Cross-Strait Tensions in 2025: Why Escalation Remains Unlikely

Cross-Strait relations, the complex ties across the Taiwan Strait between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan (officially the Republic of China, ROC), have remained tense since Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) assumed the presidency in May 2024.

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Cross-Strait Tensions in 2025: Why Escalation Remains Unlikely

Cross-Strait relations, the complex ties across the Taiwan Strait between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan (officially the Republic of China, ROC), have remained tense since Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), part of the Taiwanese nationalist “Pan-Green” coalition, assumed the presidency in May 2024. Even as the China-friendly “Pan-Blue” opposition camp, led by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), secured a majority in the Legislative Yuan, Beijing has maintained a hardline stance toward what it views as a “renegade province.” Meanwhile, US support for Taipei has grown increasingly uncertain under the ever-volatile Trump II administration. For now, however, cross-Strait escalation still appears unlikely.

Enduring Domestic Turbulence in Taiwan

In the wake of the January 2024 Taiwanese general elections, legislative gridlock has been increasingly common, accompanied by heightened political and societal polarization. The opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan has pursued a series of contentious reforms designed to expand its oversight powers, enhancing its capacity to summon officials, demand documents, and sanction noncompliance. While these initiatives have somewhat shifted the institutional balance toward the legislature, their practical impact has been constrained by constitutional challenges and public opposition. In response, Lai Ching-te has sought to consolidate executive authority through the assertive use of presidential powers (e.g., through special budgets) and strategic appeals to public opinion (e.g., through the ultimately aborted “Ten Lectures on National Unity”), framing the KMT-led legislature as an obstruction to effective governance.

In response to the alleged legislative obstruction, Taiwan’s “Great Recall” (Da Bamian) campaign in the summer of 2025 sought to remove dozens of KMT lawmakers accused of excessively blocking the executive’s agenda. All efforts failed due to low turnout and (often substantial) majorities of “no” votes. Beyond underscoring Lai’s weakening position – with approval ratings dipping from over 50 percent to somewhere between 30 and 40 percent depending on the poll – the failed recalls reinforced the KMT-led opposition’s (perceived) legislative strength.

That is not to suggest the KMT is entirely unified. Beyond its reliance on support from its ally, the populist Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) – which, with its eight seats, effectively holds the balance of power in the Legislative Yuan – the KMT has also faced internal challenges. The resignation of longtime party chair Eric Chu, a moderate establishment figure who sought to bridge the party’s often fractious pro- and (somewhat) more China-skeptical factions, precipitated a leadership contest. In that race, former Executive Yuan spokesperson (and, until 2002, DPP member!) Cheng Li-wun emerged as a ‘Deep Blue’ dark horse. Cheng advocated reduced defense spending, voiced doubts about the DPP’s (over)reliance on Washington, and signaled a readiness to pursue deeper political and economic engagement with Mainland China. Despite facing a well-established opponent in Hau Lung-pin, who pledged not to be a “CCP bootlicker” and drew on the extensive intraparty connections of his late father, General and former Premier Hau Pei-tsun, Cheng’s position on cross-Strait relations resonated strongly with the KMT’s pro-CCP constituency. Cheng ultimately prevailed over Hau, securing 50 percent of the vote to Hau’s 36 percent.

It remains to be seen whether Cheng, who already sparked considerable controversy in a boisterous Deutsche Welle interview by claiming that Vladimir Putin is a “democratically elected leader” and that NATO bears principle responsibility for the war in Ukraine, can unify the opposition. The answer is likely “no,” as several KMT establishment figures accused Beijing of favoring Cheng’s candidacy and astroturfing online support. A repeat of the fate of former ‘Deep Blue’ KMT chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu, who was replaced on the 2016 presidential ballot by Eric Chu after proving electorally unviable, cannot be ruled out.

Beijing Has Reason to Smile

Beijing has done little to dispel its clear preference for Cheng Li-wun, as it immediately sent the new KMT chairwoman a cordial congratulatory telegram, stressing the importance of pursuing cross-Strait unification. While stopping short of endorsing this stance, which has very little support in contemporary Taiwanese society, Cheng noted in her response that she viewed both sides of the Taiwan Strait as “sons and daughters of [legendary Chinese] emperors Yan and Huang.” This is likely to reassure Beijing that Cheng could foster more favorable political sentiment after 2028, or, at the very least, serve as a useful tool to pressure Lai Ching-te and the DPP. Cheng immediately commenced on this quest, urging the DPP to stop playing the ‘[anti-]China card.’

The DPP has little incentive in doing so, however. In its recent messaging, Beijing continued to emphasize the One Country, Two Systems formula, asserting that only “patriots” (aiguozhe) could govern a future semi-autonomous Taiwan under PRC control – essentially mirroring the Hong Kong and Macau model. This approach exhibits significantly less flexibility than when the framework was first introduced in the early 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping explicitly promised Taiwan greater autonomy than what was granted to the two city-states. Moreover, recent CCP discourse suggests that long-circulating rumors of an impending “upgrade” to the framework – which has consistently registered marginal support in Taiwan for the last few decades – have not, at least thus far, materialized.

There is also little evidence of any willingness in Beijing to “let bygones be bygones” – for instance, by extending amnesty offers to the DPP. On the contrary, its outreach to Taipei has been accompanied by mounting legal threats against pro-independence figures, including Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim. Beijing’s recent designation of October 25 as “Taiwan Retrocession Remembrance Day” (Taiwan guangfu jinianri), commemorating the 1945 transfer of Taiwan from Japan to the KMT(!)-led ROC, further reinforces this uncompromising stance. Lai and Hsiao therefore have very little incentive to reciprocate.

An Ever-Wavering Washington 

Although US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told his Chinese counterpart Dong Jun in late October that the US would “stoutly defend” its interests, including Taiwan and the South China Sea, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed that Taiwan would not be used as a bargaining chip in Washington-Beijing negotiations (a pledge that so far appears to have held), signals from the Trump II administration are not uniformly favorable for Taipei. Notably, earlier this year, Lai Ching-te allegedly was denied a US stopover – a long-standing litmus test of Washington’s goodwill.

It nonetheless remains uncertain which “side” the US will favor in the coming years. Should Washington continue to prioritize strengthening Taiwan’s defense capabilities and maintaining a confrontational posture toward Beijing, it will likely sustain its support for Lai and the DPP. Consistent with Trump’s expectations, Lai has strongly advocated for increased defense spending. Taiwan’s 2026 defense budget is set at 3.3 percent of GDP – a significant increase from the sub-2-percent levels of the 2010s – yet still falls short of the 5 percent NATO benchmark that Lai aims to reach by 2030, let alone the 10 percent target reportedly favored by some in the Trump II administration.

Conversely, if Washington opts to pursue more cordial cross-Strait relations, potentially in conjunction with a long-sought grand trade agreement with Beijing, it may be inclined to support more China-friendly forces in Taiwan that endorse the embattled 1992 Consensus. This view was also controversially advanced in a recent Time op-ed, which characterized Lai as “reckless” for refusing to do so. Nevertheless, given the highly pro-Taiwan composition of the US Congress, where resolutions supporting Taipei remain among the few near-unanimous bipartisan initiatives under Trump II, “sacrificing Taiwan” in the interest of improved relations with Beijing appears highly improbable.

Escalation? The Stakes (Thankfully) Remain too High 

Lai Ching-te is unlikely to be(come) sufficiently “reckless” to unilaterally trigger escalation. So far, he has stayed within the ROC’s constitutional framework – albeit pragmatically, using it to justify actions such as defending the aforementioned recall votes. Currently, Lai appears more likely to alienate his (often left-leaning) core supporters through overt pro-US gestures, such as praising Israel and its defense systems, than to venture into ‘Deep Green’ territory by pursuing de jure independence and risking it all.

Provided that Lai indeed refrains from such actions, Beijing is likewise unlikely to escalate. While the PLA’s capabilities are undoubtedly expanding, its command structure remains unsettled following renewed purges, and the risks of unilateral escalation remain prohibitively high: potential US (or even Japanese) intervention (in November, Trump personally claimed Xi “knew the consequences [of an attack]”); wider regional fallout, particularly in Southeast Asia; economic decoupling from much of the EU; total disruption of the global microchip supply chain; and damage to Chinese coastal cities from Taiwan’s missile capabilities – among other consequences.

Moreover, any unilateral escalation would be difficult to justify after years of Beijing’s assurances that the Taiwan issue should be resolved peacefully, as “Chinese do not fight against other Chinese” (Zhongguoren bu da Zhongguoren). Although Xi Jinping has consistently reiterated that the option of using force will not be renounced, it is evident that such a contingency is reserved for a formal declaration of independence. For all the nationalist rhetoric, Beijing’s cost-benefit calculus still favors restraint. The more realistic danger lies not in a deliberate war but in accidental escalation; a miscalculation, military mishap, or coercive “grey zone” operation that spirals unintentionally.

What about Brussels?

While not a principal stakeholder, Europe nonetheless has a meaningful role to play in averting such an outcome. To help prevent escalation, the EU should focus on preserving and normalizing the cross-Strait status quo that the vast majority of Taiwanese support. Rather than pushing Taipei toward symbolic assertions of de jure sovereignty or provoking Beijing into overreaction – risks often heightened by high-profile parliamentary delegations that offer little of substance – the EU can act as a stabilizing force by quietly but consistently strengthening Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty: expanding trade ties, supporting democratic governance, and deepening cooperation in critical technologies. At the same time, by upholding a red line on Taiwanese independence consistent with “its ‘One China’ policy,” maintaining dialogue with Beijing, and emphasizing the shared economic fallout of conflict, the EU can reinforce deterrence while avoiding provocation. After all, Brussels’ greatest strength lies not in taking sides across the Strait, but in helping ensure there are still two sides left to talk.

Dr. Jasper Roctus is a Senior Associate Fellow at the Egmont Institute, where he focuses on domestic Chinese politics and cross-Strait relations, occasionally branching into Vietnamese politics. In September 2025, he earned his PhD in Sinology from Ghent University within the “East Asian Culture in Perspective: Identity, Historical Consciousness, Modernity” research group, examining evolving narratives surrounding Sun Yat-sen.

(Photo credit: Wikimedia Commons)