Wars don’t end as long as they continue to yield benefits, writes Kristof Titeca. And in Sudan, the war still pays — at least for those fighting it. The population, however, bears the cost.

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Why Sudan’s Conflict is Escalating and Becoming Harder to Stop

From space, the consequences are visible. In El-Fasher, satellites register dark streaks on streets and squares: places where bodies lie after days of intense violence. On social media, videos circulate of fighters from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) filming themselves as they storm houses, loot them, and carry out executions. One might think — or hope — that such an event, a contemporary Srebrenica but without witnesses or UN troops, could mark a turning point or an end to the war. Unfortunately, that does not seem to be the case. Everything indicates that the violence could escalate further. Sudan is not a single war: it is a tangle of conflicts that reinforce one another, making it increasingly difficult to understand, let alone stop.

The conflict in Sudan is principally a struggle between two generals: Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the national army (SAF) versus Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagolo of the RSF. That story is clear and straightforward, but it is far from the whole picture: this is not a ‘simple’ civil war, but a conflict fought simultaneously on four different levels. At the local level, actors — villages, ethnic groups, clans — clash over land, water, and trade routes. At the national level, the struggle is about ideology and identity, as well as for control of the state and its resources. Regionally, neighbouring countries intervene based on their own security and power interests. And at the geopolitical level, Sudan is part of a broader contest among Gulf power blocs for access to gold, ports, and strategic corridors. All these levels directly influence one another.

The RSF now controls virtually all of Darfur. The fall of El-Fasher does not appear to be an endpoint. Their next target lies toward Kordofan, where oil pipelines run to South Sudan, where grain silos and fuel depots are located, and where crucial supply routes to Khartoum converge. Whoever controls Kordofan can economically strangle the rest of Sudan and/or fasten the administrative split of Sudan.

Competing mini-states

To understand how the RSF could advance so quickly, it is not enough to look at the national power struggle. The war is simultaneously fueled by local and national grievances that predate Dagolo or Burhan. In Darfur and Kordofan, tensions have existed for decades between sedentary farmers and nomadic groups, between different ethnic communities, between villages fighting over land or access to water points. The RSF and SAF did not invent those tensions — it activated them. Sudan is therefore being dismantled not only from above, through the struggle for state power, but also from below, by armed groups tearing territories apart. At the same time, the SAF rhetoric surrounding Darfur and Kordofan has played into the hands of RSF.

The result is that parts of Sudan already function almost like independent states. Darfur is de facto under RSF control. Large parts of the Nile Valley and the north are under SAF authority. In other peripheral regions, armed movements control their own territory. On paper Sudan is still one country, but in reality it increasingly resembles an archipelago of competing mini-states.

In the past decade, the Horn of Africa has become one of the key zones of geopolitical competition. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey compete for ports, logistical corridors, access to agricultural land, influence over governments, and control of natural resources. This rivalry is visible along the entire Red Sea: from port infrastructure in Somaliland and Ethiopia to agricultural concessions in Sudan. Africa offers what those countries lack or have too little of: land, food security, and (even more) natural resources — making the continent a battleground for political influence.

Blatantly imperialistic

The United Arab Emirates is the most aggressive player. It buys or leases ports, controls gold and trade flows, and builds networks of local allies — from Somaliland to Mozambique and Congo. Its Africa policy is blatantly imperialistic: a struggle for de facto control through infrastructure, financial dependency, and military support. Turkey competes differently, focusing on trade, construction projects, and military training. Qatar seeks leverage through diplomacy and political networks, while Saudi Arabia mainly thinks in terms of ports, food security, and protection of the Red Sea. Where once China and Europe dominated the Horn of Africa, the region is now the playing field of the Gulf.

Sudan sits at the centre of this struggle. Strategically, it lies at the crossroads between the Sahel, the Nile, and the Red Sea. The country has gold reserves, agricultural potential, a long coastline, and — especially since the fall of President Omar al-Bashir — a power vacuum. For external players, Sudan is a perfect entry point to Africa’s interior. For the warring parties inside Sudan, those same actors are a lifeline. The Emirates supply weapons, fuel, and logistical support to the RSF, in exchange for access to gold that is laundered in Dubai. Officially, Saudi Arabia is neutral in Sudan’s conflict, but in practice it has strengthened its diplomatic and economic support to the SAF. Egypt backs the SAF for its own Nile interests and out of fear of instability on its southern border.

Reasons for pessimism

The only hope lies in peace talks in the United States, in which the Emirates, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia also participate. But here too, there is reason for pessimism. U.S. influence in the region has sharply declined, and Washington knows that the Emirates are arming the RSF — yet does not intervene. The relationship with Abu Dhabi is too strategically valuable, both militarily and economically. Washington prefers to look away rather than alienate a key supplier of drones, oil, and investments.

The era is over in which international actors intervened in bloody conflicts for humanitarian reasons. The idea of a “responsibility to protect” seems forgotten and buried. Peacekeeping missions already feel like something from a distant past.

Wars do not end as long as they produce gains. And in Sudan, the war certainly produces gains: economically, militarily, geopolitically — locally, regionally, and internationally. The result is a war that continues to feed itself. But the profits go only to the fighting parties. Civilians pay the price, and their suffering is becoming almost impossible to put into words, while the world continues to look away.

(Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons)