Don’t Join the NATO Summit Without Knowing Who You Are

“The most loyal allies of the United States”. For decades, that is what most European political and military leaders understood Europe’s role on the world stage to be. In my view, that always was quite insufficient; it clearly is so now

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Don’t Join the NATO Summit Without Knowing Who You Are

“The most loyal allies of the United States”. For decades, that is what most European political and military leaders understood Europe’s role on the world stage to be. In my view, that always was quite insufficient; it clearly is so now, when the President of the United States treats his faithful allies as if they were devious rivals. But if we are not, or not only, camp followers of the Americans, then what is our role? This is not just an academic question; to know oneself is the starting point of all strategy. And without strategy, what can one do at the NATO Summit in The Hague?

The fact in itself that we feel so uneasy today, proves that merely being someone else’s ally cannot be called a Grand Strategy. If an ally of the US is all you are, then the prospect of being abandoned by the US logically produces existential Angst. Had we thought of a role beyond that, dealing with Trump would still have been very uncomfortable, but we would have had a firm fundament, in the form of a shared European definition of our own interests and priorities, on which to base our engagement with him, as equals.

A Catch 22 of Our Own Invention

Instead, Europe locked itself into a Catch 22. Feeling too weak, after World War Two, to defend ourselves against the Soviet Union, we asked the US for an alliance and a security guarantee. Then, in order to keep the US committed, we consciously remained weak. Not that we did not spend enough on defence – that is a myth. Western Europeans built both strong welfare states and strong armed forces, but without the intelligence, command & control, secure communications and other strategic enablers that would have allowed us to operate independently from the US.

NATO thus in a way became too integrated: instead of pushing the Europeans to organise for their own defence, which was the view of the first SACEUR, General Eisenhower, the Alliance created a permanent military dependence on the US. That, it must be said, eventually suited Washington: it never stopped asking Europe to contribute more – but it did not seek more autonomous allies.

Ever since I started working in this field, in the late 1990s, as an enthusiast for European strategy, I pushed back against this dependence on the US. So many people stressed to me how Atlanticist they were, and how wrong I was not to be so as well. My reply was always the same: you may be an Atlanticist, but the question is – will the Americans forever remain Atlanticists? Now we know the answer: no. Trump and the “MAGA” crowd do not care for the Atlantic Alliance.

And there is the Catch 22: if we remain militarily dependent on the US, this administration will draw down its contribution to NATO. If the Europeans cannot defend themselves, why should the US do it for them, is the not illogical reasoning. If, on the contrary, we build military autonomy, the US will say: now then can defend themselves, so we can draw down our contribution to NATO. Whatever we do or do not do, the US will reduce its commitment. And once certain American assets have left, no US government, Republican or Democrat, is likely to bring them back, given the cross-party focus on China.

But this Catch 22 exists only in our own heads. It is only because we can conceive of no other strategic role for ourselves than that of loyal ally, that we have this fear of abandonment. Thus we try to appease Trump by promising to spend 5% of GDP on defence: 3.5% on defence strictly speaking, and 1.5% on infrastructure, resilience etc. But it will not work. Not only does Trump not care for NATO; he does very much care about the EU – because he sees it as an economic and ideological rival to be defeated. “5%” will not stop him from waging economic war against the EU, or from interfering in our domestic politics in support of the extreme right. Nor will it push him to loosen this ties with Putin.

A Percentage of Independence

Much more important than the percentages game, and the real answer to overcome the Catch 22, is to choose a new strategic role for Europe. We must see ourselves as one pole of the multipolar world, at the same level as the US, Russia, and China, and urgently give ourselves the capacity to decide and to act autonomously in the political, economic, and military sphere. Once our political and military leadership internalises this, they will realise that there is, in fact, no Catch 22; that we need not fear abandonment but must stand up for our own interests. Just like everybody else does – we are the only key player that systematically talks itself into being weaker than it is.

I know the argument that Europe cannot defend itself without the US. My reply: it is impossible – until we have to, and then we will do it. Or is anybody contemplating that we simply surrender? Of course, in our current state of fragmentation and unpreparedness, war would be very costly. We would win, even against Russia, but at a huge cost in lives, matériel, and possibly territory. That is why deciding who we really are is only the starting point, of an urgent effort to create a complete European force package, that can win any war at a much more acceptable price. Ultimately, if necessary, we must be able to defend Europe and stabilise its periphery without requiring a single American soldier.

So we do have to increase our defence spending. But we must base our commitment on what we need to deter or defend against any aggression against us. Not on a number that Trump just conjured up out of thin air. Moreover, we must be very careful, for very soon many voices will no longer distinguish between the 3.5% and 1.5%, and expect core defence spending of 5% of GDP. While the real key is: to spend a significant part of the additional resources collectively, to acquire the strategic enablers that will give us military autonomy and end our dependence on the US.

Atlantic

The really odd thing is that Europe settled into this dependence even though NATO is an Atlantic Alliance, i.e. there literally is an ocean between the US and Europe. Deep down, even the most convinced Atlanticist could not but doubt whether in an all-out war the US would really risk its own territory and people to save those of Europe. That we became so utterly dependent on the US regardless is a firm indictment of our lack of strategy. If all we can think of now is how to appease Trump, we will forever remain dependent on a great power that sees us as less and less relevant. Time for a European strategic initiative.

Sven Biscop, a professor at Ghent University and director of the Europe in the World programme at Egmont, warmly thanks professor Rik Coolsaet for his comments on an earlier version of this commentary. Sven knows too much history to believe that any non-European power will rush to Europe’s aid as soon as the first shot has been fired.

This article was also published in Dutch in Knack.

(Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons)