Is Mali’s Military Regime Running out of Gas?

After almost two months of an economic blockade imposed by the Al-Qaida affiliated group JNIM, (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), the Malian military regime is under pressure to find solutions to an increasingly difficult situation for both the population and the security forces and its own regime stability.

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Is Mali’s Military Regime Running out of Gas?

After almost two months of an economic blockade imposed by the Al-Qaida affiliated group JNIM, (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), the Malian military regime is under pressure to find solutions to an increasingly difficult situation for both the population and the security forces and its own regime stability. Hundreds of fuel tankers from Senegal, Ivory Coast and Guinea have been destroyed, making the country’s main roads practically unusable and choking supply lines leading to the capital. So far however, the regime has been at loss of effectively addressing the situation, instead focusing on alleviating measures and exceptionally closing schools and universities for two weeks. Fearing an escalating popular unrest, Western states have called upon their citizens to leave the capital in a cascade of announcement during the past week, further mounting the pressure on the Malian government. How did this situation come about, what have the Malian regime done to address the situation and what are the possible short and medium-term scenarios?

JNIM’s “Montée en Puissance”

The Malian regime has faced a growing jihadist threat over the past three years, with both IS Sahel but especially JNIM gaining strength and expanding across the territory. Ironically this has taken place at the same time as the Malian authorities have circulated a strategic narrative of the armed forces’ “montée en puissance” (gain of strength). The Malian military’s retake of the symbolically important town Kidal in November 2023 with the help of the Russian Wagner group was initially seen as proof of the long-proclaimed “montée en puissance”. Yet, only half a year later, the state armed forces suffered a humilitating defeat in Tenzaouaten against both the northern separatist rebels and JNIM, resulting in the Wagner group’s most public loss with over 70 victims. Two simultaneous attacks by JNIM in Bamako in September 2024, targeting high-level military infrastructure and killing 70 Malian gendarmes in the first attack of the capital in 7 years, suggested a “montée en puissance” by the jihadists rather than the state armed forces.

The JNIM has also opened a new front in the west of Mali over the past year, after orginally focusing primarily on the north and central parts of the country. In July 2025, the group executed an unprecedented seven simultaneous attacks in the region of Kayes, situated close to the borders of Mauretania and Senegal, turning the region into a new dangerous “three-border area”, adding another area dominated by jihadist violence to the earlier Liptako-Gourma region between Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali. The territorial expansion has also included a take-over of the symbolically important town Farabougou, strategically situated at the Mauretanian border, in August this year. The city, which was liberated from jihadist rule by the new military regime in 2020, was seen as a symbol for General Goïta’s military success. Yet, since August, it has instead become a model town for the jihadists’ imposition of sharia law: banning alcohol and music, while severly constraining women’s rights.

This summer’s series of jihadist attacks were followed by a new approach by the jihadist group of economic blockades against major urban areas, such as Farabougou, Timbuktu, and Bamako. On 3 September, JNIM declared that it had set up a blockade in the Malian regions of Kayes and Nioro in the west of the country, attacking convoys transporting fuel, burning buses and threatening one of the largest private transport companies in the country, Diarra Transport, of attacks if it continued operations. A controversial deal between the company and JNIM which allowed for transport to continue under strict social religious terms prompted the Malian authorities to ban the company temporarily. The jihadist group has targeted convoys of petrol supplies from neighbouring countries Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, which account for almost 95% of Mali’s fuel, in an explicit strategy to isolate Bamako and exposing the military’s regime lack of territorial control. So far more than 200 fuel trucks have been destroyed and around 15 drivers killed or abducted. After two months of effective blockade and a severe petrol shortage in Bamako with spiked food and fuel prices, paralysed businesses, and disrupted economic activities as a result, the situation is becoming increasing difficult for the population and a political risk for the Malian authorities.

School Closure and Foreign Exodus

The Malian regime’s reaction and response to the economic blockade has been to mobilise an interministerial crisis committee, step up military presence and surveillance by increasing security checkpoints between major cities and launch operations against JNIM. Initially publicly addressing the crisis, the Malian prime minister demonstrated resolve and demanded the population to be resilient in a speech which later went viral by declaring that: “Even if we have to fetch fuel on foot with spoons, we’ll do it”. Yet, more than a month later the authorities have gone increasingly mute as the military step-up has failed to solve the crisis. State-controlled media has also decreased reporting on the crisis. Lacking the capacity to effectively address the main cause of the calamity, the Malian regime has opted to deal with the consequences and in an attempt to decrease tensions, exceptionally closed schools and universities during two weeks, until 10 November.

The increasingly tense situation has prompted Western foreign governments to update their travel advice, asking their citizens to leave the country as soon as possible. The US first urged Americans to depart immediately via commercial flights late in October, while many European states followed suit, including the UK, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Spain. The unpredictability of a growing popular unrest due to the fuel shortage and spiked prices has led external actors to take precaution, fearing a further degradation of the security situation. Yet, while individual states have changed their travel advice, the EU’s CSDP mission in the country, EUCAP Sahel Mali, remain so far operational, yet with reduced effectives and in a fuel-saving mode. However, the recent record ransom paid by the UAE of 50 million euros for the release of two Emirati hostages, taken hostage by the jihadist group in September, is further increasing the security risks for foreign nationals in the country, as the payment gave further incentive for abductions.

What Happens Now?

Speculation is running wild about different scenarios for the future of Bamako, Mali and the military regime in the media and on social media. These include the fall of Bamako, a negotiated settlement between the jihadists and the military regime, and a military surge allowing the Malian authorities to break the blockade.

A capital and a regime can fall in different ways. It can result either from deliberate attacks by ennemy forces – in this case the JNIM – or from a popular uprising driven by a population frustrated with the current sitaution. The first option, a takeover by JNIM following armed attacks, currently seems far-fetched for several reasons. First, it is not clear that this is the objective of JNIM. Putting pressure on the regime, weakening its legitimacy and authority and increasing popular discontent with its rule is one thing; attempting to take over the rule of the country is another. Second, although the capital has suffered attacks during the past year exposing the Malian security forces’ weaknesses, if threatened, the regime would most likely attempt to mobilise sufficient forces – including the Russian Africa Corps – to defend the city, and by extention, its own rule. Importantly, JNIM currently does not enjoy significant popular support in the capital, which also would make such a scenario risky. Third, while any foreign intervention from neighbouring states to defend the current regime appears unlikely at the moment, it is not entirely impossible and would entail unnecessary risks for the jihadist group.

Another possible scenario is a negotiated political settlement between the military authorities and the jihadist group. Yet this would represent a major reversal for the regime, which came to power on the promise of defeating jihadists and has consistently refused to consider such an option. Recent research, however, suggests that an exogenous shock — such as economic deterioration or widespread social unrest which clearly is the case today — could alter this stance and push the authorities to the negotiating table. Still, this would likely prove a costly course for the regime: it would lose legitimacy simply by agreeing to negotiations, and given the jihadists’ current advantage, they would almost certainly set a very high bar for talks and impose strict conditions aligned with their dogmatic Islamist agenda.

A third scenario is a prolonged economic blockade that provokes social unrest and popular demonstrations in the capital. Such a situation could either lead to a violent crackdown by the Malian military or deepen existing divisions within the armed forces, which have recently undergone several political purges. The military regime would almost certainly opt for the former to maintain its grip on power. Yet it is not impossible that factions within the security apparatus might seize the opportunity to exploit the turmoil and attempt a new coup. Even if they were to succeed, however, they too would face the daunting task of resolving the ongoing security and logistical crisis caused by the jihadists’ blockades — hardly an enviable position.

In sum, the current crisis in Mali underscores the failure of the military regime to deliver on its promises, contain the violence, and ultimately defeat the jihadist groups. It also highlights the growing strength of JNIM, which has managed to open a new western front, impose economic blockades, and exert significant pressure on the Malian authorities. The situation remains highly volatile, making any predictions futile. Suffice it to say that each of the potential scenarios at present would likely result in a further loss of legitimacy and control for the Malian regime.

(Photo credit: Nina Wilén)