Migration: Give the Pact a Chance

The European Asylum Agency’s organization of the first State of Asylum Conference in Malta on 18 June and the Commission’s publication on 11 June of the ‘State of play on the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum’ provided an opportunity to take stock halfway

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Migration: Give the Pact a Chance

The European Asylum Agency’s organization of the first State of Asylum Conference in Malta on 18 June 2025 and the Commission’s publication on 11 June 2025 of the ‘State of play on the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum’ provided an opportunity to take stock halfway between the adoption of the latter in June 2024 and its planned implementation two years later.

The tone of the assessment is well summarized in President von der Leyen’s letter to the European Council in June: ‘considerable progress has already been made at national and EU level’ but ‘much work still lies ahead for the new rules to be applied fully in one year’s time’.

It Is complicated

The aim here is not to go into the details of such an assessment, but rather to draw some lessons from it about how this high-risk governance exercise is unfolding and about the chances of success for this reform of European policy, which is unprecedented in terms of its scope, in this area.

The operationalization of a European framework is always a delicate operation, requiring effective coordination between European and national authorities, and cases of delivery gaps, with the resulting disappointment and tensions, are not uncommon. The risk is even bigger when the exercise is not merely normative but involves the mobilization of significant human, financial and technological resources and the establishment of new infrastructure, which is indeed the case here.

All hands-on deck?

The Commission remains fully committed to this cause, as evidenced by the significant financial resources it has made available. However, the question arises as to whether it has the necessary capacity to shoulder its heavy responsibilities, even with the support of agencies such as the European Asylum Agency.

On the part of Member States, political will and mutual trust will be crucial in addressing these challenges. And there is room for doubt.

Without even referring to the position of those who, from the outset, indicated that they would not play along, it is clear that, for some, the determination that had led to the search for an agreement on the pact at all costs now seems to be lacking, no doubt due to the change in government teams that has taken place in the meantime. And the cascade of internal border controls, even if it can be explained as a knee-jerk response to internal debates fuelled by populist groups, when the pact will only take effect in June 2026, is a worrying indicator of the level of mistrust that had already paralyzed the implementation of existing measures.

Very quickly, voices were raised to point out that the pact did not go far enough and that innovative solutions needed to be found. A more determined approach to relations with third countries of origin and transit was called for, and multiple steps were taken in this direction. Coalitions were formed and consolidated, notably through regular meetings prior to each European Council meeting.

The Commission responded to these requests by supplementing the pact with initiatives on returns, safe countries of origin, and safe third countries. And the bulk of the letter from the President to the June 2025 European Council summarizes the many steps taken with regard to countries of North Africa and the Middle East.

However, the recipients of this information, namely the Heads of State and Government, seem to have kept a cool head, contenting themselves with adopting conclusions that border on the banal, since they are limited to recalling previous conclusions, taking stock of progress in their implementation and encouraging an intensification of work, without launching into a barrage of new demands.

The question arises, in any case, as to whether the diplomatic frenzy deployed by some and the separate caucuses led by others should be seen as contributions to the rapid progress of a common agenda, or as unnecessary distractions from the enormous challenges involved in implementing the pact, or even as indicators of limited commitment to it. Similarly, is the proliferation of the Commission’s ‘post-pactum’ initiatives not likely to create new institutional tensions on sensitive issues and to overload the agenda of the national services responsible for implementing them once they have been adopted?

The break-or-deal moment

In any case, the answer will come at the end of the year when the complex solidarity mechanism provided for in the regulation on asylum and migration management is activated for the first time. From mid-October onwards, on the initiative of the Commission, a procedure should be launched to determine, in simple terms, the beneficiaries and net contributors of a form of solidarity that is described as mandatory but flexible: the final decision-making power will lie with the Council, with no involvement whatsoever of the European Parliament. This looks like a minefield: very technical but also affected by numerous areas of uncertainty, this mechanism will only be able to function thanks to a high level of trust between all Member States and between them and the Commission. Otherwise, the ‘solidarity’ pillar of the pact will collapse, and with it the entire edifice which is based on striking a balance between solidarity and responsibility.

The forgotten protection crisis

But behind this governance challenge lies another fundamental issue, that of compliance with international protection obligations and the European Union’s posture in this regard. Apparently deaf to this question, Member States remain focused on the dual imperative of control and return. Under the guise of a desire to better control irregular immigration, there has been a proliferation of national practices and regulations, some of which have been validated by the Commission, which may appear to be restrictions on the fundamental right to seek asylum. Clearly, the delicate balance between controlling access to the territory, which is the prerogative of any sovereign state, and the obligation to deal with protection needs, in accordance with fundamental principles of international law, is shifting notwithstanding the Pact’s purported ambition to consolidate such a balance. And the movement is accelerating even though, on the one hand, statistics on irregular border crossings, although they must be viewed with caution, are steadily declining and, on the other hand, the number of forced displacements worldwide has been dramatically increasing in recent decades.

And in the end…

The coming months will therefore be crucial for the future of the common immigration and asylum policy as set out in the Treaty of Lisbon.

Ambitions should not be exaggerated. The June 2026 deadline should not be seen as the date for full implementation of the pact, down to the smallest detail, given the ambition of the project and the technical difficulties involved in its implementation, regardless of any political will. It should be rather understood as a milestone, a moment when it will be recognized that a critical threshold has been crossed, confirming the relevance of the model and consolidating the prospect of its completion.

However, the risks of failure are real, and the consequences would be dramatic.

A breakdown in solidarity would pose an existential threat to the future of the Schengen area of free movement: internal border controls would cease to be a sporadic exercise in muscle-flexing and become a structural manifestation of the mistrust that is undermining this fundamental achievement of the European Union.

But the repercussions would not stop at the Union’s borders. While the pact had already been viewed with great mistrust outside the Union, partly because of the triumphalism surrounding its adoption, its collapse would only increase the feeling that the European Union is making third countries pay the price for its inability to get its own house in order. This will only add to the devastating effect of paralysis in the face of the human tragedy in Gaza and the drastic reduction in resources dedicated to development aid, not to mention the conditionality now openly displayed in the proposal establishing the Global Europe instrument as part of the next multi-annual financial framework.

The conclusion is obvious.

The pact is far from being a model of simplicity, and the philosophy behind it is open to debate. However, in the toxic and cacophonous context surrounding the very natural phenomenon of migration today, it may be the last bastion of a certain rationality, provided that it is applied in its entirety. A deadlock would not lead to a vacuum, as all the provisions constituting the current framework would continue to apply. But its political consequences would be devastating at a time when the European Union is perhaps not at its best and must find its place in a changing world.

It would be very easy to say that there is no alternative. But the question remains: what alternative do we have?

(Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons)