Realigning Belgium’s Geostrategic Focus with its New Defence Capabilities

During the coming months and years, new defence capabilities will be arriving in Belgium. For example, the first F-35A fighter jets and MQ-9B unmanned aerial vehicles are expected to land in Belgium this year.

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Realigning Belgium’s Geostrategic Focus with its New Defence Capabilities

During the coming months and years, new defence capabilities will be arriving in Belgium. For example, the first F-35A fighter jets and MQ-9B unmanned aerial vehicles are expected to land in Belgium this year. The first CaMo (Capacité Motorisée) vehicles for the medium brigade will arrive this summer. And the Navy will receive new frigates and minehunters in the coming years. While these provide much-needed new capabilities for the armed forces, the De Wever government needs to formulate a clear, accompanying geostrategic storyline in the next Strategic Vision for Defence and the National Security Strategy.

The need to realign new ends and ways with the planned means

Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr. defined military strategy as an equation, namely “Strategy equals ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus ways (courses of action) plus means (instruments by which some end can be achieved).” Nonetheless, Beatrice Heuser rightly adapted this equation to “ideal ends, cut to size by the limitations of means and ways in which they might be employed”. This is especially the case for a smaller power such as Belgium.

Moreover, given the long periods before Belgium’s new defence capabilities arrive and the rapid deterioration of the European security environment, many of the new capabilities (or means) to modernise the armed forces were decided in another strategic context. While Belgium was and still is involved in NATO’s military presence on the Eastern flank, the country remained also engaged in operations and missions in the Sahel region and the Middle East.

Nonetheless, the Eastern flank increased in importance since the 2014 and, especially, 2022 Russian invasions of Ukraine. The developments on the Southern flank were characterised by the ending of military operations in the Sahel region due to coup d’états and in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal in 2021, but the Southern flank remains volatile and ought not to be ignored. A crucial question now is how to realign and adjust, if necessary, the military means Belgium planned to acquire and the ends and ways that emerge from the new geostrategic context.

To prioritise or not to prioritise?

Some are arguing in favour of a 360-degree approach. However, is this a way to avoid making a geostrategic choice between the Eastern and Southern flank of Europe, and thus avoid choosing between the different threats that Belgium and its Allies face – at the risk of having a clear geostrategic focus? Or is it possible to build up the means to face the current and future threats on both flanks?

Subsequently, while it may not be necessary to only prioritise one of the geographical flanks, the separate forces may need to prioritise certain means that are predominantly suitable in different flanks. For instance, the Air Force and Navy should prioritise capabilities that focus on collective defence in the Eastern flank and have supporting or enabling roles regarding the Southern flank. The advanced 34 F-35A fighter jets (plus the additional number of aircraft in the pending second batch) and three new frigates will be the future Belgian tip of the spear concerning its contribution to NATO’s nuclear and conventional deterrence and defence.

The Land Force should prioritise in the short term the Southern flank and fulfil only a supporting role regarding the Eastern flank. While I remain convinced that Belgium should be able to field frontline forces for both flanks, the appetite for rebuilding heavy capabilities – such as tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) and Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) – amongst the senior level of the Land Force appears to be mixed. That said, the Special Operations Regiment is adapting and refocusing from the terrorist threat in the Sahel region and the Middle East to the Russian threat on the European continent and reconnecting with its historical roots in the Second World War.

The bulk of the Land Force, the medium brigade, will receive this year its first wheeled armoured vehicles that were ordered in the framework of the Belgian-French strategic partnership called CaMo (Capacité Motorisée). In its current configuration, the type and number of vehicles lack the necessary armour and firepower for the potential high-intensity warfare on the Eastern flank. Yohann Michel, a former researcher at IISS, stated in this regard that “Political and industrial imperatives have combined with clearly defined operational requirements to produce vehicle designs reflecting the experiences and demands of theatres such as Afghanistan and the Sahel. The Griffon, for example, is relatively lightly armed with a focus on protection from mines and improvised explosive devices.” France is trying to adapt some of the vehicles for more high-intensity conflicts, such as the new Serval ‘Appui SCORPION’ variant. Belgium has so far, however, made no changes in the type and number of vehicles since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, apart from adding a limited number of extra artillery vehicles.

A second, light brigade will be established in the coming years, next to the modernised medium brigade. At first glance, a light brigade plays potentially an even more limited role during high-intensity contingencies on the Eastern flank of NATO (given the absence of armour and firepower). Such light brigade can, however, also be developed in a certain way to be relevant on both flanks. Namely, if the emphasis is put on integrating unmanned ground and aerial vehicles. While the warfare of tomorrow will undoubtedly be different than today’s, the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine shows that unmanned systems are here to stay and will play a major role in potential future conflicts and wars.

Conclusion

In short, (1) the rapid deterioration of the security environment on the Eastern flank of Europe, (2) the persistent instability on the Southern flank that will likely grow worse due to security, economic, climate, and demographical challenges, and (3) the outcome of the intra-Alliance bargain at the upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague, will guide the De Wever government’s exercise to renew the Strategic Vision for Defence and the National Security Strategy. A crucial task will thus be to realign and adjust, if necessary, the means procured in another geostrategic context with the ends and ways that emerge from the new geostrategic context.

This context compels the armed forces to be able to operate on both the Eastern and Southern flanks to defend Belgium’s national security interests. Consequently, the Air Force and Navy should focus on the threat emanating from the Eastern flank, while supporting operations in the Southern direction. The Land Force should remain mobile enough and adapted to counter the threats on the Southern flank, while also increasing its firepower and reliance on advanced technologies (such as unmanned systems) to be relevant on the Eastern flank. Lastly, the Medical Service and Cyber Force should be able to provide tailored support on both flanks.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Dr. Alexander Mattelaer and Dr. Sven Biscop for their comments on an earlier version of the commentary. The views expressed in this Egmont Commentary are those of the author alone, and any errors are the sole responsibility of the author.

(Photo credit: Wannes Verstraete)