Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine has changed the European Union’s attitude towards the prospects of enlargement. While in previous years, European leaders remained skeptical about the EU’s absorption capacity and preferred to place aspiring members into the ‘neighbours category’

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The EU Enlargement test: Dilemmas of geopolitics, conditionality, and public concerns

Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine has changed the European Union’s attitude towards the prospects of enlargement. While in previous years, European leaders remained sceptical about the EU’s absorption capacity and preferred to place aspiring members into the ‘neighbours’ category’, suddenly they made the prospects of membership a step closer for Ukraine, Moldova, and Western Balkans. Amidst heated debates about its costs and benefits, EU enlargement has become a strategic imperative. Ahead of the publication of the European Commission’s annual Enlargement Package on October 29, the viability of this policy should be seen as a test of the Union’s credibility and its capacity to adapt in times of big shocks.

Revival of EU enlargement policy and its geopolitics/merit dilemma

The escalation of Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022 revived the role of the EU Enlargement policy as an important foreign policy tool. In the State of the Union speech in September 2025[1], President of the European Commission Ursula Von der Leyen called for the “next reunification of Europe” and described an enlarged Union with Ukraine, Moldova, and Western Balkans as “a security guarantee for all of us”.

Yet, the real prospects of this policy remain far from clear. Beyond a formally merit-based system guided by the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, enlargement also functions as a political tool. Historically, the decisions to enlarge were often driven by geopolitical and normative considerations, rather than pure fulfilment of EU criteria. Thus, the ‘big bang’ enlargements of 2004 and 2007 were primarily motivated by the geopolitical changes and aspirations to support democratic transition.

Today, in the presence of political and public hesitations about the inclusion of new members, the geopolitical-normative imperative to enlarge and the merit-based accession clash again. Current critiques of enlargement argue that a bigger and more diverse Union in times of crises is a big risk to take. An enlarged EU would prompt a rethink of the biggest budget lines, decision-making processes within the Union, and alter its borders. Referring to the experience of previous rounds of enlargement and democratic backsliding in Central Europe, there are calls for EU-level internal mechanisms that would allow to efficiently respond to attacks on basic democratic freedoms inside the Union. A significant internal reform would thus be needed, as rightly illustrated by President Costa’s proposal to allow a qualified majority voting (QMV) to open negotiation clusters with Ukraine and Moldova. While the Commission supports this approach, using QMV in parts of the enlargement process remains controversial and will require persuading Member States.

Others point to the domestic challenges in the candidate countries and the need to implement substantial political, economic and social reforms. The ongoing Russia aggression in the region and a number of unresolved conflicts add to this list. The case of Ukraine in particular is further complicated by reconstruction plans. Such reasoning suggests that already facing several crises, the EU should provide no geopolitical discount on accession and focus on internal reforms. The enlargement option should thus be kept ‘for better times’. Overall, there is no consensus on whether countries should negotiate and join one by one, or in small groups.

Why is enlargement not to be postponed?

However, while acknowledging the challenges and reforms needed, the EU should offer a credible accession perspective to its candidates. There are several reasons to suggest why the moment is ripe.

First, if, as Jean Monnet put it, Europe will be forged in crises, it is also true that the major crises affecting the EU and the world today demand its adaptation, flexibility, and change to address those crises and deliver to its citizens. While any crisis triggers a search for an inward-looking solution, present-day challenges are transnational and require innovative approaches built on cooperation and inclusion of external actors. EU enlargement today is thus not only about support for democratic transition, but a strategic investment into peace, prosperity, and freedom on the continent.

Second, it is a matter of EU credibility to not only reaffirm the right of its neighbours to choose alliances but to effectively act on this statement. The countries of Eastern Europe, in particular, have often been wrongly seen as either ‘Russia’s sphere of interest’ or a ‘buffer zone’. Russia’s military and hybrid aggressions against its neighbours demonstrate that such ‘grey zones’ are unstable and fail to sustain peace and stability. The EU still has room to strengthen its response to these conventional and hybrid threats. Working closely with neighbouring countries that have long faced such attacks is one of the most effective ways to do so. As security has become one of the EU citizens’ core concerns in the current geopolitical context, especially since Trump’s election, enlargement should be framed as a shared security imperative to strengthen public support for it.

Third, it is crucial not to overlook the role of public opinion in shaping the political feasibility of enlargement. The latest Eurobarometer (September 2025) shows that 56% of EU citizens support future enlargement and believe it will benefit their own country.[2] There is a growing consensus on enlargement across Member States that the EU should not only respect but also leverage. Citizens recognize the concrete benefits of enlargement, both within Europe, through a larger market and increased job opportunities, and globally, through greater geopolitical influence and solidarity. Enlargement offers an opportunity to reconnect the EU agenda with its citizens. To achieve this, the EU should reshape its narrative to emphasize the tangible benefits of enlargement for European societies and adopt strong communications strategies to convey this message effectively.

By countering disinformation, promoting enlargement as a shared European priority and integrating it into national conversations, the EU can enhance public support and engagement.

Finally, the current momentum is also favourable from a financial perspective, a key concern surrounding enlargement. The Commission’s proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), released this summer, clearly reflects this priority. Enlargement is featured as a central pillar of the Global Europe Instrument (GEI), accounting for 21% of its budget, or €43.1 billion[3]. This pillar covers all current and potential candidate countries[4], as well as Neighbourhood East partners[5], with funding allocated for pre-accession assistance, institutional support and internal EU preparations for future accessions. Additionally, a dedicated Ukraine Reserve of €100 billion has been proposed to support Ukraine’s reconstruction ant its path toward EU membership.

The inclusion of a revision clause—allowing the MFF to be adjusted if new members join during the 2028–2034 period—also sends a strong and encouraging signal to the candidate countries most advanced in the accession process. If enlargement is to remain a genuine EU priority, the final MFF, expected to be adopted by the end of 2027, must reflect that commitment.

As negotiations begin in the Council and the European Parliament, it is essential to equip policymakers with a clear understanding of the strategic and practical benefits of enlargement. Candidate countries, particularly those furthest advanced in meeting the accession criteria, have valuable contributions to offer and should not remain in the ‘waiting room’ of the EU. It is long overdue that the accession process develops in a mutually beneficial and forward-looking manner.

Conclusion

Enlargement has the potential to catalyse long-needed internal reforms in the EU and reinvigorate its citizens’ involvement in the European project. The costs of enlargement will be high. However, non-enlargement will likely be much costlier both for the future of the European project and for the accession candidates. The advancement of this policy has always depended on political will. The positive momentum for enlargement is still there: the EU initiated accession processes with Moldova and Ukraine, negotiations with Albania are underway. Enlargement is undeniably an investment, but one that promises substantial returns if managed effectively.

[1]  State of the Union Speech, President Ursula von der Leyen, September 2025,  https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en

[2] Eurobarometer, https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3413

[3] Factsheet on Enlargement, https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/budget/how-eu-budget-adopted_en

[4] Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine

[5] Armenia and Azerbaijan

(Photo credit: Bruno, Pixabay)