchange of information.

1 ‘From strengthening ties between CSDP/FSJ actors towards more security in EUROPE’, ST 10934/16
2 See also ‘Strengthening civilian CSDP - Concept paper’ ST 8084/2018
COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION

CSDP-JHA COOPERATION: FUTURE

Though increasing cooperation might seem straightforward, its realisation has proved challenging for a variety of reasons. First of all, both instruments come from distinct backgrounds: whereas JHA is linked to internal security, including internal affairs ministries (MoI) and justice ministries (MoJ), the CSDP generally falls under the responsibility of foreign affairs ministries (though its staffing also comes from MoI and MoJ line ministries) and defence ministries. These two lines of responsibility are also reflected in Brussels, further complicated by different financing lines and different EU structures of responsibility. Another challenge relates to the nature of the cooperation: whereas JHA agencies generally have a need for actionable (operational) information, several challenges, including legal ones, exist for CSDP missions and operations to provide such data. A final challenge relates to the nature of the two instruments as, even if they are deployed to the same area, their work is based on different EU pillars.

Though the CSDP and JHA are very different, a general understanding and willingness to cooperate exists. The existing arrangements and practices between CSDP and JHA have gone some way towards enhancing cooperation and information exchange. More needs to be done however to mainstream collaboration, building in particular on the new legal frameworks of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and Eurojust, and strengthening of the current Europol mandate.

Whilst most missions and operations already cooperate in multiple forms with JHA agencies, a more structured approach is needed to ensure that both EU tools work together coherently, and that any overlap, or even competition, is prevented. These forms of cooperation need to take into account the different nature of both instruments and to therefore be based on their respective comparative advantages. Options for further cooperation can be broadly summarised along the lines of (1) increased information sharing, (2) enhanced consultation from the planning stages onwards, (3) improved cooperation in the field (e.g. mutual facilitation and logistical support), (4) capability development, including joint training, coordination of training efforts, workshops and study visits and (5) delineation of roles during the implementation of action and coordination during transition phases (sequencing). Additionally, cooperation can be strengthened with national (MS) law enforcement and judiciary actors, including by increasing dialogue between the CSDP and the line ministries. Finally, it could be worth considering whether co-locating JHA agencies in a CSDP mission or operation would be useful. This would also benefit CSDP missions and operations, as they would have direct access to specific expertise (know-how, human resources, information, etc.) of relevance to their mandate.

**CSDP – FRONTEX COOPERATION**

The new EBCG Regulation envisages a considerable increase in capabilities for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), including the creation of a standing corps starting with 5 000 operational staff in 2021 and increasing to 10 000 border guards by 2027. The new regulation also broadens Frontex’ external engagement: Frontex is deploying its own liaison officers to regions from the Western Balkans to Western Africa, and now has the possibility to operate in any foreign country that signs a status agreement with the EU. Notably, the new regulation also ‘regulates’ cooperation with the CSDP: Article 68(1), second subparagraph, of the EBCG Regulation states: “[…] the Agency shall cooperate, in particular, with: j) CSDP missions and operations, in accordance with their mandates, with a view to ensuring the following: (i) the promotion of European integrated border management standards; (ii) situational awareness and risk analysis”.

Although there is a certain risk of overlap in tasks and of competition for Member States’ resources to arise, CSDP missions and operations can benefit from a strengthened Frontex, for example with regards to the de facto centre of excellence they will become. As Member States only have a single set of resources at their disposal, the additional capabilities developed could indirectly also benefit CSDP. The key to future cooperation is a mutual understanding of which tool to use when. For this purpose, a common understanding between national MoI and MFA will be crucial, as well as joint discussions in the Council, for instance in PSC-COSI.

**CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD**

The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) with its JHA agencies and CSDP missions and operations are distinct policy areas acting under different legal regimes, governed by different stakeholders (military, diplomatic or home affairs) and implemented by different EU entities. However, internal and external security have become increasingly interconnected. Whilst cooperation is already taking place in most CSDP missions and operations, increased efforts are ongoing to strengthen and streamline this cooperation. This increased cooperation could further enhance the impact of the EU’s efforts to protect its citizens and to defend its interests and values in Europe and beyond.

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7.4. THE SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

by Clément Boutillier

The security and development nexus – peace is also often added into the equation – has been defined and referred to in a large number of Commission communications, Council conclusions and other policy documents. The EU Security Strategy 2003 stressed that security is a precondition for development and that, in turn, development is a powerful tool to encourage reform in partner countries. In 2003, Europe had started to face new threats that were ‘more diverse, less visible and less predictable’, combining terrorism, regional conflicts, weak state governance and organised crime outside its borders, including in many countries supported by the EU’s development policy. The 2006 European Consensus on Development defined the security and development nexus as follows: ‘without peace and security, development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur’.1

ERADICATION OF POVERTY

As set out in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the main objective of development policy is the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. Development policy also pursues other objectives, such as ensuring sustainable economic, social and environmental development and the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, good governance and international respect for human rights.

To improve the effectiveness and the impact of EU development policy, the security and development nexus provides added value compared to traditional development approaches by taking into account the specificities of working in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS).

More than 50% of EU development assistance today is directed at countries affected by conflicts and fragility. The EU has a wide range of instruments in its toolbox to address conflicts and crises, such as conflict prevention, sanctions, humanitarian aid, mediation, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, stabilisation, political dialogue and development cooperation.

Development cooperation is a cornerstone of the external action of the European Union. It is managed by the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), which defines the EU’s development policy and uses a set of instruments to implement programmes and projects on the ground.

It does so by following development effectiveness principles such as ownership of interventions by partners at the local, national or regional levels, alignment behind objectives and strategies defined by those partners and coordination and information-sharing among donors to avoid duplication.

In 2015, the budget managed by DG DEVCO amounted to EUR 8.42 billion. The European Union and its Member States are the number one provider of official development assistance (ODA) in the world.

THE SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

An early example of a development strategy implemented on the basis of this nexus is provided by Sierra Leone from 2001 onwards. The authorities, with the support of the international community, prioritised security as their first development objective after years of civil war in order to be able to build infrastructure and deliver social services across the country later.

As it became increasingly clear that FCAS were lagging behind other developing countries in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a consensus emerged among donors to prioritise support to those countries.

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2 To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; to achieve universal primary education; to promote gender equality and empower women; to reduce child mortality; to improve maternal health; to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; to ensure environmental sustainability; to develop a global partnership for development.
DEVELOPMENT, HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY COOPERATION

Although fragility is a multidimensional concept spanning economic (e.g. youth unemployment), environmental (e.g. exposure to natural disasters and epidemics), political (e.g. corruption, lack of political inclusiveness), security (e.g. crime) and societal (e.g. inequalities) factors, violence and insecurity are often the main reasons a country is considered fragile. FCAS usually have limited capacity, authority and/or legitimacy to achieve peace and sustainable development, and the authorities have to deal with multiple pressing priorities. As a result, the sequence of reforms has to be adapted to the specific context, although it should usually start with the building of institutions and specific action to improve trust between state and society. The New Deal for engagement in fragile states, adopted as part of the outcome of the Busan High Level Forum on aid effectiveness in 2011 with strong support from the EU, listed five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals to serve as a guide for the delivery of development assistance in FCAS: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations and revenues and services. Coordination between development, humanitarian and security actors, in full compliance with their respective mandates and principles, in order to prevent crises from recurring or to help countries recover in the longer term, is often an additional challenge. Despite recent impressive progress in countries such as Myanmar/Burma and Colombia, crises and conflicts are becoming more protracted and recurrent. In six countries out of ten, significant humanitarian needs related to disasters of human and natural origin last for eight years or more. Improving the implementation of the security and development nexus in FCAS will become all the more important in the future as it is estimated that the percentage of the world’s poor living in FCAS will rise from 43 % in 2015 to 62 % in 2030, compared to only 20 % in 2005.

The EU has been one of the earliest and most prominent players to translate the nexus between security and development into its policy framework and action given its history and experience in promoting peace within its own borders and its credibility in promoting values such as democracy and human rights. It is also due to the scale of its support, the continued partnership it has built over time with many FCAS and the diversity of the short-term and long-term instruments the EU can mobilise across the conflict cycle. The 2011 Agenda for Change, defining the EU’s development policy, underlines the efforts to be pursued to tackle the challenges related to security and fragility calling for a more integrated, coherent and coordinated response. The EU Global Strategy of 2016 also calls for ‘the dual – security and development – nature of the [EU] engagement’ to be developed to deal with specific challenges posed by conflicts. The proposal for a new European Consensus on Development, adopted by the European Commission in November 2016, also states that ‘the EU and its Member States will use development cooperation as part of the full range of policies and instruments to prevent, manage and help resolve conflicts and crises, meet humanitarian needs and build lasting peace and good governance’. The revised European Consensus on Development reflects the fact that the EU aims to play a leading role in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted in 2015. The 2030 Agenda represents a new way of addressing global challenges based

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on common objectives and a shared responsibility for all countries. Peace and security is a building-block for the achievement of the agenda as a whole, and progress will be monitored through a dedicated goal – Sustainable Development Goal 16 – on peace, justice and strong institutions.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAMMES AND PROJECTS

Two evaluations of the support provided by the European Commission, to justice and security sector reform (JSSR)\(^8\) and to conflict prevention and peacebuilding (CPPB)\(^9\) respectively, were published in 2011. They help measure how the security and development nexus has gained importance not only in policy but also in the implementation of programmes and projects. Between 2001 and 2009, European Commission support for JSSR rose from EUR 14 million to EUR 174 million a year, and support for CPPB from EUR 120 million to EUR 854 million. For the 2014 – 2020 period, more than 10 % of EU development cooperation was programmed in support of conflict prevention, resolution, peace and security-related activities. EU interventions in these areas take place at all levels, from the local to the global level. This support covers a wide range of activities, from supporting conflict resolution mechanisms at community level in Nigeria’s north-east to contributing to the reconstruction trust fund in Afghanistan, preventing human rights abuses in Uganda, and supporting demining programmes and anti-piracy actions. The African Peace Facility (APF) represents a large proportion of the EU support provided to CPPB.

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9 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/thematic_evaluation_of_ec_support_to_pb_and_conflict_preven-
The facility was established in 2004 to support the capacity of the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to manage conflicts and more than EUR 2 billion has been committed under the APF so far. It serves to support peace operations in Africa such as AMISOM in Somalia, MISCA in the Central African Republic, ECOMIB in Guinea-Bissau and the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNTJF) for the fight against Boko Haram. It is also used to enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security and to support the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture for conflict prevention and management.

PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING

Evaluations of development cooperation programmes highlight a number of issues that are particularly relevant for peacebuilding and statebuilding: (a) the interdependency between good governance, security, justice, growth, employment and the delivery of basic services; (b) the need to base support on a thorough and shared analysis of conflict dynamics, fragility and factors of resilience in order to address the root causes of conflicts rather than their symptoms; (c) the necessity for national ownership and (d) the ability of partners to be flexible in order to adapt to changes on the ground and to work together. The 2013 joint communication on the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises’ is an attempt to address some of these issues.10

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO EXTERNAL CONFLICTS AND CRISIS

The comprehensive approach outlined in the 2013 communication mentioned above attempts to improve the implementation of the security and development nexus while also covering other areas such as migration and gender. It provides practitioners with guiding principles to apply in situations of conflict and crisis. It is not about ‘what to do’ but rather ‘how to do it’. It builds on a number of previous initiatives such as the Sahel and Horn of Africa strategies, which aim to make the EU’s external action more coherent, more visible and more effective by mobilising all EU tools towards a common objective. For example, the strategy for development and security in the Sahel, adopted in 2011, calls for the mobilisation of all the EU’s available tools to meet the long-term objective of ‘enhancing political stability, security, good governance, social cohesion and economic and education opportunities in the Sahel states, thus establishing the conditions for local and national sustainable development’.

Eight elements underpin the EU’s comprehensive approach: (1) a shared analysis to build a common understanding of the challenges at hand in a given context; (2) the definition of a common strategic vision setting the direction for the EU’s engagement; (3) a focus on prevention to preserve lives, to save costs and to protect the EU’s interests; (4) mobilisation of the different strengths and capacities of the EU; (5) a long-term commitment taking into account that addressing fragility and building resilient societies takes time; (6) acknowledging the link between internal and external policies and action in areas such as migration, climate change and organised crime; (7) a better use of EU delegations as the central players to carry out EU dialogue and support in partner countries; and (8) the necessity to work in partnership, for instance with the United Nations or NATO.

IMPLEMENTATION IS A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

Implementation of the comprehensive approach, as pointed out in the Council conclusions of May 2014, is the shared responsibility of EU institutions and Member States. Action

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10 JOIN(2013) 30 final of 11 December 2013
plans to take forward specific thematic and geographic priorities relating to the comprehensive approach have been prepared for 2015 and for 2016-2017. These two action plans include for instance the transition from CSDP missions to other EU instruments, the global roll-out of the early warning system and the reinforcement of staff in EU delegations specialised in migration, security issues and security sector reform. They also include geographic priorities such as Ukraine, Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali. As part of its focus on prevention and shared analysis, the comprehensive approach has led the EU to reinforce its capacity to understand fragility and anticipate crises and conflicts by developing a number of tools. The early warning system aims to identify risks of the emergence or escalation of violence and conflicts across a variety of indicators, notably in countries and regions and on thematic priorities where the EU has particular interests and leverage. The exercise triggers increased attention, intensified monitoring and appropriate preventive action for the selected countries, regions and thematic areas across the EU system. Guidance on conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity has also been issued in order to maximise the impact of the EU’s action and to manage the risks of intervening in situations that are by nature volatile. Developing a shared analysis by using such tools is crucial because the connection between security and development is always context-specific and will determine the choice and coordination of the most appropriate interventions (see graph below).

**TRANSITION FROM CRISIS MANAGEMENT TO PEACEBUILDING**

The EU Global Strategy emphasises that the EU’s ‘peace policy must also ensure a smoother transition from short-term crisis management to long-term peacebuilding to avoid gaps along the conflict cycle’. Linking crisis responses, such as humanitarian aid and CSDP, with long-term actions on peacebuilding, statebuilding, resilience and governance is indeed a recurrent challenge for the implementation of the comprehensive approach, although the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) can be used to prepare the ground for more sustained and longer-term assistance delivered by EU development interven-

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A wide range of interventions
Note: CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy
LRRD = linking relief, rehabilitation and development
The communication on the comprehensive approach emphasised that the programming of development assistance should be flexible in order to adapt to the volatile environment of fragile countries. Although the seven-year programming period for development instruments is very helpful for partner countries to define areas where the EU can support them and to have reliable and predictable development flows, it is usually difficult to adapt programming to an evolving conflict situation. The establishment of EU trust funds is the most fully developed response to this challenge, and works by delivering development assistance more flexibly with faster procedures in crises and post-conflict situations. The objective of the EU emergency trust fund for Africa, established at the Valletta Summit in November 2015, is to support partner countries in the North of Africa, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa with development projects and programmes focusing on addressing the root causes of instability, insecurity, forced displacements and conflicts.

For example, the Sahel Window includes as priorities (a) reinforcing the resilience of local communities to deal with environmental, socio-economic and security challenges; (b) improving border management, fighting transnational trafficking and criminal networks; and (c) preventing radicalisation and violent extremism. Several projects have been designed thanks to the combined analysis and knowledge of DG DEVCO at its headquarters and in EU delegations and of CSDP missions operating in the same area. A programme to strengthen security in the Mopti and Gao regions of Mali and to improve the management of border areas (PARSEC Mopti-Gao) was drawn up in close cooperation with the EUCAP and EUTM missions.

These provide a concrete illustration of some of the elements of the comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises, as does the new EU policy framework for security sector reform.

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<th>CAPACITY BUILDING IN SUPPORT OF SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT</th>
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<td>In parallel to the joint communication on security sector reform, a legislative proposal to amend the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) was presented in July 2016. The proposal extends the EU’s assistance to the military forces of partner countries, under exceptional and clearly defined circumstances, to achieve sustainable development and help partner countries prevent and manage crises by themselves. The proposal highlights that the military can play an important role in preventing violence and can contribute to setting the conditions for peace. It follows up on the gaps identified in EU support for the capacities of partners in the security sector outlined in the joint communication on Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (CBSD) of April 2015. The assistance provided under this legislative proposal may cover training, mentoring and advice, as well as the provision of equipment or infrastructure improvements with a development and human security related objective. However, it excludes recurrent military expenditure and the procurement of arms and ammunitions.</td>
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The security sector reform policy framework

Over the current programming period (2014-2020), 15 countries have a specific security component as part of their cooperation with the European Commission. Activities financed with EU instruments in security sector reform (SSR) include, but are not limited to, law enforcement, border management, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and civilian oversight of the security forces by parliaments and...
A conference on the Central African Republic took place in Brussels in November 2016. Its objective was to gather support from the international community to help the country recover from a long period of instability after its government was overthrown in 2013. Throughout the crisis, the EU has used all means available to support the country, including via three CSDP missions and a large amount of humanitarian aid. It has engaged in political dialogue with the authorities. It has set-up a multi-donor trust fund ‘Békou’ to link relief, rehabilitation and development, and has channelled development funds to support civil society, food security, education and health. It has also supported a free and fair electoral process for a return to constitutional order and to round off what it considers a successful political transition. While 2 million people are still at risk of food insecurity and one-fifth of the population remains displaced, the EU, the United Nations and the World Bank have supported the CAR authorities in drawing up their National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan for 2017–2021. The plan prioritises specific development activities while taking into account the humanitarian and life-saving needs of the population as well as security, peace and reconciliation. The case of the Central African Republic illustrates that sustainable development is only possible when and where there is peace and security. As part of the assessment several consultations and surveys have been carried out in the country to gain more insight into the population’s expectations and priorities. Security was considered the main concern and forms, together with peace and reconciliation, the first pillar of the strategy.

A HUMAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

The first objective of EU support for SSR is to improve the security of states and above all the security of individuals. From a human security perspective, trust between populations and security actors and the state’s ability to deliver on security are key for state legitimacy. The perception of the state largely depends on the way populations and security actors interact in everyday life. The second objective is therefore to support the security sector and to ensure security actors are accountable and act in full compliance with...
human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Support will be provided for SSR in line with a number of key principles, including those related to development effectiveness. National ownership and the ability of all EU instruments to adapt to changing circumstances in the field as well as the importance of conducting regular political and policy dialogues on security are key. Managing risks, including the risk of doing harm and reputational risk, is crucial when engaging in SSR, and requires a thorough analysis not only of the sector itself but also of the wider governance system.

CONCLUSION

Development approaches focusing on poverty reduction through growth and the provision of basic social services have had mixed to disappointing results in FCAS. As a consequence, the development community has been forced to take into consideration the specificities of working in such countries to a much greater extent. This explains why the security and development nexus, as part of a broader strategy towards peacebuilding and statebuilding, has acquired a growing importance in the EU policy framework. Policy-making is the result of a continuous process of learning, based on experiences from the field and on new approaches being tested. Past experiences show that long-term development and peace need to be at the core of the EU’s response from the outset of a conflict or crisis. The implementation of the EU Global Strategy and of the revised European Consensus on Development, in a challenging global context, will surely keep the security and development nexus in the limelight in the near future.

The CSDP can fill the gap in the short-run, but in the long-run other EU instruments should take the lead.

TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

Article 21: The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the [same] principles. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.
8 CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT
8.1. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

by Klaus Schadenbauer

The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy1 (EUGS) initiated a ‘renaissance’ of both civilian and military capability development in the EU. Based on substantial political momentum, and in a relatively short time (2016 – 2019) various implementation and action plans led to the re-activation of existing, and the design of new initiatives, processes and activities that are together aimed at increasing the quantity and quality of the capabilities available for the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This development is very likely to continue within the next few years, especially after the new EU Commission under President Ursula von der Leyen explicitly declared ‘security and defence’ to be one of the Commission’s top priorities:

‘...Europe also needs credible military capabilities and we have set up the building blocks of the European Defence Union. There is a European way to foreign and security policy where hard power is an important tool — but is never the only one. Hard power always comes with diplomacy and conflict prevention; with the work on reconciliation and reconstruction, which is something Europeans know well, because we have gone through this, here in Europe.’2

From a capability development point of view, the most remarkable event in this regard was the political agreement on a new Level of Ambition (LoA) as part of the Council conclusions on implementing the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) in the area of Security and Defence.3 This allowed civilian and military

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2 Ursula von der Leyen, Keynote Speech at the World Economic Forum, Davos, 22 January 2020
3 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, Brussels, 14 November 2016, (14149/16)
capability planners to initiate their top-down planning work from a solid, politically-agreed common starting point, which is a crucial pre-requisite for the credibility and acceptance of the outcomes by Member States. This LoA is essentially defined around the three EUGS priorities: (a) responding to external conflicts and crises, (b) building the capacities of partners, and (c) protecting the Union and its citizens, which provide an overarching cluster for all currently relevant capability development activities. Since 2016, the Council has set priorities and provided new guidance on defence cooperation and on adjusting tools, structures and financing, including by drawing on the full potential of the Lisbon Treaty. This has led in recent years to a significant increase in capability development activity both in Brussels and in the Member States.

The Civilian CSDP Compact, CARD, PESCO and the EDF are all examples of these new capability development initiatives created since 2016; the Civilian Capability Development Plan, the EU Headline Goal Process, and the Capability Development Plan are examples of existing processes that have been vigorously reactivated. This text will provide some basic principles and explain how these processes and initiatives together drive civilian and military capability development, whilst specifically highlighting interrelationships and a number of opportunities and challenges.

KEY PRINCIPLES OF EU CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

The most visible EU commitment to safeguarding peace and security in the Union and internationally is the array of CSDP missions and operations deployed outside the Union. Missions under the CSDP can have a military or civilian nature, depending on the actual requirements stemming from the phase, nature and intensity of the conflict or crisis to be tackled and the politically-agreed goals to be achieved by the EU activities.

The aim and only raison d’être of capability development (both at national and multi-national level) is to have the right quantity and quality of (civilian and military) capabilities at hand when these are required. In the EU CSDP context this means that on the day of the Council decision for launching an EU CSDP civilian or military operation or mission, the required capabilities should be ready for deployment. This means, for example, that for a civilian and/or military advisory mission in country X 6,000 km from Brussels, focused on ‘providing mentoring and advising to senior key leaders and military authorities for the development or transformation of defence and security organisations/institutions’, the capability development efforts should already have led (among others) to a generic ‘Strategic advisory capability’ that 1) acts on an agreed EU conceptual basis (doctrine & concepts), 2) is efficiently organised and can be deployed, logistically sustained and re-deployed in accordance with pre-arranged financial, technical and legal agreements (organisation), 3) has been educated and trained accordingly both nationally and at EU-level (training), 4) has the necessary material and equipment (vehicles, personal protection, IT equipment, etc.) at its disposal (material), 5) is embedded in a functional command and control system, which includes the necessary technical and procedural arrangements and means (leadership), 6) is adequately staffed and prepared in terms of quality and quantity, including necessary rotations over time (personnel), 7) can act on the basis of necessary infrastructure arrangements (facilities) and, as a key cross-cutting reference, 8) is technically

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4 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, Brussels, 14 November 2016, (14149/16)
5 Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, 19 November 2018, (14305/18)
6 Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
7 Permanent Structured Cooperation
8 European Defence Fund
9 EU Capability Codes and Statements 2020 (EU CCS 2020), 21 April 2020, (7443/20)
and procedurally capable of operating within all of the aforementioned areas, with other relevant CSDP capabilities of Member States and with other relevant organisations and EU and non-EU actors (interopera-
tibility). ¹⁰

This relatively simple example of a civilian or mili-
tary capability illustrates that developing capabilities is not a matter of days or weeks, but rather months or, mostly, years, especially since the guidelines for development doctrine (e.g. developing and agreeing on EU-level concepts as well as harmonising national doctrine), training (basic and advanced national and EU-level training & education and mission-specific training such as language skills), material (which is a serious factor especially in military capability development), personnel (creating and managing an adequate and suitably qualified pool of experts) require considerable development efforts (resources and time) at both Member State and EU level.

In a nutshell, planning and developing capabilities for EU crisis management faces one major challenge: it all takes time. In order to avoid the unacceptable condition of sending personnel from EU Member States at short notice or on an ad-hoc basis as part of a ‘not finally developed’ capability into a CSDP environment with critical security and safety conditions, it is vital to distinguish between ‘force generation’ and ‘capability development’.

Force generation is the process of choosing from a prepared ‘force/capability pool’ the required mix of capabilities for specific CSDP tasks. Force generation should, in the best case, only require a certain amount of mission-specific pre-deployment training and education. Force generation should be deployed in an immediate or short-term context (0-2 years) and should be based on and interlinked with an underlying and synchronised capability development process.

¹⁰ The example follows the commonly agreed ‘DOTMLPF’ approach. In accordance with the EUMC Glossary of acronyms and definitions (Brussels, 14 February 2019, EEAS(2019) 169), a capability is the ability to perform actions in order to achieve effects. Capabilities are defined by minimum requirements along the lines of Development (DOTMLPF). The lines of development of a capability are: Doctrine and Concept, Organisation, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability.
Capability development itself consists of a top-down ‘planning’ phase that aims to identify and shape the future requirements and a bottom-up ‘development’ phase aimed at generating the required capabilities in time to create the ‘force/capability profile’ that is needed. To address the time challenge mentioned above, both the ‘planning’ and the ‘development’ phases must look into the medium-term (2 to 15 years) and even longer-term (20 years) future, in line with the estimated timeframe in which each specific capability can be fully developed. Working on the basis of a future perspective clearly requires strategic foresight and a politically-agreed framework, since the key question for capability development is not ‘What do we require now?’ but ‘What do we have to develop now because it will be required in the future?’.

THE LEVEL OF AMBITION

Due to their forward-looking perspective, the key strategic benchmark for all capability planning efforts, whether in the EU or in other comparable organisations such as NATO, and whether of a civilian or military nature, is a politically-agreed LoA. In the EU, such a forward-looking LoA (or ‘headline goal’ as it was previously called) has explicitly existed since the Union stated its political ambition of being an autonomous CSDP actor. The major milestones in the initial phase were the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal and the 2000 Feira priorities, which together defined the holistic, forward-looking, political civil and military ESDP/CSDP ambition, which has had a significant effect on EU capability development until today.

Another key milestone, the Lisbon Treaty, summarised the essence of the previously agreed documents in some key paragraphs, while going one step further in certain key areas. This political guidance from the Member States provided the EU CSDP from the outset with all of the instruments, processes and structures it needed, in the form of a coherent, top-down approach. The EU chose, at least from the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) onwards, this comprehensive approach as its main CSDP ‘avenue of advance’. This has led, to date, to the parallel conduct of civilian and military capability development efforts at both the EU/supranational and Member State levels. The EUGS is the latest milestone in defining the EU LoA. The EUGS Implementation Plan on Security and Defence defines three strategic priorities as guiding and cross-cutting principles of the LoA:

‘…, the Council hereby determines the level of ambition which sets out the main goals which the EU and its Member States will aim to achieve in order to implement the EUGS in the area of security and defence, including through CSDP, in support of three strategic priorities identified in the EUGS: (a) responding to external conflicts and crises, (b) building the capacities of partners, and (c) protecting the Union and its citizens. In doing this, the EU will pursue an integrated approach linking up different EU instruments in a coordinated way, building on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach and promoting civil-military cooperation.’

This CSDP LoA is a joint civil-military approach, because it reflects closely a key principle of the EUGS, the Integrated Approach to Conflict and Crisis. This integrated approach is aimed at ‘linking up different EU instruments in a coordinated way, building on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach and promoting civil-military cooperation.’ The EUGS and the respective Council conclusions on its implementation provide further guidance and direction concerning the implementation of the three strategic priorities:

11 Petersberg declaration, Council of Ministers of Western European Union (WEU), Bonn, 19 June 1992
12 Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 11 December 1999
13 Santa Maria da Feira European Council Presidency Conclusions, 20 June 2000
14 especially Article 42 and 43 TEU
15 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, Brussels, 14 November 2016, (14149/16)
16 Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, Brussels, 14 November 2016, (14392/16)
'Responding to external conflicts and crises' addresses the full range of CSDP tasks in all phases of the conflict cycle, and entails being able to respond with rapid and decisive action through the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks covered by Article 43 of the TEU.

‘Capacity building of partners’ places emphasis on training, advice and/or mentoring within the security sector in order to contribute to the resilience and stabilisation of partner countries recovering from, or threatened by conflict or instability, in synergy with other EU instruments and actors, including the nexus of security and development, assistance to strengthen partners’ resilience and counter hybrid threats, cyber security and border security, promotion of international humanitarian and human rights law, as well as gender sensitivity, protection of civilians, and principles of democracy and good governance.

‘Protecting the Union and its citizens’ focuses on external challenges and threats that have an impact on the security of the Union and its citizens, along the internal/external nexus of security. This includes several envisaged activities that are only carried out in a wider CSDP framework or go beyond it, such as ‘strengthening the protection and resilience of the Union’s networks and critical infrastructure’, ‘preventing and countering terrorism and radicalisation’, ‘combating people smuggling and trafficking’. This priority explicitly refers to mutual assistance and/or solidarity, in line with Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222 TFEU in this context too. Thus, given respective future political guidance, the EU CSDP Military LoA, which currently (at least in the military context) focuses nearly exclusively on the EU’s external action, could in the future focus to a much higher extent on internal aspects such as the internal-external nexus, digital sovereignty, territorial integrity, protection of vital EU infrastructure and increasing the EU’s resilience against hybrid threats.

This remarkable and ambitious list of tasks provides EU civilian and military capability planners with a clear range of qualitative strategic tasks that the future EU CSDP civ-mil ‘force/capability pool’ is expected to execute. The necessary quantitative dimension and strategic outreach can be derived from another important part of the political guidance of 2016, the Annex covering ‘types of possible CSDP civilian missions and military operations derived from the EU level of ambition’, which defines the ambition in greater detail. It calls, ‘based on previously agreed goals and commitments’, for ‘credible, deployable, interoperable, sustainable and multifunctional civilian and military capabilities’ that should be able to undertake ‘rapid and decisive action in support of the level of ambition and its three strategic priorities’, across the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks covered by Article 43 of the TEU. Lastly, the ambition lists possible types of CSDP civilian missions and military operations outside the Union, some of which may be executed concurrently, that the Union should be capable of executing, including in ‘situations of higher security risk and with underdeveloped local infrastructure’:

- Joint crisis management operations in situations of high security risk in the regions surrounding the EU;
- Joint stabilisation operations, including air and special operations;
- Civilian and military rapid response, including military rapid response operations inter alia using the EU Battlegroups as a whole or within a mission-tailored Force package;
- Substitution/executive civilian missions;
- Air security operations including close air support and air surveillance;
- Maritime security or surveillance operations, including longer term in the vicinity of Europe);

17 Including the Headline Goal 2010, the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 as well as the ambition agreed by the European Council in December 2008.
18 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, Brussels, 14 November 2016, (14149/16), Annex to the Annex
• Civilian capacity building and security sector reform missions (monitoring, mentoring and advising, training) inter alia on police, rule of law, border management, counter-terrorism, resilience, response to hybrid threats, and civil administration as well as civilian monitoring missions;

• Military capacity building through advisory, training, and mentoring missions, including robust force protection if necessary, as well as military monitoring/observation missions.19

In the light of the 2020 global pandemic crisis it is worth mentioning that this 2016 ambition explicitly includes the EU’s ability to provide “assistance in the context of a global response to natural disasters and pandemics outside the EU.”20. In principle, the political-strategic guidance and direction provided by the Council in 2016 is the common starting point and current benchmark for both civilian and military capability planning and development of the Union. In a top-down approach, the military broke this down into the Requirements Catalogue 2017, which was updated in 2019 (RC 2019). This RC ‘translates’ the given spectrum of qualitative and quantitative strategic guidelines into a set of illustrative scenarios plus concurrencies that together represent the full range of future CSDP military tasks From that, a detailed list of quantitative and qualitative requirements was derived. This politically-agreed ‘Full Spectrum Force Package of the Union’ consists of a broad range of military capabilities in the Sea, Air, Land, Space, Cyber and Information domains, which comprises a striking benchmark to be achieved by Member States, both in terms of quantity and quality. In a similar top-down approach, the civilian capability development assessed the given strategic guidelines and, based on additional analysis, broke down the key aspects further into ‘mini-concepts’ so as to be able to capture the full range of required capabilities in terms

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19 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, Brussels, 14 November 2016, (14149/16), Annex to the Annex
20 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, Brussels, 14 November 2016, (14149/16), Annex to the Annex
of quantity and quality (‘Requirements List’). These efforts will enable both the civilian and military capability development to answer the initial question that triggers all subsequent steps: ‘What will be required for civilian and military CSDP?’.

**CIVILIAN CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT**

The EU CSDP LoA is the overarching yardstick for all civilian and military capability development efforts of the Union. It is apparent that a significant (if not the larger) part of this ambition concerns non-military CSDP crisis management tasks, particularly as regards the early (‘conflict prevention’, ‘resilience’) and post-crisis (‘capacity building’, ‘stabilisation’) phases of the conflict cycle. This was reflected already in the 2000 European Council ‘Feira Priorities’ and in the subsequent definition of a ‘Civilian Headline Goal 2008’ in 2004. The Feira Priorities focus on ‘civilian aspects of crisis management’ by defining four areas for effort and related capability development targets to be achieved by Member States. These four areas included the police, strengthening the rule of law, and strengthening both civilian administration and civil protection.

Though amended and adopted recently, in principle they remain valid, and illustrate one of the key differences between civilian and military capability development. While military capability planning focuses nearly exclusively on one instrument of power, civilian capability development faces the challenge of covering an extensive range of inter-related but independent instruments. This requires a substantial level of coordination, both at national level between the relevant ‘line ministries’ and services (e.g. Foreign Affairs, Interior, Police, Border Guards, Justice and Home Affairs, Development Cooperation and Disaster Relief), and at EU level, between the relevant EEAS and Commission bodies, EU agencies, and external players such as the UN. After a period of limited progress, the EU civilian capability development has, like its military counterpart, experienced a revival, thanks to the renewed approach to the civilian CSDP established in 2017. This resulted mainly in a **Civilian Capabilities Development Plan**, the so-called **Civilian CSDP Compact** and a **Joint Action Plan** on its implementation, adopted by the EEAS and the Commission. The Civilian CSDP Compact is based on three main commitments (a ‘more capable, more effective, and more joined-up civilian CSDP’) and adapts the EU’s revitalised integrated approach to crisis conflict to foster much closer coordination between the relevant EU actors and instruments during all stages of a conflict. This requires widening the scope of civilian missions and thereby increasing the quality and quantity of civilian capabilities made available by Member States in the medium term. As with the military counterpart, progress is to be measured periodically by conducting reviews involving all Member States. Here, a significant difference between EU military and civilian capability development becomes clear: While the Member States have so far clearly distinguished between military CSDP force generation and military capability development and refused to directly link them, in
the civilian domains there is no such clear division and interlinking is openly addressed. Process-wise it is planned (but not yet agreed), that the civilian capability development could follow a structured approach consisting of four steps: a capability needs assessment, a requirement list (‘What is needed?’), a gap analysis (‘What is available and what is missing?’) and an annual capability review to define the next actions to take. This process would aim at synchronising the national capability development processes, based on national implementation plans, while the joint action plan at EU level is expected to produce tangible results in the medium term (already). The Feira Priorities, in a revised and broadened form, together with the three Civilian CSDP Compact key commitments, could provide the focus for all efforts. All in all, when looking at the current and predicted EU CSDP portfolio of missions and operations, the multiple civilian CSDP instruments are likely to become an even more important cornerstone of the Union’s CSDP. The current revival of instruments and procedures encourages Member States to devote increased resources to a more structured, effective and integrated civilian capability development, capable of delivering in the medium term the politically-agreed LoA in accordance with the EUGS and the Council conclusions covering its implementation.

MILITARY CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

The Union’s current military capability development landscape is directly linked to the origins of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). From the very outset, though especially during and after the bitter political experience of the Balkans War in the 1990s, EU Member States have recognised that a credible EU CSDP is only possible if it is underpinned by a credible EU military CSDP instrument consisting of flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable capabilities and forces. In accordance with recent Council conclusions, this military instrument should be further developed in a phased approach aimed at achieving the ‘EU CSDP Military LoA’. This LoA is part of the wider EU LoA on Security and Defence, which incorporates the Civilian CSDP LoA and a wider, more defence-related ambition that has not yet been fully defined. The politically-agreed LoA and its achievement are naturally the key focus of all EU military capability development efforts, although this currently involves a range of relevant processes, initiatives and actors at EU level. Generally speaking, these processes and initiatives can be divided into two main groups, which apply either a ‘top-down capability planning’ perspective or a ‘bottom-up capability development’ perspective.31

CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM (CDM)

The Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), finally established in 2003, forms the core of ‘top-down’ EU military capability planning.32 The CDM comprises the EU Headline Goal Process (HLGP). This process is driven by the EU Military Committee (EUMC), is carried out by the EUMC Working Group/Headline Goal Task Force (EUMCWG/HTF) with the support of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and is

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29 Council Conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy, Brussels, 25 June 2018, (10246/18)
30 Report by the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission / Head of the European Defence Agency on interactions, linkages and coherence among EU defence initiatives, Brussels, 29 May 2019, (9825/19)
32 The names, of the CDM and the Capability Development Plan (CDP) are misleading, because they are exclusively focused on military capability development, and do not cover the civilian perspective.
politically controlled by the Member States via the European Council and the Council of the EU, though mainly via the Political Security Committee (PSC). The CDM and the EU Headline Goal Process broadly consist, like the equivalent NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), of several steps (or ‘sub-processes’) that are executed in a continuous, cyclical manner and strongly rely on permanent close interaction and cooperation between the political-strategic level, the military strategic level and, not least, the Member States. The most important step is the periodic political revision of the LoA, including a detailed revision of the Military CSDP LoA, which provides political guidance for the correct ‘translation’ of the political ambition into a quantified and qualified list of Military Capability and Force Requirements. The product from this step is the Requirements Catalogue (RC), which answers the question ‘What does the EU need?’ and comprises a ‘virtual force structure’ for the Union. The next step focuses on monitoring and evaluating progress. On a bi-annual basis (in full technical synchronisation with the respective NDPP steps), Member States answer the ‘EU Military Capability Questionnaire’ (EUMCQ) and thereby provide a current picture of their force profile plus a projection of the capabilities foreseen for the medium term (+15 years). Although the contributions to this bi-annual Force Catalogue (FC) are ‘voluntary’ and ‘non-binding’ (which currently prevents the direct interlinkage of the Catalogue to any CSDP force generation activity), the FC delivers an increasingly clear picture of the current and planned capability inventory / force profile of EU military forces (‘What do we have?’). Based on a comparison and deeper analysis of the two catalogues, including an analysis of the lessons identified from ongoing CSDP military operations and missions, the Progress Catalogue (PC) provides the political level, first and foremost, with bi-annual feedback on the current and projected feasibility of the CSDP Military LoA and the related operational risk. Secondly, based on the identified shortfalls, it defines so-called short-and medium-term High Impact Capability Goals (HICGs). These HICGs provide a precise picture of the military capabilities that need to be developed (and made available) by EU Member States in the short (+ 6 years) and medium terms (+ 15 years) in order to achieve the politically-agreed CSDP Military LoA, by filling in the gaps in the Union’s ‘virtual force profile’.

**CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN (CDP)**

The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established in 2004 in order to foster the development of those missing military capabilities and to support the necessary research, acquisition and armament. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is the Head of the Agency and a ministerial Steering Board decides on all strategic matters. The EDA’s main tool is the Capability Development Plan (CDP), which complements the CDM/EU Headline Goal Process from a bottom-up perspective. The CDP was installed in 2008 and has been updated at irregular intervals since then. The CDP regularly receives from the EUMC, the results of the latest EU Headline Goal Process cycle, comprising the actual military capability shortfalls and the lessons from CSDP military operations and missions, both of which generate the respective short-and medium-term HICGs. In addition the CDP takes into account the current and medium-term national and collaborative capability development and armament programmes of the Member States, which adds an industrial perspective. Lastly, the CDP incorporates a long-term future military capability perspective by including the results of various studies. The latest results of the CDP are the eleven EU Capability Development Priorities 2018. Those priorities deliver a comprehensive picture of
what capabilities need to be developed in a common effort by all EU MS with the support of relevant EU initiatives and processes. The EU capability development priorities include all HICGs, which are directly related to the LoA. Socalled 'Strategic Context Cases' (SCCs) have been developed to facilitate the achievement of the eleven priorities. They provide a comprehensive view, including an industrial and 'Research and Technology' perspective, on every priority by defining road maps ('avenues of approach') and highlighting collaborative opportunities. All in all, the CDP, together with several other EDA initiatives, such as the research and technology (R&T) centred EDA Capability Technology Groups and Overarching Strategic Research Agenda, underpin the EDA’s important current role as the EU’s primary ‘capability development forum’, which provides for a structured dialogue between the ‘top-down’ capability planning perspective and the ‘bottom-up’ capability development perspective, and includes the industrial, R&T and national viewpoints.

The eleven Capability Development Priorities are currently the key yardstick for all EU capability development initiatives. This includes three initiatives that have developed rapidly since 2016: the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF).

**COORDINATED ANNUAL REVIEW ON DEFENCE (CARD)**

The CARD monitors the implementation of the EU Capability Development Priorities, developing a comprehensive picture of the European capability landscape and identifying collaborative opportunities in a bottom-up approach. Similarly to the EU Headline Goal Process, CARD follows a continuous cyclical rhythm in its related structured dialogue with the Member States. A bi-annual report for ministers is the key product, which provides comprehensive feedback and serves as an orientation tool and key reference for the Member States in all capability-development-related matters. The first CARD report was released and agreed at Ministerial level in November 2020. This report provided a full picture of the defence planning, armament and capability priorities and programmes as well as the force and operational profiles of the EU Member States, and also including NATO and national perspectives and the key medium-term trends. In detail, the CARD report delivered a first comprehensive picture of the European defence landscape including capability development, R&T efforts, the defence industry support dimension and operational aspects. The report recommends closer cooperation and integration of Member states in the areas of defence spending, defence planning and defence cooperation and identified six focus areas for future capability development as well as three priority areas for operational collaborative opportunities for the short and medium term future. All in all, this will help politicians to take necessary decisions and provide guidance on the defence and security-related matters of Member States and the Union in the future.

**PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION (PESCO)**

The PESCO focuses primarily on generating the ‘operational availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of forces for the CSDP’, which from the very start of the EU CSDP has been identified as a key pre-requisite.
for the achievement of the EU CSDP Military LoA. The instrument itself was introduced in the Lisbon Treaty, but it underwent a significant ‘re-initialisation’ from 2016. The PESCO is based on ‘more binding commitments’ that could lead in the medium term to a real integration of defence capabilities. The participating Member States undertook, among other things, to regularly increase defence budgets in real terms, to increase defence investment expenditure to 20%, and defence research and technology to 2%, respectively, of total defence spending and, not least, to make available formations, which are strategically deployable, for the realisation of the EU LoA, in addition to a potential deployment of an EUBG. As a result, PESCO has the potential to become a key tool for filling the EU’s currently ‘virtual’ force structure, step by step, by making truly ‘connected’ force elements and capabilities available to the Union in order to create a "Full Spectrum Force Package. National implementation plans are subject to regular supervision by a joint PESCO secretariat and in the meantime

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37 Council Decision establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of Participating Member States, Brussels, 08 December 2017, (14866/17) and Protocol 10 TEU
some three dozen PESCO projects of different magnitude are part of the portfolio. PESCO projects that support projects under the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP)\(^{38}\) or the European Defence Fund (EDF)\(^{39}\) will benefit from an increased level of funding, which ultimately brings a new player into the field of military capability development, the European Commission (EC).

**EUROPEAN DEFENCE FUND (EDF)**

The EDIDP and its successor, the EDF, both stem from Juncker’s Commission, when the EC proposed a European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) with a European Defence Fund (EDF) tailored to common European priorities to support industrial and technical development in the EU with a focus on multinational defence-related programmes. This is in line with the EUGS, which underlines that ‘Member States need the technological and industrial means to acquire and sustain those capabilities which underpin their ability to act autonomously.’\(^{40}\) In 2017, as a preparatory measure, the EDIDP was created with EUR 500 million of funding to be used in 2019 and 2020. The next multiannual financial framework (MFF) of the EU, starting in 2021, will contain a chapter on ‘security and defence’, and the ‘defence’ item will include significant subsidies for the EDF over the next 7 years (2021-2027). Moreover, the Von der Leyen Commission continued on this path and centralised the related responsibilities in a newly-established Directorate-General ‘Defence Industry and Space’ (DG DEFIS). DG DEFIS will be responsible for implementation and oversight of the European Defence Fund, continuing development of an open and competitive European defence equipment market and, not least, improving the crucial link between space and defence and security.

This new development is aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), which is a crucial cornerstone of the necessary strategic sovereignty for achieving the politically-agreed LoA. After nearly two decades of significantly declining defence spending in Europe, measures are now to be taken to safeguard a minimum level of (defence) industrial autonomy so that the technological and industrial base meets Europe’s security and defence needs. The EC initiatives mainly consist of two distinct but complementary windows: the research window for providing financial support for joint defence research, e.g. through preparatory actions, and the capability window, for turning research results into capabilities and supporting the joint acquisition of defence products. The EDIDP and the EDF are both currently following a bottom-up approach by calling for proposals on certain ‘topics’ of strategic interest to the EU; in this context, and when it comes to the assessment of project proposals, the EU Capability Development Priorities, including the High Impact Capability Goals, play an important role, in addition to relevant industrial policy considerations.

**CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD**

The common starting-point and the goal for all capability development efforts is a commonly agreed political ambition which defines common goals and interests and agrees on a common perception of the world and its threats and

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opportunities. This ambition of the Union does not consist of 27 individual national ambitions, nor does it seek to enforce a single supra-national perspective. The future of EU capability development may instead lie, according to the new High Representative, in a way of gradually ‘sharing’ sovereignty in the area of capability development:

‘Our historical project does not -as it is often believed or presented- aim at abolishing the sovereignty of European states in favor of a kind of a super European state. It has a very precise objective: to enable European states to do collectively what we can no longer do alone. That is what Europe is all about. Doing together what we can no longer do alone. It means sharing sovereignty, but sometimes the less formal sovereignty you have, the more autonomous you are to take decisions.’

Currently, ongoing political discussions on the further implementation of the EUGS (‘strategic compass’) may help to create a better understanding of goals, objectives and challenges for the Union. This endeavour is based on a first comprehensive EU level 360 degree threat analysis that deals with a broad range of threats and challenges in the coming five to ten years. Based on this, political discussions will help Member States agree on a common direction on security and defence in the next year. Agreeing together on ‘what can no longer be done alone’ will significantly help shape the Union’s security and defence profile in the future and subsequently define more precise and more accepted planning goals for civilian and military capability developers.

The Integrated Approach as advocated by the EUGS (‘linking up different EU instruments in a coordinated way, building on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach and promoting civil-military cooperation’) can only be effective in the future CSDP field if it has been coherently prepared by joined-up planning and the development of capabilities with a medium-term perspective. This will require increased and multi-dimensional coherence between civilian and military capability development processes and initiatives. In this regard, promising results were achieved in 2019 with the first ‘integrated revision’ of a civil-military ‘stabilisation and capacity building’ scenario, in the context of the revision of the Requirements Catalogue. Especially with a view to the evolving hybrid threat, further capability planning activities should increasingly transform the CSDP civ-mil cooperation from co-existence into a mutually supporting relationship, in order to achieve additional CSDP civ-mil synergies. Capabilities that have been planned and developed together will be more easily and efficiently deployed and used together.

In addition to that, coherence between the planning and development aspects of both civilian and military capability development must be enhanced by fostering a structured dialogue between the bottom-up development and top-down planning perspectives. Having the same timelines, taxonomies and conceptual and procedural principles are key prerequisites for the efficient conduct of harmonised national and EU-level processes. This requires coherence between all relevant EU initiatives and processes, and the compatibility of process inputs and outputs with all of the relevant capability development processes of partner organisations, such as NATO.

In addition, due to the time required for developing capabilities, this requires strategic foresight and a suitable and efficient format for periodic revision and agreement of the LoA by the political level. Answering the question ‘What do we have to develop now because it will be required in the future?’ will require consultation and substantial coordination and cohesion of efforts between all involved actors. The maximum involvement of the EU’s existing strategic foresight capability in this process is essential.

41 Josep Borrell, speech at the Raisina dialogue 2020, New Delhi, 16 January 2020
Since the release of the EUGS, significant political momentum has been driving EU civilian and military capability development. The main root cause of the ‘renaissance’ of these activities for strengthening EU CSDP lies in the ‘emergence and escalation of conflicts around the Union and the persistence of instability and transnational threats and challenges’. Current horizon-scanning activities do not predict an improvement of this situation until the medium term. The COVID-19 crisis and its global impact as well as its effects on EU Member States and all European citizens reaffirm the need for a broad approach to security and the vital link between external and internal aspects of security and defence.

At the end of the day, all current EU civilian and military capability development initiatives and processes will be measured by their outcomes, which must initially be achieved, at the latest, within the timeframe of the next MFF (until 2027) so as to meet the expectations of the European public. This conclusion will be compounded by the fact that due to the COVID19 related economic challenges lying ahead public investment in Member States will likely face serious fiscal constraints in the next years. However, this reinforces the need for clear focus and priority in civilian and military capability planning and enhancing efficiency by maximum cooperation in capability development. The measurement of success will focus exclusively on the very core of capability development, which is the question: ‘Have the right capabilities been developed and are they ready for use?’. Only by achieving this will Europe be able to ‘learn the language of power’43, which the new High Representative considers to be necessary in order to safeguard the ‘European’ approach of multilateralism and to tackle the future challenges to our peace, freedom and prosperity.

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42 Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, Brussels, 19 November 2018, (14305/18), page 2
43 Joseph Borrell, speech at the Raisina dialogue 2020, New Delhi, 16 January 2020
From the beginning of March up to the time of writing, the Covid-19 pandemic has been the top agenda item for European and world leaders. This pandemic has highlighted the urgent need for solidarity and whole-of-government approaches to containing and ultimately eradicating the disease. Although only a few European countries have declared ‘war’ on the virus, armed forces have been on the coronavirus frontline almost everywhere on the continent. More often armed with bags of essential food rather than guns, European armed forces are proving key to fighting the spread of the virus.

Military forces are trained to mobilise quickly in crisis situations. Military exercises often simulate public health crises and test armies’ abilities to set up an operation in tough conditions, with limited resources and at short notice. Investments in military readiness and preparedness are proving their worth through armed forces’ contributions, such as building hospitals, transporting supplies, performing repatriation and evacuation operations, carrying out border management and assisting law enforcement. The capabilities currently deployed by European armies for medical purposes demonstrate the usefulness of pre-emptive research and development investments in strategic defence capabilities. The military response to Covid-19 also showcases how the military can complement civilian efforts not only in healthcare and logistics, but also in social welfare and humanitarian assistance. Such efforts see military helicopters becoming air ambulances and soldiers becoming shop assistants for the elderly. As with other disasters before it, the pandemic is highlighting the human face of the military.

ARMED FORCES TO THE RESCUE

In 2016, the EU Global Strategy acknowledged the need for effective ‘prevention, detection and responses to global pandemics’. While only some countries declared an official state of emergency (Figure 2), the armed forces have been among the first responders in almost all Member States. Non-exhaustive examples of key military contributions in various Member States are outlined below. The selection aims for broad geographical coverage, but also to illustrate the different military responses.

In Italy, one of the European countries hardest hit by the virus, the army was deployed in mid-March 2020, at first to help enforce the lockdown. Part of ‘Operazione Strade Sicure’, the armed forces were made available to respond to the crisis. Progressively, medical staff from the armed forces were assigned to assist hospitals, and the Italian Air Force was quickly mobilised to repatriate Europeans (not just Italians) stranded abroad. The air force was also engaged in transporting medical supplies and patients across Europe.
Several field hospitals were set up with the help of the armed forces, including those in Piacenza and Crema, built in just 72 hours. Lastly, Italian soldiers distributed thousands of surgical masks, gloves and sanitising gels and helped with the disinfection of public spaces.

The German Bundeswehr mobilised around 15000 soldiers to support civilian facilities with the testing and processing of patients. The German Luftwaffe also engaged in transporting intensivecare patients from around Europe to be treated in Germany and transporting donated equipment – an important sign of solidarity, according to its Defence Minister. The Bundeswehr’s procurement office played its part in helping to fast-track orders of protection equipment for health workers.

France’s ‘Opération Résilience’ was launched to coordinate the armed forces’ role in the effort to tackle the pandemic. The military has built field hospitals in one of the most severely affected French regions, the Grand Est. Moreover, the French Navy has been deployed to engage in healthcare support missions in the French Overseas Territories.
The Spanish equivalent of the French operation is ‘Operación Balmis’. As Spain became one of the countries most affected by Covid-19, the government deployed over 57,000 troops. In addition to the provision of logistical support, the Spanish armed forces also assisted with disinfecting transport infrastructure, hospitals and nursing homes and by installing shelters for homeless people. The army provided additional support to food banks and delivered essentials such as food, water and medical equipment to citizens in need.

In Belgium, military staff have provided assistance to overwhelmed and understaffed care givers in homes for the elderly. Belgian armed forces have also carried out repatriation and evacuation missions, for example flying 53 Europeans from Niger back to their Member States. Finland was among the first EU countries to make use of its military staff to reinforce public order and implement the lockdown measures, by contributing to traffic control, for example. In Hungary, special military task forces have been charged with monitoring the operational safety of 140 companies providing essential services. Besides assisting with logistical support and medical transport, the Romanian military is also providing food and water supplies to quarantined citizens. Armed forces were further tasked with reinforcing border controls and disinfecting busy roads. In Poland, the military has not only helped with logistics and law enforcement, but also assisted the government’s psychological support helpline for people in quarantine and for coronavirus patients.

The Nordic countries, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland, set an example by opting to reinforce their military cooperation in fighting the pandemic. Their respective defence ministers agreed to cooperate in joint evacuations, air transport support and information sharing. As experts note, ‘Europe can only achieve military power in concert’. It can therefore only get the best out of its armed forces in responding to the coronavirus crisis in a coordinated manner. The European Air Transport Command, a seven-member military air transport organisation, has also commanded and controlled air mobility missions, including medical evacuation, repatriation and delivery of medical supplies.

EU Member States’ military responses to the crisis were discussed by video-conference in the defence configuration of the Foreign Affairs Council on 6 April 2020. As a result, EU Defence Ministers mandated the creation of a dedicated task force at the level of the EU Military Staff. This is meant to temporarily support and facili-
tate information exchange among Member States’ armed forces on military assistance in support of civilian authorities to help fight the coronavirus pandemic. The task force will also bolster strategic communications efforts, and identify best practices and lessons learned for the future. General Claudio Graziano, Chair of the EU Military Committee, confirmed the close involvement of all chiefs of defence in EU Member States. He noted that taking account of lessons learned and increasing European armed forces’ capacity will become a priority, to be reflected also in future EU defence initiatives.

IMPACT ON EU DEFENCE AMBITIONS

With the International Monetary Fund predicting that global growth in 2020 will fall by -3% and the World Economic Forum warning of an economic shock more severe than the 2008 global financial crisis or the Great Depression, there is no doubt that defence spending will suffer. The latter tends to be the ‘sacrificial lamb’, as one expert put it, during economic crises and governmental efforts to save money. This was the case for EU countries recovering from the 2008 financial crisis, whose defence budgets started to recover only as a result of the deteriorating post-2014 security environment. Experts also draw attention to potentially misleading growth percentages in countries’ spending in the upcoming period. Recession-induced lower gross domestic product (GDP) in absolute terms could appear to increase the shares of GDP assigned to specific spending categories such as defence.

The NATO spending target of 2% of GDP on defence is considered unlikely to be met by all Allies in the immediate aftermath of the coronavirus crisis. However, not everyone agrees with the need to maintain or increase defence budgets. Looking at the case of the United Kingdom, critics contrast the vast amounts spent on defence with spending on threats such as pandemics or climate change.

IMPACT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

Defence industrial cooperation and integration programmes developed by the EU since 2016 are likely to see their funding impacted as the negotiations for the EU’s next multiannual financial framework (MFF) unfold in the context of coronavirus-ravaged economies. Recent budgetary proposals had already reduced the amounts earmarked for initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF), military mobility and the European Peace Facility before the pandemic hit Europe. It remains to be seen how they will fare in the European Commission’s upcoming revised MFF proposal, given that negotiations had to be finalised in 2020.

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), another flagship EU military and defence integration initiative, is fully dependent on the 25 participating Member States’ financial contributions. If national defence budgets suffer reductions, PESCO will too. Paradoxically, several of the 47 PESCO projects adopted, if funded appropriately, could strengthen Member States’ preparedness if or when another public health crisis hits. One example is the European Medical Command. This project is aimed at providing a centralised medical capability to coordinate military medical resources across Member States, but also to ‘create a common operational medical picture, enhance the procurement of critical medical resources and contribute to harmonising national medical standards’. The objective is for the Command to be operational in 2021. Other examples of projects that could be useful at least in part in such a crisis can be seen in Figure 3, and include in particular the ‘Special Operations Forces Medical Training Centre’, the ‘Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) Defence Training Range’, and the ‘Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package’.

For its part, the EDF and its two precursor programmes, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) and the Preparatory Action on Defence Research, can also contribute
to a Union that is better prepared to face future challenges, including pandemics. The 2019/2020 EDIDP work programme focused on key priority areas such as CBRN, the mobility of forces and artificial intelligence. The 2020 call for proposals specifically included a category on CBRN medical countermeasures, such as preventive and therapeu-
tic immunotherapy, for example.

Military mobility – a flagship PESCO project, European Commission action plan and goal under EU-NATO cooperation – could also be viewed in light of its capacity to enable the smooth and swift transport of military assets and equipment. In a health crisis, it would thus facilitate the much needed rapid transport of essentials and patients whether by road, rail, air or waterborne transport. Experts therefore argue that the Covid-19 crisis serves ‘to further underline that more defence cooperation is needed’. Cutting funding for strat-
egic capabilities that the EU and its Members currently lack would leave them in a considerably weaker position for tackling future crises.

IMPACT ON DEFENCE INDUSTRY

As for many other industries, defence will also suffer as a result of shutdowns caused by the coronavirus crisis. Defence association Finabel reports a historical fall in the stock market prices of EU defence companies, leading to possible debt increases. Manufacturing blockages could negatively affect supply chains and disrupt defence research and development activities, delay shipments of defence products, and limit available technical expertise. One report warns that coun-

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**SUPPORT FUNCTION**

- Support for health care and health security
- Logistics and transportation of goods and/or persons
- Humanitarian aid and support for law enforcement
- Fighting malicious online activity

**PESCO PROJECT NAME**

1. European Medical Command
2. Special Operations Forces Medical Training Centre
3. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) Defence Training Range
4. Materials and components for technological EU competitiveness
5. Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package
6. EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core
7. Harbour and Maritime Surveillance and Protection
8. Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance
9. EU Collaborative Warfare Capabilities
10. Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform
11. Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security
12. Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre

Number of Member States participating

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Source: EPRS
tries more severely affected by the pandemic could be slowed down as regards developing key capabilities such as artificial intelligence. Transferring money to health-related priorities, Member States are already cancelling orders for military equipment. Declining military spending will thus be directly linked to a weakened European defence technological industrial base.

The crisis could nevertheless be transformed into an opportunity to restructure and strengthen Europe’s defence industries. Another analysis envisions a possible ‘reshaping of the defence technology ecosystem’, which could become more favourable to new and innovative defence suppliers, including suppliers with healthcare-oriented solutions.

**POST-CORONAVIRUS GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE**

If the EU’s pre-coronavirus geopolitical environment was unfriendly, post-coronavirus it might become even more so. As one think-tank writes, Covid-19 is not going to kill geopolitics. Ongoing conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, as well as challenges in the Balkans, will persist or even be aggravated as a consequence of the pandemic. For instance, Russia reportedly flew strategic bombers further south than usual across the North, Norwegian and Barents Seas several times in March 2020. Peacekeeping forces in conflict areas have also seen their activity limited in recent weeks, a gap which could be exploited by ill-intentioned parties. The prevalence of dis- and misinformation has spiralled since the outbreak and could exacerbate social discontent over economic difficulties, government responses and solidarity.

The alleged ‘crisis of solidarity’ is thought to have eroded EU ambitions for increased freedom of action or strategic autonomy. Preventing a deterioration in the EU’s credibility and capacity to face threats, it is argued, would require ‘continued investment in the EU as a full-spectrum power’, including in its defence capabilities. Other experts express caution about potential cuts in strategic areas leaving ‘Europeans more vulnerable in the near future’ and exposed to threats. The European Commission’s April 2020 communication on the global response to the coronavirus shows an awareness of the impact on international security. It thus aims to soften it with targeted funding to increase external partners’ resilience. When geopolitical weaknesses could be further exposed by the coronavirus crisis, the security of EU partners is even more directly connected to its own.

**CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS**

The importance of maintaining an EU presence where the missions and operations under its common security and defence policy (CSDP) are deployed was underscored at the 6 April 2020 Foreign Affairs Council. High Representative Josep Borrell announced that some missions might see a reduction in staff and activities limited as a result of Covid-19. The latter include limiting meetings, visits and training sessions considered non-essential. He confirmed that Operations Althea and Atalanta will continue to operate at 100 % capacity, while highlighting the importance and timeliness of launching Operation EUNAVFORMED IRINI. The outbreak has, unfortunately, not spared staff deployed to CSDP missions and has even compelled certain EU countries to recall some of their military staff deployed abroad. Although civilian CSDP missions have adopted precautionary measures and reduced or adapted operational activities, indispensable functions continue digitally.

The EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its operations but with limited personnel movement to contain the virus. In Palestine, the EU Border Assistance Mission reallocated funds to donate a thermal imaging fever system to support the Palestinian authorities. The latter are also making use of a mobile clinic, previously donated by the CSDP mission, to screen citizens in the West Bank. The EU capacity-building mission in Mali provided training for the Malian
COVID-19
LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EU SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The EU is reflecting on key lessons and implications that the COVID-19 pandemic presents for its security and defence. The aim is to be ready to confront possible security consequences of the current pandemic and to become better prepared and resilient for the future.

The armed forces of European Member States play a crucial role in addressing the pandemic, by supporting civilian actors and providing cross-border support. Outside EU borders, the EU continues to support our partners also through EU military and civilian missions and operations. For example, the EU’s missions in Sahel and Niger support local authorities by providing equipment and raising awareness, e.g. working with radio stations.

- **PARTNERSHIPS**
  - Enhanced global competition demands strong multilateralism, with the United Nations at its core
  - Closer coordination with NATO, e.g. looking for synergies and avoiding duplications
  - Dialogue and cooperation with all international partners to cope with the pandemic
  - Coordination with partners on the ground (13 of the 17 EU CSOP missions and operations share the same theatre with UN missions)

- **SOLIDARITY**
  - EU Member States armed forces are helping each other
  - EEAS Task Force supports and facilitates information exchange on national military assistance to civilian authorities

- **RESPONSIVENESS**
  - Monitoring possible impact on the security and stability beyond EU borders - such as terrorism, e.g. in the Sahel
  - Our EU missions and operations need to be adaptable to changing circumstances and help partners
  - Fast track planning and decisions-making procedures
  - Making best use of our EEAS Early Warning System for conflict prevention and enhance if necessary

- **CAPABILITIES**
  - Identify options for EU civilian missions to contribute to the EU response to the pandemic
  - PESCO projects can generate collaborative projects enhancing the Union’s preparedness and resilience
  - European Defence Fund and Military Mobility need to be adequately funded, will also help EU’s economic recovery
  - EEAS - incl. Military Staff - could undertake stocktaking analysis to evaluate critical capabilities and existing gaps

- **PREPAREDNESS**
  - Addressing vulnerabilities e.g. in cyber, hybrid, disinformation, or Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats
  - Coordinated civil-military response, e.g. through exercises and training
  - Improving the protection of the EU’s internal information and communication networks
authorities in the fight against the pandemic and donated essential medical equipment. Also in Mali, and despite having limited its activities, the EU training mission continues to implement its mandate. In Ukraine, the EU’s advisory mission organised webinars and lectures to share good practices in tackling the pandemic. Lastly, experts argue that the newly launched IRINI operation and the civilian advisory mission in the Central African Republic will be crisis management tests for an EU grappling with the pandemic. Existing CSDP missions and operations might have to consider incorporating a public health and security dimension to their mandate, in addition to police, administrative and security sector reform.

CONCLUSION

Remarkable efforts have so far been made by countries in Europe and beyond, with military forces usually part of the response. Nonetheless, as stated by the chairs of external policies committees in the European Parliament, more international cooperation and solidarity is needed. The coronavirus crisis has also shown that investment in military preparedness, equipment and training can pay off when a crisis hits, as capabilities to protect citizens can be deployed in multiple scenarios, from CSDP missions to repatriation and building hospitals. As the EU is currently in a process of reflecting on its role in the world, the Covid-19 pandemic will certainly give political leaders food for thought.

Equally remarkable was the added value of EU-NATO cooperation that was demonstrated during the crisis. The pandemic not only saw the EU’s crisis response mechanisms converge with NATO’s but it also demonstrated the acute need for civil-military perspectives. The new threats faced by both organisations cannot be fully addressed with either one’s instruments alone. Therefore the rationale for a much closer cooperation between the two is as strong as it ever was. The EU’s Strategic Compass process and the NATO2030 agenda - likely leading to a new NATO strategic concept - recognise the nature of these new threats. It remains to be seen how they will translate into policy.
8.3. CASE STUDY: CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS IMPACT ON SECURITY

by Luiza-Iulia Pufu

From immediate crisis to emergency and back – dealing with the economic and financial crisis, managing the flow of irregular migration or coping for the first time with a Member State’s decision to leave the Union – the EU has barely had the chance to address in depth one of the long-term issues which it pioneered more than a decade ago, the impact of climate change on security.

A CLIMATE-RELATED PERSPECTIVE

What was once seen as a future-generation problem is now a visible phenomenon\(^1\). Disasters caused by extreme weather have multiplied around the world and Europe is no exception. Southern and Central Europe are facing frequent heat waves, droughts and wildfires, while winter floods are becoming ever more common in Northern Europe\(^2\). European citizens living in urban areas are more exposed to health risks, while the costs for society and the economy have increased as a result of climate damage caused to infrastructure and sectors such as agriculture and tourism. Increased awareness of the human impact on the environment among EU citizens has translated into mobilisation through platforms against global warming and a high turnout at the May 2019 EP elections, in which the Green parties registered an unexpected success. Although many other hot topics make the news, the Eurobarometer shows that climate change is the second main concern at EU and national level, overtaking international terrorism\(^3\). Therefore in order to keep the public engaged and supportive security issues, the latter need to be approached from a climate-related perspective as well. Such an approach makes sense since the long-term effects of climate change are a ubiquitous silent long-term threat and are more disruptive than limited and isolated security threats.

All of the above factors call for renewed action at EU level. The new Commission has made the European Green Deal a top political guideline priority, with the goal of becoming the first climate-neutral continent by 2050.\(^4\) The Green Deal aims to introduce measures that would enable EU citizens and businesses to benefit from the green transition in all sectors of economy, including energy, industry, mobility and biodiversity.

CLIMATE CHANGE IS A THREAT MULTIPLIER

As well as placing a green transition to a more competitive economy high on the agenda, the EU has drawn attention to the need to acknowledge the broader adverse effects of climate change on

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\(^1\) https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/epsc_-_10_trends_transforming_climate_and_energy.pdf
\(^2\) https://ec.europa.eu/clima/change/consequences_en
\(^3\) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6839
security. In terms of climate-related risks to security, the Green Deal\(^5\) reflects what was set out in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, describing climate change as a threat multiplier, a phenomenon that bolsters existing security risks and a source of instability, and committing the EU to working towards increased environmental resilience. It refers to climate action as an EU external action objective, including in the context of CSDP. Soon after taking up his position, the EU High Representative, Josep Borrell, renewed the EU’s ambition to take the lead in the fight against climate change, stating that climate action is a key priority in the EU’s external action, along with cooperation with partner countries\(^6\).

### THE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS

The EU already had a track record in flagging climate security threats, a report on the issue having been issued more than a decade ago by the then High Representative Javier Solana\(^7\). In 2016, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) introduced an integrated approach to climate and security, highlighting the link between security risks and climate change, and calling for a new approach. Implementing the EUGS directly translates into the shaping of EU Climate Diplomacy, where Member States and EU institutions jointly define a vision and priorities for action. This is articulated in the form of the Climate Diplomacy Action Plan, comprising 3 main strands:

* Strand 1: Advocate climate change as a strategic priority in diplomatic dialogues, public diplomacy and external policy instruments.

* Strand 2: Support post-Paris action on the ground.

* Strand 3: Address the nexus between climate change, natural resources, prosperity, stability and migration.

More recently, the climate-security nexus has been reflected in the FAC Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy in 2019 and 2020\(^8\). For the first time, in its Conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy of June 2019\(^9\), the Council acknowledged the relevance of climate change for CSDP missions and operations, including its impact on military capability planning and development in relation to the climate-security nexus.

While the impact of climate change on security has been in the spotlight in terms of discussions at EU level, the defence dimension has been somewhat neglected, though it is directly linked to security. The question to be posed is whether the broad spectrum of strategies and tools at the EU’s disposal, including CSDP missions and operations, are sufficient or adequate to prevent and address climate security risks.

A report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute\(^10\) shows that eight out of the ten countries hosting the most multilateral peace operations personnel in 2018 are located in areas highly exposed to climate change. Conflicts driven by climate change in different regions include conflicts over resources, environmentally triggered migration, and tensions over water and energy supply\(^11\). All of these are likely to lead to an increased demand for the urgent deployment of CSDP missions and operations. Such scenarios, in which CSDP missions and operations would have to provide humanitarian assistance or cope with disaster manage-

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ment, require further consideration of the role of missions and operations. Training courses on climate-related aspects in the defence context will become essential.

**INCREASING ENERGY EFFICIENCY**

Based on the EU Green Deal goals, CSDP missions and operations should also aim at energy efficiency and work towards reducing their carbon and environmental footprint. Knowing that energy is the backbone of defence and crisis management, reducing fossil fuel consumption and identifying new alternative energy sources/renewables would challenge the ‘mission-first’ principle/effectiveness of operations in the short to medium term, while at the same time reducing costs and decreasing emissions and dependence on non-EU resources.

In line with the Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, in order to further integrate effective responses to climate security risks across policy areas it is important to strengthen the link between early warning and early action. This could be achieved by further integrating climate-related risks into conflict analysis and into the early warning and conflict prevention instruments.

**CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT**

With regard to the EU’s initiatives in the field of capability development, climate-related issues could be discussed in future PESCO projects. The PESCO strategic review in 2020 provides the opportunity to assess Member States’ efforts to address climate change in existing projects. The European Defence Fund could also provide more opportunities to tackle climate change in
Climate change may undermine peace and security
Climate change exacerbates existing pressures on security as well as bringing new challenges, and the potential for violent conflict could increase. The operational responsibilities of the defence sector could also expand in the event of large-scale climate-driven disasters.
the defence area. In view of the unpredictable future weather conditions, consideration should be given to adjusting EU capabilities.

International cooperation is key when it comes to addressing climate-related risks more effectively. The EU is already leading in terms of meeting the Paris agreement goals, with the expectation that it will become climate-neutral by 2050. Such an achievement would give the EU the opportunity to advance the idea of including defence aspects within the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), the key instrument in achieving its targets up to now.

Considering the impact of climate change in Africa and the Middle East and its security dimension, as well as the consequences that it triggers for the EU, of which irregular migration is a core issue for the Southern Neighbourhood, extensive means of cooperation should be urgently reviewed.

Further on, the EU will have to translate its strategies into action, a task that will most probably face several challenges in terms of being agreed among Member States and given the EU’s limited competences in the security and defence field. For example, agreeing the framework regarding the NDCs required a decision at the highest level in the European Council.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE MILITARY

Whilst there is general acceptance amongst the military community that climate change is a threat multiplier and should be factored into future security scenarios, it could be argued – with some degree of justification – that climate security considerations have little direct bearing on contemporary military operations in general, and CSDP military operations and missions in particular. There are, nonetheless, a number of important aspects that should be highlighted.

a) Improving Operational Effectiveness & Reducing the Carbon Footprint
The ‘European Union Military Concept on Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency for EU-led military operations’ is intended to facilitate a reduction in the energy consumption of CSDP operations and missions.

b) Helping to Build Resilience, Supporting Adaptation
When developing the conflict risks and response options, more systematic consideration should be given to the role of the host nation’s military/security forces, and to identifying possibilities of working with them to support initiatives fighting climate change.

c) Support to Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief
Support to Humanitarian Assistance (SHA) is one of the tasks listed in the Lisbon CSDP task catalogue, which is included in the Capability Development Plan (CDP). The SHA is a small-scale scenario, including tasks for Disaster Relief and Consequence management, and covers operations up to brigade equivalent, including appropriate naval and air capabilities.

d) Military Engagement in Climate Diplomacy
The impact of climate change as a threat multiplier will be magnified significantly in the future, so the military have a strong self-interest in advocating urgent mitigation action as the ultimate form of conflict prevention.

But, in the end, however attractive and in line with the EU’s objectives ‘greening the military’ may be, it is difficult to envisage a complete transition towards ecologically oriented missions and operations taking place in the near future, especially when the opponent faces no limitations on its continued use of primary energy sources.

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15 EEAS 13758/12, 14 September 2012
8.4. CASE STUDY: DIGITALISATION OF DEFENCE

by Daniel Fiott

Any discussion of the digitalisation of defence is hampered by the imprecision of the associated terms and words. ‘Cyber’, ‘the cloud’, ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT), ‘block chain’ and ‘quantum computing’ are widely used but their exact meaning or application can be quite fuzzy. The truth is that we may be intellectually ill-equipped to understand the full intricacies and implications of digitalisation, even if the economic rationale for digitalisation is clear.

In fact, estimates show that the digitalisation of products and services could add more than €110 billion to industrial revenue in Europe over a relatively short time frame of five years, and thus it is easy to see why the economic rationale for greater digitalisation is so powerful. Yet digitalisation is clearly not just about economics and the geopolitical ramifications of a proliferation of digital technologies are becoming a mainstay of international politics today. The assumption is that the competition to control new technologies, and the willingness to use them to gain an advantage over other states, underlines the growing importance of ‘digital power’. It is for this reason that the European Commission has stated that it is imperative for the EU to establish ‘technological sovereignty’ in areas of key strategic importance such as defence, space, mobile networks (5G and 6G) and quantum computing.

DIGITALISATION OF ARMED FORCES IS ESSENTIAL

What digitalisation means for defence is perhaps even more unclear. While the process has accelerated since the 1970s, and armed forces are no strangers to the need to adapt to and integrate new informatics systems and processes, the modernisation and digitalisation of Europe’s armed forces is essential. Without the technological command of digital technologies, Europe could lose international influence and political autonomy. In this respect, the fact that the continent is projected to need to spend $120-$140 billion on the modernisation and digitalisation of its armed forces in the coming years (or $20-$30 billion annually) is a daunting and pressing challenge.

Indeed, this very issue was the focus of a May 2019 food for thought paper published by Finland, Estonia, France, Germany and the Netherlands. These countries implied that Europe’s militaries cannot fully function in an information dense operational environment where actors that can effectively harness computing, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and data are likely to have a military advantage.

In addition to this member state-backed food for thought paper, the European Commission released its long awaited ‘digital package’ on 19 February 2020, detailing how Europe could reap

1 The article is based on a publication by the European Union Institute for Security Studies. Source of the original article: https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/digitalising-defence
the benefits of AI, computing power and data spaces while simultaneously managing the risks of those technologies. The communications on ‘shaping Europe’s digital future’ and a ‘European data strategy’, plus the white paper on AI, do not really mention defence.\(^3\) With the 10 March release of the new EU Industrial Strategy, however, synergies between civil and defence technologies will be further explored.\(^4\) Even though the European Defence Agency (EDA) is already studying the ramifications of digitalisation for defence, this broader industrial approach by the Commission is understandable given the wider relevance of digitalisation to European society. Nevertheless, these initiatives do beg two interrelated questions:

1. How might digitalisation affect the way Europe’s armed forces plan and act?
2. What should defence planners in Europe do to benefit from digitalisation while also managing the inevitable risks?

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### DEFINITIONAL IMPRECISION

Discussions about digitalisation can be blighted by a lack of definitional clarity. We must first distinguish between *digitisation* and *digitalisation*.

**Digitisation** refers to the basic process of converting analogue data and information into bytes or lines of binary code (e.g., transforming an old printed photograph into a JPEG file). Digitisation allows computers to process, communicate and store information more flexibly and efficiently.

**Digitalisation**, however, is the term given to collective technological advances in computing power, data collection, processing and storage, and networking between computer devices. Digitalisation is therefore a transformational process that may alter how Europeans live and how they plan for future wars and conflict.

Armed forces in Europe are more than familiar with digitisation and digitalisation as they have long used computers to manage logistics and supply inventories, wage payments and the maintenance of personnel records. Military intelligence has also long profited from computer technology, e.g., Turing and Welchman’s Enigma decryption computers in the 1940s, and since the 1960s armies have used computers to perform complex mathematical calculations for artillery and ballistics accuracy. With the invention of the microprocessor in the 1970s, militaries steadily began to use computers for command and control (C2) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). In the 1990s, rapidly increasing computing power and masses of data were used to improve battlefield communication between units and strategic command and to enhance precision-strike capabilities, a process known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

Military communications, sensoring, logistics and maintenance and C2 are almost fully computerised and interconnected today, so cyber defence has become a vital element of enhancing the digital resilience of Europe’s armed forces. As military equipment, processes and informatics systems become increasingly intertwined, the potential for cyber-attacks increases. Experiences such as the ‘Conficker’ worm that infected French naval systems in 2009, and which led to the grounding of Rafale jet fighters, clearly need to be avoided. On the back of such experiences, France has pledged €1.6 billion up to 2025 for its cyber defence, but a number of other EU member states and NATO allies have also created Joint Cyber Commands, invested in cyber defence research (e.g., the Netherlands is investing €6.5 million per year) and/or have established cyber exercises and training centres (e.g., Estonia created its centre in April 2019).

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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS VITAL

Most European militaries and defence ministries recognise that international cooperation is vital to their ‘digital defences’. Within NATO, European countries are working towards the Cyber Defence Pledge agreed in July 2016 to enhance allies’ cyber capacities, and the alliance has set up Cyber Rapid Reaction Teams and a Cyberspace Operations Centre. In the EU, there are presently four specific cyber-related projects under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Commission will be making available €17.7 million for cyber situational awareness and defence capability investments under the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) in 2020. As part of the Union’s wider Cyber Defence Policy Framework (CDPF) and Capability Development Plan (CDP), cyber- and digital-related concerns are addressed, including cyber capability development, training and exercises, the protection of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) communication and information systems and more. Bodies such as the EU Military Staff (EUMS) are therefore working on initiatives such as integrating cyber defence training into the EU Battlegroup certification process. Further still, since February 2016 NATO and the EU have been implementing a technical arrangement on cyber defence with a view to exchanging information on cyber emergency responses.

Given the range of initiatives already in place, one might be forgiven for thinking that EU member states and institutions have already designed the ‘code’ needed to help Europe’s armed forces transition to the digital age. However, digitalisation confronts defence ministries and armed forces with unique challenges and questions. Firstly, advances in the cloud, IoT, block chain and quantum computing may have unintended and/or unexpected consequences for the performance of military equipment and capabilities, as well as how defence planners design and conduct operations. Secondly, the use of digital technologies for defence may presuppose changes in military doctrine or challenge the way military hierarchies and defence bureaucra-

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cies have traditionally functioned. Despite the fact that defence firms are producing new digital technological solutions for warfare, defence planners are not entirely sure how – if at all – digitalisation will alter the character of warfare.

DIGITALISATION: NO SILVER BULLET FOR EVERY PROBLEM

Whether technology can ever really fundamentally alter the character of warfare is a well-established debate in scholarly circles. Some would argue that computing power, AI and the wide use of data do little to fundamentally address political sensitivities that run through debates related to capability development, force generation and the use of military force. In this sense, digitalisation should not be seen as some silver bullet for every problem facing Europe’s militaries, and a human dimension will be required for politico-strategic guidance and maintaining the morale of troops, amongst other things. Not overly investing in the hype surrounding technology has been a mainstay of military-theoretical discussions. After the US’s rapid victory over the Iraqi military in the early 1990s, for example, scholars and policymakers lauded the idea that technological mas-
tery in the Global Positioning System (GPS), digital communications, electronic warfare, stealth, satellites and precision-strikes could lead to military superiority. It became apparent after the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, however, that technology could only take US forces so far when counter-insurgency strategies were required instead.

Based on such experiences, there is a fear that digitalisation could be used as a technological ‘sticking plaster’ to deal with intractable politico-strategic problems in warfare. Take data management, for example. European militaries already handle vast amounts of data and they process and use data for logistics, equipment maintenance, personnel health, cost management and locating specific skills and talent (e.g. languages, special training). However, having centrally accessible data sources that can be used rapidly by military leaders across all branches and services is a challenge. While advances in AI are being touted as a means to deal more effectively with data management in the military, research shows that data management processes in the military are still subject to inter-service rivalries, i.e. whichever branch holds data holds power, and a comprehensive data management system does not do away with the need for military leadership (e.g. should more resources be diverted to high performing battalions or soldiers compared with underperforming ones?).

Perhaps one of the more vivid examples of how human behaviour and digitalisation interacts can be seen in how military personnel use digital technologies. Today’s reality is that – just like anybody else – personnel in the armed forces increasingly use social media apps and geo-location services. This comes at a risk. The data and information produced by military personnel using digital technologies may incur a strategic disadvantage. Geo-location services and devices (e.g. smart watches) can hand foreign intelligence services information about where troops are directly based. Additionally, the use of social media to share photos with family members in the pre-deployment phase can be used by intelligence services to ascertain whether a new deployment (especially a covert one) is on its way. Additionally, ‘selfies’ of personnel in barracks or military installations may inadvertently put sensitive information into the public domain (e.g. computer screens in the background). Of course, we could blame technologies for such vulnerabilities but the understanding that new behaviour that is more sensitive to the risks that digital technologies potentially entail needs to take root in Europe’s militaries.

Finally, there are also limitations to the technologies being lauded as having a disruptive effect on defence. Take quantum computing, for instance. This technological domain is already being touted as the next step forward in computing power, and some studies claim that it could revolutionise naval navigation by replacing GPS with atomic clocks or greatly enhance defensive/offensive cryptography capabilities. Quantum computing is seen as a way to overcome the limitations of classical computing because it breaks the strictures of linear coding. Bits and bytes in classical computing can only be a 0 or a 1 at any one time, but quantum’s qubits can be a 0 and a 1 at the same time. This could theoretically allow quantum computing to make many more calculations. Although the calculations are disputed, Google argues that the task that took its 53-qubit computer 200 seconds to perform would take the fastest supercomputer on earth (IBM’s ‘Summit’) 10,000 years. Despite these claims, however, quantum computers require cooling devices no smaller than a van and large amounts of energy; moreover, quantum calculations can result in an error at the slightest change in temperature or electromagnetic conditions. These are hardly attributes that are compatible with a military environment.

THE BUSINESS LANDSCAPE IN THE EU

EUROPEAN STRENGTHS:

A thriving and diversified economy: 26 million active enterprises with some 144 million persons employed in the business economy.

Traditional sectors:
- Construction
- Food & beverage
- Craft Industries
- Textiles
- Publishing & printing
- Manufacturing

The European manufacturing industry accounts for 2 million enterprises and 33 million jobs.

Europe has a world market share of 33% in robotics, 30% in embedded systems, 55% of automotive semiconductors, 20% of semiconductor equipment and 20% of photonics components.

EU investments in the digitalisation of industry from 2016 to 2020: Close to €5 billion, expecting to mobilise at least €50 billion additional public and private investments by Member States, regions and industry.

CHALLENGES:

There are still big differences in the level of digitalisation of industry across sectors, Member States and regions.

Only 1 out of 5 companies across the EU are highly digitised.

Around 50% of large industries and more than 90% of SMEs feel lagging behind in digital innovation.

Europe is lagging behind on online platforms, EU industry cannot afford losing leadership in digital industrial platforms.

90% of future jobs will require some level of digital skills while 44% of Europeans lack basic digital skills.

OPPORTUNITIES:

Digitalisation of products and services can add more than €110 billion of annual revenue for industry in Europe until 2020.

WHAT IS THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION DOING?

The Digitising European Industry strategy (DEI) was launched in April 2016 to reinforce EU's competitiveness in digital technologies and to ensure that every business in Europe – whichever the sector, wherever the location, whatever the size – can fully benefit from digital innovation.

EU investments in the digitalisation of industry from 2016 to 2020. Close to €5 billion, expecting to mobilise at least €50 billion additional public and private investments by Member States, regions and industry.
EUROPEAN PLATFORM OF NATIONAL INITIATIVES ON DIGITISING INDUSTRY:

It builds on and complements Member States’ initiatives for the digitalisation of industry. So far 15 EU Member States have already launched a national initiative and more are expected in 2018.

ACHIEVEMENTS:
- Aligning national digitalisation strategies with priorities of the Digitising European Industry initiative.
- A critical mass of investments from Member States and industry in digitalisation of all businesses, in line with the initial target of €50 billion from 2016 to 2020.

DIGITAL INNOVATION HUBS:

A European network of support facilities where SMEs and mid-caps test the latest digital technologies and get training, financing advice, market intelligence and networking to improve their business.

ACHIEVEMENTS:
- Building a pan-European network of more than 200 operational Digital Innovation Hubs in co-operation with Member States and regions.
- Co-funding hundreds of innovation experiments per year, where at least one SME and one Digital Innovation Hub test and implement digital innovations.
- Coaching 100 potential Digital Innovation Hubs in regions with slower adoption of digital technologies, with focus on Central and Eastern Europe.
- Developing a common understanding with Member States on an investment programme that supports the digital transformation of SMEs.

PARTNERSHIPS AND INDUSTRIAL PLATFORMS:

Supporting Public-Private Partnerships that develop key digital technologies and assemble them to form the next-generation industrial platforms.

ACHIEVEMENTS:
- Mobilising €3 billion EU investment (2018 – 2020) for Public-Private Partnerships that support:
  - 5G, the IoT, High Performance Computing, electronics and photonics components and systems, robotics and data technologies.
  - Developing and piloting at large scale digital industrial platforms for “smart” factories, hospitals, farming, buildings, autonomous driving, etc.

A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FIT FOR THE DIGITAL AGE:

Clarifying or adopting EU regulations to ensure EU’s industry and economy can strive within the Digital Single Market.

ACHIEVEMENTS:
- Proposing to the European Council and Parliament measures on cybersecurity, free-flow of non-personal data and online platforms.

PREPARING EUROPEANS FOR THE DIGITAL FUTURE:

Upskilling the workforce and piloting EU-wide initiatives to show how education systems could respond to the digital needs of Europeans.

ACHIEVEMENTS:
- Digital Skills and Jobs Coalition and the Digital Opportunity Traineeships Pilot show the way on how the skills gap can be approached.
- 15% of the EU investment in Digital Innovation Hubs is dedicated to skills development and training.
MANAGING THE RISKS OF DIGITALISATION IN DEFENCE

European militaries should not, however, take any comfort from the uncertainties surrounding the development of digital technologies. The more Europe’s militaries become dependent on digital technologies the more they become vulnerable to the inherent risks of greater technological connectivity. The development and application of these in defence will likely result in adversaries having to find new weak points in Europe’s digital defences (this has been called the ‘capability/vulnerability paradox’). For example, looking many decades into the future the use of quantum computing may give Europe a technological edge in areas such as cryptography but it may result in certain vulnerabilities. Although secure quantum communications will also depend on high-quality organisational coordination within governments, advances in quantum communication already promise to greatly diminish the risk of data hacking due to the extreme difficulty involved in tampering with qubits. Of course, in the future it may also be possible to manipulate qubits in order to hack digital systems but the assumption today is that quantum computing may revolutionise communications and cryptography.

On the face of it then, quantum computing could be an advantage for military services but there are also potential risks. If it is assumed that quantum communication will greatly reduce the risk of remote hacking, then physical infrastructure may become more of a target for military actors – quantum communications would still rely on physical infrastructure. ‘Quantum links’ are already being developed today and China has established an almost 2,000 km land-based quantum link between Beijing and Shanghai. Such a feature of the digital age is likely decades away for most countries, of course. In addition, critical infrastructure protection requires by its very nature close cooperation between military actors and civilian bodies and private actors – thus a solely military solution to the protection of Europe’s quantum infrastructure is unrealistic. Nevertheless, we should ask whether comparable future quantum links on the European mainland would be considered military targets by potential adversaries, and, if so, we should think about how we would protect them and other digital infrastructures.

As far-fetched as this example may seem, it highlights the need for European policymakers and defence planners to develop an effective Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) strategy to deal with the false dichotomy between ‘virtual’ and ‘physical’ infrastructure. Given that the European Commission plans to release its proposal for additional measures on the CIP Directive (2008/114/EC) at the end of 2020, there could be a mutual opportunity for policymakers and defence planners to better understand the military aspects of CIP, especially with regard to digital infrastructure. Defence planners already have experience with CIP, as can be seen by military strategies to protect the global web of undersea cables that sustain the Internet and digital networks. While fibre optic undersea cables have existed since the late 1980s, defence planners increasingly recognise that damaged energy supply lines and/or undersea cables can disrupt military communications, potentially knocking out C2 networks and strategic weapons systems plus early-warning systems.8 The EU is already developing capabilities for maritime CIP; for example, five PESCO maritime projects specifically address undersea surveillance and protection.9

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Beyond the need to secure critical infrastructure, Europe’s armed forces also have to contend with greater digital connectivity, congestion and uptake. Digital technology is proliferating at ever faster rates. If, as one report claims, it took 50 million people 75 years to use the telephone but only four years for this same amount to use the internet, then the risk that adversaries will beat European militaries to unlocking innovative ways of using digital technologies is potentially high. Of course, cyber defence is one way of managing the risks associated with the proliferation and connectivity of digital technologies, but any lasting solution must go beyond this. One could argue that defence planners need to maintain analogue systems in order to ensure a minimum operational capacity in case of digital ‘blackouts’ or electromagnetic disruptions. Most military-applicable components such as microchips and processes already require a digital-analogue mix for signals and communication, and European manufacturers are already producing these types of components with the EU’s support. Despite this, there is a strong case for drawing up scenarios to test how Europe’s militaries could operate with ‘analogue only’ technologies in digitally compromised theatres.

**WORK IN PROGRESS**

With the creation of the European Defence Fund (EDF), and work towards a ‘strategic compass’ in 2020, there is an opportunity to better understand and exploit defence-relevant disruptive technologies. One could argue that the EU already has this system in place with the CDP and the Commission’s work programme planning under the EDF, and indeed these initiatives already flag needs and shortfalls in areas such as cyber defence and information superiority. Bodies such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) have also invested time in exploratory studies on how Big Data might affect the defence sector. Moreover, the Agency is developing the Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA), which could help better link the Research and Technology (R&T) priorities and interests of member states with the digital-enabled capabilities that the EU requires. Commission officials at DG Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) are looking at ways to better coordinate defence research investments with existing civilian research programmes (Horizon Europe). The Commission also earmarked €7.5 million under the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) for emerging technologies such as quantum technologies in 2019.

Yet although such efforts are important, there is no EU strategy today designed to understand how Europe’s armed forces could use such technologies nor how they would counter their use by adversaries. Thus what is required is less a systemic identification of capability gaps or disruptive technology areas and more of a continuous scenario-based process that allows defence planners to assess the benefits and risks posed by each digital technology or system. For example, advances in 3D printing, nanotechnologies and digital sensoring have already led to the creation of microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) – or microscopic wireless devices fitted with cameras and sensors that are only the size of a grain of sand. When deployed in their hundreds, these ‘smart dust’ particles could be used to provide a stealth analysis of a geographical area. Many policymakers and defence planners in Europe would not even know that MEMS exist, let alone have a strategic response to how such technologies could be used or how Europe’s militaries would counter them.

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Defence planners are, however, likely to be increasingly dependent on solutions for ‘digital autonomy’ outside of the military domain. In reality, any debate about the digitalisation of defence must include a discussion about how defence acquisition processes should adapt to digitalisation. Indeed there is a debate underway about whether digitally-supported systems such as autonomous weapons could one day replace traditional platforms such as submarines, jet aircraft or aircraft carriers. Furthermore, digitalisation in defence will require sensitive discussions about technological sovereignty and how far Europe’s militaries should be dependent on private, non-EU providers for, say, cloud computing. Europe’s defence planners need to reflect on whether uploading military-sensitive data to unsecure cloud services is wise, and, as the latest EU strategy on data states, there is a need to ensure that data is not accumulated in large concentrations by any single firm because it could affect market competition and security. In this regard, it is instructive to know that in 2019 US firms held about 70% of the global $96 billion cloud market, with providers from China making up 7%. This ‘cloud concentration’ could lead to questions about data usage rights and, in the most extreme case, could possibly reduce the military’s access to their own information sources.11

This is not to say that Europe’s armed forces should sit back and wait for industrialists to develop safer digital services, even if these civilian actors have a better knowledge of digital ‘state of the art’ and ‘art of the possible’. For example, it is likely that the issue of digital standardisation and data interoperability will increasingly weigh on European armed forces’ abilities to deploy together. The dilemma is three-fold.

• Firstly, data collection, storage and usage differ between different branches of the military in a number of European states.

• Secondly, data usage and sharing between European militaries is under-utilised or even non-existent in many cases.

• Thirdly, European armed forces cannot depend on reliable access to data sources developed in the civilian sector (e.g. think of the masses of data generated by border agencies, development agencies or even gendarmerie forces).

Although the ability to ensure data interoperability will rely on secure technological solutions, Europe’s defence ministries and armed forces

should reflect on the legal, security and policy processes they would need to develop to manage any future ‘European military cloud service’.

**DIGITAL POWER EUROPE?**

It has been shown that the advances in digital technologies such as quantum computing are not fully understood by the defence sector, and that Europe needs to be realistic about how these technological advances can benefit EU security and defence. European defence planners and policymakers must acknowledge that digital technologies will create both vulnerabilities and opportunities for Europe’s armed forces. EU institutions and mechanisms can assist European armed forces’ transition to digitalisation, but the reality is that Europe’s military bureaucracies need to change from within and digital technologies can only go so far in helping with leadership and decision-making issues. There are limits to the benefits of digitalisation in defence, even if the vulnerabilities posed by digital technologies will require defence planners at the national and EU levels to consider what more they can do to improve the resilience of Europe’s military computer networks and systems, as well as Europe’s digital infrastructure more broadly.

There are, however, some immediate (if modest) steps that could be taken by the EU. Firstly, while statistical databases such as Eurostat generate data indicators for digitalisation in the wider EU economy, there is today no concrete data picture for the digitalisation of Europe’s armed forces. This is not a call for a publicly accessible database, but digital indicators could form part of the reporting phase of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). Secondly, even if an ‘EU digital military cloud’ project would be attractive, there is no need for a specific PESCO project on digital technologies as many already address (if at times only indirectly) digitalisation. There is also no need to open up the 20 PESCO binding commitments to make room for a specific commitment on defence digitalisation because certain commitments already call for operational readiness and interoperability. Instead of projects and commitments, reporting on national defence digitalisation strategies and initiatives in the PESCO National Implementation Plans (NIPs), which ministries of defence submit each year to show how they are meeting the binding commitments, could be encouraged.

The Commission must also play a role in the digitalisation of European defence. Steps to reduce barriers to data exchanges across EU Member States should benefit defence planners, and enhanced digital standardisation could help improve the digital interoperability of Europe’s militaries. In time, however, the creation of a ‘common European defence data space’ could capitalise on the Commission’s broader civil digital initiatives and also address the specific needs of defence. Indeed, the 2020 ‘European strategy for data’ alludes to nine sectoral ‘data spaces’ for industry, the Green Deal, mobility, health, finance, energy, agriculture, public administration and skills. These ‘data spaces’ are supposed to make data management and utilisation easier across the Single Market and so it is not too difficult to see the relevance of such spaces for defence. Notwithstanding the specifics of defence, a ‘common defence data space’ could be developed to help reduce procurement, equipment and personnel costs across the EU, for instance, and other data spaces could feed this process (e.g. the energy data space could be utilised to reduce the environmental damage caused by defence).

If Europe’s armed forces are not to lose technological ground to adversaries then they need to stay ahead of the digital curve. Today we hear a lot about the need for Europe to be a geopolitical player that is not only conversant in the language of power but technologically sovereign, too. Yet the gap between rhetoric and reality is far too large. Europe cannot become a ‘digital power’ on the back of under-investment in national defence research and development (R&D) or the Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF), and neither can it really thrive if it is wholly dependent on non-EU digital technologies. Without a strong political and financial commitment to digitalisation and defence, EU member states can only ever hope to be ‘digital dwarfs’.
The truth is the first victim in any conflict. The duty of every civil society is to develop its resilience and protect information as a common good. If you fail to take your place in the information environment, others will.

During the Cold War, the potential mutual destruction guaranteed by a conflict involving nuclear weapons served as a deterrent in the physical environment. However, the birth of the internet and the subsequent rise of social networks has led the information environment to become a battleground. Government agencies, private organisations and other pressure groups fight a 24/7 battle to control the narrative – a battle in which the technological gap is no longer a determining factor.

Disinformation is taking precedence in today’s crises. Although it is not a new phenomenon, its systematic use and the ease with which it can be disseminated thanks to new technologies have turned it into one of the main vehicles for hybrid threats. In this regard, the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats, published by the European Union in 2016, states that ‘massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats’.

**DISINFORMATION GENERATES DOUBTS**

In the battle for the narrative, disinformation seeks to generate doubts about the truthfulness of facts. The truth is thus relativised by public discourse being devalued, so as to generate distrust in the institutions governing society. The main tool used to achieve this effect is not so much blatant lies, but rather the exploitation of information taken out of context and of messages that appeal more to emotion than to reason. An individual who doubts, mistrusts and is permanently subjected to information overload is fickle in their views, which makes it easy for their passive opinions to be turned into active convictions.

Assessing the effectiveness of disinformation is no simple task. The question is: can disinformation create new opinions, or does it simply strengthen
existing ones? In order to answer this question, we need to consider society’s vulnerability factors, such as the existence of external and internal divisions, the presence of minorities, fragile institutions and a weak media culture. The media play a fundamental role. Customised narratives (in some cases involving microtargeting or even individualised targeting), interference in democratic processes, self-serving leaks and document falsification are just a few examples of the ways in which the media can contribute to disinformation.

BOOM IN SOCIAL NETWORKS

Those responsible for disinformation campaigns have found in cyberspace an ideal place to hide their footprint. In other words, the nature of the internet makes it difficult to hold individuals accountable for their actions, at least under traditional regulations.

The horizontal nature of social networks enables just about any individual to become a journalist without going through any kind of editorial filter. Community saturation and the presence of troll farms (organised groups of people who make provocative comments to create controversy or divert attention away from a topic) have transformed the dynamics of the generation and dissemination of information. Semi-automatic and automatic dissemination systems also exist now, in the form of bots (computer programmes that automatically perform repetitive tasks online) and zombie servers.

HOW DO THEY DO IT?

In order to increase the time internet users spend online, platforms use customisation algorithms that isolate users in a soundbox (‘filter bubble’) with content related to their search history, reducing their access to information that runs counter to what they have already read. Troll communities do similar work, creating a large number of false identities (‘sock puppets’) that all convey the same idea with similar messages. In many cases, these messages are supported by false content created with increasingly sophisticated sound-, photo- and video-editing tools.

Humour has taken centre stage in information manipulation campaigns, with ‘memes’ – images combined with a small amount of text that appeal to viewers’ emotions and are easy to relay – proving to be a very effective tool.

What is right is right if everyone says so. In 2006, Cialdini established the six principles of persuasion. One of them – the principle of social proof – states that ‘we determine what is correct by finding out what other people think is correct’. This principle certainly applies on social networks, since once information is on our radar, the more likes it gets the more appealing it becomes. You can also buy likes on the internet. One of the main activities of troll communities is adding comments to one another’s posts to give the impression that most people agree with the ideas they promote.

Trolls also aim to increase social polarisation by actively participating and taking both sides in discussions about controversial issues such as immigration or racial tensions. In numerous cases, sites and active profiles are created from the same server and used to produce emotional content for each of the conflicting positions, thus seeking to sow greater social division.

LEAKS: WHERE DOES MY OPINION COME FROM?

One of the most powerful dissemination vehicles is information leaks. This is a very effective method since the target audience feels the information must be true because it has been obtained directly from the source. However, in most cases, leaks are part of a disinformation campaign, since the dissemination is self-interested and decontextualized, and tainted leaks – which deliberately alter the story – are also added, though they often go unnoticed.
Interference in electoral processes can either target voters, through campaigns to influence how they will vote, or electronic systems, in order to modify databases that feed the census, to tamper with vote counting or simply to steal data. The mere suspicion that the results of a vote may be manipulated generates a feeling of mistrust in the electorate that can undermine the legitimacy of the process. The European Union has been forced to act in light of an increase in cases of interference in electoral processes, in particular the Brexit referendum, the US presidential elections and the French elections.

The EU Global Strategy for 2016, the year of the Brexit referendum, established a series of priorities, chief among which is the security of the EU against current threats. In order to counter those threats, it presented a series of improvements to the EU’s defence, cybernetic, anti-terrorist, energy and strategic communication capabilities. The latter, in particular, must be able to rapidly and objectively refute disinformation, promote an open research and media environment both within and outside the European Union, and develop the Union’s ability to take action through social networks.

The European Union’s Action Plan against Disinformation defines disinformation as ‘verifiably false or misleading information created, pre-
sent and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and which may cause public harm. Public harm includes threats to democratic processes as well as to public goods such as Union citizens’ health, the environment or security. Disinformation does not include inadvertent errors, satire and parody, or clearly identified partisan news and commentary.’

The Union’s coordinated response presented in the plan is based on four pillars:

1. **Improving the capabilities of Union institutions to detect, analyse and expose disinformation**
   This is proposed to be achieved by reinforcing the strategic communication teams of the European External Action Service, the Union Delegations and the Hybrid Fusion Cell with specialised staff, monitoring services and big data analysis software.

2. **Strengthening coordinated and joint responses to disinformation**
   The plan states that prompt reaction via fact-based and effective communication is essential to counter and deter disinformation, including in cases of disinformation concerning Union matters and policies. Therefore, in March 2019, a Rapid Alert System was established in Brussels to facilitate sharing of data between Member States and EU institutions so as to enable common situational awareness. This in turn was intended to facilitate the development of coordinated responses, ensuring time and resource efficiency.

3. **Mobilising the private sector to tackle disinformation**
   About 70% of web traffic goes through Google and Facebook. This means that the vast majority of websites, including news sites, are accessed via these platforms. The EU became aware of this fact and, about a year before the European Parliament elections, an EU Code of Practice on Disinformation was published. Facebook, Google and Twitter signed this code, pledging to develop, before the European Parliament elections, internal intelligence capabilities enabling them to detect, analyse and block malicious activities in their services. The Commission and the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) monitor on a monthly basis the actions taken to uphold these commitments.

4. **Raising awareness and improving societal resilience**
   ‘Greater public awareness is essential for improving societal resilience against the threat that disinformation poses. The starting point is a better understanding of the sources of disinformation and of the intentions, tools and objectives behind disinformation, but also of our own vulnerability.’

**WHAT ABOUT THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC?**

The abundance of information – be it true, deliberately misleading or simply inaccurate – available about COVID-19 makes it difficult for individuals to identify reliable sources. This ‘infodemic’, as it has been dubbed by the World Health Organisation (WHO), is spreading as fast as the virus.
The origins of the coronavirus have not escaped manipulation. One of the most common theories circulating on the web is that the virus is a US biological weapon that was intentionally spread following Trump’s orders to isolate China. Another theory attributes it to a British laboratory that allegedly also poisoned Russian dissident Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, while others argue that Chinese spies stole it from a Canadian laboratory. Many more such theories will follow.

In this regard, the European Parliament resolution of 17 April on the COVID-19 pandemic urged the European Commission to counter aggressive propaganda efforts that are exploiting the pandemic with the aim of undermining the EU and sowing mistrust in the local population towards the European Union.

Following the adoption of this resolution, on 30 April, the European Parliament and HR/VP Borrell debated the latest report by the European External
Action Service on disinformation activities related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The report reveals many troubling facts, for instance the significant number of coordinated disinformation campaigns to spread false health information in and around Europe, and conspiracy theories and claims that authoritarian political systems – not democracies – are best suited to deal with the current crisis.

Following the debate, Foreign Affairs Committee Chair David McAllister stated that, ‘to counter negative narratives, it is particularly important to communicate about the EU’s financial, technical and medical support in response to the pandemic, both between EU countries and to our other partners, among them China. Most acts of solidarity, by organisations, professionals or individuals, take place far away from the gaze of cameras and reporters. But it would also be unfair to all the health workers, volunteers helping fellow citizens and people organising the transport of crucial equipment to let the lies about a lack of European solidarity spread without effectively challenging them.’

WHO CERTIFIES THE IMPARTIALITY OF ‘DIGITAL POLICE’?

The European Union’s Code of Practice on Disinformation benefited from a great initial boost when large social networking platforms implemented self-regulatory tools (mainly filters and moderators) against so-called malicious activities. However, both tools can be manipulated, and thus their neutrality is questionable and their power to shape opinion undeniable. Therefore, in order to answer the above question, it should be borne in mind that, in attempting to identify information manipulation, one runs the risk of creating ‘ministries of truth’ which, in order to strengthen a certain political narrative, undermine one of the greatest achievements of democracy: freedom.

OTHER INITIATIVES

The NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence in Riga provides analysis and advice, supports doctrine development and conducts research and experiments to find practical solutions to problems in the field of strategic communications, including disinformation.

There are also other private or semi-private organisations, such as the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) and Bellingcat, that analyse open sources and social networks in order to identify and expose disinformation.

Finally, the traditional mainstream media – present as they are on the web as well as in print – can play a significant role as guardians of sound journalistic practices. They are a key element in detecting and reporting information being manipulated, and they also have a role to play in educating society. There are already several media outlets making special efforts to uncover information manipulation, such as Agence France Presse with its ‘Fact Check’, the BBC with ‘Reality Check’ and Le Monde with ‘Decodex’.

Society can benefit from an environment in which government, institutions, journalists and specialised organisations collaborate based on a common understanding of disinformation dynamics.
ACTION PLAN AGAINST DISINFORMATION

UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT AND STEPPING UP EUROPEAN RESPONSE

Disinformation is an evolving challenge, with high potential to negatively influence democratic processes and societal debates. Its increasingly adverse effects on society across the European Union call for a coordinated, joint and sustainable approach to comprehensively counter it.

- **83%** OF EUROPEANS THINK FAKE NEWS IS A THREAT TO DEMOCRACY *
- **73%** OF INTERNET USERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT DISINFORMATION ONLINE IN THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD *

THE ACTION PLAN AGAINST DISINFORMATION

A set of actions aiming to build up capabilities and strengthen cooperation between Member States and EU institutions to proactively address disinformation

- **IMPROVE DETECTION, ANALYSIS AND EXPOSURE OF DISINFORMATION**
  - Invest in digital tools, data analysis skills and specialised staff within the EU institutions and in Member States
  - Assess reach and impact of disinformation

- **MOBILISE PRIVATE SECTOR TO TACKLE DISINFORMATION**
  - Implementation of EU-wide Code of practice on disinformation
  - Major online companies such as Google, Facebook, Twitter and Mozilla have signed up
  - Regular reporting as of January 2019 and possible regulatory action in case of unsatisfactory results

- **STRONGER COOPERATION AND JOINT RESPONSES TO DISINFORMATION**
  - Set-up of the Rapid Alert System to provide alerts on disinformation campaigns in real-time
  - Member States to designate national contact points for disinformation and to exchange related information

- **RAISE AWARENESS AND IMPROVE SOCIETAL RESILIENCE**
  - Targeted campaigns in Europe and beyond
  - Active participation of civil society in identifying and exposing disinformation
  - Supporting independent media and fact-checkers

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*Source: Flash Eurobarometer 464 (Fake news and disinformation online) and Special Eurobarometer 477 (Democracy and elections)
9 TRAINING AND EDUCATION
9.1. THE CSDP TRAINING POLICY

by Horst Koukhol

Training and the professional performance of staff are interlinked. Enhanced training will improve capabilities. Better trained experts will provide better impact on the ground and will make civilian missions and military operations more effective and the EU as a security provider more credible. Training is essential to making the CSDP effective: the EU external policy could not work without the efforts of well-prepared diplomats, uniformed civilians, rule of law and military personnel. The ‘EU Policy on Training for CSDP’ aims to contribute to the development of a European security and defence culture. The document creates conditions for a broader development of CSDP training within the CFSP context and also with regard to the comprehensive approach. In this regard, it has a civil-military dimension as there is a recognised need to strengthen synergies between military and civilian training personnel.

MEMBER STATES REMAIN THE KEY ACTORS

The recently presented ‘EU Policy on Training for CSDP’ and its ‘Implementing Guidelines’ take into account new drivers for training arising from considerable developments in the field of CSDP in both civilian and military crisis management. The aim of this policy paper is also to set out the guiding principles and responsibilities of the CSDP. CSDP training is a responsibility of the Member States and CSDP training activities do complement at the EU level the CSDP-relevant training provided by Member States. Member States remain the key actors in the civilian and military CSDP, as they provide the absolute majority of assets and capabilities. Any policy on CSDP training must therefore establish a clear framework for maximising the performance of all personnel connected with missions and operations, including contract staff and officials working in EU Delegations. The EEAS has recognised this, and has been supporting the Member States with their training programmes in support of CSDP missions across the spectra of military, police and civilians. Ensuring the appropriate training for civilian and military staff deployed in EU missions and operations is therefore both the responsibility and the guarded prerogative of the Member States. In the area of civilian CSDP this translates mainly into civilian experts who are deployed as seconded national experts from Member States’ police, judiciary, penitentiary, or other parts of the civil service.

TRAINING NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS

The document on the new CSDP training policy creates conditions for a broader development of CSDP- and CSDP-related training. It
comprises aspects of civilian and military training needs gathered from various sources such as lessons learned reports, feedback from missions/operations and stakeholders involved in providing (CSDP and CSDP-related) training at strategic and operational level.

CSDP training activities have to contribute to the comprehensive approach by taking stock of training needs, including feedback received from stakeholders and reflecting needs identified. There are also certain developments in the civilian-military field which create new CSDP training requirements, such as the EU Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, EU Security Sector Reform (SSR), the comprehensive approach, the mainstreaming of human rights and gender issues and mandatory pre-deployment training for seconded and international contract staff working in EU missions and on EU operations.

Additionally, there is an emerging need for training courses enhancing the capabilities of staff as regards ‘Mentoring, Monitoring and Advising’, ‘Leadership and Management’, ‘External and Internal Security of the EU’, ‘Cyber Security’ and ‘Hybrid Warfare’.

**A HOLISTIC AND COORDINATED APPROACH**

The CSDP and CSDP-related training must also be seen in context as just one EU external action tool which must fit in with the rest, reflecting the development of EU crisis management capabilities, integrating training requirements from operational activities and lessons from exercises into training, and identifying and sharing best practices among training providers. CSDP training must be cost-effective and make the best possible use of the available resources/infrastructures – including through bilateral/multilateral cooperation – inside and outside the EU – in delivering training activities and seeking synergies with international organisations. CSDP training will also need to meet requirements in the area of EU relations with third states and international organisations, with a view not only to enhancing cooperation, but also to sharing common training standards and recognition of training.

This calls for the adoption of a holistic and coordinated approach to training matters aimed at establishing links and strengthening synergies between the different training initiatives at EU level within the CSDP, with a particular focus on the interface between military and civilian areas.
THE CSDP TRAINING CYCLE

The CSDP training cycle is an iterative sequence of activities aimed at supporting the achievement of CSDP training requirements. The CSDP training cycle is a continuous process and is informed by regular analysis of CSDP training requirements. It consists of four phases: planning, conduct, evaluation and assessment.

It will apply to personnel from EU institutions when they are involved in the programming and implementation of EU training activities and also to personnel of institutions and organisations working on behalf of the European Union and where proper integration with EU actors would be vital to the success of the operation involved. It will also apply to personnel of Member States dealing with CSDP matters.

CONCLUSION

Given the complexity and shared responsibilities in CSDP training, extensive consultations have taken place within the EEAS, with Member States and with external actors involved in CSDP and CSDP-related training. As a result of all these consultations, the drafting exercise of the ‘EU Policy on Training for CSDP’ and the ‘Implementing Guidelines’ followed a thorough procedure based on joint effort.
9.2. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COLLEGE (ESDC)

by Dirk Dubois

Since its modest inception in 2005 as a network of civilian and military training providers, the European Security and Defence College has significantly expanded its activities, both in terms of the number of training activities, areas covered and output in terms of trained people. As the only provider of common security and defence policy related training at the EU level, ESDC is quickly becoming a well-recognised brand in the field of training. On the 1 September 2020, the ESDC counted 189 training and education providers from all 28 Member States¹ and from intergovernmental organisations and third countries.

Visualization of the ESDC network.

¹ The UK members were granted the status of ANP on the date the UK left the EU.
Over the past decade, the number of activities organised by the college has continuously increased. This is the result of a number of factors playing a role. First and above all, there is an increasing requirement from the EU Member States and from the EU Institutions and agencies to have common education and training on specialised domains. The business model applied by the ESDC increasingly convinced these stakeholders that the College provides a flexible and cost-effective answer to these requirements. The business model applied is a pooling and sharing approach, where all Member States on a voluntary basis contribute to the ESDC training offers and send participants. A small part of the organisational cost of the courses is co-financed by the ESDC through a grant received from the CFSP budget, but the brunt of the effort is still borne by the Member States. A second aspect that plays an important role is that the ESDC, as an organisation embedded within the European External Action Services also contributes the public diplomacy efforts of the EU through its training efforts in the European neighbourhood (Eastern partnership countries and Western Balkans), with courses dedicated to specific regions (Latin-American and ASEAN countries) and even with China. For these courses, the ESDC works closely together with the responsible regional desks and crisis management structures from the EEAS and with the relevant Commission services.

Despite all these activities and tasks, the number of people on the ESDC pay-list as well as the annual budget remains limited. In order to achieve this, from the very beginning, the network has relied on active use of dedicated or off-the-shelf IT solutions to automate the administrative processes. At the same time, the ESDC promotes amongst its network members modern approaches to training through the exchange of best practices. From the very beginning distance learning, flipped classrooms and blended learning have been a part of all of our courses.

From an organisational point of view, the ESDC structure contains four elements. The training providers are represented in the Executive Academic Board, which is responsible for the quality of the ESDC’s training activities. They are under the political guidance of the ESDC’s Steering Com-
mittee, where the Member States provide political guidance, determine the overall direction of the College and set priorities. The day-to-day management of the College is in the hands of the Head of the ESDC, who is the sole legal representative of the ESDC. The training managers in the ESDC secretariat provide assistance to all these elements, but more importantly play a key role in the organisation of the training activities in close cooperation with the training institutions in the network. At the same time, through their experience and expertise, the training managers often work closely together with the different topical and regional desks in the EEAS and the EU Institutions.

In as early as 2008, the Ministers of Defence of the Member States entrusted ESDC with the implementation of the European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers, inspired by Erasmus. Over the years, several other tasks were assigned to the ESDC. In order to address these tasks, the Steering Committee agreed to create different configurations of the Executive Academic Board. In September 2020, the EU Military Secondary Schools Forum was created as a seventh configuration. This allows the college to address complicated tasks quickly and effectively at the correct level and still maintain a correct overview at the top. Over the years, several procedures ensured that the structure remained sound and flexible, ending the life of certain configurations when they were no longer relevant and creating new ones when necessary.

With the adoption of the EU training policy on the CSDP in April 2017 and the related implementation guideline, the ESDC received official recognition as a central player in this field. As a permanent participant in both the civilian and military training groups, the college plays a key role in ensuring that the two groups remain aligned and that the civilian-military aspects are covered. Thus, the ESDC can promote whenever possible joint civilian-military training to ensure that the EU’s integrated approach starts straightaway from the participants from the EU institutions, the Member States and the other stakeholders that come into contact with the CSDP/CFSP. When the Member States requested financial support for the work of the civilian training coordinators, the ESDC immediately offered its administrative services to manage these funds on behalf of the Commission. For 2019, the ESDC budget provided the necessary funds without increasing the already agreed reference amount, while for 2020 the budget was increased to cover the additional costs.

2020 will be an important year for the College, as it will celebrate its 15th anniversary, and it is the year in which a new Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1515 will be prepared. This Decision should provide the legal basis for the near future. At the same time, in view of the ESDC’s track record, 2020 should also be the year in which we should think about the longer term future of the College as a tool for the benefit of Member States and the European Union. Whatever happens, however, we intend to be part of the solution and not the challenges!
9.3. MILITARY ERASMUS –
European initiative for the exchange of young officers inspired by Erasmus

by Harald Gell

In November 2008, the European Union Ministers for Defence decided in their Council conclusions on the ESDP – during the 2903rd Council Meeting on General Affairs and External Relations – to establish an Implementation Group for the European initiative for the exchange of young officers inspired by Erasmus, tasked with harmonising European Union basic officer education, increasing interoperability and promoting a European security and defence culture among future military leaders. The Implementation Group is a project-focused configuration of the Executive Academic Board, supported by the Secretariat of the European Security and Defence College.

Consisting of experts from basic officer education institutions, the Implementation Group develops opportunities and creates the conditions for exchanges of young officers during their initial education and
training. It uses existing exchange programmes – including civilian ones such as ERASMUS+ – as well as creating new avenues of approach for the purpose of strengthening the interoperability of the EU armed forces and – as a consequence – enhancing EU security within the framework of the CSDP.

The Implementation Group defines topic areas of problems which are to be solved to facilitate exchanges. These ‘lines of development’ focus on specific fields, such as the development of necessary competences for officers, regulations concerning administrative matters, how to pass information to the people who need it, and defining common modules considered by all EU Member States to be essential to the education of young officers. If these common modules are implemented in national curricula, then the European Union basic officer education will gradually be harmonised. By 2020, some 44 common modules worth 122.5 credits (ECTS) have been developed, which may cover more than four academic semesters.

Each year some 1700 officer cadets participate in common modules and international semesters, which are developed and organised by the Implementation Group – this tendency is increasing. The graphs on the next page illustrate the increasing number of training days over the years and number of events organised and offered by the Implementation Group.

A huge step forward was and still is the international Military Academic Forum (iMAF), which involves cooperation between five European Union basic officer education institutions, which hold annual conferences dedicated to future developments to further the aims of the Implementation Group. Various challenges are solved during these conferences, for instance: developing common modules, establishing international semesters for the Navy, the Air Force and in technical fields, financing exchanges and incorporating educational elements developed by the by 27
EU Member States into national academic curricula, which are open to all EU Member States for participation.

The Implementation Group is driven by the central idea that exchanges of officer cadets between European basic officer education institutions will in itself create a European security and defence culture, and will thus enhance Europe’s security and defence capabilities.

**SOURCES FOR MORE AND UPDATED INFORMATION**

- Webpage: http://www.emilyo.eu
- Webpage: http://www.maf-reichenau.at/
- **European Education and Training for Young Officers – The European Initiative for the Exchange of Young Officers, inspired by Erasmus** (Harald Gell & Sylvain Paile-Calvo & Symeon Zambas) available on http://www.emilyo.eu/node/1029
9.4. THE POSITIVE SIDE EFFECTS OF TRAINING – THE SECURITY POLICY DIMENSION

by Jochen Rehrl

Prologue: The European Security and Defence College is a ‘network college’ which is comprised of 120 national entities including diplomatic academies, national defence universities, police colleges and NGOs. The article below is based on that specific training environment, in which the training audience is mainly recruited from the EU institutions and national administrations, i.e. from various ministries and agencies. The training environment is international and includes both military and civilian participants, with a focus on ensuring gender and regional balance among trainees. In general, the ESDC provides training and education for the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the wider context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at European level.

INTRODUCTION

The general assumption is that the word ‘training’ refers to acquiring and applying the knowledge, skills and competencies which are needed for a specific job. In addition to the classic goals of training, however, there are some other relevant dimensions which play a crucial role, in particular when it comes to training at strategic level.

These positive side effects can be described as the ‘security policy dimension’ of training. These side effects include institution and human capacity building, strengthening participants’ intellectual diversity and confidence building – to name but a few. It is of the utmost importance that the training designer be aware of these positive side effects, in order to make the best use of them.

THE POSITIVE SIDE EFFECTS OF TRAINING

The positive side effects of training, from the trainer’s and trainee’s perspective, include:

a) Institution building
b) Human capacity building
c) Democratisation
d) Intellectual diversity
e) Regional focus
f) Agenda setting
g) Confidence building
h) Networking

This list does not claim to be exhaustive, but it gives a good overview of the potential of each training activity. It is up to the training designer to reflect on that potential and to the course director to ensure that it is fulfilled.
a) Institution building

When a training course is provided in a third country (a ‘local host’), the responsible organisation generally works with one of the regular ESDC network partners from one of the EU Member States. A representative from the ESDC Secretariat also assists the course organisers in planning and conducting the training event. The local host is requested to identify a point of contact with connections to other key ministries in order to simplify the nomination process.

In some cases, working relations between the various ministries leave room for improvement. The training activity can be used as a facilitator in order to establish or improve these relations. The preparation of such an event can also be used to introduce permanent working bodies, e.g. in order to deal with EU Common Foreign and Security Policy issues.

During training events conducted under the umbrella of the ESDC, the local host should ensure that a number of high-ranking officials are present and visible. This process, which includes the cabinets of various ministries, can again be used to stimulate working relations between various actors, and to create a network, which will then hopefully last beyond the end of the training event.

b) Human capacity building

Of course, the training courses themselves contribute to the creation of knowledgeable personnel within the countries involved (both participating and organising). Coming back to what was said under point a), however, the local personnel responsible for the courses must be not only good organisers, but also good facilitators, mediators and networkers. They should be able to make middle-management decisions, while always bearing the bigger picture in mind. The training field should not be used for national turf battles.

The personnel nominated to give a lecture or contribute to a training event face a very specific challenge. Similarly to the personnel involved in...
organising the event, local lecturers asked to provide a contribution will mostly be doing so for the first time in an international environment, in a foreign language and on a topic which could be controversial and therefore challenging to discuss.

Apart from these elements, presentation style may differ depending on the audience. Let’s use some stereotypes in order to make the point clear: whereas military audiences love to follow a PowerPoint presentation, academics prefer to listen and receive a well-structured speech; civilians, on the other hand, tend to appreciate a mixture of slides, role plays and other interactive elements. In general, military participants wait until they are asked, keeping their questions until the Q&A session is opened, whereas civilians try to clarify questions as soon as they come to mind. The lecturer is tasked with both making everyone happy … and delivering the message.

The challenges above put pressure on the lecturer, both because they represent a brand new experience and because there may be many different ways of handling them. Within the ESDC, the Chatham House rule is commonly used, which means that ‘information disclosed during a meeting may be reported by those present, but the source of that information may not be explicitly or implicitly identified’. In some countries it could be the case that all information disclosed must be approved by a higher authority, which puts additional pressure on the lecturer, in particular during the Q&A session.

The ESDC has established a well-functioning evaluation system, which can be used to give the lecturer feedback on his or her personal presentation style and how it was perceived. In addition, the College provides ‘Train the Trainer’ seminars in order to improve lecturers’ performance.
c) Democratisation

Democracy and its values are one of the key priorities of the European Union in its neighbourhood policy: free and fair elections; accountability of the political elite; the active contribution of society to political debates; an administration based on the rule of law; and the protection of human rights in all aspects.

Training and education promotes these ideas in two ways: on the one hand, by making the organisers/lecturers (training providers) aware of these principles; and on the other hand, by providing training for an audience (training receivers) which will be confronted with critical assessments and discussions.

Education (more so than training) should focus on facts and figures – that is to say, on the transfer of knowledge. Nevertheless, for more advanced courses and seminars, the trainees should be provoked into making (self-)critical assessments. This allows them to experience a healthy debate and discussion environment – the basis for democratic discourse.

Lecturers, who – in general – have to have their seminars approved by a superior, will get immediate feedback on their arguments in the Q&A period, in which they will have to defend their points of view. Trainees are invited to question everything, challenge the arguments of the lecturer and even to play devil’s advocate in order to stimulate a thought-provoking exchange of views.

Responsibility for this endeavour lies with the moderator/facilitator of a specific training and education event. This person is tasked with keeping the questions rolling, intervening when the discussion is not staying within the given parameters (in terms of both content and politeness) and finding ways to link contributions with the overall learning outcomes of the event as a whole.

d) Intellectual diversity

Freedom of speech and academic freedom are the cornerstones of any valuable training and education event: listen to each other; try to understand your opponent and make your point clear and understandable; don’t take statements personally, and try to remain on factual grounds.

Intellectual diversity can be challenging and is even sometimes not appreciated in less developed democratic cultures. There are also differences between various cultures, e.g. in some Asian countries, public disagreement is a no-go; hence, cultural awareness should also be taken into account when discussing this issue.

Promoting intellectual diversity and academic freedom does not necessarily mean that everything must be accepted. There are certainly red lines which should not be crossed, such as xenophobic remarks or other statements that violate human rights. The former President of the European Parliament, Mr Martin Schulz, gave a good example of a response to such a transgression in March 2016, when a right-wing member of the Parliament provoked the plenum with racism and therefore Mr Schulz had him excluded from the meeting. This kind of measure should not be excessively used in training and education events, but it should not be ruled out either.

Bearing in mind that training and education events should first of all be informative, intellectual diversity comes into play when climbing up the ‘knowledge pyramid’. When trainees are asked to apply, understand and explain why and how procedures and structures are as they are, they should be confronted with various approaches and methods. Intellectual diversity will help them
to find their own way. Being critical, questioning what they have been taught and developing their own problem-solving approach to challenges is the best kind of learning, and one which could even lead to a change in attitude.

e) Regional focus

The regional focus – in other words, the local ownership – of training can be seen as the key to success. A training and education event should never be a one-way street: a trainee from a specific region can enrich the event by sharing his or her experience, contributing to discussion and highlighting links which are difficult to identify from an outside perspective; while a trainer from a specific region is also beneficial for the event, because he or she can bring a regional perspective to certain issues. These perspectives are particularly important for EU bureaucrats who can easily become trapped in the Brussels bubble; external experts can therefore help to keep things simple and understandable.

The regional focus ensures that both sides take into account each other’s positions, encouraging them to think about one another and thereby open their horizons. At the end of this kind of training event, the EU officials should know more about the region and the regional representatives should know more about the EU; a classic win-win situation.

f) Agenda setting

By training and educating specific audiences, organisers have an important tool at their disposal: agenda setting. Although most EU/ESDC training is already standardised and harmonised, the
course director has the power to focus on specific topics and divide up the available time according to his or her priorities.

Agenda setting is a skill which was very well known to the former High Representative, Javier Solana. In 2008, he wrote a publication entitled ‘Security and Climate Change’. In the following months he included this topic in each and every meeting. In doing so, he gently forced the other side to read his publication and find its own position on this subject. This is a textbook example of how agenda setting can be used.

For training and education events, the major themes are already set out. There is, however, usually a certain amount of room for manoeuvre, and this should be used to add topics which are important for the organisation or the audience. Having said that, agenda setters should be aware of their power and use it wisely.

g) Confidence building

One of the main aspects of training and education events within the European Security and Defence College is confidence building. Some training events involve conflicting parties sitting in the same room. If the organiser succeeds in bringing them together, discussing issues and maybe even finding common ground, then the event can be deemed a success. Training and education – the transfer of knowledge and the strengthening of skills – are vectors for social engineering and networking.

Confidence-building measures can be facilitated through role play or other interactive exercises. It is important to give the floor to the audience; they should lead any interactions, discussions or debates. Topical facilitators could be exercises focused on conflict analysis, mediation or negotiation. All of these facilitators stimulate interaction between the participants and force them to think in the mindset of others.

h) Networking

Last but not least, networking between the participants – but also between the lecturers – is crucial if the event is to have a lasting impact. Exchanging business cards, phone numbers and email addresses can facilitate work after the event is over. Having a contact person in another country, who is reliable and can be called any time, can make life easier, in particular when an individual is under stress or is lacking situational awareness.

Networking should bring together the alumni of a specific training course, creating relationships between various ministries but also across borders. A sign of good networking during training is when participants know their counterparts in the other ministries and even in the ministries of partner countries.

If training and education events are provided on a regular basis, the network between the students and alumni will grow from year to year. This network can form the basis for trust and further cooperation, but above all for an extended period of peace in Europe, which we all wish for.

CONCLUSION

Training and education has, in addition to the learning perspective, many other positive side effects which should be taken into account and used whenever possible. In order to use the security policy dimension of training, responsible and well-educated trainers are of the utmost importance. When training is combined with a political mandate, the positive side effects of training can take the lead in order to accomplish the mission. And when training has the potential to make the world a better place, why shouldn’t it be used to do so?
**LIST OF AUTHORS**

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