On 28 September 2025, Moldova, a former Soviet republic and EU candidate since 2022, held a parliamentary election that was more than a routine vote in Chisinau. The victory of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) reaffirmed the credibility of EU enlargement

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Moldova’s Election:
A Victory Brings Dual Challenge

On 28 September 2025, Moldova, a former Soviet republic and EU candidate since 2022, held a parliamentary election that was more than a routine vote in Chisinau. The victory of the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) reaffirmed the credibility of EU enlargement and showed that resilience to hybrid threats is possible with internal resolve and external support. This outcome resonates beyond the European neighbourhood: for the EU to play a credible global role, it must succeed in engaging its periphery. Moldova, a country of 2.5 million between Romania and Ukraine, has passed this critical test.

The space between the EU and Russia remains a geopolitical danger zone until Russia’s drive for dominance in its “near abroad” is curtailed and a new European security architecture takes shape.

A Narrow but Decisive Win

Preliminary results show the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won 50.2% of the vote and 55 seats in the 101-member parliament, down from 63 last term. The pro-Russian Patriotic Bloc, uniting the Socialists and Communists led by ex-presidents Dodon and Voronin, took 24.2%. The Russia-aligned Alternative Bloc, led by ex- Chisinau mayor Ceban and former candidate Stoianoglo, secured 7.96%. Our Party, a left-wing populist group with socially conservative, anti-EU stances, gained 6.2%, while the right-wing Democracy at Home Party, tied to Romanian nationalist Costiuc, passed the threshold with 5.6%.

Turnout rose to 52.21%, up from 48.41% in 2021, with the diaspora boosting PAS. Of nearly 280,000 votes abroad, 78.62% favoured it, compared to 44.13% of 1.3 million domestically. This underscored the divide between those seeking opportunities abroad and those struggling at home. Diaspora support allowed PAS to govern without a coalition.

President Maia Sandu must now nominate a prime minister and form a pro-European government. The anticipated cohabitation between a reform-oriented president and an obstructionist parliament has been averted. This outcome is pivotal for Moldova’s EU accession process, as political division could impede reforms and complicate negotiations with Brussels.

The elections were assessed as competitive and well-organised by OSCE/ODIHR observers, despite significant challenges including foreign interference.

Moscow’s Shadow

The Kremlin’s interference in the campaign was unmistakable. Beyond vote-buying, Moscow funded influencers to spread disinformation, targeting the diaspora. It trained people to stir unrest in Moldova, while cyberattacks hit state institutions, including the Central Electoral Commission. Russian actors also maintained ties with local politicians. Added pressure came from Gagauzia, a pro-Russian autonomous region, and from Transnistria, the internationally unrecognised breakaway territory where Moscow continues to wield significant leverage.

Moldova’s structural weaknesses left it exposed to foreign interference. Incomplete judicial reforms, politicised institutions, and worsening economic hardship eroded public trust. According to the World Bank, poverty rose from 24.5% in 2021 to 31.6% in 2023. Reliance on external energy, the unresolved conflict over Transnistria, pro-Russian influence in Gagauzia, and weak cyber defences gave Moscow leverage. The election showed Moldova’s future hinges on whether Chisinau and Brussels act quickly to close these gaps.

The government countered interference with arrests, fines, and party bans. It built on last year’s milestones: a narrow referendum enshrining Moldova’s EU path in the constitution (50.46% in favour) and President Sandu’s re-election (55.4%). Together with the parliamentary win, these steps establish a firm pro-European mandate.

Regional Contrast

Moldova’s trajectory stands out within the Eastern Partnership launched by the EU in 2009. Despite Russian pressure, Ukraine and Moldova pursue membership; after Russia failed to defend it during Azerbaijan’s 2023 offensive, Armenia has pivoted west; Georgia has backslid, prompting Brussels to freeze its candidacy; Azerbaijan maintains only transactional ties with Europe; and Belarus remains in Moscow’s orbit. Moldova has sustained a clear pro-European path.

Europe’s Investment, Europe’s Risk

The EU has been strategic and resolute in supporting Moldova. Since 2021, it has mobilised over €2.2 billion in grants and loans to bolster Moldova’s sovereignty, with an additional €1.9 billion Reform and Growth Facility approved for 2025–2027.

Moldova’s resilience to Russian pressure reflects this backing and its deepening EU ties. The Association Agreement with its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area integrated Moldova into the European market, helping cut Russia’s trade share from over 25% in 2000 to just 2.5% in 2024. EU support also ended energy dependence: after Gazprom cut supplies in 2021, reverse gas flows and links to Romania’s grid secured independence by 2023.

These foundations have made Moldova a frontline case of resilience. Since 2023, the EU Partnership Mission strengthened crisis response, backed sanctions, and helped create a Cyber Rapid Response Team.

The EU has also been decisive politically. In 2022, it granted Moldova candidate status, and in July 2025 hosted the first EU–Moldova summit in Chisinau. This was followed by a joint visit from Chancellor Merz, President Macron, and Prime Minister Tusk — a signal of unwavering EU support and recognition of Moldova’s future in the Union.

After the Screening

Moldova on 22 September 2025 completed the European Commission’s screening, which flagged reform needs across 35 chapters to align national law with the acquis. This review laid the groundwork for accession talks, which the Commission says could conclude by end-2027. Opening negotiations requires unanimity, but Hungary announced a veto. Council President António Costa urged qualified majority voting to bypass Viktor Orbán’s blockade.

Transnistria clouds Moldova’s accession, as no member state wants a new security burden. The Cyprus precedent looms large: when the EU admitted Cyprus in 2004 despite its frozen conflict, it imported a division that complicates relations with Turkey.

Ukraine as Pivot

Moldova’s and Europe’s future hinges on Ukraine’s trajectory. If it secures durable security arrangements, it will prove that Western partnerships can protect sovereignty and bolster Moldova’s pro-European camp. Conversely, Ukrainian setbacks would give Moscow new opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities. Events in Ukraine shape Moldova’s political landscape, public opinion, and geopolitical realities.

The PAS victory matters for Ukraine, as it consolidates Moldova’s pro-European path and reduces the risk of it becoming a staging ground for hostile actions against its neighbour.

Ukraine’s resistance strengthens Moldova’s security and raises the costs of Russian hybrid operations. Yet even in a weakened state, Moscow can destabilise Europe through low-cost campaigns.

What Moldova must do

The first main task for the new government is to consolidate domestic support.

EU assistance, while crucial for countering Russian coercion, has yet to meaningfully improve governance and economic opportunity in ways that build lasting legitimacy. As long as jobs, corruption, and living standards remain unresolved, Moldova’s democracy will remain vulnerable regardless of external support.

Equally important is the need to reach across political divides. The government cannot overlook the opposition’s base, particularly in regions with strong septicism toward Europe. By extending dialogue and fostering pro-European momentum in these areas, Moldova can build a more cohesive national project.

In this context, the government must articulate a vision for Transnistria and Gagauzia, where opposition forces secured 51% and 82% of the vote, respectively.

The second main task for the new government is securing EU consensus for early accession. Success depends on implementing ambitious reforms – particularly strengthening judicial independence and combating corruption – that demonstrated Moldova’s readiness for membership.

What the EU must do

The EU must strengthen the credibility of enlargement to sustain Chisinau’s reform momentum.

This means moving beyond rhetoric and embracing staged integration. Achieving this requires courage in Brussels: shifting decision-making away from unanimity, managing interim steps through qualified majority voting, and mobilizing political support across the Union.

Now that the accession screening complete, formal membership talks should begin.

The EU must prepare for enlargement by bolstering its capacity to absorb new members. To ensure integration strengthens cohesion, stronger rule-of-law oversight, fewer vetoes, tailored policy frameworks, and sustainable financing are needed.

Moldova’s capacity to confront hybrid threats—from disinformation to vote-buying—offers lessons for strengthening resilience across the Union and its neighbourhood. Europe should acknowledge Moldova as a significant contributor to continental security.

From Tactical Victory to Strategic Transformation

Moldova’s pro-European victory demonstrates what is possible when the EU deploys its full range of instruments—from market access to energy integration to security cooperation. This model has countered hostile influence through strategic clarity and sustained resolve, transforming a vulnerable state in Europe’s contested neighbourhood.

The narrow margin reveals a critical challenge. While the EU has helped Moldova withstand Russian hybrid warfare, tactical success must be complemented by progress on jobs, economic opportunity, effective governance, and fighting corruption. The next phase requires ensuring that massive EU economic support translates into improved living conditions that build enduring democratic resilience.

The EU must overcome internal resistance to enlargement. Hungary’s veto threat and broader scepticism mean Brussels must demonstrate political will to advance accession and convince hesitant capitals that Moldova’s integration strengthens the Union.

Amidst challenges to Europe’s global influence, it is essential for the EU to transform its immediate neighbourhood for credibility. The lesson from Moldova—that coordinated engagement backed by substantial resources delivers geopolitical results—should shape Europe’s strategy beyond its eastern borders. This strategy should address external threats and internal governance challenges that determine whether tactical victories lead to strategic transformations.

(Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons)