Egmont Institute logo

Navigating the population change in the EU: possible pathways to demographic resilience

Post thumbnail print

In

Our world is undergoing serious demographic shifts that are expected to increase significantly in the next three decades. The European Union will be confronted with a serious fall in fertility rates, aging populations and migration. Eurostat estimates that the EU population, approximately 450 million in 2025, will shrink by about 5% by 2050, leading to a decrease of roughly 22 million people and a total of 428 million people in the EU.

*****

Introduction

Our world is undergoing serious demographic shifts that are expected to increase significantly in the next three decades. The European Union will be confronted with a serious fall in fertility rates, aging populations and migration. Eurostat estimates that the EU population, approximately 450 million in 2025, will shrink by about 5% by 2050, leading to a decrease of roughly 22 million people and a total of 428 million people in the EU.

On the contrary, Sub-Saharan Africa has a growing population and is expected to drive over half of the global increase in population, leading to a peak of the world population around 2080 with around 10.4 billion people. The African population, which currently counts around 1.5 billion is expected to increase by 1 more billion which would lead to a total of 2.5 billion in 2050, a population increase never witnessed in the history of mankind.

Although these shifts are as of yet barely noticeable in the EU, they will have profound consequences for its competitiveness, the socio-economic construct and political stability. It is therefore urgent that policymakers will dedicate more attention to the approaching changes.

Four reports recently published provide important insights to better understand current trends, future outlook and possible pathways to address the shifts: the UNFPA’s State of World Population 2025: The Real Fertility Crisis, and three reports by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission: The Role of Migration and Fertility for the Future Size of the EU’s Population, A Demographic Perspective on the Future of European Labour Force Participation and a Demographic outlook on “right to stay”.

 

The real fertility crisis:  the need to strengthen reproductive autonomy

The main message for the UNFPA’s State of World Population 2025 report is that the real fertility crisis is the crisis of a system and social norms that prevent people from fulfilling their fertility aspirations. Indeed, the gap between the number of children people wanted to have (fertility aspiration) and the number of children they effectively have is an underreported matter in discussions on demography.

UNFPA conducted a survey in 14 countries, including 3 EU member States, which showed that most people were overachieving their fertility goals, while others were underachieving them. Economic barriers were cited by more than half of the people surveyed as a reason for having fewer children than desired. These included the rising cost of living, job insecurity, difficulty finding affordable housing, and challenges with childcare. Health problems, like chronic illness or infertility, which is estimated to affect one in six persons, were reported by about twenty-five percent of respondents. Worries about conflicts, the environment, or the political climate was a factor for one in five people surveyed. Also women’s increasing access to and participation in higher education, while positive achievements for women’s rights, frequently leads to delaying motherhood.

The report also noted that fourteen percent of surveyed participants reported not having the desired number of children because they could not find a suitable partner. Eleven percent of women surveyed further cited the lack of their partner’s involvement in domestic and care work as the main reason for having fewer children than desired. Research from the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) confirmed that women experience serious time poverty, with more than fifty percent of women with children under twelve spending five hours per day caregiving. Furthermore, fifty percent of men in the EU believed they are by nature less competent than women to perform household tasks.

Low fertility is recognised to be causing population anxiety in the EU, but the UNFPA also cautions against “wrong conclusions,” such as calls for reducing access to contraception, banning sexuality education, or driving women out of the workplace, as a serious danger for reproductive rights.[1]

[1] For more inormation on the UNFPA report: Birgit Van Hout, Director, Representation Office to the European Union, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

 

The interplay between migration and fertility, a complementary relation

The JRC reports highlight the interplay between migration and fertility which should be seen as complementary rather than opposing factors, both essential to navigate the EU’s population change, particularly in addressing ageing and the projected long-term population decline.

The relation between fertility and migration is articulated as follows: immigration reduces the expected fertility threshold for a stable population long-term – of said 2.1 children per woman- while emigration raises that same threshold. Migration between EU Member States deserves special attention. While a zero-sum game for the total EU population is a significant contributor to population change through migration for individual Member States.

Migration remains a factor hard to predict. It has long been considered as a possible measure to address declining fertility rates and ageing population trends. However, even an increase in migration will only partially offset the EU’s population decline, due to changes in EU countries’ age structure.

Which creates demographic inertia, an often-overlooked factor in the EU’s population outlook, which means that even if fertility immediately rose to the replacement level, the population would still decline for some time because there are fewer people of childbearing age than older generations.

Fertility and migration impact age structure differently with different consequences for aspects such as changes in the size of the workforce. Here, fertility has a long-term impact: people enter the population through births and it takes several decades until they reach working age.

Migration can act in the shorter term by immediately feeding the labor market. This is why migration will only be able to partially compensate for the low levels of fertility that characterize this negative population momentum.

The projected expectations for the next decade see fertility in the EU to remain around 1.5 births per woman while life expectancy increases.

External migration is expected to bring a surplus of about one 1 million people annually to the EU. This would mean that the population size of the EU decreases slightly by 2050 and that the ageing of the population continues. Even with the surplus from external migration and an immediate jump in fertility levels to 2.1 births per woman, Europe would still face the negative population momentum from its current age structure in the medium future. Obviously, large differences exist across Member States, since fertility and migration lead to different outcomes depending on countries’ specific contexts.

The demographic challenge that the EU faces cannot be solved by short-term measures alone, anticipatory policy is needed. Migration and fertility must be understood as distinct but interdependent levers that, if managed coherently, could mitigate the effects of demographic decline and contribute to a more balanced and resilient demographic outlook.

[1] For more inormation on the UNFPA report: Birgit Van Hout, Director, Representation Office to the European Union, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

 

Direct consequences of demographic change on labour market and competitiveness, a structural problem  

Both the recent Letta and Draghi report identify demographic decline as the central challenge for the EU in the years to come and insist on its problematic relation with the labour market and its negative consequences on European competitiveness.

According to current projections the EU is expected to lose between 1 or 2 million workers annually in coming decades. This shrinking in workforce threatens to weaken European competitiveness, underscoring the urgent need to compensate for demographic decline through productivity gains and innovation.

Demographic change has been framed by the JRC not as a temporary “malaise,” but as an overarching and epochal transformation of societies which will entail deep inertia comparable to climate change. The solution does not lie only in attempting to reverse fertility trends and increase migration flows. Instead we should focus on a dual approach based on mitigation and adaptation policies which will be both equally necessary. Which means that the EU should ensure that labour markets, welfare systems, and social infrastructures evolve to reflect demographic realities rather than resist them. Obviously the national regional context should be taken into account when adapting those policies to individual member states [1].

[1] For more information on the JRC reports, please contact Fabrizio Natale and Philip Ueffing

 

Conclusion:

The UNFPA and JRC reports concur that the EU will be faced with a significant demographic change that will have serious consequences for its labour market, competitiveness,  healthcare and pension cost. The demographic shift is not a temporary fluctuation but will cause structural change. Fertility and migration are unlikely to reverse current major demographic trends. This

is due to the fact that demographic phenomena, by nature, have long-term consequences and are difficult to reverse.

However, demographic change should not be seen as a threat, but as an opportunity to rethink social contracts, gender equality, and economic structures in a way that supports inclusive and sustainable growth. The key question is how policy-makers respond to this demographic shift. The need for evidence-based discussion and policy-making has never been greater.

The issue the EU and the rest of the world are facing is incumbent and politicians need to acknowledge what is currently at stake in order to move beyond alarmist naratives and must urgently address those structural problems by focusing on creating the right conditions for individuals to achieve their fertility expectations.

The urgency to address the consequences of the demographic shift should also be recognized at the EU level. In this context, the attention assigned to demography in the Von der Leyen I Commission with the appointment of Dubravka Suica as Vice-President for Democracy and demography should be followed up also in the current Commission despite there being no Vice-President responsible any longer for this area.

The EU is indeed confronted with many urgent challenges that require immediate answers. This however should not lead to ignoring the more fundamental changes that are happening and that, if not addressed in a timely manner, will undermine European competitiveness, intergenerational and social cohesion, and the very socio-economic basis of the European construction.

[1] For more information on the JRC reports, please contact Fabrizio Natale and Philip Ueffing

 


(Photo credit:  Hurca – Pixabay)