A European War

The longer Russia’s war against Ukraine has lasted, the more important it has become to the security of all of Europe. Ukraine is not a member of the EU or NATO (yet), but nevertheless the EU’s and NATO’s defensive perimeter is not the border between Poland and Ukraine

*******

A European War

The longer Russia’s war against Ukraine has lasted, the more important it has become to the security of all of Europe. Ukraine is not a member of the EU or NATO (yet), but nevertheless the EU’s and NATO’s defensive perimeter is not the border between Poland and Ukraine or between Romania and Moldova; it is the front between Ukraine and Russia.

The Russian Threat

The reason is that, if at war’s end, Russia’s inner conviction (not its public posture) is that it has won, it will not stop there. So much is clear from Russia’s own publicly available strategic documents: Moscow looks at all former Soviet republics the way it looks at Ukraine. For Russia, these are subordinate states that have escaped, and therefore must be enticed or coerced back into, its exclusive sphere of influence.

If Russia would ever come to the conclusion, therefore, that Europe allows it a free hand in Ukraine, it would undoubtedly step up its efforts against other states as well, by hybrid actions, if possible, but by military force if necessary. Moldova and Georgia, which have moved the furthest outside the Russian orbit, and are already the target of fierce hybrid campaigns, would certainly suffer an intensification of Russian pressure. And if, ultimately, Russia would conclude that not only does Europe not stand up for its partners, but that it is too intimidated to unite and fight even for itself, then Moscow might be tempted into direct aggression against EU and NATO countries. In Putin’s mind, the Baltic states, which had been forcibly annexed by the USSR, certainly also belong to Russia. Thus, Russian military expansionism must be halted now, in Ukraine, as far to the East as possible.

The American Challenge

Moreover, Ukraine now has a million men and women under arms, who count on the EU’s and NATO’s side in the balance of power with Russia. If Ukraine would be defeated, that million-strong army would drop out of the equation, and the balance of power would suddenly shift dramatically in Russia’s favour. All the more so because the American contribution to the collective defence of Europe has recently become doubtful. That is a result not only of the Trump administration’s desire that Europe takes ownership of its own conventional defence, but also of the fact that Trump only ever puts pressure on Ukraine, and never on Russia, to come to an agreement to end the war. For Trump, peace in Ukraine is not an end in itself, but a means to allow him to normalise relations with Putin. If it had been up to him, he would have surely long ago sacrificed half of Ukraine or more, witness his 28-point plan that entirely favoured Russia. Fortunately, Europe has sufficient leverage (sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine that Trump cannot concede away because he does not control them) to prevent Trump’s plan from being imposed on Kyiv. But because Trump’s strategic purpose is a deal with Russia, Europe must assume that this US administration will not go to war with Russia over Ukraine under any circumstances; while it cannot assume that Trump will continue to support Ukraine indefinitely.

Trump is not wrong per se to want to end the war, because Europe has nothing better to offer other than freezing the current frontline and turning it into the line of control (without legally recognising any annexation). Victory, understood as the liberation of all of Ukraine, is only possible if Russia implodes, but that is too unpredictable to serve as an assumption on which to base strategy. Or if the European members of NATO and the EU join the war, but they will not, because the point of halting (and weakening) Russia in Ukraine is precisely to deter Russia from starting a direct great power war; for Europe to start that war itself would go against the entire logic of its strategy of deterrence and defence. The challenge is to arrive at a settlement that would certainly not be fair (for it would leave twenty percent of Ukrainian territory under Russian occupation), but that should be durable, in the sense that it would not make Ukraine even more vulnerable but would deter a third Russian invasion.

European Determination

Putin holds the cards, to borrow Trump’s expression. Europe and the US cannot force him to negotiate in earnest. China could, by ending its economic relationship, but will not, for it sees Russia as an indispensable partner to counterbalance the US. For Beijing, Russia must not necessarily win, but it cannot be defeated. At the same time, China will never rupture its relations with Europe and the US for Russia’s sake, hence it cannot afford the war escalating into a great power war either, for then it could no longer pretend to be neutral. As long as Russia does not move in that direction, China will likely just maintain its current stance.

Putin could opt for a deal: he could consolidate his considerable territorial gains and, through normalisation of relations with the US, undo to some extent his ever-greater dependence on China. If agreement is reached, Europe must set the sovereign Ukraine that survives firmly on the path towards EU-membership. EU-membership is vital for Ukraine. This is a total war: if Russia wins, it will annex large parts of Ukraine and turn the remainder into a puppet state. If Ukraine survives, it is no longer viable as a buffer state in between the EU and Russia; it must join the Union. A sui generis formula may have to be found, allowing Ukraine to join the Union without immediately gaining decision-making powers and benefits in all policy areas. But one thing must be absolutely clear: whichever formula is chosen, the moment Ukraine joins the EU, Article 42.7 applies. An attack on any EU Member State is an attack on all.

If agreement is reached, therefore, Europe must provide a security guarantee to Ukraine. That means that if Russia violates the deal, Europe must join the war itself. Anything short of that cannot be called a security guarantee. A security guarantee can be a declaration: in March 1939 Britain and France guaranteed the security of Poland, and when Nazi Germany invaded, they declared war. But a declaratory guarantee is credible only if one’s past record is one of decisive action; such, unfortunately, is not Europe’s case. The Coalition of the Willing that is already preparing plans will have to pre-deploy land, naval, and air forces to Ukraine, therefore, to signal determination and strengthen deterrence. As stated above, given Trump’s strategy, Europe must assume that if Putin calls its bluff and attacks Ukraine, this administration will not join the war. Europe, including Ukraine, must prepare to fight the next conventional war alone.

Putin might also opt to continue the war, however. One can easily imagine how Trump, if the war continues, will find a reason to blame Zelensky: “I gave you a chance of peace, you didn’t take it, you’re on your own now”. Then only Europe would continue to support Ukraine, and Putin likely thinks that in that scenario he will prevail on the battlefield. I firmly believe that is wrong: with or without the US, with the support of Europe, Ukraine will hold the line. But the sad fact is that Trump’s one-sided messages may precisely encourage Putin to continue the fight.

The Russo-Ukrainian War already is a European war, because ultimately the security of the EU and of all European members of NATO is at stake. And whichever course the conflict takes, it will most likely be Europeans alone who will support, and possibly fight alongside, Ukraine. A big responsibility, but one that Europe can and must assume.

Prof. Dr Sven Biscop lectures at Ghent University and is the acting Director-General of Egmont.

(Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons)